“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by 17 showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, 18 inadequate, or obviously futile”
How later courts described this case
- “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by 17 showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged, 18 inadequate, or obviously futile”
- “As a general rule, members of a collective 6 bargaining unit must first exhaust contractual grievance procedures before bringing an 7 action for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.”
- whether repudiation of arbitration based on conduct occurring before court 28 estops repudiator from relying on the arbitration provisions as a defense to employers’ 1 damages action
- a document may be incorporated by reference into a 28 complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the 1 basis of the plaintiff's claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 EUROPA AUTO IMPORTS, INC. d/b/a Case No.: 22cv1987-GPC(BGS)
MERCEDES-BENZ OF SAN DIEGO,
12
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S
Plaintiff,
13 MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST
v. AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
14
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
15 JURISDICTION AND GRANTING
MACHINISTS AND AEROSAPCE
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
16 WORKERS LOCAL LODGE NO. 1484,
DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE
MACHINISTS AUTOMOTIVE
17 A CLAIM WITH LEAVE TO
TRADES DISTRICT LODGE 190 and
AMEND
18 DOES 1 through 50, inclusive,
19 Defendants. [Dkt. No. 18.]
20
21 Before the Court is Defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint
22 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (Dkt. No. 18.)
23 Plaintiff filed a response on September 15, 2023. (Dkt. No. 22.) A reply was filed by
24 Defendant on September 29, 2023. (Dkt. No. 23.) The Court finds that the matter is
25 appropriate for decision without oral argument pursuant to Local Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1).
26
27
28
1 Based on the reasoning below, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
2 of subject matter jurisdiction and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
3 state a claim with leave to amend.1
4 Background
5 On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff Europa Auto Imports, Inc. d/b/a Mercedes-Benz
6 of San Diego (“Plaintiff” or “Europa”) filed a complaint against Defendant International
7 Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers Local Lodge No. 1484, Machinists
8 Automotive Trades District Lodge 190 (“Defendant” or “Union”) for breach of the
9 collective bargaining agreement and related claims. (Dkt. No. 1, Compl.) On July 20,
10 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
11 of subject matter jurisdiction and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to
12 state a claim with leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 12.) Plaintiff filed a first amended
13 complaint (“FAC”) on August 3, 2023 alleging 1) breach of the collective bargaining
14 agreement pursuant to Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”),
15 29 U.S.C. § 185; 2) unfair labor practice causing injury to business or property pursuant
16 to Section 303 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 187; 3) tortious interference with prospective
17 economic advantage and contractual business relations; 4) trespass to chattel; 5) trespass
18 to real property; 6) defamation; and 7) unfair competition under California Business &
19 Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC.)
20 According to the FAC, Europa and the Union entered into a written collective
21 bargaining agreement (“CBA”) effective May 1, 2019 until April 30, 2022. (Id. ¶ 13.)
22 Prior to April 30, 2022 and continuing through July 2022, both parties held bargaining
23 sessions to amend the CBA to agree on terms for a new contract. (Id. ¶ 34.) The no
24
25
26 1 Defendant filed a request for judicial notice of the unfair labor practice charges filed by the Union on
July 1, 2022, (21-CA-298789), and July 7, 2022, (21-CA-298926), as well as a complaint by the
27 Regional Director of Region 21 of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”). (Dkt. No. 18-2; Dkt.
No. 18-3, Fujimoto Decl.) Because the Court did not rely on these documents in its ruling, the Court
28
1 strike provision of section 32 of the CBA prohibits the Union from engaging in any
2 “strike, picketing, sympathy strike, work stoppage, slowdown of work or walk” during
3 the term of the CBA. (Id. ¶ 33.) Beginning in April 2022, “the Union planned,
4 organized, caused and directed an illegal work slowdown and work stoppages and/or
5 false sickouts among the bargaining unit employees . . . .” (Id. ¶ 35.) Plaintiff maintains
6 that the Union breached the CBA. (Id.)
7 On May 31, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a timely grievance with the Union and/or
8 made a demand for arbitration but Defendant has failed to comply even though the breach
9 occurred prior to the expiration of the CBA. (Id. ¶ 36.) Europa further alleges that the
10 work slowdown was done for economic purposes and not for any unfair labor practice.
11 (Id. ¶ 38.) Due to the Union’s breach of the CBA, Europa has been prevented from
12 timely sales and service of vehicles and has incurred and will incur substantial costs and
13 expenses due to the illegal work slowdown and stoppage. (Id. ¶ 39.) Plaintiff has
14 secured permanent, temporary, stopgap and conditional labor to maintain its operations
15 during the strike resulting in additional damages. (Id. ¶ 41.)
16 Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the FAC for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
17 and failure to state a claim which is fully briefed. (Dkt. Nos. 18, 22, 23.)
