The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DAVID LEE HARMON,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:20-cv-165-FtM-29MRM
SEAN LUX, Assistant State
Attorney and STATE ATTORNEYS
OFFICE,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter comes before the Court on initial review of the
file. Plaintiff David Lee Harmon, who is confined in the Charlotte
County Jail, filed a Civil Rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Doc. #1, Complaint). The Complaint names Sean Lux, an Assistant
State Attorney and the State Attorney’s Office as the defendants.
(Id. at 3). The Complaint brings claims for “reckless
endangerment, deliberate indifference, negligent infliction of
emotional distress,” and various negligence claims. (Id. at 5).
In support, Harmon states he was injured in an automobile accident
in March and was informed by the jail medical provider and his
public defender that “[he] was put in for a medical bond” but “Mr.
Lux never let the judge know.” (Id. at 5-6). Harmon claims
because Lux failed to advise the judge of his medical bond, he was
“involved in an accident on the day of his surgery, and hurt the
next day by a deputy.” (Id.at 6). As relief, Harmon seeks monetary
relief and punitive damages. (Id. at 7).
The Prison Litigation Reform permits a court to sua sponte
dismiss a prisoner’s complaint before service. 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(a). Grounds which warrant a sua sponte dismissal include a
finding that the complaint is frivolous, malicious, seeks monetary
damages from a defendant immune from monetary relief, or fails to
state acclaim upon which relief can be granted. Id., §
1915((b)(1)&(2). A claim is frivolous where it is apparent from
the face of the complaint the allegations are “clearly baseless”
or the “legal theories are indisputable meritless.” Carroll v.
Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A claim is also
frivolous as a matter of law where the defendant is immune from
suit. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
To the extent discernable, Harmon attributes liability to Lux
for Lux’s alleged failure to advise the state court of Harmon’s
application for a medical bond, or Lux’s opposition to Harmon’s
release on a medical bond given the fact that Harmon acknowledges
his public defender knew about the application. Harmon faults Lux
for injuries he sustained when he was injured in an accident while
being transported for surgery. Liberally construed, the Complaint
suggests that Lux’s actions denied, delayed or interfered with
Harmon’s medical care in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments.1
Prosecutors have absolute immunity from § 1983 actions that
arise from the prosecutor’s conduct “intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman,
424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Absolute immunity applies to a
prosecutor's actions undertaken as an advocate for the State.
Hart v. Hodges, 587 F.3d 1288, 1295 (11th Cir. 2009). Activities
as an advocate include initiating and presenting the State’s case
in a judicial proceeding. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
269-70 (1993). This function encompasses a wide range of conduct
including illegal and unconstitutional conduct, such as “filing an
information without investigation, filing charges without
jurisdiction, filing a baseless detainer, offering perjured
testimony, suppressing exculpatory evidence, refusing to
investigate complaints about the prison system, and threatening
further criminal prosecutions.” Hart, 587 F.3d at 1295 (quoting
Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir. 1979)). Harmon
attributes liability to Lux on the basis Lux failed to advise the
state court of his application for medical release or opposed the
same. The Eleventh Circuit in Hart clarifies that when acting as
an advocate “the absolute immunity doctrine has evolved such that
1 Plaintiff appears to be a pre-trial detainee.
even wrongful or malicious acts by prosecutors are allowed to go
unredressed.” Id., 587 F.3d at 1298. Actions taken in connection
with bail applications are prosecutorial and protected by absolute
immunity. Pinaud v. County of Suffolk, 52 F.3d 1139, 1149 (2d
Cir. 1995). The Court finds the act upon which Harmon premises
his claim was an act undertaken within Lux’s function as an
advocate for which Lux has absolute immunity from suit. See
Spano v. Satz, No. 09-60255-CIV, 2011 WL 1303147, at *6 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 31, 2011)(finding state prosecutor has absolute immunity
regarding inmate’s claim that prosecutor denied request for
medical bond).
Alternatively, the Eight Amendment establishes that “prison
officials may have a duty to porrect the health and safety of
inmates in their custody, but that duty does not extend to
prosecutors.” Spano (quoting Romer v. Morgenthau, 119 F. Supp.
2d 346, 362-63 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also Morris v. Doyle, 2010 WL
2326042 *7 (E.D. Missouri June 8, 2010)(“it is the responsibility
of prison officials to protect inmates from harm, not that of state
prosecutors or investigators.”). Thus, Harmon cannot state an
Eighth Amendment claim against Lux related to his medical care or
the harm from a deputy he allegedly suffered while in jail.
Assuming Harmon has a viable state common law negligence
claim against Lux, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over this claim and dismisses any state law claims
without prejudice. 28 U.S.C. §1367(c).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. #1) predicated upon § 1983 is
dismissed with prejudice under § 1915A(b)(1)&(2).
2. The Court dismisses without prejudice any state law claims.
3. The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions,
enter judgment, and close this file.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 15th day
of April, 2020.
\ Yo me Ap f
VAY ee DH
E. STEELE
3q IOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
SA: FTMP-1
Copies:
Counsel of Record