Robert Allen Doll, III v. Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee

06/20/2024

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs October 4, 2023

ROBERT ALLEN DOLL, III v. BOARD OF PROFESSIONAL

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 22-0363-II Robert E. Lee Davies, Senior Judge

___________________________________

No. M2022-01723-SC-R3-BP

___________________________________

In this case, an attorney appeals the recommended sanction of disbarment after three

criminal convictions. The attorney was convicted by a jury of two counts of subornation

of aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation, all Class E felony offenses and

serious crimes under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22. All three criminal

convictions arose out of the attorney’s conduct in representing a client. In the ensuing

disciplinary proceedings, a Board of Professional Responsibility hearing panel

recommended disbarment. The attorney appealed the hearing panel’s decision to the

chancery court, which affirmed. The attorney appealed to this Court. On appeal, the

attorney argues the hearing panel should have reviewed similar cases of attorney

misconduct where a suspension was imposed, and that he should be suspended based on

the sanction imposed in those cases. Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Board of

Professional Responsibility hearing panels and trial courts considering attorney discipline

promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by anchoring their decisions on

punishment to the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

Rule 9 does not give either hearing panels or trial courts authority in attorney disciplinary

cases to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions

imposed in comparative cases. The Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective from

seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—whether

appealed or not—puts it in the best position to consider comparative cases for the sake of

uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee. In this case, considering the nature of

the attorney’s misconduct, no comparable case convinces us that suspension, rather than

disbarment, is the appropriate sanction. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel and impose the sanction of disbarment.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d); Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed.

HOLLY KIRBY, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, ROGER

A. PAGE, SARAH K. CAMPBELL, and DWIGHT E. TARWATER, JJ., joined.

Peter J. Strianse, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Robert Allen Doll, III.

James W. Milam, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellee, Board of Professional

Responsibility.

OPINION

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The respondent attorney in this case, Robert Allen Doll, III, has been licensed to

practice law in Tennessee since 2003. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9,

section 33.1(d), he appeals the discipline imposed by a hearing panel of the Tennessee

Board of Professional Responsibility (“BPR” or “Board”).

On May 17, 2017, Mr. Doll was convicted by a Williamson County jury of two

counts of subornation of aggravated perjury, in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated

section 39-16-705, and one count of criminal simulation, in violation of Tennessee Code

Annotated section 39-14-115(a)(1)(c).1 See State v. Robert Allen Doll, III, No. II-

1

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-705(a) defines “subornation” as: “A person commits

an offense who, with the intent to deceive, induces another to make a false statement constituting perjury

or aggravated perjury.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-705(a). Addressing aggravated perjury, Tennessee Code

Annotated section 39-16-703(a) states: “A person commits [aggravated perjury] who, with intent to

deceive: (1) Commits perjury as defined in § 39-16-702; (2) The false statement is made during or in

connection with an official proceeding; and (3) The false statement is material.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-

16-703(a). Also addressing aggravated perjury, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-703(b) provides:

“[i]t is no defense [to an aggravated perjury charge] that the person mistakenly believed the statement to be

immaterial.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-16-703(b).

On criminal simulation, Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-115 provides:

(a)(1) A person commits the offense of criminal simulation who, with intent to defraud or

harm another:

(A) Makes or alters an object, in whole or in part, so that it appears to have value

because of age, antiquity, rarity, source or authorship that it does not have;

-2-

CR078988-B (Williamson Cnty. Tenn. May 17, 2017). The discipline at issue arises out

of these criminal convictions, described below.2

Underlying Criminal Convictions

Mr. Doll practiced law with an association of attorneys in middle Tennessee. His

practice largely consisted of family law. State v. Doll, No. M2019-00236-CCA-R3-CD,

2020 WL 7231101, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May

13, 2021). The support staff for the association of attorneys consisted of a person at the

front desk, Mr. Tim Carter, who was a notary public. Id.

Pamela Denise Van Burkleo hired Mr. Doll in 2010 to represent her in divorce and

post-divorce proceedings against her ex-husband, who was in Texas. The criminal

convictions underlying the discipline in this case arise from Mr. Doll’s representation of

Ms. Van Burkleo in the post-divorce proceedings. Id. at *1.

By the time the events underlying the criminal convictions arose in 2013, Mr. Doll

had been representing Ms. Van Burkleo for several years. In early 2013, Ms. Van Burkleo

had concerns about her children visiting with the ex-husband, so she asked Mr. Doll to file

an emergency petition to restrict his parenting time. On March 1, 2013, an emergency ex

parte petition was filed in the Williamson County circuit court on behalf of Ms. Van

Burkleo, to prevent her ex-husband from exercising his visitation with their children. Id.

at *5. Affidavits from each of their two teenage sons were attached to the petition. Id.

The emergency petition had an oath by Ms. Van Burkleo appended to it, as part of the

petition. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the oath was notarized by Mr. Carter, and

Mr. Doll signed the petition as her attorney.3 Id. On the basis of this petition, the first trial

(B) Possesses an object so made or altered, with intent to sell, pass or otherwise

utter it; or

(C) Authenticates or certifies an object so made or altered as genuine or as different

from what it is.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-115.

2

Mr. Doll appealed his criminal convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. See State

v. Doll, No. M2019-00236-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 7231101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app.

denied, (Tenn. May 13, 2021). The record for the underlying criminal case is not part of our record in this

disciplinary appeal, so the facts of the events that form the basis for the criminal convictions are taken

largely from the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion and its recitation of the facts at trial.

3

Mr. Doll testified to the BPR hearing panel that another attorney in his association of attorneys

filed the petition while he was out of town and obtained the ex parte temporary restraining order.

-3-

judge granted a temporary restraining order enjoining the ex-husband from exercising his

parenting time with the children.4 Id.

Later, on March 26, 2013, a second trial judge, Judge Timothy Easter, conducted a

hearing to determine whether the temporary restraining order should be extended.5 Id. One

of the attorneys in Mr. Doll’s association of attorneys appeared at the hearing to represent

Ms. Van Burkleo because Mr. Doll was still out of town. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo testified

under oath at this hearing that she had not signed the emergency petition. Id. Judge Easter

then asked Ms. Van Burkleo directly whether she signed the emergency petition in front of

a notary public, and she answered that she had not. Id. Judge Easter declined to extend

the temporary restraining order, set another hearing for April 23, 2013, and said he wanted

to hear from Mr. Doll on the issue at the hearing. Id.