18 Discussion
19 A. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
20 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(1) provides for dismissal of a
21 complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Rule 12(b)(1)
22 jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual. White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242
23 (9th Cir. 2000). Here, as with the prior motion to dismiss, Defendant does not articulate
24 what type of challenge it is seeking. As before, Defendants appears to be mounting a
25 factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction because it relies on evidence outside the
26 complaint.
27 In a factual attack, the challenger provides evidence that an alleged fact in the
28 complaint is false, thereby resulting in a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for
1 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). Under a factual attack, the
2 allegations in the complaint are not presumed to be true, White, 227 F.3d at 1242, and
3 “the district court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings, but may review any
4 evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual disputes concerning the
5 existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988).
6 “Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss into a factual motion by
7 presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court, the party
8 opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its
9 burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Savage v. Glendale Union H.S., Dist.
10 No. 205, Maricopa Cnty., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2003). The district court
11 may review evidence beyond the complaint without converting the motion to dismiss into
12 a motion for summary judgment. See id. However, “[a] court may not resolve genuinely
13 disputed facts where ‘the question of jurisdiction is dependent on the resolution of factual
14 issues going to the merits.’” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987)
15 (citations omitted). Ultimately, Plaintiff has the burden to demonstrate that subject
16 matter jurisdiction exists. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375,
17 377 (1994).
18 B. Legal Standard on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits dismissal for “failure to state a
20 claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal under Rule
21 12(b)(6) is appropriate where the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient
22 facts to support a cognizable legal theory. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t., 901
23 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), the
24 plaintiff is required only to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
25 that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
26 claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
27 544, 555 (2007).
28
1 A complaint may survive a motion to dismiss only if, taking all well-pleaded
2 factual allegations as true, it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is
3 plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly,
4 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
5 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
6 for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
7 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. “In sum, for a
8 complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory factual content, and
9 reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling
10 the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. United States Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.
11 2009) (quotations omitted). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court accepts as
12 true all facts alleged in the complaint, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
13 plaintiff. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 956 (9th Cir. 2009).
14 Where a motion to dismiss is granted, “leave to amend should be granted ‘unless
15 the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged
16 pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.’” DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
17 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture
18 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)). In other words, where leave to amend would
19 be futile, the Court may deny leave to amend. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at 658; Schreiber,
20 806 F.2d at 1401.
21 C. First Cause of Action –Section 301(a) of the LMRA
22 The FAC asserts a Section 301 claim under the LMRA alleging breach of the no-
23 strike provision of the CBA when the Union directed a work slowdown, work stoppage
24 and/or false sickouts in mid-April 2022, prior to the expiration of the CBA. (Dkt. No. 13,
25 FAC ¶¶ 33, 35.)
26 The Union raises three challenges seeking dismissal of the first cause of action.
27 First, it argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Europa alleges a
28
1 breach that occurred after the expiration of the CBA. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 12. )
2 Alternatively, the Union contends that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because
3 the issue is not ripe since Europa did not exhaust contractual grievance remedies. (Id. at
4 12, 14-15.) Further, the Union maintains that the FAC fails to allege exhaustion of
5 contractual grievance remedies under rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 15.)
6 1. Rule 12(b)(1) - Subject Matter Jurisdiction
7 According to the FAC, federal subject matter jurisdiction exists under Section
8 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶ 2.)
9 Section 301(a)3 of the LMRA confers the Court with subject matter jurisdiction
10 over “[s]uits for violation of contracts.” Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Div.,
11 Avco Corp. v. United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of America, Int’l.
12 Union, 523 U.S. 653, 656 (1998). “Section 301(a) is a basis for jurisdiction when the suit
13 is based on a colorable claim of breach of contract between an employer and a labor
14 organization in an industry affecting commerce and the resolution of the lawsuit is
15 focused upon and governed by the terms of the contract.” Painting & Decorating
16 Contractors Ass'n of Sacramento, Inc. v. Painters & Decorators Joint Comm. of E. Bay
17 Cntys., Inc., 707 F.2d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir. 1983).
18 Moreover, “[a]n expired CBA itself is no longer a ‘legally enforceable document.’”
19 Off. & Pro. Employees Ins. Trust Fund v. Laborers Funds Admin. Off. of N. Cal., Inc.,
20 783 F.2d 919, 922 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Cement Masons Health and Welfare Trust
21 Fund For N, Cal. v. Kirkwood-Bly, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 942, 944-45 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
22 aff'd, 692 F.2d 641, (9th Cir. 1982)); Lumber Prod. Indus. Workers Loc. No. 1054 v. W.
23 Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, Inc., 775 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1985) (“It logically
24
25
2 Page numbers are based on the CM/ECF pagination.
26 3 “Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations,
27 may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without
respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.” 29 U.S.C. §
28
1 follows that an expired [collective bargaining] agreement cannot serve as the basis for a
2 proper exercise of jurisdiction under section 301(a)”); Cement Masons Health and
3 Welfare Trust Fund v. Kirkwood–Bly, Inc., 520 F. Supp. 942, 946 (N.D. Cal. 1981)
4 (“Plaintiffs cite no case, nor can we find any, which ha[s] permitted district courts to
5 enforce properly expired collective bargaining agreements in a section 301 action”), aff'd,
6 692 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1982). As a general rule, where the bargaining contract at issue
7 has expired, the parties are “released . . . from their respective contractual obligations”
8 and any dispute between them cannot be said to arise under the contract. Litton Fin.
