The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL Case No.: 18-cv-02873-JLB (NLS)
DISTRICT,
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
Plaintiff,
13 APPROVAL OF MINOR’S
v. COMPROMISE
14
SANGEETHA BUSSY
15 [ECF No. 15]
CHANDRASEKAR and UPENDRA
16 GOPIMATH KOTEN, on their own
behalf and on behalf of minor student
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S.K., and S.K., a minor,
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Defendants.
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20 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM.
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22 Before the Court is a Motion for Approval of Minor’s Compromise filed by
23 Defendants and Counter-Claimants Sangeetha Bussy Chandrasekar and Upendra Gopinath
24 Koten (collectively, “Parents”), on their own behalf and on behalf of S.K., a minor
25 (“Student” and collectively with Parents, “Defendants”). (ECF No. 15.) The Court held a
26 hearing on the motion on August 20, 2019. (ECF No. 17.) Upon due consideration and
27 for the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
28 ///
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 On December 23, 2018, Plaintiff Escondido Union School District (“Plaintiff” or
3 “District”) commenced this action against Defendants pursuant to the Individuals with
4 Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A), appealing the final
5 decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) in an underlying state administrative
6 proceeding. (ECF No. 1.)
7 A. Complaint
8 Plaintiff alleges the following in its Complaint:
9 The Student and his family immigrated to the United States in 2009. (Id. at ¶ 9.)
10 That same year, the Student was found eligible for special education under the IDEA by
11 the Westwood Regional School District (“Westwood”) in New Jersey. (Id.) The Parents
12 signed the Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) developed by Westwood. (Id.) In
13 2014, Defendants moved to Pleasanton, California. (Id. at ¶ 10.) Although the Pleasanton
14 Unified School District held an IEP meeting regarding the Student in 2014, the Parents did
15 not consent to the IEP and began homeschooling the Student. (Id.) Defendants eventually
16 moved to San Diego, California in 2015 and continued throughout this time to homeschool
17 the Student. (Id.)
18 On August 14, 2017, the Parents enrolled the Student in the District. (Id. at ¶ 11.)
19 At that time, the Parents provided the District with a copy of the unsigned Pleasanton IEP
20 but did not mention the Westwood IEP. (Id.) The Parents also did not mention that the
21 Student had been receiving education services from Alternative Teaching Strategy Center
22 (“ATSC”) in San Diego since March 23, 2016. (Id.) The District did not learn until
23 February 2018 about the Student’s enrollment and attendance at ATSC. (Id.)
24 At the start of the 2017-2018 school year, the District generated a comprehensive
25 assessment plan and presented it to the Parents for signature on August 17, 2017. (Id. at
26 ¶¶ 12-13.) Because the District did not have the Westwood IEP, District witnesses testified
27 that they believed the Parents had revoked their consent to special education and related
28 services in September 2014. (Id. at ¶ 14.) During an October 16, 2017 IEP team meeting,
1 the Student’s mother affirmed that she had revoked services in September 2014. (Id.)
2 Based on the information provided by the Student’s mother, and because it only had the
3 unsigned IEP from Pleasanton, the District offered an interim placement to the Student in
4 a general education classroom with a 1:1 aide and a safety plan. (Id. at ¶ 15.)
5 On August 28, 2017, the Parents sent the District a unilateral placement letter written
6 by their attorney stating that although they had enrolled the Student in the District they
7 were unilaterally placing him, because a general education placement would not be
8 appropriate for the Student and the District could not provide the Student with a free
9 appropriate public education (“FAPE”). (Id. at ¶ 16.) The Parents further stated that they
10 remained interested in District services and asked the District to generate an assessment
11 plan. (Id.)
12 The District sent the Parents a letter on September 8, 2017, indicating its willingness
13 to discuss a diagnostic placement in a special education program wherein the Student could
14 be assessed, pending completion of the assessments. (Id. at ¶ 17.) The District also
15 reiterated the behavior and safety plan offered through the interim placement. (Id.) The
16 Parents did not respond to this correspondence or inquire about its content at subsequent
17 encounters with District personnel. (Id.)