When Mr. Doll returned from out of town, he learned of the events during his

absence. He filed another petition on behalf of Ms. Van Burkleo, identical to the initial

emergency petition, with an oath executed by Ms. Van Burkleo and affidavits executed by

her sons. The Williamson County circuit court, however, never reached the merits of the

second petition.

Mr. Doll appeared at the April 23, 2013 hearing as ordered. Id. He was not under

oath, but he assured Judge Easter that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his office the day the

emergency petition was signed, and that she had reviewed it. Id. Mr. Doll professed not

to know why Mr. Carter would notarize a signature that was not Ms. Van Burkleo’s

signature. Id. Judge Easter told Mr. Doll that he and Mr. Carter were potentially facing

criminal charges and advised them to get counsel. Id. He set another hearing for May 7,

2013. Id. at *6.

Judge Easter asked the District Attorney General for Williamson County to attend

the May 7, 2013 hearing. Id. At the hearing, Mr. Doll appeared but did not testify under

oath. Id. He told Judge Easter that his calendar indicated he prepared the emergency

petition for Ms. Van Burkleo on March 1, 2013, some two hours before Ms. Van Burkleo

came to his office to review and sign the documents. Id. At this hearing, one of the other

4

In later proceedings, the first trial judge, who granted the emergency petition, said that if the

petition had not included Ms. Van Burkleo’s sworn oath, the clerk’s office would not have submitted it to

him for review. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. He explained that the oath required an affiant like Ms.

Van Burkleo to swear to the truth of the facts in the petition, as shown by the notarized signature, in the

same way a witness would take an oath to tell the truth before testifying. Id.

5

There was no court reporter at this hearing.

-4-

attorneys in Mr. Doll’s office appeared to represent Mr. Carter, and told Judge Easter that

Mr. Carter was this attorney’s employee. Id. Judge Easter set a show cause hearing for

June 18, 2013.6 Id.

At the June 18, 2013 hearing, Mr. Carter was represented by a criminal defense

attorney. Id. Mr. Carter’s counsel called Ms. Van Burkleo to testify. Id. In her testimony,

Ms. Van Burkleo claimed that she had, in fact, signed the oath on the emergency petition.

Id. She said that, at the prior hearing, her response to questioning by Mr. Van Burkleo and

Judge Easter was only that her signature “looked different” on the emergency petition. She

insisted that the signature on the petition was in fact hers and that she had signed it in the

presence of Mr. Carter. Id. Ms. Van Burkleo commented that, from time to time, she

would change up her signature. Id.

At the same hearing, Mr. Doll asked Ms. Van Burkleo whether she had “come in

[his] office . . . with all three children on March the 1st to sign the [emergency] petition,”

and Ms. Van Burkleo said she did. Id. Judge Easter pointed out to Ms. Van Burkleo that

her answer was not consistent with her previous testimony under oath. Id. Nevertheless,

Mr. Doll pressed forward to ask Ms. Van Burkleo if Mr. Carter was present and notarized

her signature on March 1, 2013, and Ms. Van Burkleo said yes. Id. In light of Ms. Van

Burkleo’s testimony, Judge Easter said there was no longer an issue about her signature on

the emergency petition. Id.

On July 13, 2015, the District Attorney General obtained grand jury indictments

against Ms. Van Burkleo and Mr. Doll. Id. at *1. Counts 1 and 2 alleged that Ms. Van

Burkleo committed aggravated perjury when she testified falsely under oath that a notary

public witnessed her sign an affidavit in support of her emergency petition for a temporary

restraining order against her ex-husband. Id. The indictment also alleged that Ms. Van

Burkleo testified falsely during the show cause hearing to determine the authenticity of her

notarized signature. Id. Counts 3 and 4 of the indictment alleged that, on June 18, 2013,

Mr. Doll committed subornation of aggravated perjury with regard to the same emergency

petition. Id. Count 5 alleged that Mr. Doll committed criminal simulation on March 1,

2013 by forging Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the oath on the petition. Id.

Mr. Doll was tried on the criminal charges before a Williamson County jury, and

Judge Mark Fishburn presided over the trial. At the trial, the State presented evidence from

Ms. Van Burkleo’s employer that she was at work on March 1, 2013 at the time the

emergency petition was signed and notarized. Id. at *6. Mr. Carter testified that he did not

6

The Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion appears to refer to this hearing as a “show cause”

hearing, but the reference is not entirely clear. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *1.

-5-

recall anything about the emergency petition, including whether he notarized the signatures

of either Ms. Van Burkleo or Mr. Doll. Id.

Ms. Van Burkleo testified that Mr. Doll represented her in post-divorce proceedings

in her efforts to change the visitation arrangement with her ex-husband because she was

concerned for the physical and mental safety of her children. Id. As summarized by the

Court of Criminal Appeals, Ms. Van Burkleo testified at trial about the signature on her

oath for the emergency petition and why she had given prior inconsistent statements about

it:

She agreed that at the March 26, 2013 hearing, she said that the signature on

the petition was not her signature. She said she told Judge Easter that she

had no idea who had signed the document.

Ms. Van Burkleo said that, the following day, [Mr. Doll] called her

and seemed irritated and said “don’t you remember giving me permission to

sign your name?” She told him that she did not and further that she did not

have an email indicating as much, which was the usual course of her

arrangement with [Mr. Doll]. She thought [Mr. Doll] sounded irritated and

very short. Ms. Van Burkleo said this was the first she learned that it was

[Mr. Doll] who had signed her name.

Ms. Van Burkleo was extremely concerned for her children, so [Mr.

Doll] filed a second emergency petition on her behalf. During the course of

their discussions, [Mr. Doll] told Ms. Van Burkleo that attorneys sign

documents for clients frequently and that he might get a minor reprimand

but, since the conten[t]s of the affidavit were true, there would be no harsh

punishment. [Mr. Doll] then told her during their phone conversation, “you

just say, you know, all those documents that you saw, all your signatures look

different, but that they’re all yours.” [Mr. Doll] also told her that Mr. Carter

could get in trouble and lose his job if Ms. Van Burkleo did not say that it

was her signature. Ms. Van Burkleo said that, on the day of the hearing, [Mr.