9 Printing Div. v. N.L.R.B., 501 U.S. 190, 206 (1991).
10 Here, the parties entered into a CBA effective May 1, 2019 through April 30, 2022.
11 (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶ 13; Dkt. No. 4-2, Kucera Decl., Ex. A, CBA § 33.01.)
12 Relevant to this case, the CBA also provides:
13 SECTION 32. NO STRIKE, NO LOCKOUT
14
32.01 During the term of this Agreement, the union agrees that it will not
15 authorize, cause, induce, support or condone any strike, picketing, sympathy
strike, work stoppage, slowdown of work or walk out by any employee
16
covered by this Agreement; however, it shall not be a violation of this
17 Agreement for any person covered by this Agreement to refuse to cross any
lawful primary picket line.
18
19
(Id. § 32.01.)
20
The Union argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because Europa
21
alleges a breach that occurred in May 2022 after the expiration of the CBA. (Dkt. No.
22
18-1 at 12.) It relies on Europa’s grievance email sent on May 31, 2022 alleging
23
breaching conduct that occurred in May 2022 after the CBA expired. (Id.) Europa
24
responds that the allegations in the complaint “corroborated by declarations submitted
25
26
27
28
1 with this Opposition” establish that the Union materially breached the CBA in mid-April
2 2022. (Dkt. No. 22 at 6.)
3 In its prior order, relying on the complaint and the declarations of two Union
4 employees and the General Manager of Europa, the Court concluded that the alleged
5 breach of the CBA based on the work slowdown alleged in April 2022, prior to the
6 expiration of the CBA, survived and denied dismissal of the Section 301. (Dkt. No. 12 at
7 11.) The FAC similarly alleges breach of the CBA based on the Union directed
8 slowdown beginning in mid-April 2022. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶ 16.) In its opposition,
9 Europa relies on the declarations filed with its prior opposition to the motion to dismiss.
10 Based on the Court’s prior ruling, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss for
11 lack of subject matter jurisdiction.5
12 2. Rule 12(b)(1) - Ripeness
13 Alternatively, Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
14 because the Section 301 claim is not ripe as Europa failed to exhaust contractual
15 grievance remedies. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 12, 14.) Europa does not directly address the
16 ripeness issue but argues that it invoked the grievance process on May 31, 2022 and the
17 CBA does not require arbitration where the Union has refused to convene an adjustment
18 board. (Dkt. No. 22 at 6-12.)
19 The Court is not persuaded by the Union’s ripeness argument. The authorities
20 relied on by the Union involve motions to stay pending arbitration or petitions to compel
21
22
23 4 Plaintiff references declarations submitted with the opposition; however, no declarations are attached.
(See Dkt. No. 22.) Presumably, Plaintiff is referencing the declarations of two Union employees and the
24
General Manager of Europa stating that the Union implicitly and explicitly encouraged a work
25 slowdown in mid-April 2022 that was filed in connection with its opposition to the prior motion to
dismiss. (Dkt. No. 7-3, Cikos Decl; Dkt. No. 7-4, Irwin Decl.; Dkt. No. 7-2, Ritchey Decl.)
26 5 The parties dispute the interpretation of the May 31, 2022 email concerning when the alleged unlawful
conduct occurred; however, the Court need not address the dispute because it already ruled that Europa
27 had sufficiently alleged a breach of the CBA in April 2022 as it concerned the work stoppage.
Moreover, to the extent the May 31, 2022 grievance email raises a disputed issue of fact on jurisdiction,
28
1 arbitration and do not address the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 18-1
2 at 11 n. 2; id. at 15 n.5.) Neither does the Union’s argument that the United States
3 Supreme Court’s use of “moot” to illustrate that the Supreme Court views the issue of
4 exhaustion as jurisdictional in Clayton v. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr.
5 Implement Workers of Am., 451 U.S. 679, 692 (1981), support its ripeness argument.
6 (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 15 n.5.) The Court in Clayton addressed a circuit conflict as to whether
7 “an employee should be required to exhaust internal union appeals procedures before
8 bringing suit against a union or employer under § 301” and held “that where an internal
9 union appeals procedure cannot result in reactivation of the employee's grievance or an
10 award of the complete relief sought in his § 301 suit, exhaustion will not be required with
11 respect to either the suit against the employer or the suit against the union.” Clayton, 451
12 U.S. at 686. The Court’s use of “moot” was not in the context of subject matter
13 jurisdiction nor ripeness and this Court declines to rely on Clayton to support the Union’s
14 ripeness argument. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack
15 of subject matter jurisdiction based on ripeness as not legally supported.