18 In September and October of 2017, the District comprehensively assessed the
19 Student in the following areas: academic, cognitive, speech and language, fine motor,
20 sensory, gross motor, adaptive skills, and augmentative and alternative communication.
21 (Id. at ¶ 18.) The District also conducted a special circumstances instructional assistance
22 (“SCIA”) assessment and a functional behavioral assessment (“FBA”). (Id.) Despite being
23 asked several times by the District, the Parents did not disclose that the Student was
24 receiving behavioral or academic support services from any non-public agency (“NPA”),
25 including ATSC. (Id. at ¶ 19.) The Parents also did not disclose that the Student was
26 purportedly able to communicate by typing or that English was not his primary language.
27 (Id. at ¶¶ 20-22.)
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1 On October 16, 2017, the IEP team reviewed the results of the assessment and agreed
2 that the Student was eligible under the category of Autism. (Id. at ¶ 22.) The Student’s
3 mother attended the IEP meeting and had an opportunity to ask questions and provide input.
4 (Id.) She did not state that she disagreed with the assessments. (Id.) The IEP team’s offer
5 of FAPE included placement in a separate class program designed for students with
6 moderate-to-severe disabilities at the Student’s school of residence, with the following
7 services: specialized academic instruction for 393 minutes daily in a group setting;
8 occupational therapy consultation in the amount of ten, 30-minute sessions annually in a
9 group setting; APE for 200 minutes weekly in a group setting; psychological services for
10 20 minutes weekly in an individual setting; and speech and language services in the amount
11 of 50, 20-minute sessions in an individual or group setting. (Id. at ¶ 23.) Student was
12 offered extended school year services. (Id.) Student was also offered numerous
13 supplementary aids and accommodations including 1:1 aide assistance throughout the day,
14 with 2:1 aide assistance during transitions and activities outside the classroom and as
15 necessary to prevent elopement and a behavior intervention plan. (Id.)
16 In a letter to the District dated November 10, 2017, the Parents stated that they had
17 concluded that the proposed placement could not provide the Student with a FAPE. (Id. at
18 ¶ 24.) The Parents further described their intent to unilaterally place the Student in an
19 appropriate school. (Id.) The letter further stated the Parents’ intent to seek reimbursement
20 from the District for placement in a non-public school (“NPS”). (Id.)
21 The District responded by letter on December 15, 2017 and denied the Parents’
22 request to fund the Student’s placement at an NPS, opining that such a placement would
23 be too restrictive for the Student. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The District also indicated its intent to file
24 for due process. (Id.) The Student’s mother responded by e-mail on January 9, 2018 and
25 stated her disagreement with all parts of the IEP, except for the Student’s eligibility and
26 APE services. (Id. at ¶ 26.) The e-mail included a signed and dated signature page to the
27 October 16, 2017 IEP, which was signed and dated January 8, 2018, indicating the same
28 partial consent. (Id.)
1 On January 22, 2018, the District received a written request from the Student’s
2 mother for Independent Educational Evaluations (“IEE”) in academic achievement and
3 speech and language, including assessments of receptive, expressive, and pragmatic
4 language. (Id. at ¶ 27.) The District responded by letter on January 31, 2018 explaining
5 that the District planned to file for due process to defend its assessments. (Id. at ¶ 28.)
6 Throughout the assessment and IEP progress, the Student’s mother continued to
7 homeschool the Student, with additional services from ATSC, which is an NPA. (Id. at ¶
8 29.) ATSC is not certified through the California Department of Education to provide
9 specialized academic instruction (“SAI”) by a credentialed special education teacher. (Id.)
10 In November 2017, the Student’s mother enrolled the Student in a different homeschool
11 program linked to ATSC. (Id.)
12 Throughout the assessment and IEP progress, the Parents continually and
13 deliberately misled the District as to the Student’s abilities, needs, and current placement.
