The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARLITA O., Case No.: 23-cv-572-KSC
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER REVIEWING FINAL
13 v. DECISION OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting
SECURITY
Commissioner of Social Security,
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Defendant.
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Plaintiff filed this action challenging the final decision of the Commissioner of
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Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for benefits. Doc. No. 1. This Court directed the
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parties to explore informal resolution of the matter through the meet-and-confer process,
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but the parties were unable to resolve the case on their own. Doc. No. 10, 11. Having
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independently reviewed the parties’ briefing and the Administrative Record (“AR”), the
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Court VACATES the decision of the Commissioner and REMANDS this matter to the
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agency. On remand, the ALJ shall issue a new decision consistent with this Order.
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1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared before an Administrative Law Judge
3 (“ALJ”) for de novo review of the Social Security Commissioner’s initial decision to deny
4 plaintiff’s claim for benefits. See generally AR 20-37.1 Plaintiff’s attorney and the ALJ
5 both examined plaintiff at the hearing, and the ALJ received testimony from a vocational
6 expert. See id.; see also AR 42-56. After reviewing the documentary evidence in the record
7 and hearing the witnesses’ testimony, the ALJ concluded plaintiff was not disabled. AR 37.
8 The ALJ’s decision followed the five steps prescribed by applicable regulations
9 under which the ALJ must sequentially determine (1) if the claimant is engaged in
10 substantial gainful employment; (2) whether the claimant suffers from a “severe”
11 impairment; (3) if any impairment meets or is medically equal to one of the impairments
12 identified in the regulatory Listing of Impairments; (4) the claimant’s residual functional
13 capacity (“RFC”) and whether the claimant could perform any past relevant work; and (5)
14 whether a claimant can make an adjustment to other work based on his or her RFC. See 20
15 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); AR 24-25. The ALJ’s evaluation ends if at any individual step
16 the ALJ finds the claimant is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
17 The ALJ made a threshold finding plaintiff met the insured status requirements
18 through March 31, 2025. AR 25. At step one, the ALJ found plaintiff had not engaged in
19 substantial gainful activity between the alleged onset of disability, February 25, 2020, and
20 the hearing. Id. At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff had four severe physical impairments:
21 “bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, status post carpal tunnel release on the right,
22 degenerative changes of the left shoulder, and mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar
23 spine.” Id. The ALJ found plaintiff had the following non-severe physical and mental
24 impairments: ganglion cyst of the left foot; insomnia; dyspepsia; diabetes mellitus; and
25 unspecificed psychotic, depressive, and anxiety disorders. AR 26-28. At step three, the ALJ
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1 The Court adopts the parties’ citations to the certified record in this matter. All other
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1 found that none of plaintiff’s impairments, alone or in combination met or exceeded the
2 listings of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 28.
3 At step four, the ALJ determined plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
4 (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work, except plaintiff:
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should never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; . . . can
6 occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel,
7 crouch and crawl; . . . can frequently perform handling and
fingering bilaterally; . . . can frequently perform overhead
8 reaching on the left; . . . can frequently perform pushing and
9 pulling on the right; . . . cannot use hand tools requiring torquing
motion and pressure; [and] should avoid concentrated exposure
10 to unprotected heights and moving and dangerous machinery.
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12 AR 28-36; (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a)). The ALJ concluded plaintiff could perform
13 her past relevant work as a budget accountant. AR 36-37. Accordingly, the ALJ found
14 plaintiff was not disabled. AR 37. The Commissoner’s decision to deny plaintiff’s benefits
15 claim became final on October 25, 2022, when the Social Security Appeals Counsel denied
16 plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s decision. AR 9-14.
