The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MATTHEW SCOTT TAYLOR, Case No. 23-cv-0206-MMA (JLB)
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER:
13 v.
GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
14 A. GONZALEZ, G. BUENAVENTURA,
DEFENDANT BUENAVENTURA;
D. TORRES,
15 AND
Defendants.
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DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS
17 DEFENDANT GONZALEZ
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[Doc. No. 39]
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20 On July 13, 2022, Matthew Scott Taylor (“Taylor” or “Plaintiff”), a state prisoner
21 proceeding pro se, filed a Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) and a civil rights
22 complaint pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment
23 rights. See Doc. No. 1. Plaintiff named the California Department of Corrections and
24 Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), Correctional Sergeant A. Gonzalez, Correctional Counselor G.
25 Buenaventura, Correctional Custody Staff Officer D. Torres, and Does 1 through 3 as
26 Defendants. Id. The Court granted Plaintiff’s IFP Motion and screened the Complaint
27 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b). Doc. No. 7. In its Screening
28 Order, the Court dismissed Defendant CDCR, and directed the U.S. Marshals to serve the
1 Complaint on the remaining Defendants. See Doc. No. 7. The Court also advised
2 Plaintiff that he would have to identify the Doe Defendants before the U.S. Marshal
3 would be able to serve them. Id. at 7, fn. 2.
4 On August 3, 2023, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
5 Complaint (“FAC”). Doc. No. 18. The Court granted the motion and the FAC was filed
6 on August 18, 2023. See Doc. Nos. 24–25. Plaintiff named only A. Gonzalez, D. Torres,
7 and G. Buenaventura in his FAC and thus the other named Defendants were terminated.
8 Doc. No. 25. Defendants Buenaventura and Gonzalez now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s
9 claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Doc. No. 39.
10 Plaintiff filed an opposition, to which Defendants replied. See Doc. Nos. 40, 43.
11 Plaintiff then filed a sur-reply, Doc. No. 49, which the Court did not authorize but
12 nonetheless accepted while noting the discrepancy, Doc. No. 50. For the reasons set forth
13 below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the claims against Defendant
14 Buenaventura and DENIES the Motion to Dismiss the claims against Defendant
15 Gonzalez pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
16 I. BACKGROUND1
17 Plaintiff alleges Defendants Gonzalez and Torres were deliberately indifferent to
18 his health and safety in violation of the Eighth Amendment when they moved an inmate
19 they knew had threatened other inmates into his cell while he was incarcerated at R.J.
20 Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”); the inmate later stabbed Plaintiff multiple times.
21 Doc. No. 25. Specifically, Plaintiff states that on or about October 5, 2021, Defendant
22 Gonzalez moved inmate Durr into his cell because Durr had made threats to his previous
23 cellmate. Id. at 5. About two days after Durr was moved, Plaintiff tried to tell his
24 Correctional Counselor, Defendant Buenaventura, about his fear of Durr and Durr’s
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27 1 Because this matter is before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true the
allegations set forth in the complaint. See Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. Of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 740
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1 threats to Plaintiff by attending Buenaventura’s “open office hours.” Id. at 10–11.
2 Plaintiff “gestured that [he] needed to talk to her,” but Buenaventura “shooed [him] away
3 with her hands.” Id. Plaintiff claims Defendant Buenaventura violated his Eighth
4 Amendment rights when she refused to address his concerns about his cellmate. Id.
5 On or about October 8, 2021, Durr attacked Plaintiff with a manufactured weapon,
6 stabbing him multiple times and sending him to an outside hospital to be treated. Id.
7 According to Plaintiff, Defendant Torres did not stop Durr’s attack even though it took
8 place “in [Torres’s] direct line of sight.” Id. at 9. After the attack, another inmate, Jaime
9 Jackson, heard Defendant Torres say “he knew [Durr] was a problem.” Id. Plaintiff
10 alleges Torres and Gonzalez knew Durr was dangerous and had made threats to his
11 cellmate before he was moved into Plaintiff’s cell and that Torres or Gonzalez failed to
12 properly search Durr or his belongings for weapons before the move. Id. at 8.
13 II. LEGAL STANDARD
14 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
15 sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). A
16 pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
17 is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, plaintiffs must also plead
18 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
19 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard
20 thus demands more than a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, or
21 naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
22 678 (2009). Instead, the complaint “must contain allegations of underlying facts
23 sufficient to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.”
24 Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).
25 In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must assume the truth
26 of all factual allegations and must construe them in the light most favorable to the
27 nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996).
28 The Court must also draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. Usher v.
1 City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). The court need not take legal
2 conclusions as true merely because they are cast in the form of factual allegations.