14 (Id. at ¶ 30.) By knowingly withholding this information from the District’s evaluators,
15 they hindered the assessment process and caused the assessments to be subject to challenge.
16 (Id.) By knowingly withholding this information from the other IEP team members, they
17 undermined the IEP process and the team’s ability to offer the Student a FAPE in the least
18 restrictive environment (“LRE”). (Id.) The Parents also continually and deliberately
19 misled the District as to their sincere intent to receive a FAPE from the District, when their
20 ulterior motive was to entrap the District into to reimbursing them for wholly inappropriate
21 programs operated directly and indirectly by ATSC. (Id. at ¶ 31.)
22 On February 5, 2018, the District filed a due process complaint with the Office of
23 Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) seeking an order that the District had appropriately
24 assessed the Student in speech and academics and was therefore not obligated to fund a
25 speech or academic IEE. (Id. at ¶ 32.) The District sought a further order that it could
26 implement the Student’s entire October 16, 2017 IEP, despite the lack of full consent from
27 the Parents, because the IEP offered a FAPE in the LRE. (Id.) On April 30, 2018, the
28 Student filed a due process complaint alleging the District denied him a FAPE during the
1 2017-2018 school year and failed to properly assess him. (Id. at ¶ 33.) These two matters
2 were consolidated by OAH on May 4, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 34.) On June 5, 2018, the District
3 dismissed its complaint, without prejudice, because the Student was no longer a resident
4 of the District. (Id. at ¶ 35) The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing over six
5 days in August 2018. (Id. at ¶ 37.)
6 During the hearing, the Student, through his mother, claimed that the District’s
7 assessments in the areas of academics, speech, language, and communication were
8 inappropriate because, inter alia, the District did not assess the Student’s needs using
9 typing and he was not assessed in his primary language, Saurashtra. (Id. at ¶¶ 38, 42.) The
10 testimony unequivocally established that, even if the Student was able to communicate by
11 typing, the District was not, and could not, reasonably have been on notice of any such
12 ability at the time he was assessed. (Id. at ¶ 41.) The testimony also directly contradicted
13 the enrollment paperwork completed by the Student’s mother stating that English was the
14 primary language spoken, and the Parents’ representations to the District that English was
15 the Student’s primary language. (Id. at ¶ 42.) There was also no indication during the
16 assessments that the Student did not communicate in or understand English. (Id.)
17 The Student’s mother also testified that the Student was performing academically
18 higher at ATSC than what the District’s assessment reports indicated, but the Student’s
19 mother had never disclosed how the Student was performing at ATSC or provided the name
20 of the NPS so that the District’s assessors could observe him in that setting. (Id. at ¶ 43.)
21 During the hearing, none of the Student’s witnesses could testify that during the fall of
22 2017, the Student was higher performing academically or physically than what the
23 District’s assessors found. (Id.)
24 The ALJ issued her final decision on November 29, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 45, 48.) The
25 ALJ held that Defendants had prevailed on several of the issues and awarded the remedy
26 of reimbursement of the Student’s fees and enrollment at ATSC for the period of August
27 16, 2017 through June 5, 2018, plus transportation in the amount of $3,018.40. (Id. at ¶¶
28 47, 48.) The ALJ further ordered reimbursement for independent evaluations in an amount
1 to be established through evidence, provided to the District by the Parents, within 60 days,
2 not to exceed $1,500.00, and submitted before June 30, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 47.) The District
3 remitted full reimbursement to the Parents. (Id. at ¶ 49.)
4 The District thereafter filed the present action appealing the decision of the ALJ. In
5 the appeal, the District claims the following:
6
Ultimately, the ALJ erred in first determining that the District had to make a
7 FAPE available to the Student given that he was already placed by his Parents
at ATSC. Next, she incorrectly found the District did not offer the Student a
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FAPE, despite the overwhelming evidence that Parents withheld critical
9 information and misled the District in every instance during the assessment
and IEP process, and relied on testimony from witnesses she often determined
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to not be credible. This error was compounded by the fact that the ALJ
11 awarded reimbursement for a program that was wholly inappropriate because
it was not certified to [] provide the services it allegedly provided to S.K., not
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to mention there was no proof the Student receive any benefit from ATSC.