Doll] met her outside the courtroom and reminded her that Mr. Carter could

lose his job and instructed her how to testify. He never informed her that she

could get into trouble for lying under oath. Instead, he gave her the

impression that it was fine because the contents of the affidavit were in fact

true. She said that she trusted him, and she testified that all of the signatures

on the petitions, including the March 1, 2013 petition, belonged to her.

-6-

Ms. Van Burkleo said that she never went to [Mr. Doll’s] office at all

on March 1, 2013. She never signed the affidavit petition in the presence of

Mr. Carter. She agreed that she perjured herself when she said otherwise.

She had been indicted for two counts of aggravated perjury.

Id. at *6–7.

The State also offered the testimony of a handwriting expert. Id. at *7. The expert

testified: “Ms. Van Burkleo’s known signature was not similar to the one on the petition.”

Id. The expert also testified that “after examining known signatures of [Mr. Doll], it

appeared that it was [Mr. Doll] who signed Ms. Van Burkleo’s signature on the petition.”

Id.

Mr. Doll testified at his trial. Id. He explained that “he had the petition ready to go

and left it for Ms. Van Burkleo to sign. He assumed that she did so. He denied ever asking

Ms. Van Burkleo to testify that she had signed the petition or that Mr. Carter had notarized

her signature.” Id. On cross-examination, Mr. Doll acknowledged that “he told Judge

Easter at the April 23, 2013, hearing that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his office on March 1,

2013, at 3:00 p.m. to sign the emergency ex parte petition.” Id. Mr. Doll also

acknowledged that “he questioned his own client, Ms. Van Burkleo, about whether she

came to his office on March 1, 2013. Her answer resulted in her being charged with

aggravated perjury and also being prosecuted civilly for over a million dollars by” her ex-

husband. Id.

Mr. Doll claimed he was unaware of who actually signed Ms. Van Burkleo’s name

for the petition, but he conceded that “some of the ‘slants’ and ‘angles’ of his own signature

mirrored those of the signature purported to be of Ms. Van Burkleo on the petition. He

agreed that the signature on the petition did not look like any other that he had seen from

Ms. Van Burkleo.” Id.

On May 17, 2017, at the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Mr. Doll of two

counts of suborning aggravated perjury and one count of criminal simulation. Id. at *1.

The trial court sentenced him to two years of probation. Id.

Mr. Doll appealed his convictions to the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals.7 On

December 8, 2020, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions. Id. Mr. Doll

sought permission to appeal his convictions to this Court, which was denied. Doll, 2020

WL 7231101 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 8, 2020), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 13, 2021).

7

Mr. Doll appealed the timeliness of his indictment; he did not contest the sufficiency of the

evidence to support his convictions. Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5.

-7-

Disciplinary Proceedings

The offenses for which Mr. Doll was convicted are Class E felonies and constitute

“serious crimes” under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.8 Consequently, after

the convictions, BPR Disciplinary Counsel notified the Tennessee Supreme Court of the

convictions.9 On May 31, 2017, this Court suspended Mr. Doll’s law license and referred

the matter to the Board for formal proceedings “in which the sole issue to be determined

shall be the extent of final discipline” to be imposed.10

8

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 2 defines “serious crime” as:

any felony and any other crime a necessary element of which, as determined by the

statutory or common law definition of such crime, involves improper conduct as an

attorney, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation,

fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, willful tax evasion, deceit, bribery,

extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicitation of another

to commit a “serious crime.”

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 2.

9

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.1 provides:

(a) The clerk of any court in this state in which an attorney enters a plea of nolo

contendere or a plea of guilty to, or is found guilty by verdict of the jury or of the trial court

sitting without a jury of, a crime shall within ten days of the plea or verdict transmit a copy

thereof to the Court and to Disciplinary Counsel.

(b) Any attorney subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this Court who has entered a

plea of nolo contendere or a plea of guilty to, or who has been found guilty by verdict of

the jury or of the trial court sitting without a jury of, any serious crime, as defined in Section

2, shall within ten days of such plea or verdict provide adequate proof of the plea or verdict,

including a copy thereof, to Disciplinary Counsel.

(c) Upon receiving notice from an attorney pursuant to Section 22.1(b) with respect to

any serious crime, as defined in Section 2, or upon otherwise being advised that an attorney

subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Court has entered a plea of nolo contendere

or a plea of guilty to, or has been found guilty by verdict of the jury or of the trial court

sitting without a jury of, any crime, Disciplinary Counsel shall obtain adequate proof of

the plea or verdict, including a copy thereof, and shall file the same with a Notice of

Submission in the Nashville office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.1.

10

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3(c) provides:

-8-

On June 1, 2017, the Board filed a petition for final discipline against Mr. Doll, and

a hearing panel was appointed. Mr. Doll notified the BPR of his intent to appeal the

convictions, so resolution of the petition was deferred until the conclusion of Mr. Doll’s

appeals. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).11

Once the appeal of the underlying criminal convictions concluded, the disciplinary

proceedings resumed. The hearing panel tried the matter on November 23, 2021.

At the hearing, Mr. Doll was the only person to testify. Mr. Doll admitted to the

fact of his felony convictions, and that they all related to his actions as a practicing attorney

and occurred while he was representing a client before the court. While Mr. Doll’s counsel

emphasized that Mr. Doll acknowledged he could not challenge the convictions, he gave

context for them. For example, Mr. Doll emphasized that, at the trial on the criminal

charges, Ms. Van Burkleo was a cooperating witness with criminal charges against her,

and that she testified differently than she had testified at the show cause hearing before

Judge Easter. Mr. Doll said that his “recollection is [Ms. Van Burkleo] came in and to my

knowledge signed that document.” He said he had been paid a flat fee earlier, so he made

no money on the emergency petition, and that he had a good attorney-client relationship

with Ms. Van Burkleo until she testified against him at his criminal trial. Mr. Doll

acknowledged that, as a result of the events, Ms. Van Burkleo was charged with perjury

and sued by her former husband.

