Opinion

Thomas-Weisner v. Gipson

Court
District Court, S.D. California
Filed
Aug 20, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.1%

finding that a 23 defendant’s general responsibility for supervising prison operations is insufficient in 24 establishing personal involvement

How later courts described this case

  • finding that a 23 defendant’s general responsibility for supervising prison operations is insufficient in 24 establishing personal involvement
  • “[A] state employee’s failure to conform to state law 4 does not in itself violate the Constitution and is not alone actionable under § 1983[.]”
  • “The inquiry into causation 7 must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual 8 defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional 9 deprivation.”
  • “Dismissal of King’s 5 claims alleging violations of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations was proper 6 because the cited regulations do not create a private right of action.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 Jonquil THOMAS-WEISNER, Case No.: 19-cv-01999-JAH-BGS

12 Plaintiff,

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

13 v. GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

MOTION TO DISMISS

14 Connie GIPSON, et al.,

15 Defendants.

[ECF No. 16]

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Jonquil Thomas-Weisner (“Plaintiff”), currently incarcerated at Centinela State

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Prison (“CEN”) located in Imperial, California, is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis

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(“IFP”) in this civil rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See ECF No. 5.) In

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the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”), Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the First

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Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Protection of

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Religious Clause by removing him from his Religious Meat Alternative (“RMA”) diet after

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an alleged violation without providing an initial warning before removal. (ECF No. 15.)

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Defendant Patrick Covello and Defendant Lance Eshelman (“Defendants”) moved to

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dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) contending: (1) Plaintiff failed to

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state cause of action under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, (2) Plaintiff failed

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to state cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, (3) Plaintiff’s request for

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injunctive relief should be dismissed because he no longer resides at RJD, and (4)

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1 Defendants are entitled to Qualified Immunity. (ECF No. 16 at 5–9.) Plaintiff filed an

2 opposition to the motion to the dismiss (“Opposition”) and Defendants’ filed a reply in

3 support of their motion. (ECF Nos. 18, 19.)

4 This Report and Recommendation is submitted to United States District Judge John

5 A. Houston pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule HC.2 of the United

6 States District Court for the Southern District of California. Based on the documents and

7 evidence presented, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that

8 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC (ECF No. 16) be GRANTED and that this

9 action be DISMISSED.

10 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

11 Plaintiff participated in the RMA diet while incarcerated at California Substance

12 Abuse Treatment Facility (SATF) until he was transferred to RJD on January 5, 2018.

13 (ECF No. 15 at 1.) Once he arrived at RJD, Plaintiff claimed that he took the necessary

14 steps to obtain his RMA diet at this new prison to no avail. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that at

15 the time of the complaint, Defendant Covello was acting Warden of RJD and member of

16 the Religious Review Committee (“RRC”). (Id. at 1–2.) Plaintiff also alleged that

17 Defendant Eshelman was Community Resource Manager at RJD and also a member of the

18 RRC. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants are responsible for “the upkeep of

19 transferring inmates religious diet” and to “inform an inmate of any violation before their

20 removal” from their diet, since they are members of the RRC. (Id. at 2.)

21 By June 2018, Plaintiff indicated that he had yet to receive his RMA diet and raised

22 the issue via “CDCR Form-602” grievance. (Id. at 2.) On June 11, 2018, Plaintiff claimed

23 to have received a “CDCR Form-3030” with “DENIED” written across it and without

24 further explanation. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff then indicated that he began the CDCR grievance

25 process. (Id.) At the Second Level Response (“SLR”), Plaintiff alleged that Defendant

26 Covello responded to his grievance. (Id.) As for not receiving an initial warning, Plaintiff

27 stated that Defendant Covello indicated in his SLR that:

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1 2) you have not received a 128b (CDCR-128b Chrono) notifying you of your

violations as stated in the 3030 Religious Diet Agreement ... preview of your

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file was conducted to see if you had any previous approvals for requested diet

3 ... The review turned up negative results, so your request was treated as a new

request. Therefore, a review of your canteen purchases was conducted, which

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revealed you were purchasing items not consistent with the diet requested, ...

5 So a 128b notifying you of your violations was deemed unnecessary.

6 (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff filed his FAC against the Defendants for their alleged participation in

7 the removal of Plaintiff from the RMA diet at RJD without first warning him. (Id. at 1–2.)

8 Plaintiff claimed that this hindered his full and safe participation of his religion, which

9 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at 2.)