16 3. Rule 12(b)(6) - Failure to Exhaust Contractual Grievances
17 Additionally, the Union argues that the first cause of action for breach of the CBA
18 fails for insufficiently alleging exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures in the
19 CBA. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 15-16.)
20 a. Legal Framework
21 The Ninth Circuit has recognized that failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense
22 that must be properly pled and proven at the summary judgment stage. Albino v. Baca,
23 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). However, if a failure to exhaust is “clear on the
24 face of the complaint”, a defendant may move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at
25 1166. Although Albino addressed a Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) case, the
26 court made clear that these procedures are appropriate in all contexts where exhaustion
27 applies and explicitly included LMRA claims. Id. at 1171 (overruling Inlandboatmens
28 Union of the Pac. v. Dutra Grp., 279 F.3d 1075, 1078 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2002) (exhaustion of
1 non judicial remedies under the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”) and Ritza
2 v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 837 F.2d 365, 369 (9th Cir. 1988)
3 (per curiam) (LMRA)); see also United Ass’n of Journeyman and Apprentices of the
4 Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Indus., Underground Utility/Landscape Local Union No. 355
5 v. Maniglia Landscape, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-03037-RS, 2017 WL 11500057, at *4 (N.D.
6 Cal. Oct. 26, 2017) (citing Albino, 747 F.3d at 1171); Patrick v. Nat’l Football League,
7 Case No. CV 23-1069-DMG (SHKx), 2023 WL 6162672, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept.. 21,
8 2023) (applying Albino framework to motion to dismiss) (citing Avila v. Sheet Metal
9 Workers Loc. Union No. 293, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1044, 1059 (D. Haw. 2019) (applying
10 Albino v. Baca framework to motion to dismiss in LMRA case); Jay v. Serv. Emps. Int'l
11 Union-United Health Care Workers W., 203 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1041 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
12 (same)). Further, the burden to prove exhaustion falls on the defendant. See Albino, 747
13 F.3d at 1166 (“Failure to exhaust . . . is an affirmative defense the defendant must plead
14 and prove”) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 204 (2007)) (internal citations
15 omitted)). However, the burden of demonstrating that exhaustion would be futile falls on
16 the plaintiff. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172 (“the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by
17 showing that the local remedies were ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged,
18 inadequate, or obviously futile”) (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778
19 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996)).
20 Because Defendant raises Europa’s failure to exhaust under Rule 12(b)(6), the
21 Court looks at whether the failure to exhaust is apparent on the face of the FAC.6
22 / / /
23 / / /
24
25
6 The Union does not object to the Court’s prior reliance on Albino on the procedure to apply when
26 exhaustion is raised. However, it argues this case is akin Clayton where an aggrieved employee sought
relief under Section 301 against his employer for breach of contract and against his union for breaching
27 the duty of fair representation and should be followed by this Court. (Dkt. No. 23 at 8 n.4.) However,
besides its own opinion, the Union fails to provide any legal authority that Clayton applies to the instant
28
1 b. Extrinsic Evidence on Rule 12(b)(6)
2 To support its failure to exhaust defense, the Union relies on email
3 communications between Kevin Kucera, the Business Representative of Defendant, and
4 Roman Zhuk, Senior Vice President of Human Resources and Legal Counsel for
5 Plaintiff, (Dkt. No. 18-5, Kucera Decl., Ex. A), dated May 24, 2022 through June 7,
6 2022, arguing that they are proper for the Court’s consideration under the incorporation
7 by reference doctrine. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 15.) The Union also argues that the emails
8 between Jesse Juarez, Area Director of Organizing and Mr. Zhuk from June 13, 2022
9 through June 24, 2022, (Dkt. No. 18-5, Kucera Decl., Ex. B), should also be considered
10 under the same doctrine. (Id.)
11 “When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, if a district court considers
12 evidence outside of the pleadings, it must normally convert the 12(b)(6) motion into a
13 Rule 56 motion for summary judgment, and it must give the nonmoving party an
14 opportunity to respond.” United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). “A
15 court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint,
16 documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—
17 without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Id.
18 Under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine, the court may consider documents
19 that are referenced in the complaint as though they are part of the complaint. Khoja v.
20 Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1002 (9th Cir. 2018). Its purpose is to
21 “prevent[] plaintiffs from selecting only portions of documents that support their claims,
22 while omitting portions of those very documents that weaken—or doom—their claims.”
23 Id. (citation omitted). Documents may be incorporated by reference in the complaint
24 when “(1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the document is central to the
25 plaintiff's claim; and (3) no party questions the authenticity of the copy attached to the
26 12(b)(6) motion.” Marder v. Lopez, 450 F.3d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal citations
27 omitted); Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908(a document may be incorporated by reference into a
28 complaint “if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms the
1 basis of the plaintiff's claim”). The contents of the documents may be assumed to be true
2 for purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908; In re NVIDIA
3 Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046, 1058 n.10 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Once a document is deemed
4 incorporated by reference, the entire document is assumed to be true for purposes of a
5 motion to dismiss, and both parties—and the Court—are free to refer to any of its
6 contents.”). Documents incorporated by reference may be considered as “part of the
7 complaint,” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion into one for summary judgment.
