The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
ORLANDO DIVISION
STEPHAN KENT STUCKEY,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No: 6:19-cv-1271-Orl-31GJK
L. BEDDARD, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on initial review of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amended Civil
Rights Complaint (“Fourth Amended Complaint,” Doc. 21). Plaintiff, who is incarcerated
at the John E. Polk Correctional Facility and proceeding pro se, filed the Fourth Amended
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 5, 2019, Defendant A. Jones “had the Plaintiff placed
in segregated confinement” and that her reasons for doing so were a “pure work of
fiction.” (Doc. 21 at 6). While in segregated confinement, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Jones denied him the ability to communicate with “outside individuals” and to have
access to public records. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants L. Bedard. L. Howard,
and C. Williams “were complicit with and assisted A. Jones . . . .” (Id.).
1 Pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, the Fourth Amended Complaint is deemed to
have been filed in response to the Court’s Order of August 15, 2019. (Doc. 22 at 6).
Plaintiff states that, on June 20, 2019, Defendant Jones “amended” her reasons for
placing Plaintiff in segregated confinement but that those reasons were unsubstantiated
and “refuted by the records.” (Id. at 10). On July 3, 2019, Plaintiff was served with “a DR
after spending [a] month in [segregated] confinement.” (Id. at 15). Plaintiff “appealed
the DR to Captain L. Howard,” but the appeal was denied. (Id. at 17).
On July 8, 2019, “all forms of communication were severed by A. Jones.” (Id.). Plaintiff
claims that the disciplinary report “violated due process of law” and was untimely
because it was issued “18 days after the lawful window to write a DR had slammed shut.”
(Id. at 16).
Plaintiff seeks damages for being “wrongfully confined,” and he requests that
Defendants be required “to complete at least a 40-hour training course on professional
responsibility,” that Defendants “be retrained for their positions,” and that Defendants
be placed “on probation.” (Id. at 18). Plaintiff also seeks an order removing Defendant
Jones from her current position and placing her on suspension for sixty days. (Id.). In
addition, Plaintiff requests that Defendants return to him “all the time which was
unconstitutionally taken from him.” (Id.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Plaintiff seeks redress from a governmental entity or employee, and, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. section 1915A(a), the Court is obligated to screen such a prisoner civil rights
complaint as soon as practicable. On review, the Court is required to dismiss the
complaint (or any portion thereof) under the following circumstances:
2
(b) Grounds for Dismissal.--On review, the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the
complaint, if the complaint--
(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted; or
(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief.
28 U.S.C. §1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (“[n]otwithstanding any filing fee,
or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any
time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is frivolous or malicious.”).2
Additionally, the Court must read a plaintiff's pro se allegations in a liberal fashion.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) a violation
of a constitutional right, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
acting under color of state law.” Holmes v. Crosby, 418 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2005).
III. ANALYSIS
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court held that claims for
damages arising from challenges to the legality of a prisoner's confinement are not
cognizable in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “unless and until the conviction or sentence is
reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus”
2“A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable merit either in law or in fact.” Bilal
v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001).
3
and complaints containing such claims must therefore be dismissed. Id. 489–90.
Moreover, a state prisoner's “claim for declaratory relief and money damages, . . . that
necessarily imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed [in a disciplinary proceeding,
including a loss of good-time credits], is not cognizable under § 1983 . . .“ unless the
prisoner demonstrates that the challenged action has previously been invalidated.
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997). Thus, the Heck analysis is applied to actions
brought by prisoners who are challenging disciplinary proceedings. Roberts v. Wilson,
259 F. App'x 226, 228 (11th Cir. 2007).
In the present case, Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of due process with
regard to the issuance of the disciplinary report and that the disciplinary action against
him was based on fraudulent allegations. He seeks damages for the punishment that was
imposed on him in the disciplinary proceeding as well as the return of “all the time which
was unconstitutionally taken from him. (Doc. 1 at 18). Plaintiff’s basis for this action is
intertwined with the facts upon which the disciplinary action is based.
However, Plaintiff has never had the disciplinary adjudication invalidated.
Therefore, his § 1983 action is not cognizable in light of Heck and Balisok. See Wade v.
Carmen, No. 2:11-CV-391-FTM-29, 2011 WL 6181467, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2011) (“a
claim challenging unlawful conduct leading to an unconstitutional conviction, including
administrative action while in prison, cannot proceed unless the plaintiff shows that the
challenged conviction was reversed, expunged or otherwise invalidated as required by
the Heck standard.”). The Complaint, therefore, is dismissed without prejudice.
4
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. This case is DISMISSED.
2. Plaintiff's Motions to Appoint Counsel (Doc. Nos. 5, 20) are DENIED.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Subpoena (Doc. 19) is DENIED.
4, Plaintiff's Written Objections (Doc. 22) to Magistrate Judge Kelly’s Orders
of July 15, 2019 (Doc. 3), July 23, 2019 (Doc. 8), July 25, 2019 (Doc. 11), and August 1, 2019
(Doc. 13) are OVERRULED. Pursuant to Rule 72(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court must consider the “objections and modify or set aside any part of
the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that the Magistrate Judge’s Orders were clearly erroneous or contrary to the
law.
5. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Orlando, Florida on September 5, 2019.
® is
GREGORY A. PRESNELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies furnished to:
Unrepresented Party
OrlP-2 9/5