Goode v. Canedo

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 BENJAMIN DENNIS GOODE, Case No.: 21-CV-2054-GPC

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

13 v. MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE

PLEADINGS

14 J. CANEDO,

[ECF No. 62]

15 Defendant.

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17 I. INTRODUCTION

18 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. For

19 the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

20 II. BACKGROUND

21 Plaintiff brings an Eighth Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1.

22 He alleges his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Defendant forced him to

23 quarantine with thirty to forty COVID-19 positive inmates. ECF No. 61 at 2. Plaintiff

24 argues that Defendant ordered this quarantine despite Plaintiff explaining that his most

25 recent COVID-19 test was negative. Id. After one night in quarantine, Plaintiff was

26 moved to isolation. Id. He remained in isolation for 56 days. Id. at 6. Plaintiff’s

27 complaint alleges PTSD, sleep deprivation, and drastic weight gain because of this

28 isolation. Id. at 2.

1 Defendant subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings, challenging

2 Plaintiff’s complaint on two grounds. ECF No. 50 at 1. First, Defendant argued that

3 Plaintiff’s alleged physical injury, drastic weight gain, is not greater than de minimis. Id.

4 at 5. Second, Defendant argued that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate that his 56-day

5 quarantine caused any such injury. Id. The Court denied Defendant’s motion, finding

6 that Plaintiff’s pleadings sufficiently demonstrated both injury and causation. ECF No.

7 61. Plaintiff now moves the Court for judgment on the pleadings.

8 III. LEGAL STANDARD

9 A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be brought, “after pleadings are

10 closed—but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P 12(c). When considering a

11 motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court “must accept all factual allegations in the

12 complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.”

13 Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d

14 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). The movant is entitled to judgment only where it has been

15 “clearly established on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to

16 be resolved.” Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner and Co, Inc., 896 F.2d 1542,

17 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). An “analysis under Rule 12(c) is ‘substantially identical’ to

18 analysis under Rule 12(b)(6) because, under both rules, ‘a court must determine whether

19 the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the plaintiff to a legal remedy.’”

20 Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Brooks v. Dunlop

21 Mfg. Inc., No. C 10-04341, WL 6140912 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2011)).

22 IV. DISCUSSION

23 Plaintiff argues that the Court’s prior order, denying Defendant’s motion for

24 judgment on the pleadings, entitles him to relief. Specifically, Plaintiff contends the

25 order establishes three findings: (1) Plaintiff affirmatively and validly demonstrated all

26 elements of an Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983; (2) his alleged physical injury is

27 “more than de minimis”; and (3) “Defendant caused this injury.” ECF No. 62 at 3–4.

28 These findings, Plaintiff argues, led the Court to “draw all reasonable inferences” in his

1 favor. Id. at 4. Thus, Plaintiff interprets the order as corroborating the underlying merits

2 of his Eighth Amendment claim. See id. (“Plaintiff concurs with the advisement”).

3 Plaintiff argues that with no “further issues raised by the Defendant’s counsel,” he is

4 entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.

5 Plaintiff interpretation of the Court’s previous order is misguided. See ECF No.

6 61. In assessing Plaintiff’s claim, the Court did not substantiate his alleged Eighth

7 Amendment violation. Rather, the Court considered only whether Plaintiff pleaded

8 sufficient facts to state a viable claim. See Chavez, 683 F.3d at 1108 (holding “a court

9 must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true, entitle the

10 plaintiff to a legal remedy”). The Court’s order established only two preliminary

11 findings. First, Plaintiff’s drastic weight gain, as pled, was greater than de minimis. ECF

12 No. 61 at 5. Second, it was plausible that Defendant’s isolation of Plaintiff for 56-days

13 caused this injury. Id. at 6. Neither finding affirmed that an Eighth Amendment

14 violation had occurred as a matter of law. Instead, the order concluded only that

15 Plaintiff’s claim was sufficient to withstand Defendant’s motion for judgment on the

16 pleadings. Plaintiff’s reliance on the order for anything more than that must fail.

17 Plaintiff also misunderstands why the Court drew all reasonable inferences in his

18 favor. The Court’s decision to do so was not predicated on the strength of the alleged

19 facts nor the merits of the claim. Rather, the Court was obligated to do so on account of

20 Plaintiff being the non-moving party. See Fleming, 581 F.3d at 925 (holding a court must

21 construe all factual evidence as true and “in the light most favorable to the non-moving

22 party). Thus, the Court drew all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor in accordance

23 with the standard governing the motion. Because Plaintiff is now the moving party, the

24 Court no longer considers his pleadings with such deference.

25 Lastly, Plaintiff perceives the lack of “further issues raised by the Defense’s

26 counsel” as supporting his claim for judgement. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that

27 Defendant’s failure to respond to this Court’s order on Defendant’s Motion for Judgment

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1 on the Pleadings, ECF No. 61, requires the Court to grant his motion in the “interest of

2 judicial economy.” ECF No. 62 at 4. However, this is incorrect for two reasons.

3 First, Defendant was under no obligation to raise any additional issues in response

4 to the Court’s previous order. The Court’s order considered the merits of Defendant’s

5 motion. With the merits of the motion resolved, the motion was no longer in

6 adjudication. See Gorromeo v. Zachares, 15 Fed. Appx. 555, 556 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

7 denial of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is not ordinarily appealable . . . .”).

8 Therefore, any response from the Defendant was unnecessary, as consideration of his

9 claim was complete.

10 Second, Plaintiff fails to account for the existing affirmative defenses raised by the

11 Defendant’s answer. See ECF No. 21. A “plaintiff is not entitled to judgment on the

12 pleadings when the answer raises issues of fact that, if proved, would defeat recovery.”

13 Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. Seventh-Day Adventist

14 Congressional Church, 887 F.2d 228, 230 (9th Cir. 1989). Defendant’s answer to

15 Plaintiff’s amended complaint included five affirmative defenses: (1) Plaintiff has failed

16 to exhaust all available administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act;

17 (2) Plaintiff fails to state an actual injury; (3) the doctrine of unclean hands bars

18 Plaintiff’s ability to seek damages; (4) at all times Defendant’s actions were reasonably

19 related to achieving legitimate penological goals; and (5) the doctrine of qualified

20 immunity shields Defendant from liability because the Defendant did not violate any

21 clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person in

22 Defendant’s position would have known. ECF No. 21 at 6. With material issues of fact

23 remaining, this Court cannot grant Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.

24 V. CONCLUSION

25 For the reasons set forth above, the Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the

26 Pleadings is DENIED.

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1 IT IS SO ORDERED.

2 ||Dated: April 5, 2024 (73 salto OA )

3 Hon. Gonzalo P. Curiel

4 United States District Judge

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