Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court “cannot review state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”
How later courts described this case
- Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a district court “cannot review state court final judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”
- “[W]hen a plaintiff fails to establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a court does not need to even consider the remaining three prerequisites of a preliminary injunction [or temporary restraining order].” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
L. YVONNE BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 2:19-cv-739-FtM-29MRM
FORT MYERS REEF
ACQUISITIONS, LLC, COASTAL
RIDGE MANAGEMENT, LLC, STACY
HESS, individually and in
official capacity, and
CARMINE MARCENO,
individually and in official
capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff’s Third
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. #13) filed on
February 27, 2020. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s
request for a temporary restraining order is denied.
I.
Plaintiff filed a First Amended Original Complaint (Doc. #12)
(Amended Complaint) on February 27, 2020. The Amended Complaint
asserts claims against defendants for breach of contract,
violation of the Fair Housing Act, “violation of [] constitutional
rights,” “discrimination,” “pain and suffering,” “harassment,” and
injunctive relief. (Doc. #12, pp. 11-18.)
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Fort Myers Reef
Acquisitions, LLC (The Reef) wrongfully evicted her from her
apartment at the Reef Apartments in Estero, Florida. Plaintiff
asserts that “[o]n June 27, 2019, The Reef filed a false eviction
proceeding against [plaintiff]” in the County Court of the
Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Lee County Florida, and the
state trial court entered an order granting possession of the
apartment to The Reef on September 27, 2019. (Doc. #12, ¶¶ 8,
30.) Plaintiff contends that the state trial court’s order is
“void, invalid, unenforceable, and improper” because The Reef’s
eviction lawsuit related to an expired lease agreement, and not
her current lease agreement. (Id. ¶ 9.)
Plaintiff filed two previous requests for a temporary
restraining order (Docs. ##3, 8) on October 10, 2019 and November
6, 2019. In them, Plaintiff moved the Court to find the state
trial court’s eviction order “moot” and “wholly void” because that
order did not relate to plaintiff’s current lease agreement.
(Doc. #3, p. 6; Doc. #8, p. 1.) The Court denied plaintiff’s
motions because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over such a
request under the Rooker-Feldman1 doctrine. (Docs. ##7, 10.)
In the instant motion, plaintiff similarly argues that the
state trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order against
1 Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
plaintiff in the underlying eviction lawsuit. (Doc. #13, p. 4.)
Plaintiff reasons that the state trial court’s order was “moot,
void, and unenforceable” because it applied to an expired lease
agreement. (Id. p. 1.) Plaintiff thus requests that the Court
issue a temporary restraining order permitting plaintiff “to
resume her right to possession under the new lease . . . .” (Id.
p. 4.)
II.
To be entitled to a temporary restraining order, a movant
must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) that irreparable injury will be suffered if the relief
is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm
the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of
the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex rel.
Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir.
2005)(citation omitted). Like the previous motions seeking a
temporary restraining order, plaintiff has entirely failed to
address whether, and why, she is substantially likely to succeed
on the merits. This deficiency thus warrants denial of
plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order. See
Pittman v. Cole, 267 F.3d 1269, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001)(“[W]hen a
plaintiff fails to establish a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits, a court does not need to even consider the remaining
three prerequisites of a preliminary injunction [or temporary
restraining order].” (citations omitted)). Plaintiff has also
failed to set forth a new basis for her entitlement to a temporary
restraining order, as she simply reargues the same points made in
her previously denied motions.
In addition, as the Court noted in its previous Opinion and
Order, the Court is aware of no legal basis – and plaintiff cites
to none – establishing that the Court has the authority to preclude
enforcement of the state trial court’s order under these
circumstances. To the extent plaintiff requests the Court to
reverse the state trial court’s ruling, the Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to review the state court’s findings under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)(Under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, a district court “cannot review state court final
judgments because that task is reserved for state appellate courts
or, as a last resort, the United States Supreme Court.”).
Plaintiff’s request for a temporary restraining order is therefore
denied.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
Plaintiff’s Third Application for Temporary Restraining Order
(Doc. #13) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 28th day of
February, 2020.
Z tkicob
JOHN E. STEELE
SHMIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies:
Parties and Counsel of Record