10 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

11 On October 17, 2019, Plaintiff initially filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

12 and also filed a Motion to Proceed IFP. (See ECF Nos. 1, 2.) On January 8, 2020, the

13 Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP and dismissed Defendants Gipson and

14 Voong for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

15 §§ 1915 (e)(2(b)(ii), 1915A(b)(1). (See ECF No. 5.) However, the Court found that the

16 allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as to his First Amendment Free Exercise Clause and

17 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”) claims were “sufficient

18 to survive the ‘low threshold’ set for sua sponte screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915

19 (e)(2(b)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1). (Id. at 8–9.) Thus, the Court directed the United States

20 Marshal Service to effect service of the remaining claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint on

21 Defendants Covello and Eshelman. (See id.)

22 On May 11, 2020, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

23 pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff filed his Opposition to

24 Defendant’s Motion, to which Defendant filed a Reply. (See ECF Nos. 12, 13.)

25 On October 26, 2020, the Court issued its order granting Defendants’ Motion to

26 Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. (ECF No. 14.) As for Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free

27 Exercise Claim, the Court pointed out that the Defendants could not be held liable due to

28 their supervisory roles since there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. (Id. at

1 6.) The Court then indicated that in order for Plaintiff to state a claim against either

2 Defendant, he must allege their “‘personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation’”

3 or “‘a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

4 constitutional violation.’” (Id.) In response to Plaintiff’s claim in his opposition that the

5 Defendants were members of the RRC and therefore should have known that Plaintiff was

6 denied the right to participate in the RMA diet, the Court indicated that the inquiry into

7 causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each

8 individual defendant. (Id. at 7.) The Court detailed that a person deprives another “of a

9 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act,

10 participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally

11 required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff] complains].” (Id.) The

12 Court then granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim,

13 finding that the complaint did not contain allegations that Defendants were members of the

14 RRC and did not contain allegations that Defendants played any direct role in the decision

15 to deny or remove Plaintiff from the RMA. (Id. at 7–8.)

16 As for Due Process under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court indicated that the

17 Defendants’ purported failure to comply with § 3054.5 of the CDCR guidelines did not

18 necessarily amount to a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation in a § 1983 action.

19 (Id. at 8–9.) The Court stated that Due Process is violated only when there are changes

20 that inflict an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

21 incidents of prison life.” (Id.) The Court indicated that Plaintiff failed to allege any

22 changes to his diet were a “dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of his

23 confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest and then granted Defendants’ Motion

24 to Dismiss. (Id.)

25 The Court then granted Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA

26 claims. (Id. at 9–10.) The Court found that Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages and

27 injunctive relief against Defendants in both their individual and official capacities for

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1 RLUIPA violations could not proceed and dismissed the RLUIPA claims without leave to

2 amend. (Id.)

3 The Court did not address Qualified Immunity since the Court found that Plaintiff

4 failed to state a claim against the Defendants, however, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to

5 amend to cure the deficiencies in his claims against Defendants, with the exception of his

6 RLUIPA claim. (Id. at 10–11.) The Court warned that Plaintiff’s FAC must be complete

7 in itself, without reference to Plaintiff’s original pleading, and any claims Plaintiff fails to

8 reallege against any of the Defendants will be considered waived. (Id.)

9 III. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD

10 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either a “lack of

11 a cognizable legal theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable

12 legal theory.” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.

13 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff

14 or petitioner fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

15 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial

16 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

17 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

18 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

19 When considering a Federal Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must “accept

20 all allegations of material fact in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most

21 favorable to the non-moving party.” Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Nat’l League of

22 Postmasters, 497 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2007). However, it is not necessary for the Court

23 “to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact,

24 or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th

25 Cir. 2001). “[T]hreadbare recitals” of the elements of a cause of action, “supported by

26 mere conclusory statements,” are not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations

27 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

28 at 555. On the other hand, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and ‘a

1 pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than

2 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

3 IV. DISCUSSION

4 In the FAC, Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated the First Amendment and

5 Fourteenth Amendment for their alleged actions regarding his RMA diet. (ECF No. 15 at

6 2–3.) Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC in its entirety on the grounds that (1)

7 the conduct attributed to the Defendants are not sufficient to maintain a lawsuit under §

8 1983, (2) Plaintiff failed to state cause of action under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise

9 Clause, (3) Plaintiff failed to state cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment, (4)

10 Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief should be dismissed because he no longer resides at

11 RJD, and (5) Defendants are entitled to Qualified Immunity. (ECF No. 16 at 5–9.) Each

12 of these arguments are addressed in turn.

