The opinion
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 WILLARD RICHARD STROUD, JR., Case No.: 18-CV-515 JLS (MDD)
11 Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’
12 v. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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(ECF No. 108)
14 SHERIFF WILLIAM D. GORE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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18 Presently before the Court is Defendants Sergeant Paul Michalke, Detective
19 Benjamin Shea, and Sergeant Jesus Lizarraga’s (collectively, the “Deputy Defendants”)
20 Motion for Reconsideration (“Mot.,” ECF No. 108). Plaintiff Willard Stroud, appearing
21 pro se, did not file an opposition to the instant Motion. The Court vacated the hearing and
22 took the Motion under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule
23 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 108. Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, the
24 Court DENIES the Deputy Defendants’ Motion.
25 BACKGROUND
26 The Parties and this Court are intimately familiar with the facts of this long-enduring
27 matter, and accordingly the Court incorporates by reference the factual background as
28 / / /
1 detailed in the Court’s March 21, 2022 Order, see ECF No. 105 at 2–11. Thus, the Court
2 will only set forth here the procedural history relevant to this Motion.
3 On May 19, 2021, the Deputy Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.
4 See ECF No. 86 (“MSJ”). Plaintiff failed to timely oppose, see ECF No. 93, but filed a
5 late Opposition, see ECF No. 101. The Deputy Defendants filed their Reply, see ECF No.
6 103, and the Court accepted the late-filed Opposition and the Reply and took the matter
7 under submission, see ECF No. 104. Thereafter, this Court granted in part and denied in
8 part the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. See ECF No. 105 (the
9 “Order”). Specifically, the Court granted the Deputy Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s
10 claim for excessive force as to Sergeant Michalke; Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action for
11 unreasonable seizure of his phone; and Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action for unreasonable
12 search of his person, belongings, and vehicle. See id. at 37. The Court denied the Deputy
13 Defendants’ Motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for excessive force as to Deputies Shea and
14 Lizarraga and Plaintiff’s claim for retaliation in its entirety. See id. The Deputy
15 Defendants subsequently filed the instant Motion. See ECF No. 108.
16 LEGAL STANDARD
17 In the Southern District of California, a party may apply for reconsideration
18 “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been
19 made to any judge and has been refused in whole or in part.” S.D. Cal. CivLR 7.1(i)(1).
20 The moving party must provide an affidavit setting forth, inter alia, “what new or different
21 facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon
22 such prior application.” Id. “In resolving motions for reconsideration, courts often look to
23 the standard for relief from final judgment set forth in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
24 59(e) and 60(b), which apply to motions for reconsideration of final appealable orders and
25 relief from judgment.” Evanston Ins. Co. v. Venture Point, LLC, No.
26 220CV01783KJDEJY, 2021 WL 5500486, at *1 (D. Nev. Nov. 23, 2021).
27 “A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it ‘is presented with newly
28 discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the
1 controlling law.’” Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
2 marks omitted) (quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999) (en
3 banc)) (emphasis in original). “Clear error or manifest injustice occurs when ‘the
4 reviewing court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
5 mistake has been committed.’” Young v. Wolfe, CV 07-03190 RSWL-AJWx, 2017 WL
6 2798497, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2017) (quoting Smith v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d
7 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013)). “As the Ninth Circuit has explained the clear error standard,
8 ‘[t]o be clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably
9 wrong; it must, as one member of this court recently stated during oral argument, strike us
10 as wrong with the force of a five-week old, unrefrigerated dead fish.’” Stanislaus Food
11 Prod. Co. v. USS-POSCO Indus., No. 1:09-CV-00560-LJO, 2012 WL 6160468, at *3 n.2
12 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (quoting Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2001),
13 overruled on other grounds by Payton v. Woodford, 346 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2002)).
14 Reconsideration is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of
15 finality and conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229
16 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Ultimately, whether to grant or deny a motion for
17 reconsideration is in the “sound discretion” of the district court. Navajo Nation v. Norris,
18 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 883). A party may
19 not raise new arguments or present new evidence if it could have reasonably raised them
20 earlier. Kona Enters., 229 F.3d at 890 (citing 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d
21 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1999)).
22 ANALYSIS
23 The Deputy Defendants ask the Court to reconsider its March 21, 2022 Order to the
24 extent it denied the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff’s
25 First Amendment retaliation claim. See generally Mot. The Deputy Defendants contend
26 that the Court committed clear error by (1) finding that the timing of the speech and alleged
27 retaliatory conduct could constitute circumstantial evidence of subjective intent and (2)
28 / / /
1 denying qualified immunity to the Deputy Defendants. Id. at 2. Plaintiff, appearing pro
2 se, did not file an opposition to the Deputy Defendants’ Motion.
