noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 10 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 12(b)(6)”
How later courts described this case
- noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard 10 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 12(b)(6)”
- indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal 3 || would not be frivolous
- to succeed on ineffective assistance claim, petitioner 20 must show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness and 21 that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial would have been different
- “[The public defender] was, no doubt, paid by 16 government funds and hired by a government agency. Nevertheless, [her] function was to 17 represent [her] client, not the interests of the state or county.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 BERNARD LYNN LAMPLEY, Case No.: 22-CV-88 JLS (AGS)
CDCR #BH-2362,
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ORDER (1) GRANTING MOTION
Plaintiff,
13 TO PROCEED IN FORMA
vs. PAUPERIS AND (2) DISMISSING
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CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILING TO
FREDRICCO McCURRY,
15 STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT
Attorney at Law,
TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
16 Defendant. AND 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
17
18 (ECF No. 2)
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20 Plaintiff Bernard Lynn Lampley, currently incarcerated at the Richard J. Donovan
21 Correctional Facility (“RJD”) and proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action pursuant
22 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Compl., ECF No. 1. Plaintiff seeks damages against the attorney
23 appointed to represent him during his criminal trial based on allegations that Defendant
24 McCurry violated Plaintiff’s “due process by concealing evidence,” which he claims
25 “contributed to a guilty verdict.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff has also filed a Motion to Proceed In
26 Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) (ECF No. 2).
27 ///
28 ///
1 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
3 United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
4 $402.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s failure to
5 prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
6 § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.
7 Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). The fee is not waived for prisoners, however.
8 If granted leave to proceed IFP, they nevertheless remain obligated to pay the entire fee in
9 “increments” or “installments,” Bruce v. Samuels, 577 U.S. 82, 84 (2016); Williams v.
10 Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether their actions are
11 dismissed for other reasons. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281
12 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
13 To qualify, section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to
14 submit a “certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for
15 . . . the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.” 28 U.S.C.
16 § 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified
17 trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average
18 monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance
19 in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no
20 assets. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(b)(1); 1915(b)(4). The institution having custody of the
21 prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month’s
22 income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards those payments to
23 the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See id. § 1915(b)(2); Bruce, 577 U.S. at 84.
24 ///
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1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $52. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff.
Dec. 1, 2020)). The additional $52 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
28
1 Plaintiff has submitted his Prison Certificate and a certified copy of his CDCR
2 Inmate Statement Reports. See ECF No. 2 at 4–9; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. Cal. CivLR
3 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. These documents show that Plaintiff carried an average
4 monthly balance of $888.30 and an average monthly deposit of $897.70 to his account over
5 the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. See ECF No. 2 at
6 4.
7 Based on this accounting, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP (ECF
8 No. 2) and assesses an initial partial filing fee of $179.54 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
9 § 1915(b)(1). However, this initial fee need be collected only if sufficient funds are
10 available in Plaintiff’s account at the time this Order is executed. See 28 U.S.C.
11 § 1915(b)(4) (providing that “[i]n no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a
12 civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner
13 has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee.”); Bruce, 577 U.S.
14 at 86; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a “safety-valve”
15 preventing dismissal of a prisoner’s IFP case based solely on a “failure to pay . . . due to
16 the lack of funds available to him when payment is ordered.”). The remaining balance of
17 the $350 total fee owed in this case must be collected by the Secretary of the California
18 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), or any subsequent agency
19 having custody of Plaintiff, and forwarded to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the
20 installment payment provisions set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
21 II. Initial Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
22 A. Standard of Review
23 Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a pre-
24 answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these statutes,
25 the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner’s IFP complaint, or any portion of it, which
26 is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants who are
27 immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing
28 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010)
1 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the
2 targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”
3 Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford
4 Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).
5 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
6 which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
7 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d
8 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
9 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard
10 applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
11 12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter,
12 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
13 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
14 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the
15 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
16 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
17 [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
18 experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned,
19 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility
20 standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
21 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
22 Plaintiff claims Fredricco McCurry, the attorney who represented him during his Los
23 Angeles County Superior Court criminal proceedings, “deliberately and intentionally
24 withheld concealed/hid relevant evidence and information which contributed to a guilty
25 verdict.” ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 3. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges McCurry
26 “misrepresented” him by “falsely and unfairly hiding and covering up another suspect that
27 was accused of the murder the Plaintiff was tried for.” Id. at 4. Additionally, McCurry is
28 ///
1 alleged to have “limited the ability of the Plaintiff to present a defense.” Id. Plaintiff seeks
2 $500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. See id. at 7.
3 C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
4 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential
5 elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was
6 violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the
7 color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Naffe v. Frye, 789 F.3d 1030,
8 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2015).
9 1. “Under Color” Requirement
10 First, to the extent Plaintiff names Attorney McCurry as the sole Defendant, he fails
11 to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii);
12 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). “[A] public defender does not act under color of state law when
13 performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal
14 proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Miranda v. Clark Cty.,
15 Nevada, 319 F.3d 465, 468 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[The public defender] was, no doubt, paid by
16 government funds and hired by a government agency. Nevertheless, [her] function was to
17 represent [her] client, not the interests of the state or county.”); Garnier v. Clarke, 332 Fed.
18 App’x 416 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of prisoner’s
19 § 1983 claims against appointed counsel).