13 A. 42 U.S.C. §1983 Standard

14 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a federal cause of action against any person who,

15 acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights.” Conn v. Gabbert,

16 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). Section 1983 offers no substantive legal rights, but rather

17 provides procedural protections for federal rights granted elsewhere. Albright v. Oliver,

18 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). “Section 1983 is a ‘vehicle by which plaintiffs can bring federal

19 constitutional and statutory challenges to actions by state and local officials.’” Naffe v.

20 Frey, 789 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063,

21 1067 (9th Cir. 2006)). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff [1] must allege the

22 violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and [2] must

23 show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state

24 law.” Id. at 1035–36 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)). “Dismissal of a §

25 1983 claim following a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is proper if the complaint is devoid of factual

26 allegations that give rise to a plausible inference of either element.” Id. at 1036 (citing

27 DeGrassi v. City of Glendora, 207 F.3d 636, 647 (9th Cir. 2000), Price v. Hawaii, 939 F.2d

28 702, 707–09 (9th Cir. 1991), and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

1 B. First Amendment Free Exercise Claim

2 In his FAC, Plaintiff alleged that it was Defendants’ duties, as members of the RRC,

3 for keeping track of the religious diets of transferring inmates and warning the inmates of

4 their first violation of their RMA diet before removal. (ECF No. 15 at 1–2.) Plaintiff

5 further alleged that Defendants’ participation in removing him from his RMA diet without

6 a warning or the ability to continue on his diet “hindered his full and safe participation of

7 his religion” and violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and Fourteenth

8 Amendment “Protection of Religious” Clause. (Id. at 2.)

9 Fundamentally, “where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of

10 constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that

11 Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide

12 for analyzing a plaintiff’s claims.” See Pino v. Ladd, No. 1:13CV01593-DLB-PC, 2014

13 WL 1102721, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2014) (citing Patel v. Penman, 103 F.3d 868, 874 (9th

14 Cir. 1996)). Thus, considering that Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants’ conduct hindered

15 his full and safe participation of his religion due to their alleged participation in removing

16 Plaintiff from his RMA diet (ECF No. 15 at 2), Plaintiff’s religion claim is properly

17 analyzed under the First Amendment. See Pino, 2014 WL 1102721, at *3 (finding that

18 Plaintiff did not have a Fourteenth Amendment claim since his claim regarding his

19 religious practice was properly analyzed under the First Amendment).

20 Inmates do retain the protections afforded to them under the First Amendment,

21 including the free exercise of their religion, while incarcerated. See McElyea v. Babbitt,

22 833 F.2d 196, 197 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348

23 (1987)). Free exercise rights, however, are “necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration,

24 and may be curtailed in order to achieve legitimate correctional goals or to maintain

25 security.” Id. The protections of the Free Exercise Clause are triggered when prison

26 officials burden the practice of an inmate’s religion by preventing him from engaging in

27 conduct which he sincerely believes is consistent with his faith. Shakur v. Schriro, 514

28 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has held that inmates “have the right to

1 be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary

2 laws of their religion.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993).

3 However, since there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983, Defendants

4 cannot be held liable simply by virtue of their supervisory roles. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

5 676 (“Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

6 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). In order for Plaintiff to have stated

7 a claim against either Defendant, Plaintiff needed to have alleged their “‘personal

8 involvement in the constitutional deprivation’” or “‘a sufficient causal connection between

9 the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.’” See Jones v.

10 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942

11 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v.

12 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

13 In its order dismissing the original complaint, the Court indicated that Plaintiff failed

14 to allege that Defendants were members of the RRC and that the Defendants played any

15 direct role in the decision to deny or remove Plaintiff from his RMA diet. (ECF No. 14 at

16 7.) The Court granted Plaintiff leave to amend to cure the deficiencies, specifically

17 indicating that Plaintiff must plead in his FAC that each Defendant violated the

18 Constitution through his own individual actions in order to plead a plausible claim for

19 relief. (Id. at 7–8, 10–11.)

