holding that “the requirements for mental 6 health care are the same as those for physical health care needs”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “the requirements for mental 6 health care are the same as those for physical health care needs”
- analyzing mental health care requirements as part of 8 general health care requirements
- “Well-known medical facts are the types of matters of which judicial notice may be taken.”
- “Causation is, of 11 course, a required element of a § 1983 claim”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 MICHAEL WAYNE TURNER, Case No.: 3:20-cv-1643-WQH-DEB
CDCR #AN-8222,
11
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
Plaintiff,
12 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
vs. JUDGMENT
13
14
K. WILLIAMS and J. OLDROYD,
15
Defendants.
16
17
I. INTRODUCTION
18
On August 19, 2020, Plaintiff Michael Wayne Turner (“Plaintiff” or “Turner”), an
19
inmate at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (“RJD”) and proceeding pro se, filed a
20
civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. In it, he raised First,
21
Fourth, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants K.
22
Williams, J. Oldroyd and the California Department of Correction and Rehabilitation
23
(“CDCR”) Mental Health Service. See id. After screening the Complaint pursuant to 28
24
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A, the Court dismissed CDCR Mental Health Service as a
25
defendant and dismissed all claims except for Plaintiff’s First Amendment free exercise
26
claims against Williams and Oldroyd contained in Counts I and III of the Complaint. ECF
27
No. 8. On January 27, 2021, Plaintiff chose to proceed with the First Amendment claims
28
1 against Defendants J. Oldroyd and K. Williams which had survived screening. See ECF
2 No. 9. On May 11, 2021, the Court directed U.S. Marshal’s service pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1915(d) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) as to Williams and Oldroyd. See ECF No. 10.
4 On February 15, 2022, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No.
5 47. The Court notified Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing summary judgment
6 pursuant to Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 1998) (en banc), and Albino v. Baca,
7 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). ECF No. 48. On June 6, 2022, Turner filed an
8 Opposition to Defendants’ motion. ECF No. 59. Defendants filed a Reply on June 6, 2022.
9 ECF No. 62. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion for
10 summary judgment, and directs the Clerk of the Court to enter judgment in favor of
11 Williams and Oldroyd.
12 II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
13 The following facts are to be viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.1 See
14 Wright v. Beck, 981 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating that on summary judgment, a
15 court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party). Unless
16 otherwise indicated, the facts are undisputed.
17 To begin, an overview of the mental healthcare levels at Richard J is necessary. RJD
18 provides mental health services to inmates based on three levels of care: Correctional
19 Clinical Case Management System (“CCCMS”), the Enhanced Outpatient Program
20 (“EOP”), and Mental Health Crisis Bed (“MHCB”). Williams Decl., ECF No. 47-2 at ¶ 5;
21 Oldroyd Decl., ECF No. 47-3 at ¶ 6. CCCMS inmates are those with mental healthcare
22 needs but who still function well enough to be housed with the general population.
23 Williams Decl. ¶ 5; Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 6. EOP inmates are those with a “qualifying diagnosis”
24 who are not functioning well in the general population. Williams Decl. ¶ 5. The MHCB
25
26
1 Because Turner’s Complaint is verified, it “may be considered as an affidavit in opposition to
27 summary judgment if it is based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible
in evidence.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1132 n.14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
28
1 unit is for inmates who “present a danger to self, danger to others, or are gravely disabled.”
2 Id.; Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 6. A patient is deemed “gravely disabled” if the patient “ha[s] a serious
3 impairment in taking care of one’s daily needs, such as showering, eating, and cell
4 cleaning, but also can include social impairment, such as talking to people about paranoid
5 delusions (e.g. accusing people of spying on [the patient]), misusing objects and otherwise
6 demonstrating an inability to function in one’s environment.” Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 13. If an
7 inmate needs a higher level of care than MHCB, they are transferred to a mental health
8 hospital for acute care. Williams Decl. ¶ 5; Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 13.
9 During the relevant period, Williams, a licensed clinical social worker, was on staff
10 at RJD. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 1, 2. Williams’ caseload was made up of inmates in CCCMS.
11 Id. at ¶ 6. She met periodically with inmates in the general population, on an as-needed
12 bases. Id. Her duties included providing individual and group treatment to RJD inmates, as
13 well as pre-release and parole board planning. Id. at ¶ 5. Oldroyd worked as an RJD staff
14 psychiatrist handling MHCB admissions, discharges and medication management for
15 inmates.2 Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 5.
16 In early January 2020, Turner was housed in the general population of RJD. See
17 Williams Decl. ¶ 7. Turner is an adherent of the Nation of Islam faith. Compl. at 3. On
18 January 15, 2020, correctional staff reported that Plaintiff was acting “bizarrely” on “B
19 Yard” and requested a mental health consult. Williams Decl. ¶ 9. Williams arrived at the
20 yard and spoke to staff, who told Williams that Turner had come to the program offices
21 with all of his belongings and told staff and other inmates that he had information to share.
22 Id. Correctional staff told Williams that Turner stated “that the Bible, the Quran and the
23 dictionary were giving [Turner] codes and telling him when the mothership would be
24 picking him up.” Id.; see also Defs.’ Ex. B, ECF No. 47-1, at 103.
25
26
2 Oldroyd worked as staff psychiatrist from October 2018 to April 2020. In May 2020, she was
27 promoted to Senior Psychiatrist Supervisor at RJD, and was then responsible for supervising and
training psychiatrists in MHCB. Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 5. Since December 18, 2020, she has been Acting
28
1 Williams met with Turner in the gym shortly thereafter to assess his condition and
2 determine whether he might be a danger to himself or others, or “gravely disabled.”
