reasoning fees are not appropriate where claims raised 28 1 questions that “were not clearly resolved by [the Ninth Circuit’s] prior caselaw interpreting 2 the ADA”
How later courts described this case
- reasoning fees are not appropriate where claims raised 28 1 questions that “were not clearly resolved by [the Ninth Circuit’s] prior caselaw interpreting 2 the ADA”
- cautioning courts from 14 engaging in “post hoc reasoning”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ORLANDO GARCIA, Case No. 20-cv-02385-BAS-MDD
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER:
13 v.
(1) DENYING DEFENDANTS’
14 APPLE SEVEN SERVICES SAN
MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’
DIEGO, INC.; et al.,
15 FEES (ECF No. 12); AND
Defendants.
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(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
17 MOTION TO RETAX COSTS
(ECF No. 23)
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19 Plaintiff Orlando Garcia brought this lawsuit challenging whether Marriott’s website
20 complies with the American with Disabilities Act. The dispute turned on the Reservations
21 Rule—an ADA regulation addressing the accessibility information hotels post on their
22 websites. The Court applied the Department of Justice’s guidance on the Reservations
23 Rule to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. Later, in another case, the Ninth Circuit held that
24 the DOJ’s guidance is entitled to deference and Marriott’s website satisfies the ADA.
25 Now before the Court is Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees. There is no doubt
26 Plaintiff’s claims had questionable merit. But the Court is unconvinced that this action was
27 frivolous or unreasonable. Hence, the Court denies the request for attorneys’ fees. The
28 Court also denies Plaintiff’s related motion to retax costs.
1 I. Background
2 Defendants “own and operate the Courtyard by Marriott San Diego.” (Compl. ¶ 2.)
3 Garcia alleged he reviewed Marriott’s website, but the website provided insufficient
4 information “about the accessibility of the rooms,” which prevented him from assessing
5 whether the hotel could accommodate his needs. (Id. ¶¶ 15–17.) As a result, Garcia
6 brought two causes of action against Defendants for allegedly violating the ADA and
7 California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act. (Id. ¶¶ 20–27.)
8 Defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 3.)
9 After incorporating the Marriott website into the Complaint, the Court applied the
10 Reservations Rule, 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1), to determine whether the website violates the
11 ADA. (Dismissal Order 5:4–7:16, ECF No. 10.) The Court also looked to the DOJ’s
12 guidance on what hotel websites must include to satisfy the Reservations Rule. (Id.) After
13 reasoning this guidance is entitled to substantial deference, the Court applied it to conclude
14 Marriott’s website satisfies the Reservations Rule. (Id. 7:3–16.) The Court thus dismissed
15 Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice and set a deadline for him to move for leave to file an
16 amended pleading. (Id. 8:1–10.)
17 After Plaintiff chose not to seek leave to amend, the Court dismissed the action with
18 prejudice. (ECF No. 11.) And because Defendants prevailed, the Clerk of Court taxed
19 costs of $402—the filing fee for Defendants’ Notice of Removal—against Plaintiff. (ECF
20 No. 21.)
21 Defendants move for attorneys’ fees. (Mot. for Att’ys’ Fees (“Fee Mot.”), ECF No.
22 12.) Plaintiff opposes. (Fee Opp’n, ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff also challenges the Clerk’s
23 determination on costs. (Mot. to Retax Costs (“Retax Mot.”), ECF No. 23.) Defendants
24 object. (Retax Opp’n, ECF No. 25.) The Court finds these motions suitable for
25 determination on the papers submitted and without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26 78(b); Civ. L.R. 7.1(d)(1).
27 //
28 //
1 II. Analysis
2 A. Attorneys’ Fees
3 Defendants request attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 12205. (Fee Mot. 11:17–18.)
4 Under § 12205, the Court may award a party who prevails in a lawsuit filed under the ADA
5 “a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses and costs.” However, under
6 Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418–19 (1978), “fees should be
7 granted to a defendant in a civil rights action only upon a finding that the plaintiff’s action
8 was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.” Kohler v. Bed Bath & Beyond of
9 Cal., LLC, 780 F.3d 1260, 1266 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Summers v. A Teichert & Son,
10 127 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 1997)). The purpose of awarding fees to a prevailing
11 defendant is “to deter the bringing of lawsuits without foundation.” CRST Van Expedited,
12 Inc. v. EEOC, 578 U.S. 419, 432 (2016) (quoting Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 420).
13 Frivolous means “groundless or without foundation,” not simply that the plaintiff
14 lost the case. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421. Hence, the court “should not ‘engage
15 in post hoc reasoning,’ awarding fees simply ‘because a plaintiff did not ultimately
16 prevail.’” Kohler, 780 F.3d at 1266 (quoting EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 290
17 (9th Cir. 1993)). “Even when the law or the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at
18 the outset, a party may have an entirely reasonable ground for bringing
19 suit.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 422.