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14 (Id. at ¶ 55.) Therefore, the District in its Complaint requested that the Court, after
15 conducting a de novo review, reverse those portions of the decision that were found against
16 the District. (Id. at ¶ 56.)
17 B. Counterclaim
18 On January 22, 2019, Defendants filed an Answer and Counterclaim against the
19 District. (ECF No. 5.) Defendants brought the Counterclaim pursuant to the IDEA for the
20 payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred by the parents of a child with disabilities
21 who are the prevailing party in an administrative due process hearing. (Id. at ¶ 1.)
22 Specifically, Defendants rely on 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I), which provides as follows:
23 “In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may
24 award reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs to a prevailing party who is the parent
25 of a child with a disability.” (Id. at ¶ 7.) Defendants claim that attorneys’ fees and expenses
26 rendered in anticipation of a due process hearing fall within this authorization. (Id.)
27 ///
28 ///
1 The following allegations are taken from Defendants’ Counterclaim:
2 Defendants raised the following issues in their due process complaint filed with the
3 OAH:
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1. Whether the Escondido Union School District (“District”) denied
5 [S.K.] (“Student”) a free, appropriate, public, education (“FAPE”) for
the 2017-2018 school year, from 8/16/17 through 10/15/17 by failing
6
to have an IEP in effect for [Student] at the beginning of the school
7 year. Cal. Educ. Code § 56344(b) and 34 C.F.R. § 300.342.
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2. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school
9 year by failing to appropriately assess [Student] in all areas of suspected
disability. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56381 and 56320(f).) Specifically, the
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District failed to appropriately assess [Student] in the areas of
11 Academics and Speech, Language, and Communication.
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3. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school
13 year and ESY by failing to develop accurate present levels of academic
achievement and functional performance in the areas of Academics and
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Adapted Physical Education in [Student’s] IEP of 10/16/17. Cal. Educ.
15 Code § 56345(a)(1).
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4. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school
17 year and ESY by failing to make a specific, written offer of FAPE at
the IEP team meeting of 10/16/17. Union School Dist. v. Smith, 15 F.3d
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1519 (1994).
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5. Whether the District denied Student a FAPE for the 2017-2018 school
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year and ESY by failing to accurately identify his assistive technology
21 needs and offer appropriate assistive technology supports in the IEP of
10/16/17. Cal. Educ. Code §§ 56020.5 and 56341.1(b)(5); M.C. v.
22
Antelope Valley Union High School Dist., 858 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir.
23 2017).
24 (Id. at ¶ 43.)
25 As remedies, Defendants sought a finding that the District had denied the Student a
26 FAPE for the 2017-2018 school year; funding for IEEs in the areas of academics and
27 speech and language; reimbursement for educational services from a California Certified
28 NPA for the time period at issue; and related transportation reimbursement. (Id. at ¶ 44.)
1 The ALJ held that Defendants prevailed fully on all issues, except for Issue 5, which
2 was deemed moot. (Id. at ¶ 47.) The ALJ ordered the District to reimburse Defendants in
3 the amount of $22,000.00 for educational services from a California-certified NPA ATSC,
4 as well as $3,018.40 in reimbursement for transportation, and $1,500.00 for IEEs in the
5 areas of academics and speech and language. (Id. at ¶ 48.)
6 As the prevailing party in the OAH case, Defendants claim they are entitled to their
7 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id. at ¶ 51.) Defendants incurred $125,530.00 in fees and costs.
8 (Id.) On January 2, 2019, Defendants’ counsel provided the District’s counsel with a
9 detailed invoice requesting payment of reasonable attorneys’ fees related to the OAH case.