3 Williams Decl. ¶¶ 10–11. Williams had met with Turner before on occasion, starting in the
4 spring of 2019 and he had “seemed to be doing really well.” Id. at ¶ 7. Prior to late 2019,
5 Turner had been a “model inmate.” See Defs.’ Ex. B at 18, 35, 57. And up until January
6 15, 2020, Williams had not noted any acute mental health symptoms on Turner’s part. His
7 behavior on that day seemed “uncharacteristic” to Williams. Id. at 8; see also Williams
8 Decl. ¶ 7.
9 During Williams’ January 15, 2020 evaluation, Turner was talking rapidly and
10 making “nonsensical statements.” Defs.’ Ex. B at 103. According to Williams, Plaintiff
11 was “exhibiting delusional thinking and making bizarre statements.” Id. She noted that at
12 one point, Turner stated: “I’m the Angel Michael,” “It’s codes,” and “This is bigger than
13 y’all.” Id. Turner also mentioned his deceased grandfather, who he claimed was actually
14 alive and living in the hills behind the prison. Id. Turner told Williams that he had been up
15 all night communicating with this grandfather, who he now claimed was not deceased. Id.
16 Turner made repeated references to “codes” and the “mothership.” In her report, Williams
17 noted that he denied having auditory and/or visual hallucinations. Turner also denied
18 suicidal and/or homicidal ideation. Id. Turner told Williams: “I am the angel Michael and
19 they got me in this cage. I have a bigger cause to do. I got so many people to bless…. I’m
20 not insane. I’m not crazy. I’m not on drugs.” Id. Williams noted that Turner was alert and
21 cooperative and did not appear to “be in distress.” Id. Williams’ summary states that at one
22 point during their discussion, Turner described holes in one of the gym walls as “the moon”
23 and stated the moon was his mother and that he could see the moon and the stars through
24 a nearby cabinet.3
25
26
27
3 Turner denies telling Williams he could see through the walls. He does not, however, dispute
28
1 Based on her assessment, Williams concluded that Turner was “gravely disabled”
2 and should be admitted to MHCB, which treats inmates who are deemed a danger to
3 themselves, a danger to others, or “gravely disabled.” Williams Decl. ¶¶ 5, 12. Williams
4 then called her supervising psychologist to discuss the case.4 Id. at ¶ 13. Williams and her
5 supervisor agreed that, given his condition, Turner should be referred to MHCB for
6 diagnostic evaluation. Id. They called the MHCB director to discuss admitting Turner. Id.;
7 see also Defs.’ Ex. B at 8. At that point, MHCB staff took over and Williams was not
8 involved in Turner’s care again. Williams Decl. ¶¶ 13–14.
9 Psychologist Jessica Bailis signed the order for Turner to be admitted to the MHCB
10 at 10:51 a.m. on January 15, 2020. Defs.’ Ex. B at 8; see also Williams Decl. ¶ 13. Shortly
11 after admitting Turner to the MHCB, Dr. Bailis conducted an initial evaluation of him.
12 Bailis’ observation notes state Turner exhibited “bizarre physical and verbal” behavior and
13 was “disruptive.” Id. Later the same day, Bailis described Turner as “agitated,” “rambling,”
14 “crying,” engaged in “bizarre,” “grandiose,” and “magical thinking.” Id. at 76. Turner
15 cooperated with Bailis during the interview, but he was frustrated that he was without his
16 “codes.” Id. Bailis located Turner’s Bible, Quran, and dictionary and gave them to him.
17 Turner then “de-escalated” and returned to his cell without incident. Id. Bailis noted that
18 for the remainder of the afternoon, “[Plaintiff] could be overheard pointing out the ‘moon
19 and stars’ on the wall to any staff walking past.” Id. At the time, Bailis suspected Turner
20 was suffering from “likely substance induced intoxication.” Id.
21
22
4 Under standard procedure, when an inmate is in mental health crisis, a Crisis Intervention Team
23
is notified. The inmate is then evaluated by a member of the Crisis Intervention Team, designated
24 the “primary clinician.” The primary clinician determines whether the inmate meets the criteria
for MHCB. The primary clinician then discusses the admission with the psychology supervisor.
25
The psychology supervisor, primary clinician and Director of the MHCB (a psychologist)
26 conference and decide whether to admit the inmate to MHCB. If the inmate is deemed to meet the
eligibility criteria for MHCB admission, the inmate is taken to the Triage and Treatment area,
27 evaluated for medical clearing and, if cleared, then admitted to the MHCB. The admission order
is placed by either the primary clinician, one of the clinicians in the MHCB or the MHCB Director.
28
1 The next day, January 16, 2020, psychiatrist Anita High conducted Turner’s initial
2 psychiatric evaluation at MHCB. Id. at 64, 101; Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 16. Dr. High noted that
3 Turner reported having “visions ever since he looked at the moon a few weeks ago.” Defs.’
4 Ex. B at 102. High’s notes also indicate Turner stated:
5 I know things I never knew before like calculus I can find out
everything about everything. . . My grandfather created an element[.] Are you
6
familiar with the motherships[?] [They] have 1500 baby planes. My
7 grandfather started communicating with me since I’ve been here. The building
was 9 my cell was 207 which equals 9.
8
9 Id. When asked about his mental health history, Plaintiff responded “I don’t have anything.
10 I’m not suicidal. I have a lot going on right now. I still see signs” Id. Dr. High noted that
11 Turner was “see[ing] patterns in everything” and “demonstrating ideas of reference,”
12 which is the “delusional belief that general events are personally directed at oneself.” Id.;
13 see also Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 16. For instance, Turner told Dr. High it was significant that there
14 were 40 lights in the housing unit and he was 40 years old. Defs.’ Ex. B at 102. Based on
15 her evaluation of Turner and his history of drug overdose, Dr. High’s working diagnosis at
16 the time was “substance abuse psychosis.” Id. Dr. High concluded that Turner should
17 remain at MHCB and ordered a psychiatrist follow-up the next day. Id.
18 Dr. High saw Turner again on January 17, 2020. She found him to be cooperative
19 but hyperverbal, with tangential thoughts and complex delusions. Defs.’ Ex. B at 100. He
20 still believed he was the “Angel Michael.” Id. Dr. High noted Plaintiff had not been
21 sleeping well (he was observed awake at 3:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m.). In addition, staff had
22 observed Turner “rambling” about seeing codes in everything. Id. Turner was heard stating,
23 “I’m so tuned with the world . . . I know people don’t want to see the Angel Michael in this
24 form but here I am.” Id. When asked why he was not sleeping, Turner replied, “The
25 dictionary has my grandmother’s name.” Id. Dr. High concluded Turner should remain at
26 the MHCB level of care. Id.