Before the hearing panel, the Board argued that the presumptive sanction was

disbarment under Standard 5.1 of the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), based on the serious nature of the crimes of which

Mr. Doll was convicted, and the fact that they involve intentional interference with the

administration of justice, dishonesty and deceit, and soliciting another to commit those

(c) Upon the receipt of adequate proof and copies of a judgment, plea of nolo

contendere or guilty plea with respect to a serious crime, as defined in Section 2, the Court

shall, in addition to suspending the attorney in accordance with the provisions of Section

22.3(a), also refer the matter to the Board for the institution of a formal proceeding before

a hearing panel in which the sole issue to be determined is the extent of the final discipline

to be imposed, provided that a disciplinary proceeding so instituted will not be brought to

hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).

11

Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 22.3(c), states that “a disciplinary proceeding so

instituted will not be brought to hearing until all appeals from the conviction are concluded.” Tenn. Sup.

Ct. R. 9, § 22.3(c).

-9-

offenses. It emphasized that his actions took place in proceedings before a court and were

detrimental to the administration of justice. The Board pointed out Mr. Doll’s prior

disciplinary history, his substantial experience in the practice of law, his illegal conduct,

and the dishonest nature of his offenses as aggravating factors.

Counsel for Mr. Doll did not dispute the presumptive sanction under the ABA

Standards but emphasized the hearing panel’s discretion in determining the sanction. He

contended Mr. Doll had no dishonest or selfish motive, noted he had cooperated with the

BPR investigation of the matter, and argued that the prior discipline was remote from the

current convictions. Finally, arguing there is “disparity” in lawyer discipline, counsel for

Mr. Doll asked the hearing panel to compare a disciplinary case, In re Grace Ingrid

Gardiner, in which the attorney received a suspension rather than a disbarment for what he

characterized as similar misconduct.12

The Board objected to this last argument, arguing that recent Tennessee Supreme

Court cases had indicated that hearing panels were not to consider comparative cases.

The panel allowed Mr. Doll’s attorney to argue the Gardiner case and took the

matter under advisement.13

On December 1, 2021, the hearing panel issued its decision. The panel found the

Board had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Doll was convicted of three

criminal offenses, including two acts of subornation of aggravated perjury and criminal

simulation, all of which are felonies and constitute serious crimes.

To determine the sanction, the hearing panel then looked to the ABA Standards.

The panel found applicable Standards 5.1 and 5.11,14 which identify disbarment as the

12

Counsel for Mr. Doll cited In re Grace Ingrid Gardiner from the BPR press release as BPR

Number 23269, a disciplinary matter that apparently was not appealed.

13

Counsel for Mr. Doll argued that the misconduct in Gardiner was similar to that of Mr. Doll,

including presenting to a bankruptcy court a document with a forged signature, but the sanction imposed

was three years of suspension, with four months active suspension and the remainder on probation. The

Board responded that, if the panel chose to consider comparative cases, Gardiner was distinguishable

because the attorney in that case was not convicted of a crime.

14

ABA Standard 5.11 states:

5.11 Disbarment is generally appropriate when:

(a) a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary element of which includes

intentional interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,

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presumptive sanction “when a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a necessary

element of which includes intentional interference with the administration of justice, false

swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, and solicitation of another to commit any of these

offenses.” The hearing panel also found applicable Standards 7.0 and 7.1,15 because Mr.

Doll “violated his duties owed as a professional by knowingly engaging in conduct with

the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another and causing serious or potentially

serious injury to a client.” These ABA Standards also identify disbarment as the

presumptive sanction.

The panel found five aggravating factors. The first was prior discipline; the panel

found that the Board had shown Mr. Doll had a September 19, 2011 private informal

admonition, an April 14, 2014 public censure, and a September 20, 2018 ninety-day

summary suspension. The second aggravating factor was Mr. Doll’s dishonest and selfish

motives. The third was Mr. Doll’s refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of

misconduct, and the fourth was Mr. Doll’s substantial experience in the practice of law.

The fifth aggravating factor was Mr. Doll’s illegal conduct, consisting of the three felony

convictions, including two for subornation of aggravated perjury.

The hearing panel found one mitigating factor, Mr. Doll’s cooperative attitude in

the disciplinary proceedings.

The hearing panel’s decision considered Mr. Doll’s argument that disbarment was

not proportionate in light of a comparative case, Gardiner. The hearing panel distinguished

Gardiner, noting that the attorney in that case was neither charged nor convicted of a

criminal offense. It also acknowledged the Board’s argument that the hearing panel was

not permitted to consider comparative cases.

misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, misappropriation, or theft . . . or solicitation of another

to commit any of these offenses

ABA Standard 5.11

15

ABA Standard 7.1 states:

7.1 Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that

is a violation of a duty owed as a professional with the intent to obtain a benefit for the

lawyer or another, and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or

the legal system.

ABA Standard 7.1.

- 11 -

The hearing panel pointed to Mr. Doll’s convictions and said that “conviction of

such acts, particularly of acts of subornation of aggravated perjury, cuts through the very

heart of the judicial system and cannot be minimized in any way.” After cross-motions to

alter or amend, the hearing panel entered an order reaffirming its decision to disbar Mr.

Doll.16

Trial Court Review

Mr. Doll filed a petition for review of the hearing panel’s judgment in the Davidson

County Chancery Court, pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 33.1(a). In

support of his argument that disbarment was a disproportionate sanction, Mr. Doll asked

the trial court to consider comparative cases, again citing the Gardiner disciplinary

decision. The trial court declined to do so. The trial court said it understood the holdings

in Meehan v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 584

S.W.3d 403 (Tenn. 2019) and Beier v. Board of Professional Responsibility of Supreme

Court, 610 S.W.3d 425 (Tenn. 2020), to be that hearing panels and trial courts in attorney

disciplinary cases are to rely on the ABA Standards, not sanctions imposed in comparative

cases, to choose the appropriate sanction.17

On November 8, 2022, the trial court issued its memorandum opinion affirming the

judgment of the hearing panel. The trial court agreed that Standard 5.11(a) reflected the

appropriate presumptive sanction for Mr. Doll’s convictions of subornation of aggravated

perjury and criminal simulation, reasoning that “[a]ll three offenses amount to an

intentional interference with the administration of justice” and are “explicit violations of

[the] duty owed by every attorney.” Turning to the aggravating and mitigating factors, the

trial court said “there can be no serious challenge to the Panel’s conclusion that the

16

The Board filed a motion asking the hearing panel to alter its order to clarify that, in support of

its contention that the panel was not to consider comparative cases, the Board had cited Beier v. Board of

Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court, 610 S.W.3d 425, 436 (Tenn. 2020) (citing Meehan v. Board

of Professional Responsibility of Supreme Court of Tennessee, 584 S.W.3d 403, 416 (Tenn. 2019)). The

Board also contended that the panel improperly addressed Mr. Doll’s argument that the punishment of

disbarment by considering a comparative case. Mr. Doll filed a response and a petition to rehear arguing

that Beier and Meehan did not prohibit the panel from considering comparative cases in determining the

proper discipline.

