Frias v. County of San Diego

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOSEPH FRIAS, Individually, Case No.: 3:22-CV-00675-JO-AHG

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS

MARTINEZ’S AND GARCIA’S

14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al,

MOTION TO DISMISS

15 Defendants. PLAINTIFF’S THIRD AMENDED

COMPLAINT

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20 Plaintiff Joseph Frias alleges that the County of San Diego (“County”) and certain

21 County employees deprived him of medical care and used excessive force against him

22 while he was in their custody at the George Bailey Detention Facility. Dkt. 42 (“TAC”).

23 In his third amended complaint, Plaintiff added a supervisory liability claim pursuant to 42

24 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against two new defendants, Lieutenant Roberto Martinez and

25 Sergeant Edmundo Garcia (“Defendants Martinez and Garcia”). Id. On September 8,

26 2023, Defendants Martinez and Garcia moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim, arguing that the

27 relevant statute of limitations had passed. Dkt. 55-1 (“Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss”). For the

28 reasons stated below, the Court DENIES their motion to dismiss.

1 I. BACKGROUND

2 Plaintiff alleges that San Diego County employees at the George Bailey Detention

3 Facility used excessive force against him and deprived him of medical care while he was

4 experiencing seizures. See generally TAC. On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff informed Deputies

5 Jacobo and Le that he could not breathe and that he was about to have a seizure. Id. at 2–

6 3. Despite Plaintiff’s request for help, the deputies did not respond. Id. at 3. Plaintiff then

7 started experiencing a seizure, prompting Deputies Jacobo, Le, and Tapia to forcefully

8 restrain him. Id. at 3–4. Later, joined by Deputies Bohan and Banaga, the deputies held

9 Plaintiff down and applied pressure to Plaintiff’s knees. Id. at 4–5. When Plaintiff would

10 not stop convulsing, the deputies placed him in a “WRAP” device to restrain his movement.

11 Id. at 5. Defendants Martinez and Garcia were also present during these encounters; they

12 witnessed the deputies’ use of physical force against Plaintiff and authorized the deputies’

13 use of the WRAP device on Plaintiff. Id. at 20–21.

14 At the time of this incident, Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in County custody on

15 pending charges of assault. Dkt. 67 at 1 (“Defs.’ Reply Mot. Dismiss”). Plaintiff has

16 remained incarcerated since this incident and is now serving his sentence in state prison.

17 Dkt. 65 at 2 (“Pl.’s Opp’n Mot. Dismiss”).

18 On May 13, 2023, Plaintiff filed suit against the County of San Diego and certain

19 County employees alleging injuries stemming from the events on March 9, 2021. Dkt. 1.

20 On July 3, 2023, more than two years after the incident at issue, Plaintiff filed a third

21 amended complaint raising claims for the first time against Defendants Martinez and

22 Garcia. TAC at 20–21. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Martinez and Garcia bear

23 supervisory liability under § 1983 because they knew Plaintiff was suffering from seizures

24 but still permitted the deputies to apply unreasonable force and deprive Plaintiff of

25 necessary medical care. Id.

26 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

27 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. See

28 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In deciding a motion to dismiss, all material

1 factual allegations of the complaint are accepted as true, as well as all reasonable inferences

2 to be drawn from them. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.

3 1996). A court, however, need not accept all conclusory allegations as true. Rather, it

4 must “examine whether conclusory allegations follow from the description of facts as

5 alleged by the plaintiff.” Holden v. Hagopian, 978 F.2d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1992)

6 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A motion to dismiss should be granted if

7 a plaintiff’s complaint fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

8 plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

9 facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

10 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

11 U.S. at 678 (citing id. at 556).

12 A party may raise a statute of limitations defense on a motion to dismiss “[i]f the

13 running of the statute is apparent on the face of the complaint.” Jablon v. Dean Witter &

14 Co., 614 F.2d 677, 682 (9th Cir. 1980). However, such a motion “may be granted only if

15 the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would not permit the

16 plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v. United States, 68

17 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

18 III. DISCUSSION

19 Defendants Martinez and Garcia argue that Plaintiff’s supervisory liability claim is

20 barred by the two-year statute of limitations. See generally Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss.1 Plaintiff,

21 on the other hand, contends that the statute of limitations period should be tolled for two

22 reasons: (1) he was incarcerated at the time of his injury and thus, qualifies for tolling