20 Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s FAC, arguing that the conduct that Plaintiff

21 attributed to the Defendants do not amount to a constitutional violation. (ECF No. 16 at

22 5.) Defendants claimed that Plaintiff failed to describe any conduct undertaken in the FAC

23 that shows that the Defendants, through their own individual actions, violated the

24 Constitution. (Id. at 5–6.) Further, Defendants argued that the act of denying a grievance,

25 without more, cannot sustain a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 6.) The Defendants

26 stated that the Court previously held that the original complaint’s allegations were not

27 sufficient to state a § 1983 cause of cation and that Plaintiff has not corrected this defect.

28 (Id.)

1 Plaintiff opposed, stating that his allegations in the FAC are sufficient for purposes

2 of establishing liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in showing that the Defendants violated

3 his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 18 at 4.) Plaintiff claimed that his RMA diet stopped

4 once he transferred to RJD and that the Defendants, as members of the RRC, were

5 responsible for transferring him to his RMA diet. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff claimed that he was

6 entitled to a written warning and continuance of the RMA diet under CCR §3045.5, since

7 the non-compliant canteen purchase was his first violation. (Id. at 4.) Each Defendant is

8 analyzed separately below.

9 1. Defendant Covello

10 As to Defendant Covello’s personal participation in removing him from his RMA

11 Diet, Plaintiff alleged in his FAC that it was Defendant Covello’s duty, as a member of the

12 RRC, for keeping track of the religious diets of transferring inmates and warning the

13 inmates of any violations regarding their RMA diet before removal. (ECF No. 15 at 1–2.)

14 Plaintiff also alleged that “Defendants’ participation in the removal of Plaintiff from the

15 RMA diet without first warning him has hindered his full and safe participation of his

16 religion.” (Id.) However, since an individual’s general responsibility for supervising the

17 operations of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement, Plaintiff needed to

18 have alleged facts, not simply conclusions, that showed that the Defendants was personally

19 involved in the deprivation of his civil rights. See Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193,

20 1194 (9th Cir.1998) (finding that plaintiff must allege facts showing that the defendant was

21 personally involved in the deprivation of plaintiff’s civil rights), cert. denied, 525 U.S.

22 1154 (1999); Wesley v. Davis, 333 F. Supp. 2d 888, 892 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (finding that a

23 defendant’s general responsibility for supervising prison operations is insufficient in

24 establishing personal involvement). In his FAC, Plaintiff has only made conclusory

25 allegations that Defendant Covello participated in removing him from the RMA diet.

26 Plaintiff did not individualize Defendant Covello’s personal participation in the removal

27 and in fact failed to describe the actual person that participated in depriving him of his

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1 RMA diet. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to proffer enough facts to state a claim as to

2 Defendant Covello’s personal involvement in the alleged First Amendment violation.

3 Further, Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient causal connection between the

4 Defendant Covello’s conduct and the alleged First Amendment constitutional violation.

5 See Jones, 297 F.3d at 934. “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus

6 on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are

7 alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633

8 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370–71 (1976).) A person deprives

9 another “of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an

10 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which

11 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff] complains].”

12 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

13 The only specific conduct that Plaintiff attributed to Defendant Covello was his

14 participation in the grievance process. (See ECF No. 15.) Plaintiff first alleged that his

15 request for his RMA diet was denied without further explanation on June 11, 2018, but did

16 not provide any allegations as to who actually denied this claim. (Id. at 3.) After this

17 denial, Plaintiff claimed that he started the grievance process. (Id.) In response to this

18 grievance, Defendant Covello responded in a SLR. (Id.) Defendant Covello’s SLR

19 involved whether certain regulations applied to Plaintiff’s religious meal violation to justify

20 providing Plaintiff with a warning and continuing him on his RMA diet. (Id.) Plaintiff

21 indicated that Defendant Covello’s SLR decided that notice regarding Plaintiff’s violations

22 was found to be unnecessary. (Id.)

23 Although Plaintiff tried to frame Defendant Covello’s participation in the SLR as

24 the conduct that deprived Plaintiff of his constitutional right protected under the First

25 Amendment, Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient causal connection between the Defendant

26 Covello’s conduct and the alleged First Amendment violation. Defendant Covello’s SLR

27 to Plaintiff’s grievance only dealt with whether Plaintiff should have been provided a

28 warning and the ability to continue with his RMA diet following his first violation, pursuant

1 to state and prison regulations. Inmates do not have a constitutional entitlement to a

2 specific prison grievance procedure. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003)

3 (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). And Plaintiff cannot state a §

4 1983 claim based solely on Defendant Covello’s role in the inmate appeals process. See

5 Revis v. Syerson, No. 2:12-CV-2751-MCE-EFB, 2015 WL 641629, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb.

6 2015) (“[Defendant’s] signing of the Second Level Response is insufficient personal

7 participation.”), subsequently aff’d sub nom. Revis v. Roche, 659 F. App’x 453 (9th Cir.