8 Ritchie, 342 F.3d at 908.
9 In this case, the emails dated May 24, 2022 through June 7, 2022 between Mr.
10 Kucera and Mr. Zhuk are specifically referenced and selectively quoted in the FAC and
11 form the basis of Europa’s claim that it exhausted contractual grievance remedies. (Dkt.
12 No. 13, FAC ¶¶ 18-23.) Further, no party disputes the authenticity of the email
13 exchanges. Therefore, the Court considers the email exchange between Mr. Kucera nd
14 Mr. Zhuk under the incorporation by reference doctrine without converting the motion to
15 dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. However, the emails between Mr. Juarez
16 and Mr. Zhuk are not referenced or cited in the FAC and while they may support whether
17 Plaintiff exhausted contractual remedies, they are not properly considered under the
18 incorporation by reference doctrine. Therefore, the Court declines to consider the
19 Juarez/Zhuk emails for purposes of determining whether Europa has sufficiently alleged
20 exhaustion of mandatory contractual grievance procedures.
21 c. Exhaustion of Mandatory Contractual Grievance Procedure
22 “As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy
23 requires . . . use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union
24 as the mode of redress.” Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965). In
25 passing Section 301, Congress’ intent was to encourage mutually agreed upon grievance
26 procedures between the parties in a collective bargaining agreement to “promote a higher
27 degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements . . . thereby promot[ing]
28 industrial peace.” Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Am. Bakery & Confectionery
1 Workers Int'l, AFL–CIO, 370 U.S. 254, 263 (1962) (quoting S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong.,
2 1st Sess. 17). Therefore, mandatory grievance and arbitration procedures contained in a
3 collective bargaining agreement must be exhausted before bringing a lawsuit under
4 Section 301 of the LMRA. See Republic Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 652; Carr v. Pac. Mar.
5 Ass'n, 904 F.2d 1313, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990) (“As a general rule, members of a collective
6 bargaining unit must first exhaust contractual grievance procedures before bringing an
7 action for breach of the collective bargaining agreement.”).
8 Here, neither party disputes that a party must exhaust the grievance procedures
9 agreed upon in a CBA prior to filing a complaint in this court. Section 7 of the CBA
10 covers “any difference[s that] arise concerning the provisions of this Agreement.” (Dkt.
11 No. 4-2, Kucera Decl., Ex. A, CBA § 7 at 10.7)
12 SECTION 7. GRIEVANCE AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES
13
7.01 Should any difference arise concerning the provisions of this
14 Agreement which cannot satisfactorily be adjusted be adjusted by the
Business Representative of the Union and the Employer, the written dispute
15
shall be submitted in writing within ten (10) working days of any deadlock,
16 to an adjustment board composed of not more than two (2) representatives of
the Union and not more than two (2) representatives of the Employer. A
17
majority decision of the adjustment board shall be final and binding on all
18 parties.
19
7.02 Time for Presenting Grievances: All claims or grievances of any kind . .
20 . must be presented to the other party within thirty (30) working days of first
knowledge of the facts concerning such grievance or said claim will be
21
deemed waived.
22
7.03 The adjustment board shall meet within ten (10) working days of the
23
written submission in accordance with Section 7.01 above. In the event of
24 the failure of the adjustment board to reach an agreement within fifteen (15)
working days after appointment, it shall lose jurisdiction and the matter may
25
26
27 7 Neither party has sought judicial notice of the CBA. However, because the FAC quotes the provisions
of section 7.01 and 7.02, the Court considers the CBA that was filed with the first motion to dismiss
28
1 be referred to an impartial arbitrator to be mutually selected by the Union
and the Employer. In the event the Employer and the Union are unable to
2
agree upon the selection of the arbitrator within ten (10) working days, the
3 Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service shall be petitioned to submit a
panel of five (5) arbitrators. Each of the parties shall delete the names of two
4
(2) of the panel members and the remaining arbitrator shall decide the issue.
5
6 (Dkt. No. 4-2, Kucera Decl., Ex. A, CBA § 7 at 10-11.)
7 Here, the FAC alleges exhaustion of administrative remedies. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC
8 ¶¶ 14-24.) However, the FAC selectively quotes from the emails between Mr. Kucera
9 and Mr. Zhuk to support exhaustion of contractual grievance remedies. In determining
10 whether Europa has sufficiently alleged exhaustion, the Court also considers the emails
11 dated May 31, 2022 to June 7, 2022 between Mr. Kucera and Mr. Zhuk under the
12 incorporation by reference doctrine.
