the six-month 10 period to file a petition for relief under section 946.6(b) is a mandatory statute of 11 limitations
How later courts described this case
- the six-month 10 period to file a petition for relief under section 946.6(b) is a mandatory statute of 11 limitations
- “In light of Iqbal, it would 18 seem that the prior Ninth Circuit pleading standard for Monell claims (i.e. ‘bare 19 allegations’) is no longer viable.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 RICHARD SOARES, Case No.: 3:21-cv-01738-BEN-RBB
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Plaintiff,
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’
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v. MOTION TO DISMISS
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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and DOES [ECF No. 6]
15 1 through 10, inclusive,
16 Defendants.
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Plaintiff Richard Soares (“Plaintiff”) is suing Defendants County of San Diego,
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and unknown law enforcement officers named as Does 1-10 (“Defendants”) as a result of
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injuries Plaintiff suffered following officers responding to a call at Plaintiff’s house.
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Plaintiff’s complaint contains ten claims for relief: (1) Excessive Force (against unknown
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officers 1-6) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) Unlawful / Unreasonable Seizure of a
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Person (against unknown officers 1-6) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (3) Unlawful /
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Unreasonable Entry Into and Search and Seizure of Private Residence (against unknown
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officers 1-6) in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (4) Monell liability against the County
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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to properly train and for failure to properly hire / fire /
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discipline, (5) Monell liability against the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for official
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policies, practices, and customs, (6) False Arrest / False Imprisonment under California
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1 law (against all defendants), (7) Battery under California law (against all defendants), (8)
2 Violation of Cal. Civil Code § 52.1 (against all defendants), (9) Trespass to Property
3 under California law (against all defendants), and (10) Negligence under California law
4 (against all defendants). See generally Complaint, ECF No. 1. Defendants filed the
5 motion to dismiss now before the Court. ECF No. 6. For the reasons set forth below, the
6 motion is GRANTED-IN-PART.
7 I. BACKGROUND1
8 Plaintiff called the police to report his roommate had stolen his debit card. ECF
9 No. 1 at 6. Deputy sheriffs from the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department responded
10 to the call at Plaintiff’s house, but did not take a report. Id. at 7. As the deputies were
11 leaving Plaintiff’s house, Plaintiff closed the door behind them, but the door bounced
12 open. Id. The deputies then turned around and a male deputy told Plaintiff to “step back
13 or I am going to tase you.” Id. The male deputy then tased Plaintiff while he was
14 standing in the doorway. Id. Plaintiff, while stunned from the taser, turned and ran
15 through his kitchen before the male deputy, who had followed him into the house, tackled
16 Plaintiff on his couch, breaking Plaintiff’s guitar. Id. The male deputy then started
17 punching Plaintiff. Id. At this point, a female deputy assisted in the arrest before
18 additional deputies entered the home and continued assaulting Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff was
19 handcuffed and placed in the back of a patrol car. Id. While in the car, one of the
20 deputies placed a spit guard on the Plaintiff and threatened to hogtie him. Id. at 8.
21 Plaintiff was taken to San Diego County Jail where he was subsequently held for five
22 days. Id.
23 II. LEGAL STANDARD
24 A dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be
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27 1 The following overview of the facts is drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1,
which the Court assumes true in analyzing the motions to dismiss. Erickson v. Pardus,
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1 based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or absence of sufficient facts to support a
2 cognizable or plausible legal theory. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., 534 F.3d
3 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When
4 considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “accept[s] as true facts alleged and draw[s]
5 inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Stacy v. Rederite Otto
6 Danielsen, 609 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must not merely allege
7 conceivably unlawful conduct but must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
8 is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim
9 is facially plausible ‘when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
10 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
11 Zixiang Li v. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
12 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
13 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
14 III. ANALYSIS
15 Defendants seek dismissal of all ten of Plaintiff’s claims for relief. The Court
16 addresses each in turn.
17 A. Claims One – Three (Non-Monell 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims)
18 Plaintiff’s First, Second, and Third Claims for Relief are based on the actions the
19 deputies took at Plaintiff’s house. Defendants argue these claims should be dismissed
20 because the Plaintiff “has failed to allege facts supporting how each individual deputy
21 violated Constitutional protections.” Def. MTD, ECF No. 6 at 15. This Court disagrees.
22 Plaintiff’s complaint lays out facts that could support all three of the non-Monell § 1983
23 claims: excessive / unreasonable force on a person (the use of a taser, tackling plaintiff,
24 and then striking him), unlawful / unreasonable seizure of a person (arresting plaintiff and
25 holding him for five days), and unreasonable / unlawful entry into and search and seizure
26 of private residence (the deputies pursued Plaintiff into his house without a warrant,
27 consent, or other justification).