23 pursuant to the imprisonment disability statute California Code of Civil Procedure § 352.1

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26 1 For purposes of determining the statute of limitations, a § 1983 claim is considered a personal

injury action. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). In California, the statute of limitations period

27 for personal injury actions is two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1 (West 2023). The applicable statute

of limitations is not contested here. Thus, without tolling, Plaintiff was required to file all of his claims

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1 (“CCP § 352.1”); and (2) he did not learn of Defendants Martinez’s and Garcia’s role in

2 causing his injuries until later because they intentionally concealed their participation. Pl.’s

3 Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 3–6. The Court will first examine whether Plaintiff qualifies for

4 tolling under CCP § 352.1 and then determine whether to address Plaintiff’s second tolling

5 argument based on delayed discovery of Defendants Martinez’s and Garcia’s involvement.

6 A. Tolling Under CCP § 352.1

7 Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee when his injuries occurred, the Court must

8 determine whether CCP § 352.1, which permits tolling for the disability of incarceration,

9 equally applies to those in pretrial custody as to those in post-conviction custody.

10 Under CCP § 352.1, the Court may toll the statute of limitations for those who are

11 “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the sentence of a criminal court

12 for a term less than for life” “at the time the cause of action accrued.” CCP § 352.1(a). In

13 acknowledgment of the difficulties posed by incarceration, this provision offers individuals

14 suffering from the “disability” of imprisonment additional time to file their claims. Id.; see

15 Bledstein v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal. Rptr. 428, 441 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (reasoning that the

16 Legislature enacted CCP § 352 as a tolling provision for prisoners “in part by a recognition

17 of the practical, as well as the legal, difficulties prisoners face in instituting and prosecuting

18 suits.” (internal citation and question marks omitted)). While CCP § 352.1’s predecessor,

19 California Code of Civil Procedure § 352(a)(3) (“CCP § 352(a)(3)”), provided indefinite

20 tolling, CCP § 352.1 offers detainees an additional two years to file their claims. See Austin

21 v. Medicis, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 528, 537, 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). For example, an inmate

22 who remained in continuous custody from the time of his injury to the filing of his claim

23 would have “four years to file a [§ 1983] complaint—i.e., the regular two year period under

24 section 335.1 plus two years during which accrual was postponed due to the disability of

25 imprisonment.” Trujillo v. Jacquez, No. 10-cv-05183-YGR, 2015 WL 428010, at *11

26 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2015).

27 The Court concludes that CCP § 352.1 affords the possibility of tolling not only to

28 those serving a prison sentence post-conviction but also to those detained in county jail

1 awaiting trial. See Elliott v. City of Union City, 25 F.3d 800, 802 n.4 (9th Cir. 1994); see

2 also Mosteiro v. Simmons, No. 22-16780, 2023 WL 5695998 (9th Cir. Sept. 5, 2023)

3 (unpublished). In Elliott v. City of Union City, the Ninth Circuit held that CCP § 352(a)(3),

4 the predecessor to § 352.1, equally applies to “pre-trial detainees” in county jail. 25 F.3d

5 at 802 n.4. The circuit court reasoned that the statutory language “imprisoned on a criminal

6 charge”—the same language in CCP § 352.1—clearly denotes “post-arrest custody.” Id.

7 at 803. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit noted that the purpose of this statute

8 “would be ill-served by creating an arbitrary distinction between pre- and post-arraignment

9 incarceration” as someone in “police custody prior to arraignment” is as inhibited in their

10 “ability to investigate their claims, to contact lawyers and to avail themselves of the judicial

11 process” “as someone in custody after arraignment.” Id. at 802–03. Thus, because “actual,

12 uninterrupted incarceration is the touchstone” of this tolling statute, the circuit court held

13 that CCP § 352(a)(3) protections should “cover[] all [continuous] post-arrest custody.” Id.

14 at 803 (internal citation omitted).

15 Despite the subsequent amendment of CCP § 352(a)(3) to § 321.5, the Court finds

16 that Elliott remains the applicable law on the availability of tolling for pre-trial detainees.

17 Following the statute’s amendment, the California Court of Appeal in Austin v. Medicis

18 held that the newly enacted CCP § 321.5 excluded pretrial detainees from the protections

19 of the statute. 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 542 (“[A] would-be plaintiff is ‘imprisoned on a criminal

20 charge’ . . . [only] if he or she is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison.”). After

21 finding the term “imprisoned” ambiguous and subsequently turning to the statute’s

22 legislative history, the Austin court concluded that the statute only pertained to state

23 prisoners. Id. at 589–97. Mindful of its responsibility to follow the precedent of the state’s

24 highest court when interpreting state statutes, the Court examines whether the state

25 appellate court’s decision in Austin is “how the highest state court would decide the issue.”