13 On May 31, 2022, Mr. Zhuk, of Europa, sent an email to Mr. Kucera, the Union
14 representative, initiating a grievance pursuant to Section 7 of the CBA. (Dkt. No. 18-5,
15 Kucera Decl., Ex. A at 7-8.) The email explained, “[w]ithin the last 30 days and
16 continuing, the Union has called for a work slowdown amounting to a work stoppage in
17 direct violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.” (Id. at 8.) “As a result, the
18 Employer has been damaged in an amount to be proven at the arbitration of this matter to
19 exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000). Please contact me at your earliest
20 convenience to set up an Adjustment Board. If you would like to waive the Adjustment
21 Board and proceed directly to arbitration, please advise.” (Id.)
22 On June 1, 2022, Mr. Kucera responded that because the Union sent a notice of
23 intent to terminate dated February 1, 2022, there was no longer a contract, and therefore,
24 no grievance or arbitration provision and no-strike/no-lockout provision in effect. (Id. at
25 7.) He further denied that the Union ever called for an alleged work slowdown or work
26 stoppage. (Id.) In conclusion, he wrote, “In closing, I believe you will conclude there is
27 no reason to proceed.” (Id.) On the same day, Mr. Zhuk responded that normally there
28 would be no grievance procedure if a contract expired; however, based on his careful
1 reading of the contract, there was language that allowed for a grievance concerning a
2 cessation of work during bargaining after the termination of the contract. (Id.) He again
3 concluded with, “Please let me know if you would like to have an adjustment board and
4 when or waive such process and proceed directly to arbitration.” (Id.)
5 On June 2, 2022, Mr. Kucera replied that he disagreed with Mr. Zhuk’s
6 interpretation because the Union had issued a notice of intent to terminate on February 1,
7 2022. (Id. at 6.) Nonetheless, he wrote, “we are willing to bargain over this issue. In
8 order to do so, please provide authority that you think supports your position that the
9 agreement’s arbitration clause survived the termination of the agreement.” (Id.) On
10 June 7, 2022, Mr. Roman provided legal authority to support his position and concluded
11 with “Please let us know if you plan to go through the grievance process (adjustment
12 board, etc.), or we will be forced to take the lack of an affirmative response as a refusal
13 and seek to compel the Union to arbitrate the grievance.” (Id. at 6.) No more
14 communications are alleged between Mr. Kucera and Mr. Zhuk.
15 First, the email communications, themselves, appear incomplete and do not
16 demonstrate an absolute repudiation of the grievance procedures. In his last email, Mr.
17 Kucera wrote, “we are willing to bargain over this issue” despite the Union’s position.
18 (Id.) Europa’s final email asserted that if the Union failed to respond, it would seek to
19 compel the Union to arbitrate the grievance. (Id.) As presented, Plaintiff has failed to
20 allege complete exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures.
21 Second, Europa admittedly agrees that it did not exhaust contractual grievance
22 procedures blaming the Union’s failure to convene an adjustment board. However, to the
23 extent Europa blames the Union for failing to convene an adjustment board, it fails to
24 provide any legal authority on whether exhaustion of contractual remedies may be
25 excused for refusal to convene an adjustment board. See e.g., Cal. Trucking Ass’n v.
26 Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local 70, 679 F.2d 1275, 1283-84 (9th
27 Cir. 1981) (whether repudiation of arbitration based on conduct occurring before court
28 estops repudiator from relying on the arbitration provisions as a defense to employers’
1 damages action). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
2 Section 301 claim for failing to allege exhaustion of contractual grievance procedures
3 provided in the CBA.8
4 In sum, on the first cause of action, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to
5 dismiss for subject matter jurisdiction and GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the
6 Section 301 claim for failure to state a claim for failing to allege exhaustion of
7 contractual grievance procedures provided in the CBA.
8 D. Second Cause of Action - Section 303 of the LMRA
9 The FAC claims a violation of Section 303 of the LMRA commencing in May
10 2022. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶¶ 44-45.) It alleges that Europa conducts business with
11 neutral employers who are engaged in interstate commerce and do not perform work
12 Europa conducts, and are not concerned in any disputes between the parties or between
13 themselves and the Union. (Id. ¶ 43.) In May 2022, the Union encouraged and induced
14 neutral employees of neutral employers to strike and/or refuse to transport, handle and
15 work on goods and perform services. (Id. ¶ 44.) The object of the Union’s conduct was
16 to force the neutral employers to cease doing business with Europa. (Id.) It also
17 threatened, coerced, and restrained neutral employers with the object of forcing the
18 neutral employers to cease doing business with Europa. (Id. ¶ 46.)
