Shane v. County of San Diego

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Amanda Shane, in her individual capacity Case No.: 22cv1309-JO-AGS

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and as successor in interest for Decedent

13 Isaiah Shane, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART SOCIAL

14 Plaintiff,

WORKER DEFENDANTS’ MOTION

15 v. TO DISMISS ON BASIS OF

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

16 County of San Diego et al.,

17 Defendants.

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20 Isaiah Shane died from an accidental drug overdose while in state custody at a group

21 home. His mother, Plaintiff Amanda Shane, alleges that County social workers failed to

22 provide him with adequate treatment and supervision for his well-documented problems

23 with drug abuse and mental health. She brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various

24 County social workers alleging (1) violation of Isaiah’s Fourteenth Amendment right to

25 adequate safety, security, supervision, and care as a foster child (“Claim 1”); (2) violation

26 of his right to be free from state-created dangers (“Claim 2”); and (3) violation of his right

27 to a proper foster child case plan under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of

28 1980 (“Claim 3”). Dkt. 10 (“FAC”).

1 On November 9, 2022, these County social workers, Evelyn Gorospe, Ariel Pearson,

2 Natania Cibrian, Thomas Ruff, Kymberlee Watson, and Kristin Niemann (collectively,

3 “Social Worker Defendants”), moved to dismiss the Section 1983 claims arguing that they

4 are entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. 24. The Court held oral argument on the motion

5 on April 19, 2023. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies qualified immunity for

6 Social Worker Defendants on Claim 1 and grants qualified immunity on the remaining

7 Claims 2 and 3.

8 I. BACKGROUND

9 Plaintiff’s son Isaiah suffered from mental health and drug abuse problems from a

10 young age. Isaiah first exhibited behavioral problems in middle school and was diagnosed

11 with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder. FAC ¶¶ 64–

12 65. By tenth grade, Isaiah was running away from home, getting suspended, fighting with

13 security, and having run-ins with the police. Id. ¶¶ 68–70. He began to experiment with

14 drugs such as Xanax at fifteen years old. Id. ¶ 69.

15 In March 2020, the County became involved in Isaiah’s care due to his mental health

16 and drug abuse problems. On March 10, 2020, Isaiah was violent towards Plaintiff. Id. ¶

17 76. The police took Isaiah into custody and determined he was under the influence of

18 drugs. Id. Isaiah was hospitalized for a cocaine overdose and placed on an involuntary

19 hold for a mental evaluation from March 11, 2020, to March 23, 2020. Id. During this

20 period, County social workers investigated the situation. Id. ¶ 77. Although Plaintiff told

21 the investigating social worker that Isaiah needed critical care in a residential treatment

22 facility, the County still sent Isaiah home with Plaintiff upon his discharge from the

23 hospital. Id. ¶ 77.

24 In September 2020, the County took custody of Isaiah due to his escalating need for

25 professional mental health and drug treatment. On September 8, 2020, Isaiah was again

26 violent towards Plaintiff and was placed on another involuntary medical hold. Id. ¶ 78.

27 While Isaiah was in the hospital, Plaintiff told Evelyn Gorospe, the investigating social

28 worker, about Isaiah’s history of drug abuse, behavioral problems, and need for intensive

1 care. Id. ¶ 79. Plaintiff informed Ms. Gorospe that she could not take Isaiah home after

2 the medical hold because he required professional mental health and drug treatment. Id. ¶

3 83. Consequently, Ms. Gorospe took Isaiah into the custody of the County on September

4 9, 2020. Id. ¶ 83.1

5 Ms. Gorospe and her supervisor, Ariel Pearson, reviewed Isaiah’s case file and

6 records to determine his needs while in County custody. Records in the County’s

7 possession documented Isaiah’s history of running away, substance abuse problems

8 (including the March 2020 drug overdose), and mental health and behavioral issues. Id. ¶

9 85. Ms. Gorospe noted in her September 11, 2020 detention report that Isaiah required

10 drug treatment, mental health services, and close supervision to ensure his immediate

11 safety. Id. ¶ 86.

12 Despite this knowledge of Isaiah’s need for intensive drug treatment and

13 supervision, Ms. Gorospe and Ms. Pearson placed Isaiah with a foster parent instead of a

14 properly resourced secure residential treatment facility. Id. ¶ 87.2 Isaiah continued to use

15 drugs while placed with this foster parent, until this foster parent informed the County she

16 could no longer keep Isaiah in her custody. Id. ¶ 89.