8 2016); see also George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who

9 cause or participate in the violations are responsible. [. . .] Ruling against a prisoner on an

10 administrative complaint does not cause or contribute to the violation.”); Cejas v. Myers,

11 No. 112CV00271-AWI-DLB, 2016 WL 1695060, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 2016) (finding that

12 a defendant who reviewed an appeal did not personally participate in the constitutional

13 violation since the Defendant did not have any reason to believe Plaintiff’s constitutional

14 rights had been violated after the Defendant reviewed the previous appeal decisions and

15 had no reason to think that a constitutional violation had occurred); Lopez v. Peterson, No.

16 2:98-CV-2111-LKK-EFB, 2013 WL 3994466, at *16 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 2013) (“[T]he prison

17 grievance procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in

18 reviewing and denying inmate appeals cannot serve as a basis for liability under section

19 1983.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:98-CV-2111-LKK, 2013 WL

20 5946182 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2013); Hernandez v. Cate, 918 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1018 (C.D. Cal.

21 Jan. 2013) (“Plaintiff cannot state a section 1983 claim based solely on [the Defendant’s]

22 role in the inmate appeals process.”); Lamon v. Junious, No. 109CV00484GSAPC, 2009

23 WL 3248173, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2009) (“[T]he involvement of prison personnel in

24 reviewing and issuing decisions on Plaintiff’s inmate appeals does not provide a basis for

25 the imposition of liability on them for the conduct of others.”).

26 Accordingly, Defendant Covello’s SLR was too far removed to state a claim as to

27 the causal connection between Defendant Covello’s conduct and the alleged constitutional

28 deprivation. Therefore, accepting all the allegations regarding Plaintiff’s First Amendment

1 Free Exercise Claim as to Defendant Covello as true and construing them in the light most

2 favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim that is

3 plausible on its face. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT that

4 this First Amendment claim be DISMISSED as to Defendant Covello.

5 2. Defendant Eshelman

6 As to Defendant Eshelman, Plaintiff also alleged that it was his duty, as a member

7 of the RRC, for keeping track of transferring inmates’ religious diets and warning inmates

8 of any violations regarding their RMA diet before removal. (ECF No. 15 at 1–2.) Plaintiff

9 then alleged that “Defendants’ participation in the removal of Plaintiff from the RMA diet

10 without first warning him has hindered his full and safe participation of his religion.” (Id.)

11 Plaintiff has only made these two conclusory allegations regarding Defendant Eshelman’s

12 personal participation in removing him from the RMA diet.

13 Initially, Defendant Eshelman’s involvement with the RRC is insufficient in

14 establishing personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Wesley, 333 F.

15 Supp. 2d at 892 (“[A]n individual’s ‘general responsibility for supervising the operations

16 of a prison is insufficient to establish personal involvement.’”). Further, there is no specific

17 allegation in the FAC that Defendant Eshelman personally participated in removing

18 Plaintiff from his RMA diet, which is not enough to establish Defendant Eshelman’s

19 personally involvement in the deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Barren, 152 F.3d

20 at 1194 (“A plaintiff must allege facts, not simply conclusions, that show that an individual

21 was personally involved in the deprivation of his civil rights. Liability under § 1983 must

22 be based on the personal involvement of the defendant.”). Although the Court’s order as

23 to the first Motion to Dismiss indicated that Plaintiff needed to plead that each Defendant

24 violated the Constitution through his own individual actions, Plaintiff failed to

25 individualize Defendant Eshelman’s personal participation in removing him from the RMA

26 diet. (ECF Nos. 14 at 7–8; 15 at 1–3.) Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to proffer any facts

27 to state a claim as to Defendant Eshelman’s personal involvement in a constitutional

28 deprivation.