3 In their Motion, however, the Deputy Defendants raise “the same arguments, facts[,]
4 and case law” that this Court already considered; accordingly, the Deputy Defendants raise
5 insufficient grounds to grant reconsideration. See Wargnier v. Nat’l City Mortg. Inc., No.
6 09cv2721-GPC-BGS, 2013 WL 3810592, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2013) (denying motion
7 for reconsideration where the motion reflected the same arguments, facts, and case law that
8 were previously considered and ruled upon by the court). “A motion for reconsideration
9 is not an opportunity to renew arguments considered and rejected by the court, nor is it an
10 opportunity for a party to re-argue a motion because it is dissatisfied with the original
11 outcome.” See FTC v. Neovi, Inc., No. 06-CV-1952-JLS JMA, 2009 WL 56130, at *2
12 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2009) (quoting Devinsky v. Kingsford, No. 05 Civ.2064(PAC), 2008 WL
13 2704338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)), aff’d, 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). Consequently, the
14 Deputy Defendants have failed to establish that they are entitled to reconsideration of the
15 Court’s Order on the identified issues.
16 Furthermore, considering the relevant Ninth Circuit authority, the Court does not
17 find that denying summary judgment as to the retaliation claim gives rise to “the definite
18 and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Young, 2017 WL 2798497, at *5
19 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). First, the Deputy Defendants argue that
20 Plaintiff’s speculation that the Deputy Defendants acted out of retaliation is not sufficient
21 evidence to be cognizable on summary judgment. Mot. at 3–4 (citing Wood v. Yordy, 753
22 F.3d 899, 905 (9th Cir. 2014); Carmen v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9th
23 Cir. 2001)). The Deputy Defendants further argue that “Ninth Circuit jurisprudence is clear
24 that circumstantial evidence of timing alone is not enough to prove retaliatory intent.” Mot.
25 at 4 (citing Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1995)).
26 The Court respectfully disagrees with the Deputy Defendants. The Ninth Circuit has
27 stated that “a plaintiff create[s] a genuine issue of material fact where he produce[s]
28 additional evidence that the ‘proximity in time between the protected action and the
1 allegedly retaliatory [arrest]’ [is such that] a ‘jury logically could infer [that the plaintiff]
2 was [arrested] in retaliation for his speech.’” Keyser v. Sacramento City Unified Sch. Dist.,
3 265 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Schwartzman v. Valenzuela, 846 F.2d 1209,
4 1212 (9th Cir. 1988)). The Deputy Defendants contend that Plaintiff does not have the
5 “additional evidence” needed to establish a genuine issue of material fact, Mot. at 5; yet,
6 the “additional evidence” referred to in Schwartzman was simply evidence that the
7 defendants were aware of the plaintiff’s speech, 846 F.2d at 1212. Here, although the
8 specific facts are heavily disputed, it is uncontested that the Deputy Defendants were aware
9 of Plaintiff’s speech. See ECF 105 at 4–6.
10 Likewise, in its Order, this Court correctly noted that “timing can properly be
11 considered as circumstantial evidence of retaliatory intent.” Pratt, 65 F.3d at 808 (citing
12 Soranno’s Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989)). In Pratt,
13 circumstantial evidence of timing was not enough to prove retaliatory intent because, “most
14 importantly, there [was] insufficient evidence to support . . . the finding that [the] officials
15 . . . were actually aware of the [speech].” Id. Here, the Deputy Defendants’ awareness of
16 Plaintiff’s speech could suffice as the “additional evidence” needed to create a genuine
17 issue of material fact regarding the timing of the speech and alleged retaliatory conduct.
18 See Keyser, 265 F.3d at 744. Accordingly, as the Court previously found, drawing all
19 reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor and viewing the evidence in the light most
20 favorable to him, a jury could reasonably infer that the Deputy Defendants went “hands
21 on” and ultimately arrested, searched, and charged Plaintiff in retaliation for his refusal to
22 comply with their requests rather than to prevent the introduction of contraband into a
23 detention facility or for the alleged commission of the crimes of public intoxication and/or
24 resisting arrest. See Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d 853, 868 (9th Cir. 2008). And while
25 the Deputy Defendants make much of their search operation and their alleged intent to
26 search Plaintiff before he engaged in protected speech, see Mot. at 7, an argument already
27 raised and rejected, see MSJ at 19; Order at 36, the fact remains that a jury could plausibly
28 conclude that Plaintiff’s exercise of his constitutional rights motivated the Deputy
1 Defendants to use force they otherwise would not have in effecting that search and
2 subsequently arresting Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court finds that it was neither clearly
3 erroneous nor manifestly unjust to deny summary judgment as to the retaliation claim.
