“A corporate director or officer's participation in tortious conduct may be 10 shown not solely by direct action but also by knowing consent to or approval of unlawful 11 acts”
How later courts described this case
- “A corporate director or officer's participation in tortious conduct may be 10 shown not solely by direct action but also by knowing consent to or approval of unlawful 11 acts”
- “If conflicting inferences may be 24 drawn from the facts, the case must go to the jury.”
- where genuine disputes exist, the courts “view the evidence in 13 the light most favorable to the opposing party.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 LEANNE TAN, Individually and On Case No.: 20cv1082-LL-DDL
Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated,
12
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
Plaintiff,
13 KATHRYN MARTORANO’S
v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY
14
JUDGMENT
QUICK BOX, LLC, et al.,
15
Defendants [ECF No. 338]
16
17 __________________________________
18 AND RELATED CROSSCLAIMS AND
THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS.
19
20
21 Before the Court is Defendant Kathryn Martorano’s (“Defendant” or “Kathryn”)
22 Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the Alternative, Partial Summary Judgment. ECF
23 Nos. 338, 389 (sealed).1 Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment has been fully
24
25
1 ECF No. 338 is the redacted Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 338-8 is the
26
redacted Exhibit E to the Declaration of Christopher B. Queally. ECF No. 338-11 is the
27 redacted Exhibit A to the Declaration of Matthew Martorano. ECF No. 389 is the sealed
Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 389-3 is the sealed Exhibit E to the Declaration
28
1 briefed, and the Court deems it suitable for submission without oral argument. For the
2 reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment in
3 its entirety.
4 I. BACKGROUND
5 A. Factual Disputes
6 The Court has taken the relevant facts from the parties’ declarations, exhibits, and
7 respective Rule 56.1 statements of facts. ECF No. 389-1 (sealed)2, Defendant’s Separate
8 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“DSSUF”); ECF No. 407-4 (sealed)3, Plaintiff’s
9 Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“PRSSUF”).
10 Based on the parties’ statements of facts, the Court references Plaintiff Leanne Tan’s
11 (“Plaintiff”) version of the facts when noting a genuine factual dispute. See Tolan v. Cotton,
12 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (where genuine disputes exist, the courts “view the evidence in
13 the light most favorable to the opposing party.”). The Court also notes where facts are
14 disputed by the non-moving party.
15 B. Factual Background
16 In 2017, Matthew Martorano founded Konnektive LLC, a software technology
17 company, in Puerto Rico. DSSUF ¶ 1. Konnektive LLC is headquartered in Puerto Rico,
18 where most of its nine employees work, and has additional offices in Roswell, Georgia. Id.
19 ¶ 2; ECF No. 338-10, Declaration of Matthew Martorano in Support of Motion for
20 Summary Judgment (“M. Martorano Decl.”) ¶ 4. The Konnektive LLC organization chart
21
22
23 Matthew Martorano. ECF Nos. 340, 340-2, and 340-3 are notices of the lodgment of the
Motion for Summary Judgment and exhibits.
24
25 2 ECF No. 338-2 is the redacted Separate Statement. ECF No. 389-1 is the sealed Separate
Statement. ECF No. 340-1 is the notice of the lodgment of the Separate Statement.
26
27 3 ECF No. 367-4 is the redacted Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement. ECF No.
407-4 is the sealed Response to Defendant’s Separate Statement. ECF No. 370-5 is the
28
1 shows that Matthew Martorano is the CEO, and Kathryn Martorano, Matthew Martorano’s
2 wife, is the COO. ECF No. 367-3, Ex. 11; DSSUF ¶¶ 13, 15.
3 Konnektive LLC’s primary product is its customer relationship management (CRM)
4 platform which allows users, such as online retail merchants, to manage, track, and
5 organize customer data, including customer names, contact information, communications,
6 sales, and marketing. DSSUF ¶ 3. Most of the merchants who purchase a license to use the
7 Konnektive CRM are retailers who sell their products via the Internet. Id. ¶ 4. To accept
8 credit card payments for sales, online merchants need a merchant identification number
9 (“MID”) so that funds can be transferred via a credit card network (e.g., MasterCard or
10 Visa) from the customer’s account to the merchant’s account. Id. ¶ 6. MIDs are issued by
11 a bank or payment processor. Id. Konnektive LLC is not involved in issuing MIDs or
12 processing transactions, but Konnektive LLC is registered as a service provider to multiple
13 banks. Id. ¶¶ 7, 36.
14 Konnektive LLC is a
15 . Id. ¶ 37; M. Martorano Decl. ¶ 12;
16 PRSSUF ¶ 37. According to Defendant,
17
18 . DSSUF ¶ 38; M. Martorano Decl. ¶ 12. Plaintiff contends that Konnektive LLC
19 only became a
20 . PRSSUF ¶ 38.
21 Some of the technology that Konnektive LLC offers was developed by another
22 entity, Converging Resources Corporation (CRC) (formerly Konnektive Corporation),
23 which is based in Roswell, Georgia.4 DSSUF ¶ 10. After the CRM platform was developed
24 and its rights were assigned to Konnektive LLC, Kathryn Martorano became the sole owner
25 and sole shareholder of CRC. Id. ¶ 11. The CRC organization chart shows that Kathryn
26
27
4 Kathryn Martorano and Matthew Martorano live in Puerto Rico and typically work
28
1 Martorano is the CEO and supervises various employees. ECF No. 367-3, Ex. 10.
2 Defendant states that Konnektive LLC and CRC were companies with separate identities,
3 separate books, and separate employees, but Plaintiff disputes this. DSSUF ¶ 39; PRSSUF
4 ¶ 39. Defendant further states that CRC has sufficient assets to meet its debts, including
5 employee payroll, taxes, overhead, and other debts, but Plaintiff also disputes this. DSSUF
6 ¶ 40; PRSSUF ¶ 40.