27 Turner was seen by another psychiatrist, Dr. Deam, on January 19, 2020. Turner
28 spoke in “paranoid tones.” Id. at 98. Turner had put his mattress on the floor of his cell and
1 was using the plastic bed frame to lay out documents, but he would not discuss the
2 significance of them. Id. Turner was refusing to take his prescribed Cymbalta,5 and was
3 not willing to consider alternative medications. Id. Dr. Deam agreed that Turner should
4 remain at the MHCB level of care. Id.
5 Turner was seen by Oldroyd for the first time on January 22, 2020. Id. at 95–97. By
6 that time, Turner had been in MHCB for a week. Oldroyd summarized the visit as follows:
7 [Turner] reports being “happy and blessed.” He went on to talk about being
on the earth to stop violence, get world peace, [and] feed all the people. [He]
8
admitted to seeing red lights coming into the prison, believing that they are
9 the means to which his grandfather is communicating with him. He also
described how his grandfather has control over the prison and [it] was actually
10
designed by him as well. He talks of the “mothership” which is the Nation of
11 Islam, and [stated] its purpose was to protect others. [Turner went] on to talk
about going back to the pyramids when he closes his eyes and have a 3rd eye.
12
The 3rd eye is for ESP and for clairvoyance allowing him to travel back in
13 time. He then talked about the “Secret Society,” which is government-
controlled technology that comes directly from the “mothership.” [Turner]
14
states that he does not know the purpose of the “Secret Society.” He denies
15 [being] paranoid but endorses ideas of reference. He sees planes in the sky
and believes that his grandfather is tapping into [his] mind and communicating
16
with him. He writes words on paper and his grandfather can communicate
17 with him directly from the paper. He believes that when his new TV stopped
working, it was “preparation for things to come.” [Turner] has grandiose
18
ideas, stating that he can make the stars appear and that he is playing the role
19 of the Angel Michael to bring about help and goodness in the world. He also
describes the ability to move clouds. [Turner] is having [visual hallucinations]
20
of the “mothership” but denies having [auditory hallucinations] . . . His
21 thinking is disorganized with circumstantiality and perseveration. Speech is
normal. Mood is mildly euphoric. He denies [suicidal ideation/homicidal
22
23
24 5 The Court takes judicial notice that Cymbalta, also known as Duloxetine, is a “serotonin
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor (SNRI) antidepressant” medication. See Physician’s Desk
25
Reference, https://www.pdr.net/drug-summary/Cymbalta-duloxetine-288#3 (last visited Aug. 22,
26 2022). See United States v. Howard, 381 F.3d 873, 880 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2004) (taking judicial
notice of the effects of certain medications listed in the Physician’s Desk Reference); see also
27 Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 419 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Well-known medical facts are the
types of matters of which judicial notice may be taken.”).
28
1 ideation]. Turner was seen in [Recreational Therapy] climbing on the table
today to see the lights and talking to them in staccato sentences. The Warden
2
had to come and tell him to get down which he did without incident.
3
Id. at 96–97.
4
After meeting with Turner, Oldroyd settled on a working diagnosis of
5
“schizophreniform disorder.” Id. at 95; see also Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 22. Oldroyd also noted
6
that “substance use disorder” could not be ruled out because, although Turner denied
7
substance abuse, he was refusing a urine test. Defs.’ Ex. B at 95. Schizophreninform
8
disorder is a mental illness which presents with psychosis, during which an individual
9
cannot tell what is real from what is imagined, sees or hears things that are not there, and
10
has a disorganized thought process. Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 22. In making her diagnosis, Oldroyd
11
relied on her experience and Turner’s medical history. Oldroyd also noted that Turner had
12
received three rule violations in quick succession over the past few months––all of which
13
were suggestive of psychotic symptoms and which were out of character for Turner, who
14
had previously been a “model inmate.” Id.; see also Defs.’ Ex. B at 18, 35, 57. She also
15
noted: “starting PC26026 for [grave disability] and possible [danger to self]/[danger to
16
others] – psychotropic medication indicated.” Defs.’ Ex. B at 95.
17
Oldroyd met with Turner a second time on January 23, 2020. Id. at 91. Turner
18
exhibited symptoms similar to those she observed during her previous visit. Id. Turner
19
reported seeing a red light that was from the “mother ship” and was “communicating to
20
him from Allah.” Id. at 92. Turner also described how he was feeling prior to being
21
admitted to MHCB on January 15, 2020. Turner told Oldroyd his mind was getting
22
“flooded” with overwhelming knowledge and he “looked at the moon and felt his heart
23
starting to change.” Id. Turner said he then knew he was able to “crack the code.” Id. at
24
25
26
6 California Penal Code section 2602 authorizes involuntary medication of state inmates on a non-
27 emergency basis where certain criteria are met. Cal. Penal Code § 2602(c). In addition to other
requirements, the inmate is entitled to a hearing before an administrative judge, with the assistance
28
1 92–93. Turner said he “decided it was time to leave prison to do his work saving the gangs
2 from violence [and] feeding starving people.” Id.at 93. Turner packed his belongings and
3 went to talk to the Warden. When he got to the program office, Turner shared his papers
4 with numbers and “codes” with correctional officers there. Id.
5 During the same January 23, 2020 appointment, Oldroyd discussed California Penal
6 Code section 2602 and the procedure for involuntary medication of mental health inmates.
7 Id. Turner became “quietly argumentative” and asked Oldroyd if she had an agenda, and
8 whether she believed in God. Turner insisted that everything he was telling Oldroyd was
9 true and he was not psychotic or crazy. Id. When Oldroyd explained that a § 2602 petition
10 was going to be filed so he could be medicated despite his refusal, Turner stated, “well then
11 the wrath of Allah will come down on you for this injustice.” Id. Oldroyd noted: “working
12 on non-urgent PC2602 for grave disability, pending completion––antipsychotic medication
13 indicated.” Id. at 92.