On January 12, 2022, the hearing panel entered the order reaffirming its earlier decision. The panel

distinguished Beier because the attorney in that case was not convicted of a crime. In support of its decision

to disbar Mr. Doll, the panel cited Meehan, in which the attorney was convicted of a serious crime, and this

Court affirmed disbarment as the sanction.

17

The trial judge commented that he had been the trial judge in both Meehan and Beier and was

well familiar with them.

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aggravating factors far outweigh the single mitigating factor.” It affirmed disbarment as

the appropriate sanction for Mr. Doll.

Mr. Doll now appeals to this Court under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section

33.1(d).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court oversees the practice of law in this State in exercise of the authority

vested in it by the Tennessee Constitution. Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 435–36 (Tenn. 2020)

(citing Tenn. Const. art. II, § 1; Tenn. Const. art. II, § 2; Tenn. Const. art. VI, § 1).

“Accordingly, when we are called upon to review judgments in disciplinary proceedings

against lawyers, we do so in light of our fundamental and inherent power to promulgate,

administer, and enforce the rules governing the licensing and professional conduct of

lawyers practicing in Tennessee.” Talley v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 358 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tenn.

2011). When an attorney or the Board seeks judicial review of the hearing panel’s decision,

the trial court’s “review shall be on the transcript of the evidence before the hearing panel

and its findings and judgment.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). The trial court may:

reverse or modify the decision if the rights of the party filing the Petition for

Review have been prejudiced because the hearing panel’s findings,

inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) in violation of constitutional or

statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the hearing panel’s jurisdiction; (3)

made upon unlawful procedure; (4) arbitrary or capricious or characterized

by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion; or (5)

unsupported by evidence which is both substantial and material in the light

of the entire record.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(b). Subsection (d) addresses appeals to the Tennessee Supreme

Court.

Either party dissatisfied with the decree of the circuit or chancery court may

prosecute an appeal directly to the Court. The appeal shall be determined

upon the transcript of the record from the circuit or chancery court, which

shall include the transcript of evidence before the hearing panel, and upon

the parties’ briefs but without oral argument, unless the Court orders

otherwise.

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Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 33.1(d). In all, this Court “bear[s] ultimate responsibility for

enforcing the rules governing our profession. Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 437 (quoting Mabry v.

Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Supreme Court, 458 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tenn. 2014).

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Doll argues that BPR hearing panels have the authority to review

comparative discipline, i.e. prior disciplinary cases involving similar circumstances, to

determine the proper sanction in a given case. In the alternative, he argues that, under this

Court’s review, suspension rather than disbarment is the appropriate sanction for Mr. Doll.

We consider both issues in turn.

Hearing Panel Review

Mr. Doll argues first that, in deciding the recommended sanction in a disciplinary

matter, BPR hearing panels may review comparative discipline, i.e. prior disciplinary

decisions involving similar circumstances. Indeed, Mr. Doll asserts that a hearing panel

would abuse its discretion by declining to review such comparative discipline.

We respectfully disagree. In attorney disciplinary cases, BPR hearing panels derive

their authority from Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9. Section

15.4 of Rule 9 provides: “In determining the appropriate type of discipline, the hearing

panel shall consider the applicable provisions of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer

Sanctions.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). Rule 9 does not provide authority for either

hearing panels or trial courts to base recommended attorney disciplinary sanctions on a

review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases:

Under Rule 9, a hearing panel is directed to consider the applicable

provisions of the ABA Standards to determine the appropriate sanction in a

particular case. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a). There is no authority under

Rule 9 for a hearing panel to base its recommended sanction on a review of

sanctions imposed in similar cases. In addition, a trial court’s authority to

reverse or modify a hearing panel’s decision is limited to the five grounds

listed in Section 33.1(b). Inconsistency with sanctions in similar cases is not

a listed ground.

Meehan, 584 S.W.3d at 416. The holding in Meehan was emphasized later in Beier, in

which the Court said that “neither BPR hearing panels nor reviewing trial courts are

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authorized to base a recommended sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in

comparative cases.” 610 S.W.3d at 436–37. The Beier Court clarified:

The chancery court based its conclusion on the appropriate sanction in part

on a comparative analysis, that is, a review of similar cases to determine the

appropriate sanction. As noted above, this Court recently held that, while

hearing panels and trial courts must consider the applicable provisions of the

ABA Standards to determine the appropriate sanction in a particular case,

“[t]here is no authority under Rule 9 for a hearing panel to base its

recommended sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in similar cases.”

Meehan, 584 S.W.3d at 416 (citing Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(a)).

Moreover, “a trial court’s authority to reverse or modify a hearing panel’s

decision is limited to the five grounds listed in Section 33.1(b).

Inconsistency with sanctions in similar cases is not a listed ground.” Id.

Thus, reviewing trial courts are not authorized to base a recommended

sanction on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases. Our opinion

in Meehan, however, was issued after the chancery court’s decision in this

case, so the chancery court could not have been aware of it when the ruling

was made.

Beier, 610 S.W.3d at 448 n.23. Thus, this Court stated in both Meehan and Beier that Rule

9 does not authorize either hearing panels or trial courts to base recommended attorney

disciplinary sanctions on a review of sanctions imposed in comparative cases.

Despite the language in Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9 and the Court’s directive

in Meehan and Beier, Mr. Doll urges us to permit hearing panels and trial courts to utilize

comparative cases to determine the appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary cases.