10 (Id. at ¶ 52.) The District did not respond and did not pay Defendants’ reasonable
11 attorneys’ fees and costs. (Id.)
12 C. Settlement Conference
13 On January 23, 2019, the Court set an Early Neutral Evaluation Conference (“ENE”)
14 before this Court. (ECF No. 6.) On February 11, 2019, the parties consented to have a
15 United States magistrate judge conduct all proceedings in this case including trial, the entry
16 of final judgment, and all post-trial proceedings. (ECF No. 7.) Accordingly, this case was
17 referred to the Honorable Nita L. Stormes to conduct the ENE. (ECF Nos. 10, 12.) The
18 ENE took place on April 8, 2019. (ECF No. 13.) The parties did not settle at that time,
19 but Judge Stormes made a settlement recommendation and the parties were instructed to
20 contact Judge Stormes’ Chambers by 5:00 p.m. on April 15, 2019 to advise whether they
21 would accept the recommendation. (Id.) On April 15, 2019, the parties advised the Court
22 that the parties had agreed to the Court’s recommendation. (ECF Nos. 14; 15-1 at 2.)
23 D. State Court Action
24 On March 5, 2019, the District filed a complaint for damages, fraud, and negligent
25 misrepresentation against Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of California,
26 County of San Diego, Case No. 37-2019-00012253-CU-FR-NC (“Fraud Complaint”).
27 (ECF Nos. 15 at 4-5; 15-1 at 2.) The District served Defendants via a process server when
28 they appeared at the April 8, 2019 ENE. (ECF Nos. 15 at 4-5.)
1 E. Settlement Agreement
2 On May 15, 2019, Defendants filed a Motion for Approval of Minor’s Compromise.
3 (ECF No. 15.) The parties attached a copy of their Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”).
4 (ECF No. 15-1.) In the Agreement, the District agreed to pay Defendants $50,000 “in full
5 satisfaction of all disputes arising out of the OAH Case No. 2018041322 (Due Process
6 Case), U.S. District Court case 3:18-cv-02873-[JLB-JLS] (Federal and Counter Federal
7 Complaints) and Superior Court of the State of California Court case 37-2019-00012253-
8 CU-FR-NC (Fraud Action).” (Id. at 3.) The District agreed to make full payment via check
9 made payable to “The Law Offices of Cara Lucier” within 60 calendar days of the effective
10 date of the Agreement, and upon receipt by the District of a completed W-9 form from
11 Defendants’ counsel. (Id.) If Defendants’ counsel is not timely paid, the Agreement
12 becomes void. (Id.)
13 Pursuant to the Agreement, Defendants agreed “not to pursue a civil or any other
14 type of action to recover the balance of their attorneys’ fees and costs relating to the Due
15 Process Case, Federal Complaint, Counter Federal Complaint and Fraud Complaint, and
16 any other fees and costs incurred subsequently thereto, including but not limited to
17 communications to collect said fees and costs, seeking an order of judgment pursuant to
18 Local Rule 17.1, and negotiating this Agreement.” (Id. at 3-4.) The parties also agreed to
19 a general release of all past, present, and future claims against each other arising out of the
20 Due Process Case, Federal Complaint, Counter Federal Complaint, and Fraud Complaint,
21 and to a waiver of California Civil Code Section 1542. (Id. at 4-5.)
22 The effective date of the Agreement is the date that the Agreement, as signed by all
23 parties, is approved by the District’s Board of Education and is approved by the Court per
24 Local Civil Rule 17.1, whichever occurs later. (Id. at 8.) The Board was to consider the
25 Agreement at its May 9, 2019 regular Board meeting, in closed session. (Id.)1 The parties
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1 According to the motion, the Board approved the Agreement on May 9, 2019.