20 Defendants first argue Plaintiff’s action was frivolous when filed. (Fee Mot. 6:14–
21 8:10, 13:18–28.) They point to several district court cases applying the Reservations Rule
22 that predate this case, including one involving Marriott’s website in 2017. See, e.g., Barnes
23 v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., No. 15-CV-01409-HRL, 2017 WL 635474 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
24 16, 2017). (See Fee Mot. 6:12–8:10.) Although these decisions suggested Plaintiff’s case
25 would face an uphill battle, they do not now show Plaintiff’s action was frivolous or
26 unreasonable. None of those decisions bound this Court or foreclosed Plaintiff’s claims.
27 Cf. Kohler,780 F.3d at 1267 (reasoning fees are not appropriate where claims raised
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1 questions that “were not clearly resolved by [the Ninth Circuit’s] prior caselaw interpreting
2 the ADA”).
3 Further, it was not until after the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims that the Ninth
4 Circuit first squarely addressed the Reservations Rule in Love v. Marriott Hotel Services,
5 Inc., 40 F.4th 1043 (9th Cir. 2022). There, after examining the regulatory framework,
6 Judge McKeown resolved the parties’ dispute over “how much deference we should afford
7 the DOJ’s interpretation of the Reservations Rule in the DOJ Guidance.” Id. at 1047. She
8 explained that the DOJ’s guidance is entitled to controlling weight in light of the
9 Reservation Rule’s structure, history, and purpose. Id. at 1047. Then, in applying the
10 DOJ’s guidance, Judge McKeown concluded “Marriott’s website passes muster” and
11 affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at 1048–49. Again,
12 although this Court had reached the same result several months earlier, that does not mean
13 this action was frivolous when filed. See Kohler, 780 F.3d at 1266 (cautioning courts from
14 engaging in “post hoc reasoning”).
15 Defendants also argue that even if the case was not frivolous when filed, it later
16 reached that point. (Fee Mot. 8:12–11:15, 14:1–13.) Defendants highlight dozens of
17 district court decisions that dismissed similar claims while Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
18 motion awaited this Court’s decision. (Id. 8:12–11:15.) Defendants argue Plaintiff was
19 thus on notice that his claims were frivolous before this Court ruled on Defendants’ motion.
20 (Id. 6:3–11.) The Court remains unconvinced. Like the decisions predating the filing of
21 Plaintiff’s Complaint, those district court decisions were not binding on this Court. And it
22 was not unreasonable for Plaintiff to wait for a ruling on Defendants’ pending motion to
23 dismiss. In addition, Defendants argue Plaintiff brought this case and others in bad faith
24 because his counsel delayed decisions by filing amended pleadings with irrelevant changes
25 (Fee Mot. 4:20–5:2.), but there is no evidence of such conduct here. Plaintiff abandoned
26 his claims after the Court ruled on the decisive legal issues, and Defendants did not have
27 to take any further action.
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1 Finally, the Court notes a district court reached a similar conclusion in Love v. CHSP
2 TRS San Francisco LLC, No. 20-CV-07259-DMR, 2022 WL 597034 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
3 2022). There, the court reasoned that, “[a]bsent binding authority on the Reservations
4 Rule,” the plaintiff’s complaint “was not wholly without merit to justify a statutory award
5 of attorneys’ fees to Defendant under the ADA.” Id. at *4. The court also persuasively
6 addresses many of the other arguments raised by Defendants here. See id. at *3–7, n.5.
7 This Court is similarly unconvinced that fees should be awarded because of bad faith or
8 that sanctions should be issued under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See id. at *6 (reasoning sanctions
9 under § 1927 are not warranted where the court adjudicated one dispositive motion and the
10 litigation did not continue). Consequently, the Court denies Defendants’ motion for
11 attorneys’ fees.