14 On January 24, 2020, psychiatrist H. Greenwald, the Chief of Mental Health for
15 RJD, prepared a referral for Turner to receive inpatient psychiatric care pursuant to Penal
16 Code § 2684, which sets out the procedure for transfer of mentally ill prisoners to a state
17 hospital for treatment. Id. at 82. On the same day, the California Penal Code § 2602
18 petition, signed by Oldroyd, was filed. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. B, ECF No. 60-2 at 11–14. A
19 hearing date was set for February 18, 2020. Id. at 11.
20 Oldroyd saw Turner again on January 27 and 30, 2020. Defs.’ Ex. B at 85–88;
21 Oldroyd Decl. ¶¶ 29–30. Oldroyd’s notes state Turner continued to exhibit the same
22 behavior and symptoms as during his previous visits. Defs.’ Ex. B at 85–88. During the
23 January 27 visit, Oldroyd noted Turner “was internally stimulated looking up in the sky
24 and talking to what he was experiencing in the sky.” Id. at 87. At that point, Turner was
25 refusing to take psychotropic medication but he was aware that a section 2602 petition was
26 in the works. See id. at 88, 93. Turner told Oldroyd he would not talk to her “because you
27 are making me take medication.” Id.; see also Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 29. When Oldroyd saw
28 Turner on January 30, 2020, he told her “I have nothing to say to you, so please go away.”
1 Defs.’ Ex. B at 86. Oldroyd noted that during a group meeting two days prior, Turner had
2 told her she needed to “get a Bible because [you] really don’t understand these spiritual
3 things or you would be able to see what I see.”7 Id. at 86.
4 On February 5, 2020, Turner was transferred from RJD MHCB to California Health
5 Care Facility (“CHCF”) to receive a higher level of care. Id. at 12; see also Oldroyd Decl.
6 ¶ 28. Oldroyd had no further involvement with Turner’s care or treatment. She did,
7 however, appear at Turner’s Penal Code § 2602 hearing on February 20, 2020, during
8 which an administrative judge was to determine whether Turner could be involuntarily
9 medicated. The administrative judge ultimately ruled that Turner was not “gravely
10 disabled” and denied the § 2602 petition. In doing so, the Medication Court Administrator
11 stated that “the treating psychiatrist was not able to demonstrate [that Turner] lack[ed]
12 insight regarding his need for psychiatric medication. The patient showed minimal to no
13 signs of grave disability.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. B at 27. On March 5, 2020, Turner was
14 transferred from CHCF to Mule Creek State Prison’s Enhanced Outpatient Unit. Oldroyd
15 Decl. ¶ 31.
16 III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
17 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show
18 that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
19 judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). While Turner bears the burden of proof
20 at trial, Defendants, as the moving parties, bear the initial burden of informing a court of
21 the basis for their motion and of identifying the portions of the record that demonstrate an
22 absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
23 323 (1986). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing
24
25
26 7 On January 28, 2020, psychologist Bailis met with Turner and noted Turner expressed
“frustration” with Oldroyd and stated Turner believed she was “working for Satan” and “trying to
27 mess with my brain” by prescribing medication. Defs.’ Ex. B at 113. Turner stated that Oldroyd
did not understand that he was a messenger of God who was sent to help others. Turner believed
28
1 law, and a dispute about such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
2 reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty
3 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
4 If Defendants meet their initial responsibility, the burden then shifts to Turner to
5 establish a genuine dispute as to any material facts that exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
6 v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). To establish the existence of this factual
7 dispute, Turner must present evidence in the form of affidavits and/or admissible discovery
8 material to support his contention that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. See Fed. R.
9 Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586 n.11.
10 District courts must “construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se
11 inmates and . . . avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly.” Thomas v. Ponder, 611
12 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). However, if Plaintiff “fails to properly support an
13 assertion of fact or fails to properly address [Defendant’s] assertion of fact, as required by
14 Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion . . ..”
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). Plaintiff, as the opposing party, may not rest solely on conclusory
16 allegations of fact or law. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir. 1986). A “motion
17 for summary judgment may not be defeated . . . by evidence that is ‘merely colorable’ or
18 ‘is not significantly probative.’” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50; Hardage v. CBS Broad.
19 Inc., 427 F.3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir. 2006).
20 IV. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
21 Williams and Oldroyd argue there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to
22 whether they violated Turner’s First Amendment right to exercise his religion when he was
23 transferred to MHCB, and ultimately to CHCF, based on a determination that he was
24 suffering from a mental health emergency and “gravely disabled.” Defs.’ P. & A. Supp.
25 Mot. Sum. J., ECF No. 47 (“Defs.’ P. & A.”). Specifically, Williams and Oldroyd argue
26 that summary judgment is warranted because there is no triable issue that (1) Williams
27 caused Turner to be transferred and (2) Williams and Oldroyd’s actions were taken in
28 pursuit of a legitimate penological interest and not based on Turner’s religious exercise. Id.
1 at 12–18. Defendants also contend they are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 19–20.
2 A. First Amendment Free Exercise
3 Prisoners “retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, including its
4 directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of
5 Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted); see also Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,
6 322 & n. 2 (1972). A prisoner’s right to freely exercise his religion, however, is limited by
7 institutional objectives and by the loss of freedom that comes with incarceration. O’Lone,
8 482 U.S. at 348. To implicate the Free Exercise Clause, a prisoner must show that the belief
9 at issue is both “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d
10 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884–85 (9th Cir. 2008)
11 (noting the Supreme Court’s disapproval of the “centrality” test and finding that the
12 “sincerity” test in Malik determines whether the Free Exercise Clause applies).