19 The Union engaged in a secondary boycott – encouraging and inducing neutral
20 employees, and threatening, coercing and restraining neutral employers - through
21 unlawful means of blocking ingress and egress to Europa’s property, shouting threats,
22 and assault and battery. (Id. ¶ 46.) For instance, Interstate Batteries is a neutral employer
23 that delivers automotive batteries to Europa. (Id. ¶ 43.) Agents of the Union physically
24
25
26 8 Because the Court grants the motion to dismiss for failure to exhaust the grievance procedures, the
Court need not address Defendant’s additional and alternative argument that even if Europa alleged
27 exhaustion, it does not present a cognizable claim because the issue is subject to arbitration and Europa
inappropriately seeks to have this Court adjudicate the merits of its contractual dispute. (Dkt. No. 18-1
28
1 blocked an Interstate Batteries delivery vehicle from existing Europa’s property and
2 threatened to climb onto the vehicle and cause damage to it. (Id. ¶ 47.) The Union’s
3 object was to force the neutral employers to intercede in the dispute and cease doing
4 business with Europa constituting an unlawful secondary boycott. (Id.)
5 Section 303 of the LMRA provides:
6 (a) It shall be unlawful . . . for any labor organization to engage in any
activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of
7
this title.
8 (b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason o[f] any
violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of the
9
United States . . . or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties.
10
11 29 U.S.C. § 187. Relatedly, section 158(b)(4), or section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor
12 Relations Act (“NLRA”) prohibits a labor organization from engaging in secondary
13 boycotts. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B). Secondary boycott activities are those “which are
14 calculated to involve neutral employers and employees in the union's dispute with the
15 primary employer.” Iron Workers Dist. Council of the Pac. Nw. v. N.L.R.B., 913 F.2d
16 1470, 1475 (9th Cir. 1990). “A § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) violation has two elements.” Overstreet
17 v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199,
18 1212 (9th Cir. 2005). “First, a labor organization must ‘threaten, coerce, or restrain’ a
19 person engaged in commerce (such as a customer walking into one of the secondary
20 businesses).” Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)). “Second, the labor organization
21 must do so with ‘an object’ of ‘forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling,
22 handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
23 processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.’” Id.
24 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B)).
25 Defendant argues that Plaintiff fails to allege a Section 303 violation for three
26 reasons: (1) Europa does not plead an injury; (2) the alleged conduct targets Europa, the
27 primary employer, and not the secondary employer; and (3) the Union’s conduct was not
28 coercive. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 17-19.)
1 First, the Union contends that the FAC fails to assert an injury under Section 303.
2 (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 17.) Europa does not meaningfully oppose and seeks leave to file a
3 second amended complaint to allege an injury. (Dkt. No. 22 at 17.)
4 Section 303 of the LMRA confers standing to “[w]hoever shall be injured in his
5 business or property by reason o[f]” an unfair labor practice under NLRA § 8(b)(4). See
6 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). “[A] court must determine whether Section 303 standing exists by
7 looking to: (1) the nexus between the injury and the statutory violation; and (2) the
8 relationship between the injury alleged and the forms of injury that Congress sought to
9 prevent or remedy by enacting the statute.” Am. President Lines, Ltd. v. Int'l Longshore
10 & Warehouse Union, 721 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Fulton v. Plumbers &
11 Steamfitters, 695 F.2d 402, 405 (9th Cir. 1982)).
12 According to Europa, the FAC alleges injury by claiming that Interstate Batteries
13 was induced to intercede in the labor dispute between the parties. (Dkt. No. 22 at 17; see
14 also Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶¶ 43-47.) There are no allegations that inducing Interstate
15 Batteries to intercede produced any injury or damage. This allegation is not sufficient to
16 allege an injury to support standing. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b). Therefore, the Court grants
17 dismissal the Section 303 LMRA cause of action for failing to plead injury. However,
18 because the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint to allege
19 injury, it also considers the other arguments raised by the Union.
20 Defendant next argues that the Union’s alleged conduct targets Europa, the
21 primary employer, seeking to halt the day-to-day operations of the struck employer and
22 halt all those approaching the situs whose mission is selling the struck product. (Dkt. No.
23 18-1 at 18.) Europa responds that the FAC alleges unlawful secondary conduct because
24 the Union targeted Interstate Batteries, a neutral employer, to force it to cease doing
25 business with Europa. (Dkt. No. 22 at 16.)
26 Section 8(b)(4) was intended to meet “the dual congressional objectives of
27 preserving the right of labor organizations to bring pressure to bear on offending
28 employers in primary labor disputes and of shielding unoffending employers and others
1 from pressures in controversies not their own.” N.L.R.B. v. Denver Bldg. Council, 341
2 U.S. 675, 692 (1951). Section 8(b)(4) “proscribes secondary activity, but by its express
3 proviso allows for primary activity even though such activity may indirectly affect a
4 secondary employer. Thus, the crucial question in this type of case is always to determine
5 the object of the labor activity.” N.L.R.B. v. N. Cal. Dist. Cnty. of Hod Carriers &
6 Common Laborers of Am., AFL-CIO, 389 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1968). “If it is primary,
7 in other words directed only at the employer with whom the union has a bona fide labor
8 dispute, then it may be lawful even though some neutral or secondary employers might
9 be affected. Conversely, if its object is to bring indirect pressure on the primary
10 employer by involving neutral or secondary employers and their employees, then it may
11 be unlawful.” Id. The United States Supreme Court recognized that protected primary
12 picketing “has characteristically been aimed at all those approaching the situs whose
13 mission is selling, delivering or otherwise contributing to the operations which the strike
14 is endeavoring to halt . . . including other employers and their employees.” Brotherhood
15 of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 388 (1969). The Court
16 distinguished unlawful secondary boycott as “sanctions [that] bear, not upon the
17 employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has no
18 concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop business with the employer in the hope that
19 this will induce the employer to give in to his employees’ demands.’” Id.