7 The parties disagree on the scope of Kathryn Martorano’s duties and responsibilities
8 as CEO of CRC and COO of Konnektive LLC. First, Defendant states that although she
9 holds the title of COO of Konnektive LLC, she is not an owner of Konnektive LLC and
10 never has been. DSSUF ¶ 14. Defendant’s duties are limited to handling administrative HR
11 functions, such as onboarding employees, exit interviews, payroll, benefits, and diversity
12 training. Id. ¶ 18. Defendant also assists the CFO in managing the books and furnishing
13 information annually to outside auditors. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant’s use of the Konnektive CRM
14 is limited to running reports for purposes of accounts receivable for the billing and
15 collecting licensing fees from merchants. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Defendant states she was not
16 involved in the design, development, coding, updates, or maintenance of the Konnektive
17 CRM software and does not supervise anyone who does. Id. ¶¶ 16–17, 25, 34.
18 Next, Defendant states she does not handle management of Konnektive licensee
19 accounts and does not perform any type of marketing, sales, onboarding, or management
20 of merchants who use Konnektive software. Id. ¶¶ 21–22, 24, 26, 31. Specifically,
21 Defendant states she was unaware of RMG’s status as a licensee prior to the action being
22 filed and that she had never met or communicated with any of the RMG representatives or
23 La Pura entities. Id. ¶¶ 23–24. Defendant was also unaware of RMG’s business practices,
24 what products RMG was selling, how RMG’s products were manufactured and labeled,
25 how RMG’s products were marketed, and to whom the products were being sold to. Id. ¶¶
26 27, 30, 35. In particular, Defendant states she had never met Plaintiff Leanne Tan and had
27 no knowledge of the details of Plaintiff’s purchase of a La Pura product, including how
28 payment was accepted. Id. ¶¶ 29, 30. In addition, Defendant states that she had no
1 knowledge of what financial institutions RMG applied to for MIDs, what representations
2 were made to secure the MIDs, which MID was used by RMG or a La Pura entity at any
3 given time, or how RMG used its MIDs. Id. ¶ 28. Lastly, according to Defendant,
4 Defendant does not use CRC or Konnektive LLC to pay her personal debts, and she
5 received a salary from Konnektive LLC and dividends from CRC when they were declared.
6 Id. ¶ 41.
7 Plaintiff disputes Kathryn Martorano’s statements that she had limited knowledge
8 and a limited role at Konnektive LLC and CRC. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20–24, 26–31, 40–41. Plaintiff
9 further disputes the credibility of Kathryn Martorano’s testimony, alleging that it
10 contradicts with her declaration. Id. ¶¶ 18, 20–24, 26–31, 40–41.
11 Plaintiff argues that Kathryn Martorano had knowledge of the products and
12 controlled and directed key employees as the CEO of CRC and COO of Konnektive LLC.
13 Id. ¶¶ 18, 27.
14 ECF
15 No. 407-2 at 1–39 (sealed)5, Deposition of Jeremy Sistrunk Volume I (“Sistrunk Depo.
16 Vol. I”) 91:10-25; PRSSUF ¶ 18.
17
18 Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 92:16-25; PRSSUF ¶ 18. Additionally, Aaron
19 Turgeman, a former Konnektive LLC developer, testified that Kathryn Martorano
20 sometimes attended company meetings with the software development team where they
21 discussed progress on the software’s features, load balancing, and MID management. ECF
22 No. 367-2, Ex. 6, Deposition of Aaron Turgeman (“Turgeman Depo.”) 43:16-44:14, 69:15-
23 22; PRSSUF ¶ 18. Further, the former Konnektive LLC employees testified that it was
24 common knowledge to the employees that that the load balancing feature was unethical,
25
26
27 5 ECF No. 367-2 at page 175 is the redacted Deposition of Jeremy Sistrunk Volume I. ECF
No. 407-2 at pages 1 through 39 is the sealed Deposition of Jeremy Sistrunk Volume I.
28
1 illegal, or fraudulent and that it “enable[d] people to trick people out of money.” See ECF
2 No. 367-2, Ex. 7, Deposition of Justin Reviea (“Reviea Depo.”) 64:5-65:20, 67:25-68:15,
3 104:4-105:5, 161:17-162:18; see also Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 83:14-84:25 91:10-25; ECF
4 No. 407-2 at 40–64 (sealed)6, Deposition of Jeremy Sistrunk Volume II (“Sistrunk Depo.
5 Vol. II”) 72:4-10, 85:10-86:10, 115:9-116:24; PRSSUF ¶ 30.
6 C. Procedural Background
7 On January 7, 2021, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No.
8 89. In the FAC, Plaintiff alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of California’s
9 Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), (2) violation of California’s False Advertising
10 Law (“FAL”), (3) violation of the unfair and fraudulent prongs of California’s Unfair
11 Competition Law (“UCL”), (4) violation of the unlawful prong of California’s UCL, and
12 (5) civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act violations. Id. ¶¶
13 363–897; see also ECF No. 130 at 45 (granting dismissal of Plaintiff's non-California state
14 consumer protection law claims in the FAC).
15 On August 30, 2023, Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos.
16 338, 389 (sealed). On December 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed her opposition (“Opposition” or
17 “Oppo.”). ECF Nos. 367, 407 (sealed).7 On December 15, 2023, Defendant filed her Reply
18 (“Reply”) in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment and objected to Plaintiff’s
19 evidence. ECF Nos. 373, 374. On December 26, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition to
20 Defendant’s evidentiary objections. ECF No. 381.
21 / / /
22 / / /
23
24
25 6 ECF No. 367-2 at page 176 is the redacted Deposition of Jeremy Sistrunk Volume II.