3 Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987). Similarly, “conclusory
4 allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are not sufficient to defeat a motion to
5 dismiss.” Pareto v. FDIC, 139 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1998).
6 When the plaintiff is appearing pro se, the court must construe the pleadings
7 liberally and afford the plaintiff any benefit of the doubt. See Thompson v. Davis, 295
8 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2001); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621,
9 623 (9th Cir. 1988). In giving liberal interpretation to a pro se complaint, however, the
10 court is not permitted to “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially
11 pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
12 The court must give a pro se litigant leave to amend his complaint “unless it determines
13 that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v.
14 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted) (citing Noll v.
15 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1447 (9th Cir. 1987)).
16 IV. DISCUSSION
17 “The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to protect inmates from
18 violence.” Wilk v. Neven, 956 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer v.
19 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). To rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment
20 violation, a plaintiff must first show that the deprivation alleged is, objectively,
21 ‘sufficiently serious.’” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
22 298 (1991)). Second, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to show that Defendants
23 acted with “deliberate indifference.” Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060,
24 1068 (9th Cir. 2016); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A prison official acts with ‘deliberate
25 indifference . . . only if the [prison official] knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
26 inmate health and safety.’” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004)
27 (quoting Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on
28 other grounds by Castro, 833 F.3d at 1076). “Under this standard, the prison official
1 must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
2 substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must also draw the inference.’”
3 Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837).
4 A. Defendant Buenaventura
5 In his Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff concedes that he has failed to
6 state an Eighth Amendment claim with respect to Defendant Buenaventura and asks the
7 Court to dismiss Buenaventura as a defendant. Doc. No. 40 at 1. Accordingly, the Court
8 GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss as to Defendant Buenaventura.
9 B. Defendant Gonzalez
10 Defendant Gonzalez argues Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state a claim against him
11 because his allegations are too vague and conclusory. Doc. No. 39-1 at 8–10. The Court
12 finds, however, that the FAC contains sufficient facts to plausibly allege Gonzalez knew
13 housing Durr with Plaintiff “posed an excessive risk to [Plaintiff’s] health and safety,”
14 and that he disregarded that risk. Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
15 According to Plaintiff, Gonzalez knew Durr had a history of threatening cellmates with
16 violence and, despite knowing this, Gonzalez housed Durr with Plaintiff. Doc. No. 25 at
17 5. Indeed, the reason Durr was rehoused with Plaintiff was because he had threatened his
18 previous cell mate. Id. In addition, the fact that Durr stabbed Plaintiff only three days
19 after Gonzalez moved Durr into Plaintiff’s cell establishes it is more likely than not the
20 threat Durr posed was either known or was obvious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[A]
21 prison official [cannot] escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while
22 he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the
23 complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who eventually
24 committed the assault.”); see, e.g., Miles v. County of Alameda, No. 22-cv-06707-WHO,
25 2023 WL 2766663, at *8 (N.D. Cal. April 3, 2023) (denying motion to dismiss where
26 defendants knew inmate was mentally ill, had a violent history, and had attacked other
27 inmates when they housed him with the decedent).
28 / / /
1 Further, Plaintiff claims Gonzalez failed to properly search Durr’s belongings for
2 || weapons before moving Durr into Plaintiffs cell and that Durr then stabbed Plaintiff with
3 ||an inmate manufactured weapon three days after moving into Plaintiff's cell. /d. at 5-6.
4 || These facts are sufficient to plausibly suggest at this stage of the proceedings that despite
5 || being aware Durr was a dangerous inmate who had threatened his previous cellmates,
6 || Gonzalez failed to take reasonable measures to abate that risk by properly searching
7 || Durr’s belongings for weapons before moving Durr into Plaintiffs cell. See Farmer, 511
8 ||U.S. at 847; Armstead v. Fields, 638 Fed. Appx. 601, 604 (9th Cir. 2016) (denying
9 || qualified immunity because “[b]y November 2009, it was clearly established in the Ninth
10 || Circuit that if any officer knew that an inmate was acting dangerously with cellmates, or
11 || that an inmate was a threat to his cellmate, but housed the two together anyway, doing so
12 || would violate the Eighth Amendment’).
13 V. CONCLUSION
14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss all claims
15 against Defendant Buenaventura pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
16 || without prejudice. The Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Eighth
17 || Amendment claim with respect to Defendant Gonzalez pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
18 || Procedure 12(b)(6).
19 Defendants Gonzalez and Torres will serve and file an Answer to Plaintiff's
20 || Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 25] within the time set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(a)(4)(A).
21 IT IS SO ORDERED.
22 Dated: March 15, 2024
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95 United States District Judge
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