17 After this foster parent placement failed, social workers Thomas Ruff and Natania

18 Cibrian arranged for Isaiah to live at Circle of Friends, a short-term residential therapeutic

19 facility licensed by the County. Id. ¶ 90. During this time, Circle of Friends was at the

20 center of public controversy—there had been numerous complaints of staff failures to

21 properly supervise minors, and complaints of alcohol and drug use in the facility among

22 the minors. Id. ¶¶ 93–94. Numerous phone calls to the police also indicated concerns of

23 the care and supervision at Circle of Friends: from 2017 through 2021, the facility called

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26 1 The Juvenile Court entered a detention order on September 14, 2020 that confirmed the County’s

custody of Isaiah. FAC ¶ 84.

27 2 In making these placements, Social Worker Defendants would recommend the placement to the

juvenile court, which then ordered the placement based on their representations. See FAC ¶¶ 87–88 , 96,

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1 the police to request assistance with the children in their charge almost 350 times, including

2 calls reporting runaway minors. Id. ¶ 95. Ms. Cibrian and Ms. Pearson were aware of

3 Isaiah’s history of running away, his substance abuse, and his mental health issues from

4 his case file. Id. ¶ 91. Despite Isaiah’s documented need for supervision and treatment for

5 mental health and drug abuse, Mr. Ruff and Ms. Cibrian nevertheless placed Isaiah at Circle

6 of Friends. Id. ¶ 96.

7 Isaiah’s drug abuse problems worsened during his stay at Circle of Friends, which

8 led to his placement at another foster home. On September 17, 2020, Isaiah entered Circle

9 of Friends, where he was able to smuggle drugs and alcohol into the facility and continue

10 his drug use. Id. ¶ 97. Circle of Friends staff informed Ms. Cibrian of Isaiah’s drug use.

11 Id. ¶¶ 98–100. Due to these issues, Ms. Cibrian and Mr. Ruff arranged for Isaiah to live in

12 the home of Laura Henderson and her two sons, Harley and Cameron. Id. ¶ 102. Plaintiff

13 alleges these social workers made this placement decision even though they knew Harley

14 was a drug user who had used drugs with Isaiah in the past. Id. ¶¶ 102–103 Specifically,

15 Plaintiff had told Ms. Cibrian that Isaiah and Harley had done drugs together, and that the

16 Henderson home was a “drug house.” Id. ¶¶ 102–106. Ms. Cibrian and Mr. Ruff also

17 knew that Isaiah would be unsupervised during the day due to Ms. Henderson’s work

18 schedule, and so Harley, just twenty years old, would be Isaiah’s primary caregiver. Id. ¶

19 107. Even though they were aware of these risks, Ms. Cibrian and Mr. Ruff still placed

20 Isaiah at the Henderson home on October 30, 2020, where he drank alcohol, left the home

21 late at night unsupervised, and abused Xanax during his stay. Id. ¶¶ 108–111.

22 Eventually, on December 15, 2020, Ms. Cibrian, Mr. Ruff, and social workers

23 Kymberlee Watson and Kristin Neimann recommended that Isaiah be placed back in Circle

24 of Friends’ custody. Id. ¶¶ 112–13. These social workers made this recommendation even

25 though they were aware, based on Isaiah’s previous stay, that the facility could not provide

26 the level of care, intensive supervision, and drug treatment that Isaiah required for his

27 mental health and drug abuse problems. Id. ¶ 114. Isaiah entered Circle of Friends on

28 December 16, 2020. Id. During this second stay at the facility, Isaiah continued to abuse

1 drugs and access alcohol without any supervision, monitoring, or adequate rehabilitation

2 or drug treatment. Id. ¶¶ 120–21. On May 3, 2021, while still at Circle of Friends, Isaiah

3 accidentally overdosed on drugs and died. Id. ¶ 124.

4 II. LEGAL STANDARD

5 Government officers sued under Section 1983 may be immune from civil liability

6 under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity precludes liability if the

7 officer’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

8 which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

9 (1982). The purpose of this doctrine is to balance two important interests: “the need to

10 hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to

11 shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties

12 reasonably.” O’Doan v. Sanford, 991 F.3d 1027, 1036 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Pearson

13 v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)).