12 B. Costs
13 The Clerk granted Defendants $402.00 in costs, which is the amount they paid to
14 remove this case. (ECF No. 21.) Garcia moves to retax costs pursuant to Civil Local Rule
15 54.1. He argues “the award does not comply with Ninth Circuit precedent preventing cost
16 shifting absent a showing of [Christiansburg] frivolousness, which was not made by this
17 Court.” (Retax Mot. 2 (citing Brown v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.
18 2001)).) Defendants argue the Supreme Court’s decision twelve years later in Marx v.
19 General Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013), leads to a different result. (Retax Opp’n
20 3:26–4:25.)
21 Under Rule 54(d), a prevailing party may recover costs, other than attorneys’ fees,
22 “unless a federal statute provides otherwise.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d). Rule 54 “codifies a
23 venerable presumption that prevailing parties are entitled to costs.” Marx, 568 U.S. at 377.
24 In Marx, the Supreme Court examined a cost provision in the Fair Debt Collection
25 Practices Act that allowed the court to award attorneys’ fees and costs upon finding the
26 action “was brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.” 568 U.S. at 373
27 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)). The issue was whether this discretionary provision
28 meant Rule 54(d)’s presumption no longer applied. Id. The Supreme Court concluded the
1 FDCPA’s fee-shifting provision “is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1), and, thus, does not
2 displace a district court’s discretion to award costs under the Rule.” Id. at 387–88.
3 By contrast, in Brown, which did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s
4 guidance, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “[w]hen the federal statute forming the basis for
5 the action has an express provision governing costs, . . . that provision controls over the
6 federal rules.” 246 F.3d at 1190. Therefore, because the ADA’s fee-shifting provision—
7 § 12205—addressed both attorneys’ fees and costs, the Ninth Circuit concluded
8 “the Christiansburg test [for shifting fees] also applies to an award of costs to a prevailing
9 defendant under the ADA.” Id. at 1190.
10 The Court agrees with Defendants that the Supreme Court’s analysis in Marx
11 encompasses § 12205. Like the FDCPA provision examined in Marx, § 12205 is
12 permissive. It allows the Court to award attorneys’ fees and costs “in its discretion.” 42
13 U.S.C. § 12205. Therefore, “§ 12205 is not contrary to Rule 54(d)(1) with respect to
14 costs,” and “§ 12205 does not displace Rule 54(d)(1).” Garcia v. Gateway Hotel L.P., No.
15 CV 20-10752 PA (GJSx), 2021 WL 4776352, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2021).
16 If “intervening Supreme Court authority is clearly irreconcilable” with Ninth Circuit
17 precedent, “district courts should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher
18 authority.” Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts have thus applied
19 Marx, reasoning it is irreconcilable with Brown from many years prior. See Garcia, 2021
20 WL 4776352, at *2; T.P. v. Walt Disney Parks & Resorts U.S. Inc., No. CV 15-05346-
21 CJC(EX), 2022 WL 1054935, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2022). Other courts, albeit not
22 bound by Brown to begin with, have reached the same result. See M.T. v. Denver Publ.
23 Sch. Dist., No. CV 18-338 PAB, 2018 WL 5298385, at *2 (D. Col. Oct. 24, 2018); Webster
24 v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. CV 13-6613, 2016 WL 4467750, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 24, 2016).
25 The Court finds the reasoning from Garcia, 2021 WL 4776352, at *2–3, on this issue
26 is sound. Consequently, “[a]lthough the Court applied the Christiansburg standard to
27 Defendant[s]’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, and concluded that Defendant[s] [are] not
28 entitled to fees under that standard, the Court concludes that, following Marx, Rule
1 54(d)(1) provides the appropriate standard for an award of costs in this action.” See id. at
2 || *3.
3 In sum, the Court concludes that Rule 54(d)(1) allows Defendants to recover costs
4 the prevailing parties. There is no reason to disturb the Clerk’s determination, and the
5 || Court denies Plaintiffs motion to retax costs.
6 Conclusion
7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for attorneys’
8 || fees (ECF No. 12). The Court also DENIES Plaintiffs motion to retax costs (ECF No.
9 }}23).
10 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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12 || DATED: September 26, 2022 □□□ (gyhark
13 United States District Judge
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