20 2. Criminal Proceedings – Heck’s “Favorable Termination” Requirement
21 Second, there are two methods for state prisoners to raise complaints related to their
22 imprisonment in federal court. See Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004)
23 (“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to imprisonment
24 . . . .”) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973)). In general, claims of
25 constitutional violations related to the “circumstances” of a prisoner’s confinement must
26 be brought in a civil rights action under section 1983, see id., while constitutional
27 challenges to the validity or duration of a prisoner’s confinement must be raised in a
28 petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, or through appropriate state
1 relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78–79 (2005) (citations and internal quotation
2 marks omitted); Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“The
3 Court has long held that habeas is the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state
4 prisoners that fall within the core of habeas, and such claims may not be brought in a § 1983
5 action.”) (citing Dotson, 544 U.S. at 81–82).
6 Thus, to the extent Plaintiff seeks damages based on claims that he has been
7 unlawfully convicted, sentenced, and/or incarcerated due to his public defender’s
8 “malpractice” and other “wrongful conduct,” see Compl. at 6, he may not pursue those
9 claims in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, without first showing his
10 conviction has already been invalidated. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
11 In Heck, the Supreme Court held:
12 in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
13
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
14 invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
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executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to
16 make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A
17
claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or
18 sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under
§ 1983.
19
20 Id. at 486–87; Washington v. Los Angeles Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1054–55
21 (9th Cir. 2016).
22 “Suits challenging the validity of the prisoner’s continued incarceration lie within
23 ‘the heart of habeas corpus,’ whereas ‘a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner
24 who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the
25 fact or length of his custody.’” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003)
26 (emphasis added) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498–99); Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498–99
27 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus is “explicitly and historically designed” to provide a
28 ///
1 state prisoner with the “exclusive” means to “attack the validity of his confinement” in
2 federal court).
3 Because Plaintiff seeks damages based on alleged violations of his constitutional
4 rights during his criminal proceedings in Los Angeles Superior Court, he may not proceed
5 pursuant to § 1983 unless he alleges and can show that conviction has already been
6 invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 855–56 (“Absent such a
7 showing, ‘[e]ven a prisoner who has fully exhausted available state remedies has no cause
8 of action under § 1983.’” (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 489)). This is because an award of
9 damages in his favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction and
10 consequently affect the duration of his confinement. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; see also
11 Pattillo v. Lombardo, No. 2:17-CV-01849-JAD-VCF, 2017 WL 3622778, at *4 (D. Nev.
12 Aug. 23, 2017) (“When a prisoner challenges the legality or duration of his custody, raises
13 a constitutional challenge which could entitle him to an earlier release . . . or seeks damages
14 for purported deficiencies in his state court criminal case, which effected a conviction or
15 lengthier sentence, his sole federal remedy is the writ of habeas corpus.”); Toney v. Ruiz,
16 No. 3:10-CV-00405 BTM (PCL), 2010 WL 2383787, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (noting
17 that “ineffective assistance of counsel claims ‘necessarily imply the invalidity’ of criminal
18 proceedings”) (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 487; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688
19 (1984)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (to succeed on ineffective assistance claim, petitioner
20 must show that counsel’s performance fell below objective standard of reasonableness and
21 that but for counsel’s errors the result of the trial would have been different).
22 Because Plaintiff does not allege to have already invalidated his conviction in Los
23 Angeles Superior Court, the case which forms the basis of this § 1983 suit by way of direct
24 appeal, executive order, or through the issuance of either a state or federal court writ of
25 habeas corpus, Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, his Complaint must be dismissed sua sponte and in
26 its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted pursuant to
27 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b).
28 ///
1 D. Leave to Amend
2 Finally, while the Court would typically grant Plaintiff leave to amend in light of his
3 pro se status, it concludes doing so under the circumstances would be futile. See Lopez,
4 203 F.3d at 1127; Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817,
5 824 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing “[f]utility of amendment” as a proper basis for dismissal
6 without leave to amend).
7 III. Conclusion and Orders
8 For the reasons discussed, the Court:
9 (1) GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2);
10 (2) DIRECTS the Secretary of the CDCR, or her designee, to collect from
11 Plaintiff’s trust account the $179.54 initial filing fee assessed, if those funds are available
12 at the time this Order is executed, and to forward whatever balance remains of the full $350
13 owed in monthly payments in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding
14 month’s income to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in Johnson’s account
15 exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL PAYMENTS MUST BE CLEARLY
16 IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION;
17 (3) DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order by U.S. Mail
18 on Kathleen Allison, Secretary, CDCR, P.O. Box 942883, Sacramento, California, 94283-
19 0001, or by forwarding an electronic copy to trusthelpdesk@cdcr.ca.gov;
20 (4) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28
21 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) without prejudice, but without leave to amend;2
22 (5) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal from this Order would be frivolous and
23 therefore, would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
24
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2 See Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 1995) (court should dismiss
26
claims barred by Heck without prejudice “so that [the plaintiff] may reassert his claims if
27 he ever succeeds in invalidating his conviction.”); Briggs v. Enriquez, No. CV 17-4615-
FMO(E), 2017 WL 6210802, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 2017), report and recommendation
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1 || Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); Gardner v. Pogue, 558 F.2d 548,
2 (9th Cir. 1977) (indigent appellant is permitted to proceed IFP on appeal only if appeal
3 || would not be frivolous); and
4 (6) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to close the file.
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 Dated: February 7, 2022 tt ,
7 jen Janis L. Sammartino
g United States District Judge
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