Woods v. Broomfield

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 EARNEST C. WOODS, II, Case No.: 21-cv-1391 JLS (DEB)

12 Petitioner,

ORDER: (1) DISMISSING PETITION

13 v. FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE; AND

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(2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTIONS

15 RON BROOMFIELD, Warden, AND REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL

NOTICE WITHOUT PREJUDICE

16 Respondent.

17 [ECF Nos. 1–4, 6]

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19 Petitioner Earnest C. Woods, II (“Petitioner”) is a state prisoner confined at San

20 Quentin State Prison (“San Quentin”) who is proceeding pro se with a Petition for a Writ

21 of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that challenges his parole board hearing

22 denials, the conditions of his confinement, and his underlying 1987 criminal conviction.

23 See ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). He has paid the $5.00 filing fee. See ECF No. 1-2. Petitioner also

24 has filed a motion for appointment of counsel and expert witness (ECF No. 2) and two

25 requests for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 3, 6) and moves for an evidentiary hearing (ECF

26 Nos. 4, 6). For the reasons discussed below, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT

27 PREJUDICE the instant action and DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s motions and

28 requests for judicial notice WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

1 CLAIMS CHALLENGING PAROLE BOARD DETERMINATION

2 A petition for writ of habeas corpus may be filed in the United States District Court

3 of either the judicial district in which the petitioner is presently confined or the judicial

4 district in which he was convicted and sentenced. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); Braden v. 30th

5 Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 497 (1973). Petitioner’s state court conviction

6 occurred in San Diego County Superior Court, which is within the jurisdictional boundaries

7 of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. See 28 U.S.C.

8 § 84(d). Petitioner is presently confined at San Quentin, located in Marin County, which

9 is within the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court for the Northern

10 District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(a). Thus, habeas jurisdiction potentially exists

11 in both the Southern and Northern Districts.

12 Petitioner contends that the instant Petition challenges his parole board hearing

13 denials, see Pet. at 1, 4–5, with the most recent denial appearing to have taken place in

14 2019, see id. at 16, and raises several claims alleging federal constitutional violations

15 arising from the parole board’s decisions in his case, see id. at 7, 10–12, 14, 16, 18. When

16 a habeas petitioner is challenging a parole board determination, the district court of the

17 district in which the petitioner is confined is a more convenient forum because of the

18 accessibility of evidence, records, and witnesses. Thus, it is generally the practice of the

19 district courts in California to transfer habeas actions challenging parole determinations to

20 the district of confinement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in

21 which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be

22 in the interests of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could

23 have been brought.”); see also Dunne v. Henman, 875 F.2d 244, 249 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The

24 proper forum to challenge the execution of a sentence is the district where the prisoner is

25 confined.”). With respect to Petitioner’s parole board hearing claims, that forum is the

26 Northern District of California.

27 However, as discussed below, because the instant Petition also contains claims

28 challenging Petitioner’s 1987 conviction and sentence, which appear subject to the

1 statutory provisions concerning second or successive habeas applications, the Court

2 declines to transfer the instant case. Instead, the Court finds it is appropriate to dismiss

3 this case without prejudice to Petitioner raising his parole claims (as well as any

4 contentions concerning alleged actions by San Quentin prison officials, discussed below)

5 in the Northern District of California.

6 CLAIMS SUBJECT TO GATEKEEPER PROVISION

7 To the extent Petitioner is also challenging his 1987 conviction and sentence, the

8 instant Petition is not the first Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Petitioner has filed in

9 this District challenging the same 1987 conviction and sentence in San Diego County

10 Superior Court case number CR 83908. On August 27, 1991, Petitioner filed in this District

11 a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his 1987 conviction and sentence of 17

12 years to life in San Diego Superior Court case number CR 83908. See ECF No. 1, Civil

13 Case No. 91cv1175 H (HRM) (S.D. Cal.). On June 26, 1992, the court denied that petition

14 on the merits. See ECF No. 12, Civil Case No. 91cv1175 H (HRM) (S.D. Cal.). On

15 October 29, 1992, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s request for a certificate of probable

16 cause. See ECF No. 17, Civil Case No. 91cv1175 H (HRM) (S.D. Cal.) (copy of Ninth

17 Circuit order). On May 20, 2004, the Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s application for

18 authorization to file a second or successive section 2254 petition in this District with

19 respect to that conviction. See ECF No. 19, Civil Case No. 91cv1175 H (HRM) (S.D. Cal.)

20 (copy of Ninth Circuit order); see also Order in Woods v. Borg, No. 04-71661 (9th Cir.

21 2004). The Court takes judicial notice of these prior filings and orders. See United States

22 v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court may take judicial notice of its own

23 records in other cases, as well as the records of an inferior court in other cases.”).

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1 In the instant Petition, Petitioner again raises several claims challenging the same

2 1987 conviction and sentence.1 See e.g., Pet. at 6, 15. Petitioner acknowledges that this is

3 not his first federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1987 conviction in

4 San Diego Superior Court case number CR 83908 and acknowledges a prior federal

5 petition challenging that conviction was denied on the merits. See id. at 5. While Petitioner

6 asserts that “[t]his petition is based on a Board of Prison Hearing denial, an administrative

7 decision on his sentence,” id., Petitioner also indicates that one or more of the same issues

8 presented in the instant Petition were raised in his prior federal petition, see id. “Before a

9 second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the

10 applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district

11 court to consider the application.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also Burton v. Stewart,

12 549 U.S. 147, 153 (2007) (holding that a petition is “second or successive” where the

13 petitioner challenges “the same custody imposed by the same judgment of a state court” as

14 in a prior petition).