14 To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court considers

15 two independent questions: (1) whether the officer’s conduct violated a statutory or

16 constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the

17 incident. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). Stated another way,

18 qualified immunity bars Section 1983 suits against a government officer when “either no

19 deprivation of rights was alleged or the law dictating that specific constitutional [or

20 statutory] right was not yet clearly established.” Cates v. Stroud, 976 F.3d 972, 978 (9th

21 Cir. 2020) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). Although qualified immunity is a two-step

22 analysis, the court may analyze just the second step “when no clearly established law shows

23 that the officers’ conduct was unconstitutional.” O’Doan, 991 F.3d at 1036. As to statutory

24 rights, courts also look to whether “existing precedent must have placed the statutory[]

25 question beyond debate.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017).

26 For the purposes of qualified immunity, a right is clearly established if “a reasonable

27 officer would recognize that his or her conduct violates that right under the circumstances

28 faced, and in light of the law that existed at that time.” Kennedy, 439 F.3d at 1065 (citing

1 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)). “The right must be settled law, meaning that

2 it must be clearly established by controlling authority or a robust consensus of cases of

3 persuasive authority.” Tuuamalemalo v. Greene, 946 F.3d 471, 477 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing

4 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590–91). The court need not, however, find “a prior case with

5 identical, or even materially similar facts”; it is enough that “the preexisting law provided

6 the defendants with fair warning that their conduct was unlawful.” Kennedy, 439 F.3d at

7 1065 (internal quotations omitted). If a right is not clearly established, the defendant is

8 entitled to qualified immunity. Lawrence v. U.S., 340 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2003). If the

9 right is clearly established, the court determines “whether the defendant’s conduct was

10 ‘objectively legally reasonable’ given the information possessed by the defendant at the

11 time of his or her conduct.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641).

12 When defendants assert qualified immunity in a motion to dismiss under Rule

13 12(b)(6), dismissal is not appropriate unless the court can determine, based on the

14 complaint itself, that qualified immunity applies. O’Brien v. Welty, 818 F.3d 920, 936 (9th

15 Cir. 2016) (quoting Groten v. California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001)). While courts

16 may consider qualified immunity at the pleadings stage, the Ninth Circuit has noted that

17 “[d]etermining claims of qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage raises special

18 problems for legal decision making.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018)

19 (citing Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 956–57 (9th Cir. 2004)). The Ninth

20 Circuit has also observed that, by considering qualified immunity at the pleadings stage,

21 “the courts may be called upon to decide far-reaching constitutional questions on a

22 nonexistent factual record.” Kwai Fun Wong, 373 F.3d at 957. In considering qualified

23 immunity, the court must accept the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and

24 construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hyde v. City of Willcox, 23 F.4th

25 863, 869 (9th Cir. 2022).

26 III. DISCUSSION

27 Plaintiff brought three Section 1983 claims against Social Worker Defendants in

28 their individual capacities for allegedly placing Isaiah in foster homes and facilities with

1 inadequate supervision and treatment for his drug abuse and mental health problems.

2 Plaintiff claims that by placing Isaiah in these foster placements, these defendants violated

3 (1) Isaiah’s right to safety, security, supervision, and care as a foster child; (2) his right to

4 be free from state-created dangers; and (3) his right to a foster child “case plan” required

5 by federal statutes. Social Worker Defendants argue that qualified immunity shields them

6 from Section 1983 liability for each of these claims because these rights were not clearly

7 established in the law. The Court examines whether existing law clearly defined the

8 contours of the above constitutional and statutory rights such that a reasonable social

9 worker would have known that his or her conduct violated those rights.

10 A. Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s Special Relationship Claim (Claim 1)

11 Social Worker Defendants argue that qualified immunity shields them from

12 Plaintiff’s claim that they violated Isaiah’s Fourteenth Amendment right to safety, security,

13 and supervision as a foster child. The Fourteenth Amendment generally does not confer

14 an affirmative right to governmental aid unless a “special relationship” exists between the

15 state actors and the plaintiff. Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 971 (9th Cir. 2011).

16 This special relationship exists when the state has a custodial relationship with the

17 individual—for example, prisoners or children in state custody—such that the state

18 assumes some responsibility for that person’s safety and well-being. See id.; Estelle v.