13 If the inmate makes an initial showing of a sincerely held religious belief, he must
14 establish that prison officials substantially burdened the practice of his religion by
15 preventing him from engaging in conduct that he sincerely believes is consistent with his
16 faith. Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1138 (9th Cir. 2015); Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884–86
17 (9th Cir. 2008); Malik, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). “A substantial burden . . . place[s]
18 more than an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce
19 individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an
20 adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Jones v. Williams, 791 F.3d
21 1023, 1031–32 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d
22 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013)).
23 “Once a claimant demonstrates that the challenged regulation impinges on his
24 sincerely held religious exercise, the burden shifts to the government to show that the
25 regulation is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Jones v. Slade, 23
26 F.4th 1124, 1144 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Walker, 789 F.3d at 1138); see also O’Lone, 482
27 U.S. at 349; Shakur, 514 F.3d at 884–88. In determining whether a legitimate penological
28 interest exists, the Supreme Court has articulated four factors to be considered: (1) whether
1 there is a valid, rational connection between a state interest and the prison regulation; (2)
2 whether prisoners have an alternative method of engaging in religious practice; (3) the
3 impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right would have on guards and other
4 inmates; and (4) the absence of ready alternatives to the challenged regulation. Turner v.
5 Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987); see also Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993).
6 Here, Defendants do not claim that Turner’s religious beliefs, as a member of the
7 Nation of Islam, are not sincerely held. Nor do they contend that he was not “substantially
8 burdened.” Rather, they argue that summary judgment is proper here because there is no
9 genuine factual dispute as to whether Williams caused Turner’s religious beliefs to be
10 burdened. They further assert that there is no triable issue because the actions of Williams
11 and Oldroyd were reasonably in pursuit of legitimate penological interests. See Def.’s P.
12 & A. at 12–18.
13 1. Sincerely Held Belief
14 As noted above, to implicate the Free Exercise Clause, Turner must satisfy an initial
15 burden by showing his belief is “sincerely held” and “rooted in religious belief.” Malik, 16
16 F.3d at 333 (quoting Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981)). Plaintiff states,
17 and Defendants do not dispute, that he has a sincerely held religious belief in the tenets of
18 the Nation of Islam. See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3. Turner attests that he is a faithful follower
19 of the Nation of Islam, which teaches, among other things, the existence of a “mother
20 plane” as “an actual tenet of [the Nation of] Islam.” Id.; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C at 13.
21 As Turner explained to one of his therapists, as a member of the Nation of Islam, Turner’s
22 faith includes beliefs based on Elijah Muhammed’s book “The Fall of America,” which
23 discusses the existence of a “mother plane,” an enormous round ship that flies down to
24 earth every six months-to-a-year, and which will also come “when it’s time for complete
25 destruction.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. C at 19. Turner asserts that it is a Nation of Islam belief that
26 “there are 1500 baby planes that come off the mother plane and those are what people
27 confuse for [unidentified flying objects].” Id. Turner states he is sincere in his beliefs. Id.at
28 1, 13, 19; see also Compl. at 3, 5.
1 Defendants have presented no evidence to create a genuine factual dispute that
2 Turner lacks a sincerely held religious belief. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. As such,
3 based on Turner’s sworn statement, the Court finds he has satisfied his initial burden of
4 showing he possesses a sincerely held belief in the tenets of Nation of Islam. See Obataiye-
5 Allah v. Steward, 857 Fed. Appx. 403, 2021 WL 2105494 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding the
6 plaintiff inmate’s declaration was sufficient to establish he had a sincerely held belief in
7 the principles of the Nation of Islam).
8 2. Substantial Burden
9 In his verified Complaint, Turner alleges his right to practice his Nation of Islam
10 faith was burdened by Williams and Oldroyd when he was removed from the RJD general
11 population, admitted to MHCB on January 15, 2020 and subsequently transferred to the
12 CHCF on February 5, 2020. See Compl. at 3–6.
13 “A substantial burden need not actually force a litigant to change his practices; a
14 violation may occur where the state denies [an important benefit] because of conduct
15 mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify
16 his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Walker, 789 F.3d at 1135. Here, Turner states he
17 was punished for simply expressing tenets of his beliefs and his ongoing a “spiritual
18 awakening.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A at 2. After being transferred to MHCB and CHCF, Turner
19 attests he was afraid to practice his religion because he had been deemed “gravely disabled”
20 by Williams and Oldroyd when he expressed the tenets of his faith. Compl. at 5. In addition,
21 having been transferred out of RJD general population, Turner was no longer able to
22 participate in certain programs and activities. Evidence presented by both parties indicates
23 that prior to his transfer to MHCB, Turner had been slated to enter the Male Community
24 Reentry Program, based on his history of good behavior and programming. Defs.’ Ex. B at
25 57; see also Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A at 5. After his transfer out of general population, he was no
26 longer eligible to enter the program. Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A at 5. The Court finds, based on the
27 evidence presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to Turner, he was substantially
28 burdened by his transfer out of RJD general population for mental health treatment. See
1 Walker, 789 F.3d at 1135.
2 3. Causal Connection Between Williams’ Actions and Plaintiff’s Burden
3 Williams contends she is entitled to summary judgment because she did not
4 personally order Turner’s transfer from the general population to the MHCB. Defs.’ P. &
5 A. at 12–13. Williams claims there is no genuine dispute of material fact as to her liability
6 because, even assuming Turner’s sincere religious beliefs were substantially burdened, she
7 did not cause the burden because she did not cause Turner to be transfer. Id.
8 In order to obtain relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish a causal
9 connection between the purported constitutional violation and alleged injury. Est. of Brooks
10 ex rel. Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Causation is, of
11 course, a required element of a § 1983 claim”); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d at 1207.
12 A “causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts
13 by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’
14 constitutional harms.” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty School Bd of Trustees, 479 F.3d 1175,
15 1183 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)); see
16 also Rodriguez v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018); Harris v.
17 Roderick, 126 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1997); Merritt v. Mackey, 827 F.2d 1368, 1371
18 (9th Cir. 1987). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’
19 formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355
20 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir.