1 Additionally, Plaintiff failed to allege a sufficient causal connection between

2 Defendant Eshelman and the alleged First Amendment violation. See Jones, 297 F.3d at

3 934. Despite the Court’s previous order indicating that the causal connection must be

4 individualized as to each individual Defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have

5 caused a constitutional deprivation, Plaintiff failed to plead any specific and individualized

6 actions as to Defendant Eshelman. See Leer, 844 F.2d at 633 (“The inquiry into causation

7 must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual

8 defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional

9 deprivation.”). Plaintiff failed to allege that Defendant Eshelman affirmatively acted,

10 participated in another’s affirmative acts, or failed to act when he was legally required to

11 do so, that deprived Plaintiff of his First Amendment right. See Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743

12 (“A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

13 meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative

14 acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation

15 of which complaint is made.”). The general allegations in the FAC, without a specific

16 causal link between Defendant Eshelman and the removal of Plaintiff from the RMA diet,

17 fails to state a claim for relief.

18 Accordingly, Plaintiff failed to proffer any individualized facts to state a claim as to

19 the causal connection between Defendant Eshelman and the alleged constitutional

20 deprivation under the First Amendment. Therefore, accepting all the allegations regarding

21 Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise Claim regarding Defendant Eshelman as true

22 and construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff has failed

23 to state a cognizable claim that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE

24 RECOMMENDED THAT that this First Amendment claim be DISMISSED as to

25 Defendant Eshelman.

26 ///

27 ///

28 ///

1 C. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Claim

2 In his FAC, Plaintiff alleged that it was Defendants’ duties, as members of the RRC,

3 for keeping track of the religious diets of transferring inmates and warning the inmates of

4 any violations regarding their RMA diet before removal, pursuant to California Department

5 of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s Operations Manual (“Department’s Operations

6 Manual” or “DOM”) § 54080.14 and Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations

7 (“CCR”), § 3054.5. (ECF No. 15 at 1–2.) Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants violated

8 the Fourteenth Amendment when they neglected these guidelines. (Id. at 3.)

9 Section 3054.5 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations states:

10 Any alleged compliance violation of the Religious Diet Program Agreement

shall be reported using CDC Form 128-B, General Chrono, citing CCR, Title

11

15, [§] 3054. All reports shall be sent to the designated representative of the

12 RRC, who shall consult with the inmate. The RRC shall make the final

determination of continuing eligibility, and complete a CDCR Form 3030-C

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[] , Religious Diet Program Notice of Non-Compliance, which is incorporated

14 by reference. As described on the CDCR Form 3030-C, a first violation of the

Religious Diet Program Agreement shall result in a warning issued to the

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inmate, and a second violation within six months of the first violation may

16 subject the inmate to removal from the program. A copy of the completed

CDCR Form 3030-C shall be provided to the inmate.

17

Further, as to an inmate’s non-compliance, § 54080.14 of the Department’s Operations

18

Manual states in part:

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Chaplain Responsibilities. [. . .] Upon receiving a completed inmate’s

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“Religious Diet Request” form, the Chaplain, or their designee shall: [. . .]

21 Meet with inmates, giving them the opportunity to respond to allegation(s) of

noncompliance with Religious Diet Program. Utilize the Religious Diet

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Program Notice of Noncompliance form.

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1 Although not labeled as a separate cause of action nor expressly alleged, Plaintiff’s Due Process

26 allegation is addressed in the Court’s previous order (ECF No. 14) and is embedded within the FAC (ECF

No. 15). Accordingly, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s pleadings liberally and proceed to address the

27 Due Process argument as if it was a discrete cause of action listed in the FAC. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (pro se complaints “must be held to less

28

1 Monitoring for Religious Diet Program Inmate Compliance. Any staff may

report an incident of an alleged inmate Religious Diet Program Agreement

2

compliance violation [. . .] Religious Diet Program Agreement. The incident

3 report must be in writing using a CDC Form 128-B, General Chrono, citing

CCR, Title 15, Section 3054. All written reports shall be sent to the

4

appropriate Chaplain who shall make the final determination of continuing

5 eligibility.

6 Although Plaintiff tried to frame the issue surrounding his RMA diet as a

7 constitutional violation, Plaintiff’s only allegation in his FAC specifically involved

8 whether the Defendants should have followed the procedures listed in DOM § 54080.14

9 and CCR § 3054.5 following Plaintiff’s first violation of his RMA diet. (See ECF Nos. 15;

10 18.) Plaintiff argued that the Defendants should have provided notice to Plaintiff regarding

11 his violation and should have continued Plaintiff on his RMA diet. (ECF Nos. 15 at 2–3;

12 18 at 3–4.) Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants violated these regulations by not notify

13 him of his violation of his RMA diet and did not allow him to remain on his RMA diet

14 following his first violation. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants’ “lack of following

15 the guidelines set in place by the CCR, Title 15, section 3054, is a basis for liability in a

16 §1983 lawsuit,” and that the Defendants neglecting these regulations effectively denied

17 him Due Process. (See ECF No. 18 at 4.)