17 II. DISPUTED ISSUE
18 Plaintiff raises only a single issue in this appeal: the ALJ failed to articulate specific,
19 clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony. Doc
20 No. 12 at 6.
21 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
22 This Court will affirm the ALJ’s decision if (1) the ALJ applied the correct legal
23 standards; and (2) the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Batson v. Comm’r
24 of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 2004). Under the substantial
25 evidence standard, the Commissioner's findings are upheld if supported by inferences
26 reasonably drawn from the record, and if there is evidence in the record to support more
27 than one rational interpretation, the Court will defer to the Commissioner. Id.
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1 The Court’s ability to uphold the ALJ’s decision is limited in that this Court may not
2 make independent findings and therefore cannot uphold the decision on a ground not
3 asserted by the ALJ. See Stout v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1054
4 (9th Cir. 2006). Even if the ALJ makes an error, this Court can nonetheless affirm the
5 denial of benefits if such error was “harmless, meaning it was ‘inconsequential to the
6 ultimate nondisability determination.’” Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1154 (9th Cir. 2020)
7 (quoting Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)).
8 IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COMMISSIONER’S DECISION
9 When a Social Security claimant presents objective medical evidence of an
10 underlying impairment that might reasonably produce the complained-of symptoms, and
11 the ALJ does not find evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant’s
12 testimony about the severity of those symptoms for “specific, clear, and convincing
13 reasons.” Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Brown-Hunter v.
14 Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015)). The “clear and convincing standard requires
15 an ALJ to show his work.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022). “The
16 standard isn’t whether [this] court is convinced, but instead whether the ALJ’s rationale is
17 clear enough that it has the power to convince.” Id. Concurrently, the ALJ may not merely
18 provide a summary of record evidence and a boilerplate conclusion asserting plaintiff’s
19 testimony is generally inconsistent with objective medical evidence. Lambert, 980 F.3d at
20 1277. Rather, the ALJ must identify specific testimony he or she finds not credible and
21 “link that testimony to part of the record supporting” the negative credibility assessment.
22 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d 487.
23 The record shows plaintiff testified the following symptoms impacted her ability to
24 work: pain and tingling in hands from bilateral carpel tunnel syndome causing difficulty
25 with manipulation and inability to file or type on the computer for more than three hours
26 in a work day or 30 minutes at a stretch; left shoulder elasticity and pain when holding
27 objects; inability to lift more than 3-5 pounds because of back, shoulder, and hand injuries;
28 inability to sit for more than thirty minutes due to back pain; hip cramping and chronic shin
1 cramping causing inability to drive for more than five to ten minutes; anxiety and
2 depression that impact her ability to work with colleagues; an inability to lift even light
3 household objects like cups or silverware without a risk of dropping them; sleeplessness
4 due to pain throughout the day which in turn causes lack of focus; blurred vision that
5 impacts the ability to focus on work-related tasks; and urinary incontinence that impacts
6 the ability to attend meetings and meet deadlines. See AR 47-53, 211-18.
7 At step one, the ALJ found plaintiff’ “medically determinable impairments could
8 reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms.” AR 32. At step two, the
9 ALJ found Plaintiff’s statements not fully credible because plaintiff’s “statements
10 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely
11 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for reasons explained
12 in the decision.” Id. An ALJ may not, however, simply write off the plaintiff’s subjective
13 symptom testimony with a boilerplate statement about such testimony not being consistent
14 with the record as a whole. Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102-
15 03 (9th Cir. 2014); accord Moore v. Colvin, 743 F.3d 1118, 1122 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff
16 notes the ALJ included this kind of boilerplate, prefatory language in the decision, and she
17 characterizes the ALJ’s subsequent rationale as “insufficient.” See Doc. No. 12 at 8-9.
18 Based on this Court’s review of the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ did not stop at making a
19 boilerplate recitation of his credibility determination. See generally AR 28-32. At the
20 outset, the ALJ accurately identified the subjective symptoms complained of by plaintiff.
21 See AR 29-30. The ALJ then pointed to at least some of the symptoms plaintiff identified,
22 and explained his rationale for finding plaintiff’s testimony not credible. See, e.g., AR 30-
23 31. However, the ALJ’s method of assessment was not consistent throughout his analysis.