Doing so, he argues, would promote uniformity of punishment and align attorney

disciplinary proceedings with current practices for mitigating a defendant’s sentence in

criminal cases.18

18

Mr. Doll points to the United States Sentencing Guidelines applicable in federal criminal

proceedings, which permit a criminal defendant to cite analogous cases to mitigate his sentence. He argues

that disciplinary hearing panel proceedings are similar.

We have repeatedly rejected similar attempts to liken attorney disciplinary proceedings to criminal

proceedings. “As this Court has repeatedly held, attorney disciplinary proceedings are not criminal

proceedings.” Harris v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 645 S.W.3d 125, 136 (Tenn. 2022) (citing

cases).

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We decline to do so. The omission in Rule 9 of authority for hearing panels and

trial courts to consider comparative cases is intentional, not inadvertent. The Court recently

explained the centrality of the ABA Standards to achieving uniformity of punishment in

attorney discipline:

Regardless of comparative cases, . . . the primary tool for determining

appropriate and consistent sanctions for attorney misconduct is the ABA

Standards. The Standards themselves state their purpose:

The Standards constitute a model, setting forth a

comprehensive system for determining sanctions, permitting

flexibility and creativity in assigning sanctions in particular

cases of lawyer misconduct. They are designed to promote: (1)

consideration of all factors relevant to imposing the

appropriate level of sanction in an individual case; (2)

consideration of the appropriate weight of such factors in light

of the stated goals of lawyer discipline; (3) consistency in the

imposition of disciplinary sanctions for the same or similar

offenses within and among jurisdictions.

ABA Standard 1.3 (“Purpose of These Standards”). Thus, the ABA

Standards were designed to promote consistency in the imposition of

disciplinary sanctions. “Use of the ABA Standards will further the goal of

our disciplinary system because they ‘combine clear, straight-forward

guidelines which ensure a level of consistency necessary for fairness to the

public and the legal system with the flexibility and creativity essential to

secure justice to the disciplined lawyer.” Grievance Adm’r v. Lopatin, 612

N.W.2d 120, 127 (Mich. 2000) (quoting In re Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 52

(Alaska 1986)). They serve as a guide to impose “a level of discipline that

takes into account the unique circumstances of the individual case, but still

falls within broad constraints designed to ensure consistency.” Id.

Under the ABA Standards, barring unusual circumstances, once the

correct presumptive sanction is determined, that sanction generally applies

unless aggravating or mitigating factors indicate a greater or lesser sanction

is appropriate.

Manookian v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 685 S.W.3d 744, 808 (Tenn. 2024)

(some citations omitted) (cleaned up). Thus, under Rule 9, hearing panels and trial courts

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considering attorney discipline promote consistency in the imposition of sanctions by

anchoring their decisions on punishment to the ABA Standards.

We recognize that attorney disciplinary matters are fact-intensive, and decisions on

the appropriate sanction may hinge on nuance, detail, and unique circumstances in a

particular case. See, e.g., In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d 288, 299 (Tenn. 2021) (noting there are

“cases where the facts do not fit neatly within the ABA Standards”). For that reason, we

have emphasized that the ABA Standards “serve as ‘guideposts’ for determining the

appropriate punishment rather than ‘rigid rules that dictate a particular outcome.’” In re

Vogel, 482 S.W.3d 520, 533 (Tenn. 2016) (quoting Hyman v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct.,

437 S.W.3d 435, 447 (Tenn. 2014)).

The ABA Standards themselves “allow the application of aggravating or mitigating

circumstances to adjust the sanction imposed.”19 In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d 71, 75 (Tenn.

2018) (citing ABA Standard 9.1)). The ABA Standards list of aggravating and mitigating

factors “are illustrative, not exclusive, and other factors may be considered.” In re Sitton,

618 S.W.3d at 303 (in addition to listed aggravating and mitigating factors, Court

considered as an additional aggravating circumstance that lawyer’s unethical comments

“were made in a very public setting, on social media”).

Courts have recognized that “meaningful comparisons of attorney sanction cases

are difficult as the behavior that leads to sanction varies so widely between cases.” In re

Robinson, 209 A.3d 570, 597 (Vt. 2019) (quoting In re Strouse, 34 A.3d 329, 340 (Vt.

2011) (Dooley, J., dissenting)). Tethering the disciplinary decisions of hearing panels and

trial courts to the ABA Standards is the best way to afford them the flexibility needed to

account for the unique circumstances in a given case, while also promoting consistency by

ensuring that the level of discipline falls within broad boundaries.

Still, our rules recognize that “[i]nconsistent sanctions, either within a jurisdiction

or among jurisdictions, cast doubt on the efficiency and the basic fairness of all disciplinary

systems.” Background, ABA Standards. To minimize the risk of such inconsistency, this

Court reviews attorney sanctions imposed across the State, even sanctions that are not

appealed. See, e.g., Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 15.4(b) (Court review where there is no appeal)

(“The Court shall review the recommended punishment provided in such judgment or

settlement with a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and

appropriateness of punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.”); see also

19

Aggravating circumstances are defined as “any considerations or factors that may justify an

increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed.” ABA Standard 9.21. Mitigating circumstances are

defined as “any considerations or factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be

imposed.” ABA Standard 9.31.

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Manookian, 685 S.W.3d at 807 (attorney appeal) (“For the sake of uniformity, we seek to

review the sanctions imposed in any other cases with similar circumstances.”).

Hearing panels and trial courts have ready access to the relatively few reported

opinions on disciplinary cases that are appealed, but have limited access to and familiarity

with the greater number of disciplinary decisions that are not appealed. Moreover,

unappealed disciplinary decisions not reflected in court opinions, such as the Gardiner case

cited repeatedly by Mr. Doll, may reflect a lesser discipline for reasons that are not apparent

from press releases or summaries, such as proof or witness problems after investigation,

TLAP referrals, and the like, but which are often revealed to this Court in documents filed

to aid our review of the discipline. Thus, the Supreme Court’s more expansive perspective

from seeing the broad swath of attorney disciplinary matters in the entirety of the State—

whether appealed or not— puts it in the best position to appropriately consider comparative

cases for the purpose of ensuring uniformity of punishment throughout Tennessee.