19 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–105 (1976) (establishing government’s obligation to provide

20 medical care for inmates); Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842 (9th

21 Cir. 2010) (establishing government’s affirmative duties to foster children in state custody).

22 To determine whether qualified immunity protects officials acting within the context of a

23 foster child relationship, a court should (1) “determine[] the contours of a foster child’s

24 clearly established rights . . . under the ‘special relationship’ doctrine of substantive due

25 process” and (2) “examine[] whether a reasonable official would have understood that the

26 specific conduct alleged by [the plaintiff] violated those rights.” Henry A. v. Willden, 678

27 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012).

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1 1. A Foster Child’s Clearly Established Rights Under the “Special Relationship”

2 Doctrine

3 The Ninth Circuit has clearly established that children in state custody have a

4 Fourteenth Amendment due process right to safe placement, supervision, and protection

5 by a social worker. When the state takes custody of a child, it must provide the child with

6 “reasonable safety and minimally adequate care and treatment appropriate to the age and

7 circumstances of the child.” Lipscomb v. Simmons, 962 F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1992);

8 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989) (recognizing

9 the state’s affirmative duty to provide “basic human needs . . . [including] medical care and

10 reasonable safety” to a person in its custody). In Tamas, the Ninth Circuit clearly

11 established that a foster child’s Fourteenth Amendment rights extended to the right to

12 supervision, protection, and safe foster care placement by a social worker. 630 F.3d at 842.

13 There, foster children brought Section 1983 claims against social workers who allegedly

14 placed them with a foster parent who abused them and neglected to provide them with basic

15 care. Id. at 837–41. For example, the foster parent allegedly left them alone at night and

16 did not feed them. Id. The court denied the social workers’ assertion of qualified

17 immunity, holding that the foster children’s right to safe foster care placement and proper

18 supervision was clearly established. Id. at 847.

19 Two years after Tamas, the Ninth Circuit further expanded the contours of a foster

20 child’s clearly established rights to encompass the right to medical care. Henry A., 678

21 F.3d at 1001. In Henry A., social workers allegedly failed to provide a group of foster

22 children with medical care. Id. at 996–998. The social workers did not transfer the foster

23 children’s medical records to their respective treatment providers: as a result, some of these

24 children did not receive the appropriate medical treatment and suffered severe illnesses.

25 Id. at 997. Specifically, one foster child received incorrect medication and was hospitalized

26 with near organ failure because of the social workers’ failure to provide his medical

27 records. Id. Another foster child suffered from an impacted colon because the County

28 neglected to authorize the necessary medical treatment, which caused treatment delays. Id.

1 These foster children brought Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging failure to adequately

2 provide medical and mental health services. Id. at 998. The Ninth Circuit held that social

3 workers violate a foster child’s right to adequate safety and medical care when they are

4 deliberately indifferent to a child’s serious medical needs such as failing to provide

5 necessary medication or facilitate medical treatments. Id. at 1000; see also Norfleet v. Ark.

6 Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that failure to supervise

7 foster child’s asthma violated the state’s clearly established “obligation to provide adequate

8 medical care, protection and supervision [to foster children]”).

9 Moreover, the body of case law surrounding the rights of prisoners establishes that

10 constitutional rights of people in state custody extend to medical care, supervision, and

11 monitoring to prevent medical harm. In defining the contours of the rights of children in

12 state custody, the Ninth Circuit court in Henry A held that “the substantive due process

13 rights of foster children are analogous to those of prisoners”; therefore, the court “can also

14 look to [its] prisoner cases to further define what constitutes a ‘serious medical need.’” 678

15 F.3d at 1001. Looking to Ninth Circuit prisoner cases, this Court finds that the law has

16 clearly established that individuals in state custody have the right to monitoring and

17 protection from their own self-harming tendencies due to mental health and medical

18 problems. Sandoval v. Cty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 678–679 (9th Cir. 2021) (failure

19 to monitor detainee who suffered from drug overdose constituted deliberate indifference to

20 serious medical need); Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1082–1083

21 (9th Cir. 2013) (failure to monitor inmate with mental health problems and perform CPR

22 after his suicide attempt constituted deliberate indifference to serious medical need). In

23 Sandoval, a person detained in a county jail died from a methamphetamine overdose after

24 jail staff left him unmonitored for eight hours, despite signs that he was under the influence

25 of drugs. 985 F.3d at 662. The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity for the jail staff,

26 finding that a reasonable official would have understood that “failing to check on [the