ECF No. 407-2 at pages 40 through 64 is the sealed Deposition of Jeremy Sistrunk Volume
26
I. ECF No. 370-3 is the notice of lodgment of the deposition.
27
7 ECF No. 367 is the redacted Opposition. ECF No. 407 is the sealed Opposition. ECF No.
28
1 II. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS
2 As a preliminary matter, Defendant raises various evidentiary objections to the
3 evidence in support of Plaintiff’s Opposition. ECF No. 374. Specifically, Defendant targets
4 statements in the depositions of Defendant Kathryn Martorano, Matthew Martorano,
5 Jeremy Sistrunk, Aaron Turgeman, and Justin Reviea. See id. Defendant objects to portions
6 of these declarations on various evidentiary grounds, including relevance, hearsay,
7 speculative lay testimony, and improper legal conclusions. See id.
8 Before ordering summary judgment, a district court “must also rule on evidentiary
9 objections that are material to its ruling.” Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973
10 (9th Cir. 2010). “To begin, objections for relevance are generally unnecessary on summary
11 judgment because they are ‘duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.’”
12 Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Burch v.
13 Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006)). “[I]f evidence
14 submitted on summary judgment could create a genuine dispute of material fact, it is, by
15 definition, ‘of consequence in determining the action,’ and therefore relevant.” Id. (quoting
16 Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119). “Conversely, if the submitted evidence does not create a
17 genuine dispute of material fact, there is no need for the court to separately determine
18 whether it is relevant because, even assuming it is not, it will not affect the ultimate
19 summary judgment ruling.” Id.
20 “[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative, and/or
21 argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the
22 summary judgment standard itself.” Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. “Moreover, Federal
23 Rule of Evidence 403 objections are unnecessary at the summary judgment stage because
24 there is no jury that can be misled and no danger of confusing the issues.” See Holt v. Noble
25 House Hotels & Resort, Ltd., 370 F. Supp. 3d 1158, 1164 (S.D. Cal. 2019). “Accordingly,
26 the Court does not consider any objections on the grounds that the evidence is irrelevant,
27 speculative, argumentative, prejudicial, that it constitutes hearsay or inadmissible lay
28
1 opinion, or that there is a lack [of] personal knowledge.” Id. (citing Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d
2 at 1122).
3 Here, Defendant’s objections on the grounds that Plaintiff’s evidence is irrelevant,
4 constitutes an improper legal conclusion, or constitutes as hearsay are redundant of the
5 summary judgment standard and lack a sufficient legal basis. See Holt, 370 F. Supp. 3d at
6 1164; Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 665. Therefore, the Court overrules these evidentiary
7 objections.
8 The remaining evidentiary objections are the Defendant’s speculative lay testimony
9 objections.
10 See ECF No. 374 at 107–99. Defendant provides no
11 reasoning beyond her boilerplate objections as to why these portions of the depositions
12 would qualify as improper evidence.
13 An objection alleging that the proffered evidence is improper lay opinion testimony,
14 which goes to the content of the evidence, may be appropriate on summary judgment. See
15 United States v. Durham, 464 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2006). Yet, lay opinion testimony is
16 permissible provided it is “(a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, (b) helpful
17 to a clear understanding of [the witness's] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue,
18 and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope
19 of Rule 702.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701). “[T]he line between lay and expert opinion
20 depends on the basis of the opinion, not its subject matter.” United States v. Barragan, 871
21 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2017). “Opinion testimony of lay witnesses must be predicated
22 upon concrete facts within their own observation and recollection-that is facts perceived
23 from their own senses, as distinguished from their opinions or conclusions drawn from
24 such facts.” Durham, 464 F.3d at 982 (quoting United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 985
25 (9th Cir. 1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Losch, 603 F.
26 Supp. 3d 795, 799 (D. Ariz. 2022) (finding that an engineer witness “may testify as a lay
27 witness about a specialized or technical subject where the testimony is based on the
28 witness's personal knowledge”).
1
2
3
4
5 See Sistrunk Depo Vol. I at 19:11-23; Turgeman Depo. at 9:20-10:16;
6 Reviea Depo. at 15:3-6.
7 See Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 68:1-
8 19; Turgeman Depo. at 22:5-27:18; Reviea Depo. at 42:2-23, 44:14-48:17.
9
10
11 See Losch, 603 F. Supp. 3d at 799; Fed. R. Evid. 701. Accordingly, the Court
12 overrules Defendant’s speculative lay testimony objections as to the depositions of the
13 former Konnektive LLC employees.
14 II. LEGAL STANDARD
15 Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the evidence and drawing all
16 reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no
17 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
18 of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). A fact
19 is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a
20 dispute as to a material fact is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier
21 of fact to decide in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
22 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Cline v. Indus. Maint. Eng’g & Contracting Co., 200 F.3d 1223,
23 1229 (9th Cir. 2000). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
24 summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 (citations omitted).
25 The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying the portions of the pleadings
26 and record that it believes demonstrate the absence of an issue of material fact. See Celotex,
27 477 U.S. at 323. The burden then shifts to the non-movant to show “there is a genuine issue
28 of material fact.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585
1 (1986). The non-movant must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by
2 the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, [and] designate specific
3 facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (internal
4 quotation marks omitted). In carrying their burdens, the parties can either cite to evidence
5 supporting their own position or show the other side's position is either unsupportable or
6 devoid of any genuine dispute. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). In addition, “[c]redibility
7 determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
8 from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, [when] he is ruling on a motion for
9 summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
10 “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
11 governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248; see also
12 T.W. Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987)
13 (“Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary
14 judgment.”)).