For these reasons, we decline Mr. Doll’s invitation to interpret Tennessee Supreme

Court Rule 9 as authorizing hearing panels and trial courts determining attorney discipline

to consider comparative cases in addition to applying the ABA Standards.

2. Supreme Court Review

We next review the sanction recommended by the hearing panel and affirmed by

the trial court. Here, the hearing panel identified disbarment as the appropriate presumptive

sanction under ABA Standards 5.11 and 7.1 and found five aggravating and one mitigating

factor applicable. The trial court agreed with this analysis.

We agree that disbarment under ABA Standards 5.11(a) and 7.1 is the appropriate

presumptive sanction for Mr. Doll’s convictions of subornation of aggravated perjury and

criminal simulation. As stated by the trial court, all three criminal convictions “amount to

an intentional interference with the administration of justice” and “are explicit violations

of dut[ies] owed by every attorney.”

The hearing panel identified five aggravating factors: (1) prior discipline; (2)

dishonest and selfish motives; (3) refusal to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the

misconduct; (4) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (5) the nature of the

illegal conduct. It identified one mitigating factor, Mr. Doll’s cooperative attitude in the

disciplinary proceedings. We agree that all of these factors are applicable, and we agree

with the trial court that the five aggravating factors “far outweigh the single mitigating

factor.” Thus, the hearing panel applied the appropriate ABA Standards and the

aggravating and mitigating factors.

- 18 -

Mr. Doll does not dispute these findings. Instead, Mr. Doll notes that the ABA

Standards are guidelines, not mandates, and he asks this Court to conduct its own

comparative analysis and find suspension, not disbarment, to be the appropriate sanction

for Mr. Doll.

In response, the Board argues that this Court should not undertake a review of

comparative discipline unless we first determine that the hearing panel chose to apply

incorrect ABA Standards. The Board points to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section

15.4(b), which applies when neither party appeals the sanction. Rule 15.4(b) states that

this Court “review[s] the recommended punishment provided in such judgment[s] . . . with

a view to attaining uniformity of punishment throughout the State and appropriateness of

punishment under the circumstances of each particular case.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, §

15.4(b). Because this case was appealed under Section 33, the Board says this Court’s

review is under the same standard of review as the trial court, citing Board of Professional

Responsibility v. Reguli, 489 S.W.3d 408, 417 (Tenn. 2015). The Board posits that there

“is no basis for the Court to conduct a proportionality review of the sanction in this case,

absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court or the hearing panel.”

We respectfully disagree. This Court is the “final and ultimate arbiter of the

propriety of the professional conduct of all lawyers practicing in Tennessee.” Talley, 358

S.W.3d at 190. The Court “reviews disciplinary judgments in light of our ‘inherent power

. . . and fundamental right to prescribe and administer rules pertaining to the licensing and

admission of attorneys.’” Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 612

(Tenn. 2010) (quoting In re Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 773 (Tenn. 1995)). Nothing in our

Rules precludes the Court from reviewing comparative cases on appeal.

Moreover, the Board’s argument overlooks our precedent. In prior cases in which

a party has appealed to this Court, we have said that, “[i]n reviewing the punishment

appropriate for an offense, it is also appropriate to consider sanctions imposed in cases with

similar facts.” Lockett v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 380 S.W.3d 19, 29 (Tenn. 2012); see also Bd.

of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct. of Tenn. v. Maddux, 148 S.W.3d 37, 40 (Tenn. 2004); Milligan v.

Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 166 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tenn. 2005). This is true

even where the hearing panel applied the appropriate ABA Standards and their application

of the standards and aggravating and mitigating factors was supported by substantial and

material evidence. See Hanzelik v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Sup. Ct., 380 S.W.3d 669, 682

(Tenn. 2012); Bailey v. Bd. of Pro. Resp., 441 S.W.3d 223, 236 (Tenn. 2014). In all, we

decline to constrain our appellate review in the manner suggested by the Board.

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Mr. Doll first asks us to compare his conduct to the attorney in In re Grace Ingrid

Gardiner, which he obtained from a BPR press release on the attorney’s discipline.20 Both

the hearing panel and the trial court were correct in observing that, unlike Mr. Doll, the

attorney in Gardiner was not convicted of a crime.

Mr. Doll compares his conduct to cases where he says a suspension was imposed

even though the attorneys were convicted of felony offenses, citing Lockett, 380 S.W.3d

19; In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d 71; Order, In re Ford, BPR #14312, No. M2016-01035-SC-

BAR-BP (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2016); and Order, In re Temple, BPR #26096, No. M2015-01280-

SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. June 27, 2016).

As noted in In re Cope, in cases where an attorney was convicted of a felony,

“almost all of the attorneys were disbarred.” 549 S.W.3d at 75. In the few cases where the

attorney received a suspension instead of disbarment, there were significant differences

from the facts in Mr. Doll’s case.

First, in those cases, none of the attorneys had three felony convictions. See In re

Cope, 549 S.W.3d at 72, 76 (one felony conviction for insider trading involving fraud and

deceit); Order, In re Ford, BPR #14312, No. M2016-01035-SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. Dec. 22,

2016) (theft over $1,000); Order, In re Temple, BPR #26096, No. M2015-01280-SC-BAR-

BP (Tenn. June 27, 2016) (one attempted criminal usury conviction); Lockett, 380 S.W.3d

at 22 (state court conviction of felony theft and federal court conviction of willful failure

to file tax returns).

Second, in the Cope opinion, the Court acknowledged that disbarment was the

presumptive sanction, but pointed out that the attorney “had no other disciplinary actions

in his career, his criminal conduct was atypical, and his conduct did not injure his clients.”

In re Cope, 549 S.W.3d at 76. The same cannot be said of Mr. Doll. He has had three

prior disciplinary actions, and his three felony convictions were directly related to his use

of his law license. See In re Robinson, 209 A.3d at 597 (noting that prior case law did not

support departing from the presumptive sanction of disbarment because in prior cases

where criminal conduct resulted in suspension “the criminal conduct was not directly

related to the [attorneys’] use of their law licenses.”).

20

For the reasons we noted above, cases that are not reflected in an opinion by this Court are less

helpful than published opinions in a proportionality review. Press releases and summaries of these cases

may not reflect things like proof or witness issues, nuance and detail that can be important in comparing

one case to another.