28 While Doe pleading is typically disfavored in federal courts, there are certain
1 exceptions. When the identity of alleged defendants will not be known prior to the filing
2 of a complaint, “the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify
3 the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities,
4 or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629
5 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Doe pleading is appropriate because the Plaintiff is able to
6 identify the organization to whom the Doe defendants belong, in this case the San Diego
7 County Sheriff’s Department, but cannot identify by name the individuals allegedly
8 responsible for his harm. The identities of the deputies who responded to the call at
9 Plaintiff’s house are known by the Defendants. This is not a case where naming Doe
10 defendants will result in a needlessly extensive discovery; rather, the County can turn
11 over the names of the individuals on the scene at the time of the alleged incident at any
12 time. The Court will give Plaintiff the opportunity to identify the unknown deputies
13 through discovery.
14 Defendants argue that even if the Court allows the suit against Doe defendants to
15 move forward, it should dismiss all Doe defendants besides the first two. ECF No. 6 at 9.
16 While the Plaintiff did only name a male and female officer throughout most of his
17 complaint, paragraph 23 of his complaint does allege “additional deputies entered
18 [Plaintiff’s] home to assault and batter [Plaintiff].” ECF No. 1 at 7. As discussed above,
19 the identity of these additional deputies are likely known to the County and Plaintiff will
20 have the opportunity to ascertain their identities through discovery.
21 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims for Relief One, Two, and Three is DENIED.
22 B. Claims for Relief Four and Five (Monell 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Against the County of San Diego)
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24 Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief allege Defendant County of San
25 Diego violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights pursuant to the Supreme Court’s holding in
26 Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
27 Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 11-14. Plaintiff claims the County failed to properly train,
28 failed to properly hire, fire, and discipline its deputies, and enacted unconstitutional
1 policies, customs, usages, and practices. The County argues that Plaintiff only makes
2 conclusory allegations and that there are no facts pled that support the plausibility of the
3 claim for relief. MTD, ECF No. 6 at 10.
4 For a Monell violation under § 1983, a Plaintiff must allege and present evidence
5 that the unconstitutional activities of the police officer were pursuant to a “policy
6 statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the
7 entity’s officers].” Monell 436 U.S. at 690. Plaintiff’s complaint includes the following
8 allegations:
9 “The training policies of COUNTY were not adequate to train its peace office
employees to properly and lawfully handle situations similar to the one they
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were presented with when they confronted plaintiff[.]”
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“[T]he San Diego County Sheriff’s Department has for many years now
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unlawfully detained / arrested persons as well as subjected persons to various
13 constitutional violations including using excessive force and unlawfully
entering homes.”
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15 “At all times complained of herein, Defendants DOES 1 through 6, inclusive,
were acting pursuant to the policies, customs, usages and practices of the San
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Diego County Sheriff’s Department . . . 1) arresting persons without probable
17 cause; 2) using excessive force upon persons; 3) retaliating against persons
for exercising constitutionally protected conduct; 4) unlawfully entering and
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searching residential homes; and 5) for covering-up unlawful and tortious
19 conduct by San Diego County Sheriff’s Department personnel.”
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Complaint, ECF No. 1 at 11-14
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On its face, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to meet the minimum threshold established
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by Twombley and Iqbal. Plaintiff asserts the County has policies in place that allegedly
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led to these incidents, but fails to offer any facts as to what these policies are. These
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matters may be more fully developed through the discovery process, but that does not
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justify failing to meet the minimal pleading requirements. As the Supreme Court stated
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in Iqbal, “Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-
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pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
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1 armed with nothing more than conclusions.” 556 U.S. at 678-79.
2 While threadbare pleading on Monell claims was at one point sufficient to survive
3 a motion to dismiss in the Ninth Circuit, Twombly and Iqbal changed that. Addressing
4 the matter in AE ex. Rel. Hernandez v. County of Tulare, the court stated:
5 First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth, allegations in a complaint or
counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must
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contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to
7 enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively. Second, the factual
allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to
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relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to
9 the expense of discovery and continued litigation. This standard applies to
Monell claims and should govern future pleadings in this case.
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11 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
12 Districts courts in the Ninth Circuit have also acknowledged as much and held that
13 previous decisions authorizing a lower pleading standard for Monell claims are no longer
14 valid after Twombly and Iqbal. See, e.g., Canas v. City of Sunnyvale, 2011 WL 1743910,
15 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2011) (holding that cases that applied the Ninth Circuit's “bare
16 allegation” standard “no longer are controlling in the post-Iqbal/Twombly era”); Young v.
17 City of Visalia, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (“In light of Iqbal, it would
18 seem that the prior Ninth Circuit pleading standard for Monell claims (i.e. ‘bare
19 allegations’) is no longer viable.”).