15 III. DISCUSSION
16 Defendant moves for summary judgment on each cause of action remaining in
17 Plaintiff’s FAC. See ECF No. 389 (sealed), Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion” or
18 “Mot.”). The Court addresses each of Defendant’s challenges to Plaintiff’s claims in turn.
19 A. Aiding and Abetting
20 First, Defendant argues that she is entitled to summary judgment on the CLRA, FAL,
21 and UCL claims because there is no evidence that Defendant aided and abetted RMG and
22 the La Pura entities. See id. at 15–18; Reply at 5–6, 10–11.
23 A claim for aiding and abetting a tort requires that the defendants “(a) [knew] the
24 other's conduct constitute[d] a breach of duty and [gave] substantial assistance or
25 encouragement to the other to so act or (b) [gave] substantial assistance to the other in
26 accomplishing a tortious result and the person's own conduct, separately considered,
27 constitute[d] a breach of duty to the third person.” Bradshaw v. SLM Corp., 652 F. App'x
28 593, 594 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Casey v. U.S. Bank Nat. Assn., 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 401, 405
1 (Ct. App. 2005)) (alterations in original); Decarlo v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2020 WL
2 1332539, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2020) (“Liability may be imposed on those who aid and
3 abet another's violation of the UCL if the individual knows the other's conduct constitutes
4 a violation and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other to so act.”).
5 1. Knowledge or Substantial Participation in the Breach8
6 Under California law, aiding and abetting liability requires the defendant have
7 “actual knowledge of the specific primary wrong the defendant substantially assisted.” See
8 In re First All. Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d 977, 993 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Casey, 26 Cal. Rptr.
9 3d at 406). The actual knowledge standard requires more than “a vague suspicion of
10 wrongdoing,” and a defendant must have known more than that “something fishy was
11 going on.” Id. at 993 n.4 (quoting Casey, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409) (emphasis omitted).
12 However, “[a] plaintiff may prove actual knowledge through inference or circumstantial
13 evidence.” Simi Mgmt. Corp. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 930 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1099 (N.D. Cal.
14 2013). Courts have found that a defendant's “decision to ignore suspicious activity or red
15 flags is sufficient to demonstrate actual knowledge.” In re Woodbridge Invs. Litig., 2020
16 WL 4529739, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020); see In re First All. Mortg. Co., 471 F.3d at
17 999 (noting that coming “upon red flags which were seemingly ignored was enough to
18 establish actual knowledge under the California aiding and abetting standard”). Courts
19 have also found that allegations concerning a defendant's knowledge and familiarity with
20 the structure and operation of an alleged fraudulent scheme are relevant to the actual
21 knowledge inquiry. See Gonzales v. Lloyds TSB Bank, PLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1208
22 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (“In further support of their allegation that Defendant had knowledge of
23
24
25
26
8 Plaintiff asserts Defendant’s liability under both theories of aiding and abetting in the
27 FAC, but the parties present the same arguments and evidence in this Motion for the
“substantial participation” prong of aiding and abetting liability and the “actual
28
1 the Ponzi scheme, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant knew the hallmark characteristics of a
2 Ponzi scheme, and identified these characteristics in the Midland Entities’ accounts.”).
3 The substantial assistance standard “requires that the defendant's actions be a
4 ‘substantial factor’ in causing the plaintiff's injury.” Facebook, Inc. v. MaxBounty, Inc.,
5 274 F.R.D. 279, 285 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Impac Warehouse Lending Grp. v. Credit
6 Suisse First Boston LLC, 270 Fed. Appx. 570, 572 (9th Cir. 2008)). Ordinary business
7 transactions “can satisfy the substantial assistance element of an aiding and abetting claim
8 if the [defendant] actually knew those transactions were assisting the [principal] in
9 committing a specific tort. Knowledge is the crucial element.” In re First All. Mortg. Co.,
10 471 F.3d at 995 (quoting Casey, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 406).
11 Defendant states that Plaintiff’s allegations are false and contends that there is no
12 evidence that Defendant knew of the La Pura entities’ alleged fraudulent scheme or that
13 Defendant assisted RMG or the La Pura entities in any way. See Mot. at 17–18. To support
14 this argument, Defendant cites to her own declaration in stating that she had never met or
15 communicated with any of the RMG or La Pura representatives. See id. at 17; ECF No.
16 338-9, Declaration of Kathryn Martorano in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
17 (“K. Martorano Decl.”) ¶ 10; DSSUF ¶ 23. Defendant states that she did not sign up any
18 of the La Pura entities as licensees and that she was unaware of what products RMG sold
19 and to whom they were being sold. See Mot. at 17–18; K. Martorano Decl. ¶¶ 11–12;
20 DSSUF ¶¶ 24, 27, 28, 30. Defendant asserts she had no knowledge of what financial
21 institutions RMG applied to for MIDs, what representations were made to secure the MIDs,
22 which MID was used by RMG or a La Pura entity at any given time, or how RMG used its
23 MIDs. See Mot. at 18; DSSUF ¶ 28. Defendant also states that she did not design, develop,
24 or code any of the Konnektive CRM software. See Mot. at 17; K. Martorano Decl. ¶ 14;
25 DSSUF ¶ 25. Moreover, Defendant states she never met Plaintiff Leanne Tan and had no
26 knowledge of the details of Plaintiff’s purchase of a La Pura product, including how
27 payment was accepted. See Mot. at 18; K. Martorano Decl. ¶ 15; DSSUF ¶¶ 29, 30.