27 inmate] for hours . . . presented such a substantial risk of harm to [the inmate] that the

28 failure to act was unconstitutional.” 985 F.3d at 678 (internal quotations omitted). In

1 Lemire, a mentally ill inmate died by suicide after jail staff left him unmonitored for an

2 extended period of time. 726 F.3d at 1076. The court denied summary judgment on the

3 grounds that the lack of monitoring and supervision “posed a substantial risk that some

4 inmate would come to harm, either self-inflicted or otherwise[.]” Id. These Ninth Circuit

5 cases, among others, clearly establish that foster children’s rights to safe placement,

6 supervision, protection, and adequate medical care set forth in the Tamas and Henry A

7 cases also extend to appropriate monitoring and supervision to prevent serious self-inflicted

8 harm.

9 2. Alleged Conduct Violated Clearly Established Rights Under the Special

10 Relationship Doctrine

11 Having determined the contours of a foster child’s Fourteenth Amendment rights,

12 the Court next examines Plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether a reasonable social

13 worker would know that his or her conduct surrounding Isaiah’s care violated these rights.

14 Based on the allegations, the Court finds that reasonable officers in the shoes of Social

15 Worker Defendants would have known that placing Isaiah in the foster placements

16 described above violated those rights. With regard to Isaiah’s placement with the first

17 foster parent, Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Gorospe and Ms. Pearson were aware that Isaiah

18 had previously overdosed on drugs, had a history of running away, and required drug

19 treatment and mental health services. FAC ¶¶ 85–86. Despite this knowledge, these

20 defendants failed to provide Isaiah with such medical treatment and supervision and instead

21 placed him with an ill-equipped foster parent. Id. ¶ 87. A reasonable social worker would

22 have understood that failing to place Isaiah in a facility with adequate mental health

23 treatment and supervision despite knowledge of his serious drug abuse and mental health

24 problems amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.

25 With regard to Isaiah’s placement at Circle of Friends and then the Henderson home,

26 Plaintiff alleges that Ms. Cibrian and Mr. Ruff were aware of Isaiah’s history of substance

27 abuse and need for mental health and drug treatment. Id. ¶¶ 93–96. Despite this

28 knowledge, these defendants placed him at Circle of Friends, which they knew had

1 inadequate treatment for drug abuse and poor supervision and monitoring. Id. Ms. Cibrian

2 and Mr. Ruff also arranged for Isaiah to stay at the Henderson home, even though they

3 knew that Harley had used drugs with Isaiah, the Henderson home was a “drug house,” and

4 20-year-old Harley would be Isaiah’s primary caretaker. Id. ¶¶ 102–107. A reasonable

5 social worker would have understood that failing to provide Isaiah with proper monitoring

6 and mental health and drug treatment despite his drug abuse problems would constitute

7 deliberate indifference to Isaiah’s right to safety in his foster care placements.

8 Finally, with regard to Isaiah’s second Circle of Friend’s placement, Plaintiff alleges

9 that Ms. Watson and Ms. Neimann placed Isaiah back at Circle of Friends even though

10 they knew that Isaiah did not get the intensive monitoring and drug and mental health

11 treatment that he needed during his previous stay. Id. ¶ 114. Plaintiff alleges that these

12 defendants knew Isaiah used drugs, did not get adequate drug and mental health treatment,

13 and his mental illness, substance abuse, and behavioral issues had substantially worsened

14 during his previous stay. Id. ¶¶ 114–115. Based on these allegations, a reasonable social

15 worker would have recognized that the failure to provide Isaiah with the supervision,

16 monitoring, and drug treatment that he required would violate his clearly established rights

17 to such monitoring to prevent his self-destructive behaviors.

18 Accepting as true all factual allegations in the complaint, Plaintiff has alleged that

19 Social Worker Defendants reasonably knew of the substantial risks of placing Isaiah

20 without proper mental health and drug treatment, yet still chose to do so in deliberate

21 indifference to Isaiah’s clearly established right to adequate supervision and medical care

22 while in state custody. Based on these allegations and the clearly established law, a

23 reasonable social worker would have understood they were violating Isaiah’s constitutional

24 rights. Social Worker Defendants are therefore not entitled to qualified immunity on Claim

25 1.