18 Only violations of the U.S. Constitution or federal law are cognizable under 42

19 U.S.C. § 1983. Canell v. Oregon Dep’t of Just., 811 F. Supp. 546, 550 (D. Or. 1993) (citing

20 Williams v. Treen, 671 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1126 (1983)).

21 Violations of state law or state regulations generally do not amount to a constitutional

22 violation in § 1983 actions. See, e.g., Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087, 1092 (9th Cir.

23 2009) (All § 1983 claims must be premised on a constitutional violation. [. . .] If the

24 government official [. . .] did not violate the claimant’s rights under the Constitution, no

25 relief lies within §1983.]”); Sweaney v. Ada Cnty., 119 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1997)

26 (“To the extent that the violation of a state law amounts to the deprivation of a state-created

27 interest that reaches beyond that guaranteed by the federal Constitution, [§] 1983 offers no

28 redress.”)); Doe v. Conn. Dept. of Child & Youth Servs., 911 F.2d 868, 869 (2d Cir. 1990)

1 (“[A] violation of state law neither gives [plaintiff] a § 1983 claim nor deprives defendants

2 of the defense of qualified immunity to a proper § 1983 claim.”); Patterson v. Coughlin,

3 761 F.2d 886, 891 (2d Cir. 1985) (“[A] state employee’s failure to conform to state law

4 does not in itself violate the Constitution and is not alone actionable under § 1983[.]”); see

5 also (ECF No. 14 at 8).

6 Notwithstanding, state regulations can sometimes give rise to liberty interests that

7 are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Chappell v.

8 Mandeville, 706 F.3d 1052, 1064 (9th Cir. 2013) (Graham, J., concurring) (quoting Sandin

9 v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). “The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause

10 protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty or property; and those who seek to

11 invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”

12 Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). But it does not “protect every change in

13 conditions of confinement having a substantial impact on the inmate in relation to the

14 ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478. While the Ninth Circuit has

15 recognized that Fourteenth Amendment protection can extend to state prison regulations,

16 this determination rests on whether a violation of the regulation imposes “‘atypical and

17 significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,’” and

18 is generally confined to regulations that relate to freedom from restraint. Id.

19 In its previous order, the Court informed the Plaintiff that under the circumstances

20 of this case, Due Process is only violated when there are changes that inflict an “atypical

21 and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”

22 (ECF No. 14 at 8.) The Court then granted Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff’s

23 Fourteenth Amendment claim, stating that Plaintiff failed to allege that any changes to his

24 diet were a “dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of his confinement that would

25 give rise to a liberty interest. (Id. at 8–9.) The Court then granted Plaintiff leave to amend

26 to cure this deficiency. (Id. at 10.)

27 Accepting all allegations of material fact in the FAC as true and construing them in

28 the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Plaintiff has not cured this defect for two

1 reasons. First, Plaintiff cannot prove an essential element of his claim, that a federal

2 constitutional right has been violated, since there is no independent cause of action under

3 § 1983 for violations of CCR § 3045.5 or other similar regulations. See, e.g., King v. Los

4 Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 672 F. App’x 701, 702 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Dismissal of King’s

5 claims alleging violations of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations was proper

6 because the cited regulations do not create a private right of action.”); Himes v. Hadjadj,

7 No. 19CV2216-JAH-MSB, 2020 WL 4582676, at *8 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 2020) (“The Court’s

8 review of federal and state precedent allowing Fourteenth Amendment due process claims

9 to proceed on the basis of CCR violations has uncovered no reported decisions finding that

10 an independent cause of action is authorized by violations of CCR Title 15 § 3045.5, or

11 any similar regulations.”), report and recommendation adopted, No. 19CV2216-JAH-

12 MSB, 2021 WL 843182 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 2021); Nible v. Fink, No. 16-CV-02849-BAS-

13 RBM, 2019 WL 2611102, at *4 (S.D. Cal. June 2019) (“[V]iolations of Title 15 of the

14 California Code of Regulations ... do not create a private right of action.”), aff’d, 828 F.

15 App’x 463 (9th Cir. 2020); Wallace v. Olson, No. 3:16-CV-1917-AJB-NLS, 2017 WL

16 1346825, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 2017) (“[T]o the extent Plaintiff’s FAC and exhibits focus