28
1 Further, Defendant relies heavily on Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, for the proposition
2 that an attenuated nexus between a tortious act and a defendant’s general knowledge that
3 its users will misuse its software service is insufficient to impose aiding and abetting
4 liability. See Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U.S. 471, 505–06 (2023); Mot. at 16. However,
5 Taamneh is distinguishable on the facts. In Taamneh, the defendants provided generally
6 available virtual platforms, such as Twitter, and the defendants failed to stop ISIS despite
7 knowing that ISIS was using these platforms to plan terrorist attacks. Id. at 505–06. The
8 Supreme Court found that there was an “arm’s length” relationship between the defendants
9 and the wrongful terrorist act because “defendants’ platforms [were] global in scale and
10 allow[ed] hundreds of millions (or billions) of people to upload vast quantities of
11 information on a daily basis.” Id. at 500.
12 Although the scale of the Konnektive software and its users is disputed, the evidence
13 indicates the Konnektive platform is not similar to the defendants’ platforms in Taamneh,
14 which included hundreds of millions (or billions) of people. See DSSUF ¶ 12; Taamneh,
15 598 U.S. at 500. Further, the defendants in Taamneh were portrayed as bystanders because
16 “plaintiffs point to no act of encouraging, soliciting, or advising the commission of the
17 Reina attack that would normally support an aiding-and-abetting claim.” Taamneh, 598
18 U.S. at 500. In contrast, here, Plaintiff has presented evidence that Defendant’s relationship
19 to the tortious act was not “arm’s length, passive, and largely indifferent.” Id.
20 The instant case also has a different context from Taamneh. Although Taamneh
21 outlines general aiding and abetting liability principles, Taamneh held plaintiffs failed to
22 plausibly allege aiding and abetting liability under a motion to dismiss, not a motion for
23 summary judgment. Id. at 482. This Court previously denied the Konnektive Defendants’
24 motion to dismiss, stating that the FAC’s allegations were sufficient to state a claim against
25 the Konnektive Defendants for violations of the CLRA, FAL, and UCL under an aiding
26 and abetting theory of liability. See ECF No. 130 at 28–31.
27 In opposition to Defendant’s Motion, Plaintiff argues that a jury could infer from the
28 circumstantial evidence that Defendant would have known about or authorized, approved,
1 or consented to the fraudulent conduct of CRC and Konnektive LLC as the CEO and COO.
2 See Oppo. at 28. Plaintiff first offers evidence of the corporate organization charts, which
3 were drafted by Defendant, that show that Defendant was the CEO of CRC and the COO
4 of Konnektive LLC. See ECF No. 367-3, Exs. 10, 11; ECF No. 407-1, Ex. 1 (sealed)9,
5 Deposition of Kathryn Martorano (“K. Martorano Depo.”) 92:24-93:10. Next, Plaintiff
6 offers testimony from a former Konnektive LLC developer, Turgeman, that Defendant
7 sometimes attended company meetings with the software development team where they
8 discussed progress on the software’s features, load balancing, and MID management. See
9 Turgeman Depo. 43:16-44:14, 69:15-22.
10
11 Sistrunk Depo.
12 Vol. I 91:10-25, 92:16-25. Plaintiff also emphasizes testimonial evidence from former
13 Konnektive LLC employees that it was common knowledge to the employees that the load
14 balancing feature was unethical, illegal, or fraudulent and that it “enable[d] people to trick
15 people out of money.” See Reviea Depo. 64:5-65:20, 67:25-68:15, 104:4-105:5, 161:17-
16 162:18; see also Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 83:14-84:25 91:10-25; Sistrunk Depo. Vol. II, 72:4-
17 10, 85:10-86:10, 115:9-116:24.
18 Further, Plaintiff disputes Defendant’s credibility and states that there are
19 inconsistencies and contradictions between Defendant’s testimony and declaration. See
20 Oppo. at 28; PRSSUF ¶ 18. On summary judgment, the conflicting inferences from this
21 evidence must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor as the non-moving party, and any credibility
22 determinations must be reserved for the jury. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; LaLonde v.
23 Cnty. of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If conflicting inferences may be
24 drawn from the facts, the case must go to the jury.”).
25
26
27 9 ECF No. 367-2 at pages 1 through 139 is the redacted Deposition of Kathryn Martorano.
ECF No. 407-1 at pages 1 through 139 is the sealed Deposition of Kathryn Martorano. ECF
28
1 The evidence presented by Plaintiff regarding Defendant’s knowledge and
2 familiarity with the structure and operation of Konnektive LLC, CRC, and the Konnektive
3 software leads to the inference that Defendant had actual knowledge of the fraudulent
4 scheme or substantially assisted in the fraudulent scheme. See Gonzales, 532 F. Supp. 2d
5 at 1208; In re First All. Mort. Co., 471 F.3d at 995. Moreover, Defendant has failed to
6 show that there are no disputes of material fact regarding Defendant’s knowledge of or
7 substantial assistance in the fraudulent scheme. As laid out in the Factual Background
8 section above, Plaintiff and Defendant dispute almost every fact that could possibly be
9 material to Plaintiff’s CLRA, FAL, and UCL claims.
10 Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to
11 Plaintiff’s claims that Defendant aided and abetted RMG and the La Pura entities in
12 violating the CLRA, FAL, and UCL.
13 B. RICO Claims
14 Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s RICO conspiracy claim fails because there is no
15 evidence that Defendant agreed to participate in a conspiracy to violate RICO. See Mot. at
16 19–23; Reply at 6–10.