24 Plaintiff’s testimony can be divided into three general categories related to (1) her
25 activities of daily living (“ADLs”); (2) her physical pain from shoulder, back, and wrist
26 impairments; and (3) residual impairments not directly caused by her physical injures. The
27 Court will separately address the ALJ’s assessment of each category because the ALJ’s
28 methods differed for each.
1 Evidence related to a plaintiff’s ADLs is generally of limited probative value
2 because a plaintiff need not be confined to permanent bedrest to be deemed too disabled to
3 work. See Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1016 (9th Cir. 2014). As such, evidence of an
4 ability to engage in ADLs is only probative when it is “inconsistent” with a plaintiff’s
5 testimony or where it establishes skills that can readily be transferred to the workplace. Id.
6 Plaintiff in this case identified serious limitations to her ability to engage in ADLs,
7 testifying she could not manipulate a zipper, do dishes, open jars, or use breakable
8 glassware. AR 52. She claimed an inability to change her clothes without assistance, so she
9 normally remained in pajamas all day. AR 212. She also needed help with personal
10 grooming and food preparation. Id. at 212-13. The ALJ cited a series of reports (dated
11 November 11, 2020, and August 25, 2020) from plaintiff’s physical therapy to support a
12 conclusion that plaintiff’s ability to perform her ADLs was not as dramatically impaired as
13 her subjective testimony indicated. AR 30-31.
14 The ALJ’s reliance on these reports was unpersuasive. While the ALJ noted some
15 “improvement” in the November 11, 2020, report, plaintiff was still reporting an ability to
16 perform her ADLs that barely meets the standard for independent living, let alone a person
17 capable of engaging in full-time work. See AR 986-87. Moreover, that same report
18 indicates plaintiff still struggled to lift more than 8 pounds, which falls below the ten pound
19 limit incorporated into the ALJ’s conclusion plaintiff could perform sedentary work.
20 Compare AR 986 with 20 C.F.R. 404.1567(a). Although this demonstrates an improvement
21 from an earlier report dated August 25, 2020, as the ALJ noted, the August 25, 2020, report
22 paints a dire picture of plaintiff’s condition in which she is limited to lifting only five
23 pounds (or less), and she is incapable of cutting anything “harder than a tomato” in her
24 home kitchen. See AR 1014-15. The record evidence cited by the ALJ was not inconsistent
25 with plaintiff’s testimony at the hearing because it still showed she was seriously impaired
26 in performing her ADLs. The evidence also did not demonstrate transferrable job skills
27 because the reports of plaintiff’s physical therapy still indicate plaintiff was too impaired
28 to perform at the level of work prescribed by the ALJ. The ALJ erred when he rested his
1 conclusion on this evidence because it did not fit the Ninth Circuit’s test for relevant ADL
2 evidence. See Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1016.
3 The ALJ’s rejection of plaintiff’s subjective testimony about her wrist, back, and
4 shoulder also raises issues. The Ninth Circuit has clearly rejected the approach whereby
5 the ALJ sets out a typical Residual Functional Capacity assessment and leaves the Court
6 to conclude the ALJ rejected plaintff’s subjective testimony to the extent it was inconsistent
7 with the RFC assessment. See Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494-95; Treichler, 775 F.3d at
8 1103. The ALJ cannot simply summarize record evidence and state a conclusion: he must
9 give “reasons” why the plaintiff’s testimony is not credible. Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at
10 494. Here, the ALJ did an adequate job of identifying plaintiff’s testimony about her pain
11 symptoms and the degree to which those symptoms impaired plaintiff’s ability to work.