26 B. Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s State-Created Danger Claim (Claim 2)

27 Social Worker Defendants also argue qualified immunity shields them from

28 Plaintiff’s claim that they violated Isaiah’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from

1 state-created dangers. Under this danger creation theory, a state is liable under the

2 Fourteenth Amendment when “the state affirmatively places the plaintiff in danger by

3 acting with deliberate indifference to a known and obvious danger.” Patel, 648 F.3d at

4 971–972 (quotations omitted). To state a substantive due process claim based on a state-

5 created danger, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) “that the officers’ affirmative

6 actions created or exposed her to an actual, particularized danger that she would not

7 otherwise have faced”; (2) “that the injury she suffered was foreseeable”; and (3) “that the

8 officers were deliberately indifferent to the known danger.” Martinez v. City of Clovis,

9 943 F.3d 1260, 1271 (9th Cir. 2019). Deliberate indifference requires that the official

10 “knows that something is going to happen but ignores the risk and exposes [the plaintiff]

11 to it.” Patel, 648 F.3d at 974 (quoting L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 1996)).

12 1. A Foster Child’s Clearly Established Rights Under the “State-Created Danger”

13 Doctrine

14 The Ninth Circuit law on the “state-created danger” doctrine makes clear that social

15 workers cannot place foster children where they will meet affirmative dangers such as an

16 abusive foster parent. Tamas, 630 F.3d at 843–44; Henry A, 678 F.3d at 1002. In Tamas,

17 social workers allegedly placed the foster children with a foster parent who physically and

18 sexually abused them. 630 F.3d at 843–44. Similarly, in Henry A., social workers

19 allegedly placed the foster children in foster homes that had a known history of chronic

20 neglect and abuse. 678 F.3d at 1002. The Henry A. court held that a foster child’s rights

21 under the state-created danger doctrine were clearly established in cases where a social

22 worker placed a foster child in a home with a known danger of abuse. Id.

23 Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court finds no clear authority extending the

24 state created danger doctrine to situations where a state official failed to provide necessary

25 care or prevent a child’s own self-destructive behaviors, as opposed to affirmatively

26 exposing the child to a third-party danger. Plaintiff has not pointed to any case which has

27 clearly established under a state-created danger theory that a social worker could be liable

28 to a foster child who suffered from a lack of monitoring and medical treatment in a foster

1 care placement. The only Ninth Circuit cases clearly holding social workers accountable

2 under a state-created danger doctrine arise in contexts where a social worker placed the

3 child with an abusive or dangerous foster parent. Tamas, 630 F.3d at 843–44; Henry A,

4 678 F.3d at 1002. Ninth Circuit case law therefore does not clearly establish that the state

5 created danger doctrine encompasses passively failing to provide the correct level of

6 medical care and monitoring as opposed to exposing children to affirmative dangers that

7 they otherwise would not have faced.

8 2. Alleged Conduct Does Not Violate Clearly Established Rights Under the State-

9 Created Danger Doctrine

10 Having determined the contours of clearly established rights of foster children under

11 the state-created danger doctrine, the Court next examines Plaintiff’s allegations to

12 determine whether a reasonable social worker would know that his or her conduct

13 surrounding Isaiah’s care violated these rights. As described above, Plaintiff alleges that

14 Social Worker Defendants failed to placed Isaiah in foster homes and facilities that could

15 provide him with the level of supervision and treatment that he required for his mental

16 health and drug abuse problems. FAC ¶¶ 86–89, 97–100, 108–111. Plaintiff does not

17 allege that Social Worker Defendants placed him with an abusive or dangerous foster

18 parent or another affirmative, external source of danger that he would not have faced if it

19 were not for that placement. Here, the dangers besetting Isaiah—his mental health

20 condition and drug addiction problem—did not come from the placement: they came from

21 his own self-destructive behaviors. Under these circumstances, a reasonable social worker

22 would not have understood that failing to provide Isaiah with placements that fully met his

23 needs was tantamount to subjecting him to an affirmative, external danger. Because the

24 law does not clearly extend liability for state-created dangers to such failures to treat,

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27 3 Plaintiff points only to Henry A. and Tamas in her briefing as sources of clearly established law

to overcome Social Worker Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity. See Baker v. Racansky, 887

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1 supervise, and protect a foster child from himself, a reasonable social worker would not

2 have known that his or her conduct violated a right under a state-created danger theory.