17 almost exclusively on [Defendants’] alleged failures to properly follow CDCR Title 15

18 prison regulations governing the processing of his inmate appeals, he has failed to state a

19 claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted.”), aff’d, 715 F. App’x 797 (9th Cir. 2018);

20 Chappell v. Newbarth, No. 106CV-01378OWW-WMW, 2009 WL 1211372, at *9 (E.D.

21 Cal. May 2009) (“The Court has found no authority to support a finding that there is an

22 implied private right of action under Title 15.”).

23 Second, Plaintiff has not provided any allegations that the violation of a state or

24 prison regulation imposed an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary

25 incidents of prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484. In his FAC, Plaintiff first alleged

26 that the Defendants, as members of the RRC, should have followed the procedures set forth

27 in DOM § 54080.14 and CCR § 3054.5 following his first religious meal violation. (ECF

28 No. 15 at 2.) Plaintiff then made a conclusory allegation that the Defendants’ participated

1 in removing Plaintiff from his RMA diet without warning, which hindered his full and safe

2 participation of his religion. (Id.) Plaintiff failed to provide any allegations indicating that

3 violating a state or prison regulation resulted in a dramatic departure from the basic

4 conditions of his confinement that would give rise to a liberty interest. Sandin, 515 U.S.

5 at 485.

6 To the extent Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Covello violated his Fourteenth

7 Amendment Due Process rights during the grievance process, the FAC also failed to state

8 a valid claim for relief. Inmates do not maintain a constitutional right to an effective

9 grievance or appeal procedure. Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 860. And Plaintiff’s allegation that

10 Defendant Covello’s SLR to Plaintiff’s grievance should have followed the procedures set

11 forth in DOM § 54080.14 and CCR § 3054.5 following his first religious meal violation

12 does not amount to atypical or significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of

13 prison life that implicate protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

14 Clause. See Zarate v. Tilton, No. C 08-3896SI-PR, 2009 WL 311401, at *6 (N.D. Cal.

15 Feb. 2009) (“The failure to grant an inmate’s appeal in the prison administrative appeal

16 system does not amount to a due process violation. [. . .] The denial of an inmate appeal is

17 not so severe a change in condition as to implicate the Due Process Clause itself[. . . .] An

18 incorrect decision on an administrative appeal or failure to process the appeal in a particular

19 way therefore did not amount to a violation of his right to due process.”)

20 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to establish that any violation of DOM § 54080.14

21 and CCR § 3054.5 by the Defendants amounted to a constitutional violation. Therefore,

22 accepting all the allegations regarding Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

23 claim as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

24 Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, IT

25 IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT that this Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

26 claim be DISMISSED as to both Defendant Covello and Defendant Eshelman.

27 ///

28 ///

1 D. Injunctive Relief

2 Plaintiff requested that the injunctions requested in the initial complaint be rewarded.

3 (ECF No. 15 at 4.) However, Judge Houston previously dismissed, without leave to amend

4 as futile, Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim which included the same request for injunctive relief.

5 (ECF No. 14 at 9–10.) Accordingly, IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT

6 Plaintiff’s reasserted request for injunctive relief be DISMISSED.

7 E. Qualified Immunity

8 Defendants also move to dismiss on the ground that they are entitled to qualified

9 immunity. Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against

10 them, it need not reach any issues regarding qualified immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533

11 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would have been violated were the

12 allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

13 immunity.”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better

14 approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is

15 to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right

16 at all.”).

17 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

18 For the reasons discussed, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the District

19 Court issue an Order: (1) adopting this Report and Recommendation; (2) GRANTING

20 Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 16); and (3) DISMISSING Plaintiff’s FAC.

21 IT IS ORDERED that no later than September 3, 2021, any party to this action

22 may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. The document

23 should be captioned “Objection to Report and Recommendation.”

24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with

25 the Court and served on all parties no later than September 17, 2021. The parties are

26 advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise

27 those objections may waive the right to raise those objections on appeal of the Court's

28

1 ||order. See Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d

2 || 1153, 1157 (th Cir. 1991).

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

A Dated: August 20, 2021 p / /

5 on. Bernard G. Skomal

6 United States Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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