4 Second, the Deputy Defendants argue that even if Plaintiff did adduce sufficient
5 evidence to withstand summary judgment, the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified
6 immunity because no clearly established case law provided notice that their conduct in this
7 context was unlawful. Mot. at 10 (citing Shay v. City of Huntington Beach, 816 F. App’x
8 47, 50 (9th Cir. 2020)). The Deputy Defendants contend that the particular facts of the two
9 cases cited by the Court do not put the Deputy Defendants on notice of a First Amendment
10 violation. Id. at 9 (citing Gasho v. United States, 39 F.3d 1420, 1425–27 (9th Cir. 1994);
11 Duran v. City of Douglas, Ariz., 904 F.2d 1372, 1374 (9th Cir. 1990)). The Deputy
12 Defendants argue that Gasho and Duran are not controlling because in both cases the
13 alleged retaliatory conduct occurred in public where the officers were required to have
14 probable cause to search; yet here, the alleged retaliatory conduct occurred on the private
15 grounds of a detention facility in which all visitors entering the grounds are made aware
16 that they are subject to administrative searches while on the property. Id. The Deputy
17 Defendants ultimately contend that, “to defeat qualified immunity, Plaintiff must set forth
18 a case where officers initially acting pursuant to the administrative search exception, and
19 conducting a pre-planned investigation, subjectively violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment
20 rights, when Plaintiff’s exercise of those rights consisted of a refusal to be searched.” Id.
21 at 9–10.
22 The Court disagrees with the Deputy Defendants. The argument that Gasho and
23 Duran fail to provide notice of a constitutional violation is unavailing. See Mot. at 9. The
24 issue here is not whether the Deputy Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to
25 the administrative search, but whether they are entitled to qualified immunity for going
26 “hands on” and ultimately arresting Plaintiff in response to his denial of consent to the
27 deputies’ search. See ECF No. 63 (“Pl.’s 3d Am. Compl.”) ¶¶ 80, 84, 87. Although no
28 case law existed at the time that instructed the deputies that Plaintiff should be allowed to
1 ||leave the facility prior to being searched, Cates v. Stroud, 976 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir.
2 2020), the Court has correctly noted that “[i]t is clearly established that a person’s Fourth
3 || Amendment rights are violated 1f the sole basis for his arrest is his challenge to the officer’s
4 || authority absent a warrant.” Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1439. The deputies should have been aware
5 || of the clearly established law that “probable cause is obviously lacking when the arrest is
6 ||motived purely by a desire to retaliate against a person who verbally challenges the
7 authority to effect a seizure or arrest.” /d. at 1438. Here, the Deputy Defendants forcibly
8 ||seized and arrested Plaintiff for public intoxication and resisting or obstructing a peace
9 || officer after Plaintiff refused to consent to the search. See Order at 8. That the Deputy
10 || Defendants did not conduct any sobriety tests of Plaintiff after Plaintiff contends that he
11 ||asked the deputies for a field sobriety test or a “toxicology examination” further supports
12 || an inference that the arrest may have been retaliatory and pretextual. /d. Thus, as noted in
13 || the Order, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could conclude that the Deputy Defendants
14 “hands on” and ultimately arrested Plaintiff in retaliation for his constitutionally
15 || protected refusal to comply with their commands. /d. at 36. Accordingly, the Court finds
16 || that its ruling that the Deputy Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter
17 || of law on Plaintiffs retaliation claim was neither clearly erroneous nor manifestly unjust.
18 CONCLUSION
19 In light of the foregoing, the Court DENIES the Deputy Defendants’ Motion for
20 || Reconsideration (ECF No. 108). The Court will issue separate rulings on the Deputy
21 Defendants’ Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 109) and □□□□□□□□□□
22 ||Motion to Extend Time and Request Court Appointed Attorney (ECF No. 110) in due
23 || course.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 || Dated: June 16, 2022 jae L. Lo memeaite-
on. Janis L. Sammartino
37 United States District Judge
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