26 Vestar Dev. II, LLC v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 249 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal

27 citation omitted) (establishing that when there is no applicable California Supreme Court

28 decision, a court “must predict how the highest state court would decide the issue using

1 intermediate appellate court decisions, decisions from other jurisdictions, statutes,

2 treatises, and restatements as guidance.” (internal citation omitted)). For the following

3 reasons, the Court finds that there is “convincing evidence that the state supreme court

4 would decide [the scope of CCP § 352.1] differently” and thus, respectfully declines to

5 follow Austin. Id. (internal citation omitted) (“[A] federal court is obligated to follow the

6 decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts” only “where there is no convincing

7 evidence that the state supreme court would decide differently.” (internal citation omitted)).

8 Persuaded by the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in its unpublished decision, Mosteiro v.

9 Simmons, the Court finds that the California Supreme Court would be unlikely to follow

10 Austin because its reasoning conflicts with important principles of statutory interpretation.2

11 See 2023 WL 5695998. As the Ninth Circuit noted, the Austin court erred in finding CCP

12 § 352.1 ambiguous and in subsequently turning to legislative history to resolve its meaning.

13 Id. at *2–3. To begin, the Austin court improperly focused on the meaning of “imprisoned”

14 without considering its larger context: “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution

15 under the sentence of a criminal court.” See Super. Ct. v. Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd., 241 Cal.

16 Rptr. 3d 554, 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of statutory

17 construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be

18 determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.” (internal

19 citation and quotation marks omitted)). In doing so, the Austin court ignored the critical

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2 The Court notes, however, that pre-Mosteiro, many district courts have reached the opposite

22 conclusion. See, e.g., Sekerke v. Hoodenpyle, No. 19-cv-35-WQH-JLB, 2020 WL 914885, at *4–5 (S.D.

Cal. Feb. 26, 2020) (declining to follow Elliott because federal courts “must follow the decision of the

23 intermediate appellate court of the state.”) (internal citation omitted)); Arreola v. Cnty. of Fresno Pub.

Def.’s Office, No. 1:20-cv-00272-AWI-SAB, 2020 WL 1169222, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2020)

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(following Austin and holding that “section 352.1 does not apply to an individual who is in pretrial custody

25 in a county jail at the time his claims accrued because he is not ‘imprisoned on a criminal charge’ within

the meaning of section 352.1”); Garcia v. Corral, No. 18-cv-04730-PJH, 2019 WL 931754, at *3 (N.D.

26 Cal. Feb. 26, 2019) (same); Lockett v. County of Los Angeles, No. CV-185838-PJW, 2018 WL 6842539,

at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2018) (same); see also Shaw v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 810 F. App’x

27 553, 554 (9th Cir. 2020) (reasoning that it was “obligated to follow” Austin in the absence of evidence

that the California Supreme Court would rule to the contrary); Darbouze v. Christopher, No. 21-55133,

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1 language, “on a criminal charge,” which modifies the term “imprisoned.” See Golden State

2 Boring & Pipe Jacking, Inc. v. Orange Cnty. Water Dist., 49 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447, 453 (Cal.

3 Ct. App. 2006) (holding that courts may not “delet[e]” or “read[ ] out” terms that the

4 Legislature inserted). Importantly, the “usual and ordinary meaning” of “charge” is “the

5 specific crime the defendant is accused of committing,” not the crime for which he is

6 convicted. Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990); see also Maddox v. Lake, No. D066181,

7 2015 WL 4571550, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. July 29, 2015) (noting that under CCP § 352.1, an

8 individual can face “charges” pre-conviction); McAlpine v. Super. Ct., 257 Cal. Rptr. 32,

9 35, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that “criminal charge” in a similar statute means an

10 “accusatory pleading” that precedes judgment and sentence). Thus, when “imprisoned” is

11 analyzed in its context—“imprisoned on a criminal charge”—rather than in isolation, the

12 term’s meaning is not ambiguous as it clearly signifies custody prior to conviction. See