21 2008); Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). When making the
22 causation determination, the court “must take a very individualized approach which
23 accounts for the duties, discretion, and means of each defendant.” Leer v. Murphy, 844
24 F.2d 628, 633–34 (9th Cir. 1988).
25 While Williams did not personally sign the order admitting Turner to MHCB on
26 January 15, 2020, she made the initial determination that Turner was “gravely disabled.”
27 Defs.’ Ex. B at 103; Williams Decl. ¶ 9. A trier of fact could reasonably find that Williams’
28 determination set in motion a series of events that resulted in Turner’s admission to MHCB.
1 Indeed, Williams states the purpose of her evaluation of Turner was to “assess[] him to
2 determine whether he might be a danger to self, danger to others or gravely disabled.”
3 Williams Decl. ¶ 11. As noted above, MHCB is specifically for inmates who have been
4 deemed a danger to themselves or other, or are “gravely disabled.” Id. at ¶ 5. Williams
5 concluded that given Turner’s condition, he “should be admitted to MHCB.” Id. at ¶ 13.
6 Williams then contacted her supervisor to discuss the case and they both agreed that Turner
7 should be referred to MHCB, based on Williams’ determination that he was “gravely
8 disabled.” Id. Williams and her supervisor then “called the MHCB Director to discuss
9 admitting Turner to MHCB.” Id. At that point, MHCB staff took over and custody staff
10 escorted Turner to the MHCB. Defs.’ Ex. B at 8.
11 While Williams did not sign the order admitting Turner to the MHCB, her
12 determination that Turner was gravely disabled was a crucial factor in his being transferred
13 there. A reasonable jury could find that Williams “set in motion the series of acts” by which
14 she knew or reasonably should have known would cause Turner to be removed from RJD
15 general population and transferred to MHCB, which, in turn, created a substantial burden
16 on his religious exercise. See Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183.
17 4. Legitimate Penological Interest
18 Both Williams and Oldroyd argue that, even assuming Turner’s sincerely held belief
19 was substantially burdened, the challenged conduct did not offend the First Amendment
20 because it was reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.8 Defs.’ P. & A. at 15–
21
22
23
8 Williams and Oldroyd also assert that summary judgment should be granted because they both
24 based their opinions about Turner’s mental healthcare needs on their professional experience, not
his religious expression. Defs.’ P. & A. at 13–14. Defendants cite no legal authority for this
25
proposition. Turner argues Defendants based their opinions on his expression of Nation of Islam
26 tenets, which Williams and Turner found “bizarre.” He contends that the statements Defendants
found to be delusional were actually expressions of well-established Nation of Islam beliefs. See
27 Compl., at 3–6. As noted above, to obtain relief, Turner need only show his sincere religious
beliefs were substantially burdened by Defendants. If he makes such a showing, Defendants must
28
1 18. As discussed above, determining whether a legitimate penological interest exists, the
2 Supreme Court has articulated four factors to be considered: (1) whether there is a valid,
3 rational connection between a state interest and the prison regulation; (2) whether prisoners
4 have alternative means of engaging in religious practice; (3) the impact accommodation of
5 the asserted constitutional right would have on guards and other inmates; and (4) the
6 absence of ready alternatives to the challenged regulation. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90; see
7 also Ward, 1 F.3d at 876.
8 a. Valid, Rational Connection
9 The Court must first consider whether there is “valid, rational connection” between
10 the challenged conduct and “the legitimate government interest put forth to justify it.”
11 Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. “The first Turner factor is the most important.” Jones v. Slade, 23
12 F.4th 1124, 1135 (9th Cir. 2022). To evaluate whether a valid, rational connection exists,
13 the Court must determine “whether the governmental objective underlying the policy is (1)
14 legitimate, (2) neutral, and (3) whether the policy is ‘rationally related to that objective.’”
15 Id. (quoting Mauro v. Arpaio, 188 F.3d 1054, 1059 (9th Cir. 1999)). The initial burden is
16 on defendants to put forth a “common sense” or intuitive connection between their
17 challenged conduct and a legitimate penological interest. Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348,
18 357 (9th Cir. 1999). If the defendants satisfy the initial burden, the inmate must present
19 enough evidence to refute the connection between the conduct and the objective. If the
20 inmate fails to do so, the court is to presume the governmental objective is legitimate and
21 neutral and the first Turner prong is satisfied. See Ashker v. California Dept. of
22 Corrections, 350 F.3d 917, 923–24 (9th Cir. 2003); Frost, 197 F.3d at 357.
23 Williams and Oldroyd assert two, overlapping government interests: (1) complying
24 with its obligations under the Eighth Amendment and (2) maintaining order and the safety
25 of inmates (including Turner) and staff. Defs.’ P. & A. at 16–17.
26
27
Jones, 23 F.4th at 1144. To the extent Defendants argue their conduct was based on medical
28
1 First, the Eighth Amendment requires state actors to protect the health and safety of
2 the inmates in their care. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 842 (1994). This
3 includes an obligation of prison staff to provide mental health care that meets “minimum
4 constitutional requirements.” Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 501 (2011); see also Doty v.
5 Cty. of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that “the requirements for mental
6 health care are the same as those for physical health care needs”); see also Hoptowit v. Ray,
7 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982) (analyzing mental health care requirements as part of
8 general health care requirements). The Eighth Amendment is violated when officials are
9 deliberately indifferent to an inmate’s serious mental health need. Doty, 37 F.3d at 546; see
10 also Capps v. Atiyeh, 559 F. Supp. 894, 916 (D. Ore. 1983) (“[A]n inmate suffers [E]ighth
11 [A]mendment pain whenever he must endure an untreated serious mental illness for any
12 appreciable length of time.”). Compliance with the Eighth Amendment is a valid and
13 neutral objective; and prison officials have a legitimate interest in doing so. See Jones, 23
14 F. 4th at 1135; see also Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating
15 prisons have an interest in “protecting inmate health”).