17 To establish a RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), a plaintiff “must allege
18 either an agreement that is a substantive violation of RICO or that the defendants agreed to
19 commit, or participated in, a violation of two predicate offenses.” Howard v. Am. Online
20 Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Baumer v. Pachl, 8 F.3d 1341, 1346 (9th
21 Cir. 1993)). “A [defendant] must intend to further an endeavor which, if completed, would
22 satisfy all of the elements of a substantive criminal offense, but it suffices that he adopt the
23 goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor.” Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S.
24 52, 65 (1997). A defendant must have been “aware of the essential nature and scope of the
25 enterprise and intended to participate in it.” Baumer, 8 F.3d at 1346.
26 “The illegal agreement need not be express as long as its existence can be inferred
27 from the words, actions, or interdependence of activities and persons involved.” Oki
28 Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 298 F.3d 768, 775 (9th Cir. 2002).
1 “Unlike common law conspiracy, which requires that a participant specifically intend the
2 object of the conspiracy be accomplished, RICO conspiracy requires only ‘that two or more
3 people agreed to commit a[t least two] crime[s] covered by the [RICO] . . . statute (that a
4 conspiracy existed) and that the defendant knowingly and willfully participated in the
5 agreement (that he was a member of the conspiracy).’” United States v. Wallis, 630 Fed.
6 App'x 664, 668 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106, 110 (2003))
7 (alterations in original).
8 Here, Defendant argues that she cannot be said to have known the business operation
9 of every licensee, understood every function of the Konnektive software, or “agreed” to
10 personally participate in each and every scheme simply by virtue of her positions at CRC
11 and Konnektive LLC and her marriage to Matthew Martorano. See Mot. at 20, 23. In
12 particular, Defendant contends that
13
14 Id. at 22.
15 In opposition, Plaintiff contends that there is strong circumstantial evidence that
16 Defendant knew about the essential nature of the scheme and intended to participate in it.
17 See Oppo. at 26–27. First, Plaintiff cites to testimony from former Konnektive developers
18 and programmers that state it was common knowledge to the employees that the load
19 balancer, a major feature of the Konnektive software, was unethical, illegal, or fraudulent
20 and that it “enable[d] people to trick people out of money.” See Reviea Depo. 64:5-65:20,
21 67:25-68:15, 104:4-105:5, 161:17-162:18; see also Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 83:14-84:25
22 91:10-25; Sistrunk Depo. Vol. II, 72:4-10, 85:10-86:10, 115:9-116:24. Second, Plaintiff
23 points out that Defendant must have known the load balancer was illegal because the
24 Konnektive software included a pop-up when it was used “such that if [Defendant] ever
25 attempted to use her own company’s software she would have seen the warning about load
26 balancing” that stated: “Load balancing activity is prohibited by the card schemes and
27 banks and will lead to termination of your merchant facilities if discovered.” ECF No. 367-
28 3 at 15–16, Ex. 13; Oppo. at 26. Indeed, Defendant has still not set forth evidence or an
1 explanation for how a load balancing software could be used for a lawful, non-fraudulent
2 purpose. In addition, Plaintiff argues that Turgeman’s deposition testimony reveals that
3 Defendant sometimes attended company meetings with the software development team
4 where they discussed progress on the software’s features, load balancing, and MID
5 management. See Turgeman Depo. at 43:16-44:14, 69:15-22. According to Plaintiff, a jury
6 could infer that Defendant knew the load balancer was illegal given Defendant’s role at
7 Konnektive LLC, the load balancer pop-up, and Defendant’s attendance at these meetings.
8 See Oppo. at 26–27.
9 In light of the evidence that Plaintiff has presented, there are several triable issues of
10 fact relevant to Plaintiff’s § 1962(d) claim against Defendant, including the extent of
11 Defendant’s awareness of the essential nature of the scheme and her intent (or agreement)
12 to participate in it. As stated above, a RICO conspiracy claim does not require Defendant
13 to have specifically or expressly intended the object of the conspiracy be accomplished.
14 Wallis, 630 Fed. App'x at 668; Oki Semiconductor Co., 298 F.3d at 775. Further, the Court
15 agrees with Plaintiff that intent “is a question of the state of mind . . . a factual matter rarely
16 free from dispute and thus rarely enabled in summary proceedings.” Tatung Co., Ltd. v.
17 Shu Tze Hsu, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1138, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (quoting Ferring B.V. v. Barr
18 Labs., Inc., 437 F.3d 1181, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
19
20 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Accordingly,
21 the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s RICO
22 conspiracy claim.
23 C. Personal Liability of Kathryn Martorano
24 Next, Defendant argues that she cannot be held personally liable for the alleged
25 misconduct of the Konnektive entities by virtue of her positions at CRC and Konnektive
26 LLC. See Mot. at 23–26.
27 “Corporate director or officer status neither immunizes a person from personal
28 liability for tortious conduct nor subjects him or her to vicarious liability for such acts . . .
1 Directors or officers of a corporation do not incur personal liability for torts of the
2 corporation merely by reason of their official position, unless they participate in the wrong
3 or authorize or direct that it be done.” Balsam v. Trancos, Inc., 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 128
4 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, “[t]acit consent
5 is enough to prove a conspiracy against a director or officer of a corporation, so long as the
6 director or officer concurred in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful
7 purpose.” Schwartz v. Pillsbury Inc., 969 F.2d 840, 844 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation and
8 internal quotation marks omitted); PMC, Inc. v. Kadisha, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 663, 671 (Ct.
9 App. 2000) (“A corporate director or officer's participation in tortious conduct may be
10 shown not solely by direct action but also by knowing consent to or approval of unlawful
11 acts”).