15 Even were Petitioner able to demonstrate that the instant Petition falls within the

16 statutory provisions allowing for permission to file a second or successive habeas petition,

17 see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)–(B), Petitioner still first must obtain authorization from the

18 Ninth Circuit to file a petition in this District, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); see also

19 Morales v. Sherman, 949 F.3d 474, 476 (9th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (recognizing that 28

20 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) is “a provision that bars district courts from entertaining a second

21 or successive petition unless its filing has first been authorized by the court of appeals”).

22 In the instant case, Petitioner indicates he has not obtained permission from the Ninth

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1 This is far from the first time Petitioner has attempted to challenge his 1987

26 conviction and sentence in a petition dismissed as successive. See, e.g., ECF No. 3 at 2

n.1, Civil Case No. 16-CV-1453 CAB (NLS) (S.D. Cal.) (dismissing habeas petition as

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successive and citing to five prior petitions filed between 2004 and 2015 challenging that

28 conviction that also were dismissed summarily as successive).

1 Circuit to file a second or successive petition, see Pet. at 5, and the Court’s review of the

2 Ninth Circuit’s electronic docket similarly fails to reflect that Petitioner has obtained such

3 permission from the Ninth Circuit.2 Accordingly, to the extent Petitioner raises claims

4 challenging his 1987 conviction and judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the

5 instant Petition.

6 CLAIMS CHALLENGING ACTIONS OF PRISON OFFICIALS

7 Petitioner also contends his Eighth Amendment rights were violated “based on

8 CDCR being deliberate [sic] indifferent to his health and safety due to Covid-19” and

9 specifically asserts that “prison officials endangered his health in the outbreak of Covid-19

10 at San Quentin” by way of cell moves, filing rule violation reports against Petitioner for

11 refusing to be housed unmasked with a prisoner who tested positive, pushing back

12 Petitioner’s parole suitability hearing, obstructing his attempts to exhaust administrative

13 remedies, and causing or worsening his medical conditions. See Pet. at 19.

14 Upon cursory initial review, it is unclear whether these claims fall under habeas

15 corpus or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While Petitioner appears to advance some challenges to the

16 conditions of his confinement which must be brought, if at all, in a civil rights complaint

17 filed pursuant to section 1983, Petitioner also asserts a delay of his parole suitability

18 hearing, which could fall within the ambit of habeas corpus to the extent it impacted or

19 impacts the fact or length of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499

20 (1973) (“[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a

21 constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of

22 his custody.”); see also Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)

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2 A review of the Ninth Circuit’s docket instead appears to reflect multiple instances

26 in which the Ninth Circuit has denied Petitioner permission to file a second or successive

petition in this district. See, e.g., ECF No. 2, Case No. 14-73404 (9th Cir.); ECF No. 6,

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Case No. 16-73651 (9th Cir.); ECF No. 2, Case No. 18-70070 (9th Cir.); ECF No. 3, Case

28 No. 18-72947 (9th Cir.).

1 (“[W]e hold that if a state prisoner’s claim does not lie at ‘the core of habeas corpus,’ it

2 may not be brought in habeas corpus but must be brought, ‘if at all,’ under § 1983.”)

3 (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487; Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 535 n.13 (2011)).

4 Because Petitioner is currently confined at San Quentin and alleges that the events

5 at issue took place at that same institution, see Pet. at 1, 19, which is within the

6 jurisdictional boundaries of the Northern District of California, the Court concludes the

7 proper venue for this challenge is the Northern District regardless of whether these claims

8 ultimately fall within the core of habeas corpus or section 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)

9 (“A civil action may be brought in—(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides,

10 if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial

11 district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim

12 occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3)

13 if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this

14 section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal

15 jurisdiction with respect to such action.”); see also Dunne, 875 F.2d at 249 (“The proper

16 forum to challenge the execution of a sentence is the district where the prisoner is

17 confined.”). Again, because several of the claims presented in the instant Petition appear

18 subject to the statutory provisions concerning second or successive habeas applications,

19 the Court declines to transfer the instant case and finds dismissal without prejudice

20 appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a

21 case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interests

22 of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been

23 brought.”).

24 CONCLUSION

25 In light of the foregoing, the Court DISMISSES this action WITHOUT

26 PREJUDICE. To the extent Petitioner wishes to challenge the length or duration of his

27 confinement based on a challenge to his parole board determination, he may file a 28

28 U.S.C. § 2254 Petition in the Northern District of California. To the extent Petitioner

1 || wishes to pursue claims concerning the conditions of his confinement at San Quentin, he

2 || must file a new civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Northern District of

3 ||California. To the extent Petitioner is attempting to raise claims challenging his 1987

4 ||conviction and sentence in San Diego Superior Court Case No. CR 83908, because there

5 ||is no indication that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has granted Petitioner leave to file

6 || a successive petition, this Court cannot consider those aspects of the Petition. Petitioner is

7 precluded from filing a petition in this Court challenging his 1987 conviction and

8 ||sentence in this Court if he first obtains the necessary order from the Ninth Circuit Court

9 ||of Appeals.

10 Because this action is dismissed without prejudice, the Court DENIES AS MOOT

11 || Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel and expert witness (ECF No. 2), requests

12 || for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 3, 6), and motions for an evidentiary hearing (ECF Nos. 4,

13 ||6). Said denials are also WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court SHALL

14 || CLOSE the file.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 Dated: October 27, 2021 tt

17 pee Janis L. Sammartino

18 United States District Judge

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