12 AR 29-30. However, he simply concluded “some” of her testimony was inconsistent with
13 the medical record. AR 30. He devoted some effort to inadequately rebutting plaintiff’s
14 claims related to her ADLs. AR 30-32. Then he offered the boilerplate conclusion about
15 plaintiffs “statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her]
16 symptoms [as] not entirely consistent” with the record “for the reasons explained in this
17 decision.” AR 32. At that point, the ALJ appears to have started an RFC assessment that
18 amounted to a recitation of various medical records and reports, with little comment on
19 their significance. See AR 32-36. At no point did the ALJ try to link any of the voluminous
20 medical records to plaintiff’s subjective testimony about her pain, and he never provided
21 specific “reasons” for rejecting plaintiff’s testimony that, on account of her wrist, back,
22 and shoulder, she was incapable of working. The Court concludes the ALJ’s analysis was
23 therefore insufficient because the ALJ appears to have concluded, without providing
24 reasons, that plaintiff’s testimony was simply inconsistent with the RFC assessment.
25 As to plaintiff’s testimony about her sleeplessness, inability to focus, blurred vision,
26 or urinary incontinence, the ALJ’s decision does not provide any reason why that testimony
27 was rejected. The ALJ listed these symptoms and summarily concluded the plaintiff’s
28 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause “some” of the plaintiff’s symptoms.
1 See AR 29-32. However, it is not clear from the ALJ’s decision whether these symptoms
2 were corroborated by objective medical evidence (or not), whether the ALJ found
3 plaintiff’s testimony not credible, or whether the ALJ even considered these factors at all.
4 The only thing the Court can conclude with any clarity is these symptoms went unadressed,
5 which does not discharge the ALJ’s duty. The Court concludes the ALJ erred by rejecting
6 plaintiff’s testimony about her sleeplessness, inability to focus, blurred vision, or urinary
7 incontinence.
8 The Court must also assess whether these errors were harmless. This Court’s ability
9 to assign harmlessness to an ALJ’s error is severely constrained because the decision on
10 an applicant’s disability rests solely with the Social Security Administration. See Brown-
11 Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492. Harmless error is therefore the exception to the rule in Social
12 Security appeals. See id. In the context of a credibility determination such as this one, the
13 Ninth Circuit finds harmless error where the ALJ provides an invalid reason to discount a
14 plaintiff’s subjective symptom testimony, but the ALJ’s decision nonetheless incorporated
15 another, independently sufficient ground for the adverse credibility determination. See
16 Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded on other grounds 20
17 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a). In this case, the ALJ did not address plaintiff’s claims of
18 sleeplessness, inability to focus, blurred vision, or urinary incontinence at all; his
19 assessment of plaintiff’s pain testimony was insufficient; and his assessment of plaintiff’s
20 ADL’s was based on an erroneous reading of the record. None of the ALJ’s flawed analyses
21 were supported by independent, sufficient reasoning free from error. Accordingly, the
22 Court concludes the error here was not harmless.
23 The question of disposition remains. Plaintiff suggested the decision here should be
24 “reversed” as opposed to merely vacated. See Doc. No. 12 at 18. Remand for an award of
25 benefits is inappropriate where the evidence in the record contains conflicts that leave the
26 Court with serious doubts about whether the plaintiff is actually disabled. See Brown-
27 Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495-96. Here, although the ALJ failed to properly assess plaintiff’s
28 subjective symptom testiomony, he also noted a panoply of qualified medical practitioners
1 ||had opined plaintiff was capable of working. See AR 32-36. The Court is not in a position
2 || to resolve this conflict in the evidence. Accordingly, the Court will remand the matter so
3 ALJ may properly evaluate all of the symptoms identified by plaintiff.
4 V. CONCLUSION
5 The ALJ did not correctly evaluate plaintiff's subjective symptom testimony as
6 || required by the controlling regulations and case law. The decision of the Commissioner 1s
7 || VACATED. On remand, the ALJ shall reconsider the record and issue a new decision
8 ||consistent with this Order. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of
9 || plaintiff and close the case.
10 Dated: December 12, 2023 Yy JA
D Hori. Karen 8S. Crawford
United States Magistrate Judge
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