12 Here, Defendant argues that there is no evidence that Defendant authorized or
13 directed unlawful activity of any entity. See Mot. at 25. Defendant asserts that she only
14 handled administrative HR functions and accounts receivable at Konnektive LLC. See id.;
15 DSSUF ¶ 18. Defendant contends she did not personally develop any software used or
16 licensed by Konnektive and had no knowledge of the business practices or interests of
17 RMG or the La Pura entities. See DSSUF ¶¶ 34, 35. Defendant further states that
18 Konnektive is merely “a software technology company that provides a CRM platform to
19 retail merchants . . . it’s not a piece of malware.” Mot. at 25. To support this argument,
20 Defendant argues that Konnektive is registered as a service provider with multiple banks
21 and that . Id.; DSSUF
22 ¶ 37; M. Martorano Decl. ¶ 12. According to Defendant,
23
24 . DSSUF ¶ 38; M. Martorano Decl. ¶ 9.
25 Defendant relies on Balsam v. Trancos, Inc. for the proposition that personal liability
26 cannot be imposed on a CEO and sole owner of a corporation when the CEO has minimal
27 involvement with the division’s operation, did not knowingly consent to or approve of any
28 unlawful acts on the corporation’s part, and did not participate in most of the corporation’s
1 decisions. See Oppo. at 23–25; Balsam, 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 129. Balsam is distinguishable
2 on the facts. In Balsam, there was no evidence that the CEO knew or should have known
3 what he was doing was tortious or wrongful. Id. Further, in Balsam, the CEO committed a
4 tort in reasonable reliance on expert advice. Id.
5 On the contrary, Plaintiff offers evidence demonstrating that Defendant was
6 involved with Konnektive LLC and CRC’s operations. Again, Plaintiff points to evidence
7 that Defendant sometimes attended corporate meetings with Konnektive LLC employees
8 where they discussed the software updates, the load balancer, and MID management. See
9 Turgeman Depo. at 43:16-44:14, 69:15-22. Plaintiff also offers evidence that former
10 Konnektive LLC employees testified that it was common knowledge to the employees that
11 the load balancing feature was unethical, illegal, or fraudulent and that it “enable[d] people
12 to trick people out of money.” See Oppo. at 24; Reviea Depo. 64:5-65:20, 67:25-68:15,
13 104:4-105:5, 161:17-162:18; see also Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 83:14-84:25 91:10-25;
14 Sistrunk Depo. Vol. II 72:4-10, 85:10-86:10, 115:9-116:24.
15
16 Sistrunk Depo. Vol. I 91:10-25. Plaintiff argues that it is highly unlikely that
17 Defendant, in her level of involvement as COO and CEO of Konnektive LLC and CRC,
18 was the only person at the company who did not know that they were selling something
19 illegal or fraudulent. See Oppo. at 24.
20
21
22 . Id. at 25.
23 In light of the evidence that Plaintiff has presented, Defendant’s argument is
24 unavailing. Plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate there is a triable issue
25 of material fact. Drawing all inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds a reasonable
26 jury could find that Defendant participated in or consented to tortious conduct.
27 Additionally, Defendant’s personal liability does not depend on having developed the
28 actual software or the actions or inaction of other corporations, such as the banks and
1 MasterCard. See Schwartz, 969 F.2d at 844. Accordingly, the Court denies Defendant’s
2 Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s personal liability claims.
3 D. Alter Ego Liability
4 Lastly, Defendant argues that she may not be held liable on an alter ego theory
5 because Konnektive LLC and CRC are not the alter egos of Defendant. See Mot. at 26–28;
6 Reply at 13–14.
7 “Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and distinct from its
8 stockholders, officers and directors, with separate and distinct liabilities and obligations.”
9 Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 824, 836 (Ct. App. 2000). “The
10 alter ego doctrine arises when a plaintiff comes into court claiming that an opposing party
11 is using the corporate form unjustly and in derogation of the plaintiff's interests.” Gerritsen
12 v. Warner Bros. Ent. Inc., 116 F. Supp. 3d 1104, 1135–36 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Mesler
13 v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985)).
14 “Alter ego is an extreme remedy” and is “sparingly used.” Sonora Diamond Corp.,
15 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 836. Courts look to “all the circumstances to determine whether the
16 doctrine should be applied.” Id. California courts have stated that a “corporate identity may
17 be disregarded—the ‘corporate veil’ pierced—where an abuse of the corporate privilege
18 justifies holding the equitable ownership of a corporation liable for the actions of the
19 corporation.” Id. “The purpose behind the alter ego doctrine is to prevent defendants who
20 are the alter egos of a sham corporation from escaping personal liability for its debts.”
21 Hennessey's Tavern, Inc. v. Am. Air Filter Co., 251 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862 (Ct. App. 1988).
22 To apply the alter ego doctrine, courts must determine that “(1) such a unity of
23 interest and ownership exists that the personalities of the corporation and individual are no
24 longer separate, and (2) an inequitable result will follow if the acts are treated as those of
25 the corporation alone.” Sandoval v. Ali, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1031, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (citing
26 RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab–Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 545–46 (9th Cir. 1985)). To determine
27 whether there is a sufficient unity of interest and ownership to support alter ego liability,
28 courts consider factors like: “commingling of funds and other assets of the two entities, the
1 holding out by one entity that it is liable for the debts of the other, identical equitable
2 ownership in the two entities, use of the same offices and employees, use of one as a mere
3 conduit for the affairs of the other, disregard of corporate formalities, lack of segregation
4 of corporate records, and identical directors and officers.” Virtualmagic Asia, Inc. v. Fil–
5 Cartoons, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1, 13 (Ct. App. 2002). To establish inequity in the absence
6 of alter ego liability under the second prong, “a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to
7 demonstrate that ‘conduct amounting to bad faith makes it inequitable for the corporate
8 owner to hide behind the corporate form.’” Stewart v. Screen Gems-EMI Music, Inc., 81 F.