3 Shafer v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 868 F.3d 1110, 1117 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that qualified

4 immunity applies if no clearly established law exists on the issue); see also White, 580 U.S.

5 at 79 (noting that clearly established law must be “particularized” to the facts of the case).

6 Social Worker Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Claim 2.

7 C. Qualified Immunity for Plaintiff’s Federal Statutory Rights Claim (Claim 3)

8 Finally, Social Worker Defendants assert qualified immunity for Plaintiff’s claim

9 that they violated the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 by failing to

10 incorporate adequate mental health services and drug treatment protocols into Isaiah’s case

11 plan. In support of their assertion, Social Worker Defendants argue that existing law does

12 not clearly establish that case plans need to incorporate specific mental health and drug

13 treatment protocols.

14 1. A Foster Child’s Clearly Established Rights to a Case Plan

15 In 1980, Congress amended the Social Security Act to enact the Adoption Assistance

16 and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (the “CWA”), which required state foster care systems to

17 meet certain minimum conditions to qualify for federal funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 621, 670. As

18 relevant here, the state is required to develop a “case plan” for each foster child pursuant

19 to the CWA’s “case plan provisions.” See 42 U.S.C. §§ 671(a)(16) and 675(1). The statute

20 defines a case plan as a written document that describes the type of placement, the

21 appropriateness of the placement, and how the state plans to carry out the placement of the

22 child. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1). The plan must include the child’s health and educational

23 records, a description of the child’s permanency plan, and a plan for ensuring the child’s

24 educational stability. 42 U.S.C. § 675(1); Henry A., 678 F.3d at 1006. The case plan must

25 generally ensure that the foster child receives “safe and proper care” to address the needs

26 of the child while in foster care but does not otherwise specify what constitutes such safe

27 and proper care. 42 U.S.C § 675(B).

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1 Despite Plaintiff’s assertion that the CWA requires a case plan to specify appropriate

2 mental health and substance abuse protocols, the Court has not identified any case law that

3 establishes that a case plan must contain this level of specificity. Neither the Ninth Circuit

4 nor a consensus from other circuits has ruled that a foster child’s right to a case plan under

5 the CWA includes a certain degree or level of mental health and drug treatment. While

6 Ninth Circuit law generally recognizes a foster child’s right to have a case plan, it does not

7 provide guidance on the particularities of the case plan. In Henry A., foster children

8 brought a Section 1983 claim premised on violations of the case plan provisions requiring

9 the development of a case plan for a foster child. Id. at 1006. There, the Ninth Circuit

10 found a violation of the CWA because some of the foster children did not receive a case

11 plan at all. Id. Neither the Ninth Circuit nor other circuits have otherwise examined what

12 specific treatments need to be included in a case plan to be compliant with the CWA. Cf.

13 California State Foster Parent Ass’n v. Wagner, 624 F.3d 974, 978–980 (9th Cir. 2010)

14 (discussing rights guaranteed by non-case plan provisions of the CWA); Lynch v. Dukakis,

15 719 F.2d 504, 509 (1st Cir. 1983) (discussing rights to a case plan).

16 2. Alleged Conduct Does Not Violate Clearly Established Rights to a Case Plan

17 The Court examines Plaintiff’s allegations to determine whether a reasonable social

18 worker would know that his or her conduct violated the requirements of the CWA. In this

19 case, Plaintiff does not allege that Isaiah received no case plan under the CWA. Instead,

20 she alleges that Social Worker Defendants violated the CWA by failing to provide a case

21 plan with appropriate services for his needs such as mental health and drug treatment. FAC

22 ¶ 193. Because binding case law does not clearly establish that such a failure violates the

23 CWA’s case plan requirements, a reasonable social worker would not have known that

24 providing Isaiah with a case plan that does not specify adequate mental health and drug

25 treatment plans would have violated his rights under the CWA. Social Worker Defendants

26 are therefore entitled to qualified immunity on Claim 3.

27 ///

28 ///

I IV. CONCLUSION

2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES Defendants Evelyn Gorospe,

3 || Ariel Pearson, Natania Cibrian, Thomas Ruff, Kymberlee Watson, and Kirstin Niemann’s

4 ||motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity as to Claim 1 and GRANTS the

5 motion as to Claims 2—3 [Dkt. 24].

6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

7 ||Dated: June 16, 2023

8

? Ho orgbfe Tinsook Ohta

10 United States District Judge

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