16 Moreover, courts have held that security, order, and rehabilitation are all legitimate
17 penological interests. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 408 (internal citations omitted);
18 Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting legitimate penological interests
19 include “security, order, and rehabilitation”). Thus, the question here is whether there is a
20 “rational connection” between the legitimate interest in protecting the health and safety of
21 inmates (including Turner) and the decisions made by Williams and Oldroyd related to
22 Turner’s behavior in January 2020.
23 Williams attests that on January 15, 2020, she received a request from custody staff
24 for an “urgent consult” with Turner. Williams Decl. ¶ 9. Custody officers reported that
25 Turner had shown up in the program office with all his belongings and was acting strangely.
26 Turner reportedly told staff and other inmates in the office that the Bible, the Quran, and
27 the dictionary were giving him codes and telling him when the mothership would be
28 picking him up. Id. When Williams met with Turner in the RJD gym, she noted that Turner
1 was speaking rapidly, “exhibiting delusional thinking and making nonsensical statements.”
2 Id. at ¶ 10. Turner repeatedly referred to “codes” and, at one point, stated: “I’m the Angel
3 Michael and they got me in this cage. I have a bigger cause to do. I got so many people to
4 bless.” Id. Williams states Turner explained that he had been awake all-night crying
5 because he was communicating with this deceased grandfather, who Turner now realized
6 was not dead. Id. Williams states Turner “was facing a cabinet and reported he was able to
7 see the moon and the stars through the cabinet.” Id. Williams found Turner’s behavior
8 “uncharacteristic.” Id. at ¶ 7; see also Defs.’s Ex. B at 8. He had previously been a model
9 inmate. Defs.’s Ex. B at 8, 18, 35.
10 Given Turner’s disruptive behavior and grandiose statements, which notably
11 appeared to be new behavior for Turner, a jury could find that it was not unreasonable for
12 Williams to believe Turner needed the mental healthcare provided by MHCB. In addition,
13 a jury could find that, because Turner was making statements which custody staff and other
14 inmates found bizarre and distracting, segregating him from the general population while
15 getting him mental healthcare was rationally related to the prison’s interest in providing
16 Turner with adequate healthcare, as required under the Eighth Amendment. Segregating
17 Turner from the general population was also rationally related to the state’s interest in
18 maintaining order in the prison and protecting the safety of all inmates and staff.
19 In his Opposition, Turner denies some of the conduct Williams attributes to him.
20 Turner states he never told Williams that he could see through walls. See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex.
21 A at 2. This, however, does not undermine the Court’s conclusion. Turner does not dispute
22 that he proclaimed himself to be the Angel Michael, was obsessed with “codes,” declared
23 his deceased grandfather was alive and communicating with him, and appeared in the
24 program office with all his belongings while exhibiting other unusual behavior. Regardless
25 of whether it was informed by his religious beliefs, Turner’s behavior was potentially
26 disruptive and suggested a concerning change in disposition. Thus, even viewing the
27 evidence in the light most favorable to Turner, the evidence shows that Williams’ conduct
28 was rationally related to the government’s interest in protecting inmate health and safety.
1 Similarly, evidence in the record shows Oldroyd based her mental health evaluations
2 of Turner on his behavior as opposed to his religious beliefs. When Oldroyd met with
3 Turner on January 22, 2020, he believed “red lights” coming into the prison were a means
4 by which his deceased grandfather was communicating with him. Defs.’ Ex. B at 95.
5 Turner referred to a “secret society” controlled by the government. Oldroyd also noted that
6 Turner had been found standing on a table earlier that day and “the warden had to tell him
7 to get down.” Id. at 96. Turner told Oldroyd he was not sleeping because “there was too
8 much to do.” Id. Based on her evaluation, she noted Turner was exhibiting paranoia,
9 endorsing “ideas of reference” (the “delusional belief that general events are personally
10 directed at oneself”) and making grandiose statements. See Defs.’ Ex. B at 95–96; see also
11 Oldroyd Decl. ¶¶ 19–21. As such, Oldroyd’s decision that Turner needed continued mental
12 health intervention was rationally related to the government’s interest in providing
13 adequate mental healthcare to Turner, safeguarding institutional order, and protecting the
14 safety of all inmates and staff.
15 Having found Oldroyd has satisfied her initial burden, Turner must present enough
16 evidence to refute the connection between the challenged conduct and the objective. See
17 Ashker, 350 F.3d at 923–24; Frost, 197 F.3d at 357. Turner argues that Oldroyd only spoke
18 to him for “3 to 4 minutes.” Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. A at 12. Turner states that Oldroyd
19 “misdiagnosed” him as being gravely disabled. Id. He points to the February 20, 2021
20 determination by an administrative law judge, denying the § 2602 petition after concluding
21 that Plaintiff was not “gravely disabled.” See Pl.’s Opp’n, Ex. B at 27–29. But even viewed
22 in the light most favorable to Turner, the evidence shows Oldroyd relied on not just her
23 interview with Turner, but also a review of his medical history, including reports provided
24 by Williams and other mental health professionals who evaluated or observed Turner
25 during his time in MHCB. Oldoryd’s opinion that Turner needed to be in MCHB was
26 shared by Dr. High and Dr. Deems. See Defs.’ Ex. B at 98, 100, 102. The administrative
27 law judge’s subsequent decision that there was insufficient evidence that Turner was
28 “gravely disabled” does not undermine the connection between Oldroyd’s conduct and the
1 state’s interest. To the extent Oldroyd’s medical opinion caused Turner to remain at MHCB
2 or caused his subsequent transfer to CHCF, it was nonetheless rationally related to the
3 government’s interest in providing mental healthcare that comports with the Eighth
4 Amendment and with the prison’s interest in maintaining order, Turner’s safety, and the
5 safety of other inmates and staff. Therefore, the Court finds the first Turner factor weighs
6 heavily in favor of Williams and Oldroyd.