13 Mosteiro, 2023 WL 5695998, at *2.

14 Second, the Austin court’s reading of “imprisoned” as post-conviction custody is

15 flawed because it renders critical language in CCP § 352.1 superfluous. The statute

16 provides tolling for those “imprisoned on a criminal charge, or in execution under the

17 sentence of a criminal court.” CCP § 352.1 (emphasis added). Because “in execution

18 under the sentence of a criminal court” already signifies post-conviction custody,

19 interpreting “imprisoned on a criminal charge” identically would make the statute

20 unnecessarily redundant. See City of Huntington Park v. Super. Ct., 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 68,

21 72 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (establishing that “a construction of a statute which makes some

22 words surplusage” violates a “cardinal rule” of statutory interpretation). Moreover, by

23 indistinguishably interpreting the two phrases as post-conviction custody in state prison,

24 the Austin court’s reading ignores the statute’s disjunctive “or,” which requires that each

25 phrase “be given separate meaning.” Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979);

26 see also Ruiz v. Ahern, No. 20-cv-01089-DMR, 2020 WL 4001465, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July

27 15, 2020) (finding that no explanation was provided “for why section 352.1 contains both

28 phrases in the disjunctive”). Because CCP § 352.1’s relevant language is not ambiguous

1 when read consistently with principles of statutory interpretation, the Court is convinced

2 that the California Supreme would neither deem it necessary nor appropriate to turn to

3 legislative history as the Austin court did. See Am. Tower Corp. v. City of San Diego, 763

4 F.3d 1035, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he text of the statute is ‘persuasive data’ that the

5 California Court of Appeal misinterpreted” a statute.); see also Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P.

6 v. Bd. of Equalization, 189 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 681 (Cal. App. Ct. 2015) (“[R]esort to

7 legislative history is appropriate only where statutory language is ambiguous.” (internal

8 citation and quotation marks omitted)).

9 Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s broader reading of CCP § 352.1 is more reflective of the

10 statute’s “prevailing purpose” than the Austin court’s interpretation. Mosteiro, 2023 WL

11 5695998, at *3. According to the California Court of Appeal, the Legislature originally

12 enacted CCP § 352 as a tolling provision for prisoners in “recognition of the practical, as

13 well as the legal, difficulties prisoners face in instituting and prosecuting suits.” Bledstein,

14 208 Cal. Rptr. at 441 (finding that CCP § 352 applied to federal prisoners in a half-way

15 house). The Ninth Circuit has similarly recognized that the tolling statute serves to

16 compensate for the challenges that all detainees face in bringing litigation, explaining that

17 no one “form[ ] of custody” creates a greater challenge than the other. Elliott, 25 F.3d at

18 802–03. In holding that CCP § 352.1 only applies to state prisoners—rather than all

19 detainees—the Austin court deviated from the statute’s goal to redress the legal barriers

20 posed by incarceration. In conclusion, the Court finds that both the plain language and

21 prevailing purpose of CCP § 352.1 provide convincing evidence that the California

22 Supreme Court would not adopt the Austin court’s reasoning. See Vestar, 249 F.3d at 960.

23 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit instructs, the Court holds that CCP § 352.1’s tolling provisions

24 equally apply to pretrial detainees as to state prisoners. See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802–03;

25 Mosteiro, 2023 WL 5695998, at *4.

26 Here, Plaintiff is eligible for tolling pursuant to CCP § 352.1 because he was in pre-

27 trial custody when County officers allegedly violated his constitutional rights and he has

28 remained in continuous custody ever since. See Elliott, 25 F.3d at 802–03. While the two-

| || year statute of limitations for his § 1983 claims would have normally expired by March 9,

2 2023, under CCP § 352.1’s tolling provisions, Plaintiff is entitled to an additional two years

3 || to file with a deadline of March 9, 2025. See Trujillo, 2015 WL 428010, at *11. Because

4 Plaintiff filed his § 1983 supervisory liability claims against Defendants Martinez and

5 || Garcia on July 3, 2023, these claims are timely.

6 Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Martinez and

7 || Garcia are not barred by the statute of limitations under CCP § 352.1, it declines to address

8 || Plaintiff's delayed discovery arguments. See generally TAC.

9 IV. CONCLUSION

10 For the reasons set out above, the Court DENIES Defendants Martinez’s and

11 || Garcia’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff's TAC.

12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13 || Dated: November 29, 2023 Qe

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15 Honorable Jinsook Ohta”

16 United States District Judge

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