20 Simply alleging the County failed in any of these areas does not support a plausible
21 claim. To the extent the Plaintiff tries to draw on this one incident as evidence of poor
22 hiring and training processes, the Supreme Court recognized that “a particular officer
23 may be unsatisfactorily trained will not alone suffice to fasten liability on the city,” and
24 “plainly, adequately trained officers occasionally make mistakes; the fact that they do
25 says little about the training program or the legal basis for holding the city liable.” City
26 of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); Merritt v. County of Los Angeles,
27 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989).
28 Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims for Relief Four and Five is GRANTED.
1 C. Claims for Relief Six – Ten (California State Law Claims)
2 The Court need not address the substance of Plaintiff's state law claims, as the
3 pleadings do not indicate that Plaintiff has complied with the procedural requirements to
4 assert his claims.
5 Under the California Government Claims Act, “no suit for money or damages may
6 be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be
7 presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has
8 been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board....”
9 Cal. Gov't Code § 945.4. “[S]ubmission of a claim to a public entity pursuant to section
10 900 et seq. ‘is a condition precedent to a tort action and the failure to present the claim
11 bars the action.’ ” Phillips v. Desert Hosp. Dist., 49 Cal. 3d 699, 708 (1989) (quoting
12 Lutz v. Tri–City Hosp., 179 Cal. App. 3d 807, 812 (1986)). The failure to timely present
13 a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars the plaintiff from bringing suit
14 against that entity. City of Stockton, 42 Cal. 4th at 738; State of Cal., 32 Cal. 4th at 1239.
15 Under Government Code section 911.2, “[a] claim relating to a cause of action for
16 death or for injury to person ... shall be presented ... not later than six months after the
17 accrual of the cause of action[,]” while “[a] claim relating to any other cause of action
18 shall be presented ... not later than one year after the accrual of the cause of action.” Cal.
19 Gov't Code § 911.2(a). The date of accrual for the purposes of section 911.2 is the same
20 as the date of accrual of the underlying cause of action within the meaning of the statute
21 of limitations. Id. § 901. Equitable tolling does not apply to section 911.2’s six-month
22 deadline for filing the initial government claim to the public entity because it is not a
23 statute of limitations. Willis v. City of Carlsbad, 48 Cal. App. 5th 1104, 1121 (2020),
24 reh'g denied (May 29, 2020), review denied (July 22, 2020).
25 If a plaintiff fails to file a timely claim within six months after accrual of the claim,
26 an application may be made to the public entity seeking leave to present a late claim
27 which must be presented within a reasonable time to the public entity but not to exceed
28 one year of the accrual date. Id. §§ 911.4(a) & (b). The board must grant or deny the
1 application within 45 days. Id. § 911.6(a). If the board fails to respond, “the application
2 shall be deemed to have been denied on the 45th day.” Id. § 911.6(c).
3 If an application for leave to present a late claim is denied, as a last resort, the
4 plaintiff may file a petition to the court for an order relieving him from section 945.4, the
5 claim presentment requirement. See Cal. Gov't Code § 946.6(a). This “petition shall be
6 filed within six months after the application to the board is denied or deemed to be denied
7 pursuant to Section 911.6.” Id. § 946.6(b). Unlike the initial claim under section 911.2,
8 equitable tolling applies to a late petition for relief under section 946.6. J.M. v.
9 Huntington Beach Union High Sch. Dist., 2 Cal. 5th 648, 653 (2017) (the six-month
10 period to file a petition for relief under section 946.6(b) is a mandatory statute of
11 limitations).
12 Here, Plaintiff’s complaint lacks any acknowledgement of compliance with the
13 pre-suit demand provisions of California law. Despite being raised by Defendants in
14 their motion to dismiss, Plaintiff fails to address the matter in his response. Because the
15 Court finds Plaintiff’s case procedurally deficient, Defendant’s motion to dismiss all of
16 Plaintiff’s claims under state law (Claims for Relief 6-10) is GRANTED. As Doe
17 defendants 7-10 were only alleged to have violated the state law claims, they are
18 dismissed from the case.
19 D. Leave to Amend
20 If a court dismisses a complaint, it may grant leave to amend unless “the pleading
21 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc.
22 v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). The Court will allow
23 Plaintiff to amend his complaint regarding the Monell claims if he can point to a specific
24 policy or failure of the County. Regarding the claims under California State law, the
25 Court will allow leave to amend to provide Plaintiff the opportunity to demonstrate
26 compliance with California state law.
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1 |}IV. CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court orders as follows:
3 1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims one through three is DENIED.
4 2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims four through ten is GRANTED.
5 3. Doe Defendants 7-10 are dismissed from this case.
6 4. Plaintiff may file a First Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days that
7 cures the pleading deficiencies identified in this Order. Plaintiff may not
8 add additional claims or parties without seeking leave from the Court. If
9 Plaintiff fails to cure the deficiencies outlined by the Court, the Court may
10 dismiss this matter with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED. "
12 || Dated: April 22, 2022
B N. ROGER T. BENIT
United States District Judge
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