7 b. Alternate Means
8 The second Turner factor is “whether there are alternative means of exercising the
9 right that remain open to prison inmates.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 89–90. In the context of free
10 exercise claims, the relevant inquiry under this factor is not whether the inmate has an
11 alternative means of engaging in the particular religious practice that he claims is being
12 affected; rather, the question is whether the inmate has been “denied all means of religious
13 expression.” Ward, 1 F.3d at 877. The second Turner factor has been deemed satisfied
14 where the prisoner retains “the ability to participate in other significant rituals and
15 ceremonies” of his faith, even if some aspects of religious practice are impinged upon. Id.
16 Williams and Oldroyd present evidence that in the MCHB, inmates’ religious beliefs
17 and practices are “accommodated as much as possible.” See Oldroyd Decl. ¶ 10. Inmates
18 are not permitted to attend group religious services but can request chaplain visits.9 Id.
19 MHCB inmates are permitted to pray in their cells and “generally allowed to have religious
20 literature, unless it is making their psychosis worse or they are misusing in (i.e., tearing it
21 up or throwing it).” Id. Notations in Turner’s medical records indicate he was given his
22 Bible, Quran and a dictionary the day he was transferred to the MHCB. Defs.’ Ex. B at 76,
23 78, 98, 121. Turner also had access to outdoor recreation while in MHCB, where he was
24 seen praying on several occasions. Id. at 78, 123, 124.
25
26
9 Defendants do not indicate whether a Nation of Islam chaplain was requested by, or made
27 available to, Turner. In any event, the Constitution does not necessarily require prisons to provide
each inmate with the religious counselor with beliefs wholly congruent to his own. Johnson v.
28
1 Turner argues generally that the expression of his religious beliefs while in MHCB
2 was seen as an indication that he was delusional by both Williams and Oldroyd. Compl. at
3 3, 5. With regard to Williams, there is no evidence she had any part in Turner’s care after
4 he was admitted to MHCB on January 15, 2020. On that date, records indicate Turner had
5 access to his religious texts, including the Bible and Quran, was permitted to read them,
6 pray and request a chaplain. Defs.’ Ex. B at 76, 78, 98, 121. There is no evidence that
7 Williams denied the Turner the ability to participate “significant rituals and ceremonies”
8 of the Nation of Islam. See Ward, 1 F.3d at 877.
9 As for Oldroyd, who did treat Turner while he was in MHCB, medical records
10 indicate Turner retained possession of his Bible and Quran during his 20-day stay. Defs.’
11 Ex. B at 76, 78, 98, 121. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has distinguished between
12 curtailing “various ways of expressing belief, for which alternative ways of expressing
13 belief may be found” and requiring the inmate to “defile himself, according to the
14 believer’s conscience, by doing something that is completely forbidden by the believer’s
15 religion.” See Ward, 1 F.3d at 878. While Oldroyd deemed some of Turner’s religious
16 declarations, such as “I am the Angel Michael,” as an indication he was suffering from
17 grandiosity and/or delusions, Turner had other ways to practice the Nation of Islam faith,
18 such as reading his religious texts. Turner presents no evidence that he was unable to fulfill
19 any “commandments” of the Nation of Islam. See id. Therefore, the second factor weighs
20 in favor of both Williams and Oldroyd.
21 c. Impact of Accommodation
22 The third Turner factor requires the Court to consider “the impact accommodation
23 of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates and on the
24 allocation of prison resources generally.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 91; Washington v. Harper,
25 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990). The accommodation Turner sought in this case was simply to
26 be permitted to remain in the general population at RJD. It is undisputed, however, that
27 Turner’s behavior on January 15, 2020 was disruptive to other inmates and staff. Indeed,
28 the disruption caused when Turner first came into the program office, carrying all his
1 belongings, was the reason a mental health evaluation was sought in the first place. As
2 discussed above, given Turner’s outbursts, allowing him to remain in the general
3 population of inmates would likely have been detrimental to maintaining order. Even after
4 he was transferred to the MHCB, his behavior was disruptive. On one occasion he climbed
5 on a table and would not get down until the Warden intervened. Def.’s Ex. B at 96.
6 Therefore, the third Turner factor weighs in favor of both Williams and Oldroyd.
7 d. Absence of Ready Alternatives
8 Under the fourth and final Turner factor––whether the challenged regulation is an
9 “exaggerated response” to the prison’s concerns––Plaintiff must show there are “obvious,
10 easy alternatives” to the regulation that “fully accommodate the prisoner’s rights at de
11 minimis cost to valid penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91. The burden is on
12 the Plaintiff to show that there are obvious and easy alternatives to the challenged policy.
13 Mauro, 188 F.3d at 1062. “This is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials
14 do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of
15 accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 91. Instead,
16 the proper inquiry is “whether the prisoner has pointed to some obvious regulatory
17 alternative that fully accommodates the asserted right while not imposing more than a de
18 minimis cost to the valid penological goal.” Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135–36
19 (2003). Here, Turner fails to suggest an obvious or easy alternative to being transferred to
20 MHCB for mental healthcare. The undisputed evidence shows Turner’s behavior was
21 disruptive and indicated a need for a mental health intervention. Because Turner has neither
22 argued nor provided evidence to show there existed an alternative with de minimis costs to
23 valid penological interests, the fourth factor weighs in favor of Williams and Oldroyd.
24 5. Conclusion
25 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds all four Turner factors weigh in favor of
26 Williams and Oldroyd. The Court therefore concludes the there is no triable issue as to
27 whether Plaintiff’s transfers for mental healthcare was reasonably related to legitimate
28
1 || penological interests. Williams and Oldroyd are entitled to summary judgment.!°
2 Vv. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
3 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for
4 ||summary judgment (ECF No. 47) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and DIRECTS the Clerk
5 || of the Court to enter judgment in favor of Defendants K. Williams and J. Oldroyd.
6
7 Dated: September 9, 2022 BME: ie Z. A a
8 Hon. William Q. Hayes
9 United States District Court
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25 || ———____
26 '0 Because the Court has found no triable issue as to whether Turner’s First Amendment rights
27 || were violated, the Court finds it is unnecessary to determine whether Williams and Oldroyd are
28 01 (20 i yuan’ immunity based on clearly established law. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,
24 eo oe