- 20 -

Significantly, Mr. Doll cannot claim that his conduct did not injure his client. The

details about Mr. Doll’s misconduct and his defense in his disciplinary hearing show why

his conduct toward his client was particularly egregious.

Here, the proof in Mr. Doll’s criminal case, apparently credited by the jury, showed

that Ms. Van Burkleo was at her workplace when the fake signature was placed on the oath

for the emergency petition and notarized. The proof indicated that Mr. Doll himself put

the signature on the document.

The proof also showed that, after Ms. Van Burkleo testified that she did not sign the

petition, at the next hearing, Mr. Doll told Judge Easter “that Ms. Van Burkleo was in his

office the day that the petition was signed.” Doll, 2020 WL 7231101, at *5. At the next

hearing, Mr. Doll embellished this untruth and told Judge Easter that his calendar showed

he prepared the emergency petition on March 1, 2013, “two hours before Ms. Van Burkleo

arrived in his office at 3:00 p.m. to review and sign the documents.” Id. at *6.

Not content with his own prevarication to hide his misconduct, the proof at the

criminal trial showed Mr. Doll proceeded to coach Ms. Van Burkleo into lying in open

court. Ms. Van Burkleo testified that Mr. Doll called her and, in an irritated and short

manner, said “don’t you remember giving me permission to sign your name?” Id. She

responded that she did not. Id. He minimized his misconduct, telling her that “attorneys

sign documents for clients frequently and that he might get a minor reprimand but, since

the conten[t]s of the affidavit were true, there would be no harsh punishment.” Id. Mr.

Doll went on to instruct her, at the hearing, “you just say, you know, all those documents

that you saw, all your signatures look different, but that they’re all yours.” Id. He warned

her that, if she did not repeat that lie, Mr. Carter “could get in trouble and lose his job.” Id.

Ms. Van Burkleo testified at the criminal trial that, the day of the show cause hearing

before Judge Easter, Mr. Doll met her outside the courtroom “and reminded her that Mr.

Carter could lose his job and instructed her how to testify.” Id. Mr. Doll never disclosed

to Ms. Van Burkleo that he was coaching her to commit a criminal offense; instead he led

her to believe “it was fine because the contents of the affidavit were in fact true.” Id. Ms.

Van Burkleo dutifully followed Mr. Doll’s instructions, and ended up being charged with

criminal offenses for the conduct he urged upon her.

Thus, it is undisputed that the jury in the criminal case credited testimony showing

that Mr. Doll took advantage of the trust his client placed in him and pressured her into

lying in court, all in order to shield Mr. Doll from the fallout of his actions. This course of

action resulted in disastrous consequences for Mr. Doll’s client.

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The record also supports the hearing panel’s finding, as an aggravating factor, that

Mr. Doll refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his misconduct. True enough,

after his conviction for subornation of aggravated perjury, Mr. Doll conceded he could not

dispute the underlying criminal convictions and acknowledged they all related to his

actions as a practicing attorney. He acknowledged that Ms. Van Burkleo was charged with

perjury and sued by her former husband. But instead of recognizing that these

consequences were caused by his choices and actions, Mr. Doll continued to maintain that

Ms. Van Burkleo in fact signed the oath on the emergency petition,21 and he insinuated that

the real problem was Ms. Van Burkleo’s choice to testify untruthfully that she did not.22

He apparently viewed himself as a victim of the contentious nature of post-divorce

litigation: “You know, if I could add, domestic attorneys who did this a little longer than

me and who are a lot wiser than me advised me don’t handle post divorce matters. I wish

I’d listened.” Mr. Doll’s continuing “claim [that] this is all just a gross misunderstanding

. . . is not taking responsibility.” In re Sitton, 618 S.W.3d at 303.

As emphasized by the hearing panel below, Mr. Doll’s conduct in this case,

particularly his subornation of aggravated perjury, “cuts through the very heart of the

judicial system and cannot be minimized in any way.” We agree with the hearing panel

and the trial court that disbarment, rather than suspension, is the appropriate sanction for

Mr. Doll.

For those reasons, we affirm the chancery court’s affirmation of the hearing panel’s

sanction of disbarment, effective upon entry of this Court’s order under Tennessee

Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1.23

21

In his testimony, Mr. Doll maintained that his “recollection is [Ms. Van Burkleo] came in and to

my knowledge signed that document.”

22

Mr. Doll testified that his relationship with Ms. Van Burkleo was good and “there was really no

conflict between the two of us until she testified at trial” that she did not sign the oath on the emergency

petition.

23

At the Board’s suggestion, the hearing panel’s initial order recommended Mr. Doll be disbarred

retroactive to the date of his summary suspension on May 31, 2017. The Board later asked the panel to

strike the retroactivity language. The panel’s modified order did not modify the retroactivity language. In

its brief to this Court, the Board asks us to fix the retroactivity language.

Under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1, Mr. Doll’s disbarment is effective upon

entry of this Court’s order. Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 28.1. During Mr. Doll’s appeals of his criminal

conviction, this Court amended Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 30.2 to provide: “Individuals

disbarred under Rule 9 prior to July 1, 2020, may not apply for reinstatement until the expiration of at least

five years from the effective date of the disbarment.” That order also amended Tennessee Supreme Court

Rule 9, section 30.4(d) to state: “Individuals disbarred on or after July 1, 2020, are not eligible for

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CONCLUSION

We hold the trial court’s decision upholding the hearing panel’s sanction of

disbarment was neither arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the

judgment of the chancery court and the decision of the hearing panel to disbar Mr. Doll

from the practice of law in the State of Tennessee. Mr. Doll’s disbarment shall be effective

upon entry of this Court’s order under Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 28.1. The

costs of this appeal are taxed to Robert Allen Doll, III and his surety, for which execution

may issue if necessary.

_________________________________

HOLLY KIRBY, CHIEF JUSTICE

reinstatement.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9, § 30.4(d). These amendments took “effect immediately” upon the

filing of the January 23, 2020 order.

The petition for discipline against Mr. Doll was filed on June 1, 2017, but because of the intervening

criminal proceedings and appeals, the hearing panel decision recommending disbarment was not issued

until December 1, 2021. Therefore, Mr. Doll is subject to the July 1, 2020 rule change making disbarment

permanent.

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