9 Supp. 3d 938, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Sonora Diamond Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
10 837).
11 Here, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s alter ego claim fails because the mere fact
12 that Defendant is the sole shareholder of CRC cannot justify the application of the alter ego
13 doctrine. See Mot. at 27. Defendant states that Konnektive LLC and CRC have separate
14 identities, separate books, and separate employees. See id.; DSSUF ¶ 40. In addition,
15 Defendant asserts that CRC has sufficient assets to meet its debts including employee
16 payroll, taxes, overhead, and other debts. See Mot. at 27; DSSUF ¶ 40. Defendant does not
17 use CRC or Konnektive LLC to pay her personal debts, and she received a salary from
18 Konnektive LLC and dividends from CRC when they were declared. See Mot. at 27;
19 DSSUF ¶ 41. Defendant also argues that no inequity would result if Defendant is not held
20 personally liable for claims against Konnektive LLC and CRC. See Mot. at 28.
21 In opposition, Plaintiff states that a number of factors relevant to an alter ego claim
22 are present. See Oppo. at 29–30. First, Plaintiff points out that Defendant’s claims that
23 corporate formalities were followed contradict Defendant’s claims throughout the Motion
24 that she had no knowledge or involvement in the business. See id. at 29–30. In support of
25 this argument, Plaintiff cites to Defendant’s declaration and testimony. Id. Plaintiff offers
26 statements from Defendant’s testimony in which she states she had no idea what corporate
27 formalities were and did not initially recall submitting declarations in this case. See K.
28 Martorano Depo. 43:1-44:16, 61:4-67:18. Defendant also testified that she did not know
1 what was supposed to happen during corporate annual meetings and that she did not recall
2 whether CRC ever had meetings to elect the company’s directors. See id. 37:4-17. It is
3 especially notable that Defendant testified as to having “no idea how many directors the
4 company had, did not know whether she herself was a director, and did not know anyone
5 who was a director of her own solely-owned corporation.” See id. 37:19-38:19.
6 Additionally, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s contradicting testimony that Matthew
7 Martorano had no formal role in CRC but that he was simultaneously submitting
8 documents on CRC’s behalf to the state and had the ability to determine CRC employees’
9 compensation. See id. 87:13-90:1; 96:16-97:2.
10 Next, Plaintiff points out that this Court has previously recognized a verified
11 complaint from a lawsuit filed in 2018 in Georgia state court by the former Chief Technical
12 Officer of Konnektive Corporation against CRC, Konnektive LLC, and Matthew
13 Martorano by Jared Hall. See Oppo. at 30; ECF No. 130 at 13–14; FAC ¶ 341. The Georgia
14 verified complaint alleged that there existed such a unity of interest and ownership between
15 CRC, Konnektive LLC, and Matthew Martorano that the entities’ separate personalities do
16 not in reality exist and that an inequitable result would lie if the Court allowed them to
17 escape liability through the use of their separate forms. See ECF No. 130 at 13–14; FAC ¶
18 341. Although Defendant was not named in the Georgia complaint, Defendant is alleged
19 in the FAC to have “ha[d] a role controlling operations for all of the Konnektive entities
20 despite them being nominally separate, and operates them from Roswell, Georgia as a
21 single entity along with her husband.” FAC ¶ 341.
22 Here, the evidence offered by Plaintiff leads to the inference that there was a unity
23 of interest and ownership such that the personalities of Konnektive LLC, CRC, and
24 Defendant were no longer separate, and an inequitable result would follow if the acts were
25 treated as those of the corporation alone. The evidence leads to an inference that Defendant
26 “comingl[ed] funds and other assets and failure to segregate funds of the separate entities”
27 and that there was “treatment by an individual of the assets of the corporation as [her]
28 own,” which are two of the factors considered in the alter ego test. See Goodrich v. Briones,
1 || 626 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010); Virtualmagic Asia, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13. It is
2 undisputed that CRC and Konnektive LLC identical directors and officers, which is
3 || another factor considered in the alter ego test. See DSSUF 4 1, 11, 13, 15; ECF No. 367-
4 Exs. 10, 11; Virtualmagic Asia, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13. Therefore, although
5 ||Defendant states that Konnektive LLC and CRC have separate identities, contrary
6 ||inferences may be drawn from the other materials in the record and conflicting inferences
7 be resolved in Plaintiff's favor as the non-moving party. Further, it is for the jury to
8 || weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations.
9 In light of the evidence offered by Plaintiff, the Court finds there is a genuine dispute
10 material fact on this issue and summary judgment is not appropriate. Moreover,
11 ||“[s]ummary judgment based on disregard of the corporate form is typically not appropriate,
12 || because ‘[w]hether a party is liable under an alter-ego theory is normally a question of
13 || fact.’” See Century Sur. Co. v. Belmont Seattle, LLC, 543 F. App’x 737, 738 (9th Cir. 2013)
14 || (quoting Zoran Corp. v. Chen, 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 597, 606 (Ct. App. 2010)). Accordingly,
15 ||the Court denies Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs alter ego
16 claims.
17 CONCLUSION
18 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion for Summary
19 || Judgment.
20 IT IS SO ORDERED.
21 ||Dated: March 14, 2024 NO
22 DE |
73 Honorable Linda Lopez
34 United States District Judge
25
26
27
28