20 Here, the FAC sufficiently alleges a secondary boycott as to the Union’s conduct
21 towards the Interstate Batteries delivery vehicle. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶ 47.) It alleges that
22 the Union agents blocked the vehicle, threatened to climb onto the vehicle and cause it
23 damage. (Id.) The Union’s object was to force Interstate Batteries, the neutral employer,
24 to intercede in the dispute between Europa and the Union and to cease doing business
25 with Europa. (Id.) Taking these allegations as true, the Court concludes that Europa has
26 sufficiently alleged conduct targeting a neutral employer.
27 Finally, Defendant maintains that the Union’s conduct was not coercive because it
28 was a protected primary strike. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 18-19.) Europa argues that the FAC
1 alleges conduct that exceeds peaceful strike activity and includes violence or threats of
2 violence. (Dkt. No. 22 at 17.)
3 NLRA § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) requires that the union “threaten, coerce, or restrain” any
4 person to cease doing business with another. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii). The Supreme
5 Court has emphasized that, in light of a union’s First Amendment rights, the phrase
6 “’threaten, coerce, or restrain’ . . . should be interpreted with ‘caution’ and not given a
7 ‘broad sweep.’” Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades
8 Council, 485 U.S. 568, 578 (1988).
9 In this case, the FAC alleges that the Union blocked an Interstate Batteries delivery
10 vehicle from exiting Europa’s property and threatened to have its agent climb onto the
11 vehicle and cause damage to it. (Dkt. No. 13, FAC ¶ 47.) The core object was to direct
12 union pressure at neutral employees to refuse to work with and inducing and coercing
13 their neutral employers to cease doing business with Europa and direct union pressure at
14 neutral employers. (Id.)
15 The FAC alleges conduct beyond lawful peaceful picketing against Europa;
16 therefore, taking the allegations of the FAC as true, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has
17 sufficiently alleged the union threatened or coerced the Interstate Batteries delivery
18 person to cease doing business Europa in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii). See
19 Overstreet, 409 F.3d at 1213-14 (a union protest at a neutral employer’s premises that
20 creates a physical or symbolic barrier to the neutral employer or promotes physical
21 confrontations with individuals seeking to enter the neutral employer's business was
22 unlawful).
23 In sum, because Europa failed to allege injury, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s
24 motion to dismiss the second cause of action alleging violations of Section 303 of the
25 LMRA.
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 E. State Law Claims
2 Defendant seeks dismissal of the FAC in its entirety with prejudice but provides no
3 legal basis for the dismissal of the state law claims. (Dkt. No. 18-1 at 19.) Nonetheless,
4 the Court considers the remaining state law claims.
5 The third through seventh causes of action allege state law claims for 1) tortious
6 interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual business relations, 2)
7 trespass to chattel, 3) trespass to real property, 4) defamation, and 5) unfair competition
8 pursuant to California Business & Professions Code section 17200 et seq. (Dkt. No. 13,
9 FAC ¶¶ 48-71.)
10 A district court that has original jurisdiction over a civil action “shall have
11 supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action
12 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
13 Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). The “district court
14 may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if -- .
15 . . (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. . .
16 .” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
17 Here, because the Court grants dismissal of the federal causes of action, there is no
18 basis for the Court’s jurisdiction; therefore, it sua sponte GRANTS dismissal of state law
19 claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
20 banc) (district courts may decline sua sponte to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
21 F. Leave to Amend
22 In the event the Court grants dismissal of any claim under Rule 12(b)(6), Plaintiff
23 seeks leave of Court to file a second amended complaint to cure the deficiencies. (Dkt.
24 No. 22 at 17-18.) Therefore, because amendment would not be futile, the Court
25 GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. See DeSoto, 957 F.2d at
26 658; Schreiber, 806 F.2d at 1401.
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 Conclusion
2 Based on the reasoning above, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to dismiss
3 || the LMRA Section 301 claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1),
4 || GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss the LMRA Sections 301 and 303 claims for
5 || failing to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff is granted one final opportunity to
6 || file a second amended complaint on or before November 16, 2023. Finally, the Court
7 || DENIES Defendant’s accompanying motion to dismiss the state law claims under the
8 || anti-SLAPP statute as MOOT. (Dkt. No. 19.)
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 ||Dated: November 2, 2023 <=
12 United States District Judge
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