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1 are responsible for their own legal fees and costs, except as otherwise provided for in the
2 Agreement. (ECF No. 15-1 at 7.)
3 The parties represent in the Agreement that the District has met all its obligations
4 under the ALJ’s decision and order with respect to reimbursement to the Parents for ATSC
5 tuition and related transportation costs. (Id. at 2.)2 Pursuant to the Agreement, the District
6 may submit a copy of the Agreement to the California Department of Education in support
7 of why it is not obligated to fund these IEEs. (ECF No. 15-1 at 4.)
8 In the Agreement, the District agreed to dismiss without prejudice the Fraud
9 Complaint within one business day of receipt of the Parents’ initials and signatures, as well
10 as their attorneys’ signatures, to this Agreement. (Id. at 4.) In consideration of this, the
11 Parents agreed not to withdraw their consent to the Agreement before the Board. (Id.) The
12 parties further agreed that the Student was to file the present motion within seven days after
13 the Board approved or ratified the Agreement. (Id.)
14 II. LEGAL STANDARD
15 This District’s Local Civil Rule 17.1 addresses settlements for minors and provides
16 in pertinent part:
17 Order of Judgment Required. No action by or on behalf of a minor or
incompetent, or in which a minor or incompetent has an interest, will be
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settled, compromised, voluntarily discontinued, dismissed or terminated
19 without court order or judgment. All settlements and compromises must be
reviewed by a magistrate judge before any order of approval will issue. The
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parties may, with district judge approval[,] consent to magistrate judge
21 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) for entry of an order approving the entire
settlement or compromise.
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23 CivLR 17.1(a).
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2 As of the date of the Agreement, the Parents had not submitted the paperwork
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necessary to entitle the Student to reimbursement for IEEs in the areas of academics and
27 speech and language. (Id.) The parties updated the Court at the hearing on the present
motion and clarified that the District has not approved reimbursement for IEEs in these
28
1 “District courts have a special duty, derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
2 17(c), to safeguard the interests of litigants who are minors.” Robidoux v. Rosengren, 638
3 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2011). Rule 17(c) provides that a district court “must appoint a
4 guardian ad litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent
5 person who is unrepresented in an action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(c). “In the context of
6 proposed settlements in suits involving minor plaintiffs, this special duty requires a district
7 court to ‘conduct its own inquiry to determine whether the settlement serves the best
8 interests of the minor.’” Robidoux, 638 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573
9 F.2d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1978)); see also Salmeron v. United States, 724 F.2d 1357, 1363
10 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[A] court must independently investigate and evaluate any compromise
11 or settlement of a minor’s claims to assure itself that the minor’s interests are protected,
12 even if the settlement has been recommended or negotiated by the minor’s parent or
13 guardian ad litem.” (internal citation omitted)).
14 The Ninth Circuit in Robidoux established that district courts reviewing the
15 settlement of a minor’s federal claim should “limit the scope of their review to the question
16 whether the net amount distributed to each minor plaintiff in the settlement is fair and
17 reasonable, in light of the facts of the case, the minor’s specific claim, and recovery in
18 similar cases.” 638 F.3d at 1181-82. They should also “evaluate the fairness of each minor
19 plaintiff’s net recovery without regard to the proportion of the total settlement value
20 designated for adult co-plaintiffs or plaintiffs’ counsel—whose interests the district court
21 has no special duty to safeguard.” Id. at 1182 (citing Dacanay, 573 F.2d at 1078). “So
22 long as the net recovery to each minor plaintiff is fair and reasonable in light of their claims
23 and average recovery in similar cases, the district court should approve the settlement as
24 proposed by the parties.” Id.
25 III. DISCUSSION
26 As an initial matter, the Court notes that the settlement at issue is not a typical one
27 as the Student is not directly receiving a net recovery from the settlement. Nevertheless,
28 after reviewing the motion and Agreement, the Court finds that the agreed upon $50,000
1 settlement is fair and reasonable considering the facts of this case and serves in the best
2 interest of the Student. Defendants incurred $125,530.000 in attorneys’ fees and costs in
3 litigating the OAH case. (See ECF Nos. 5 at ¶ 51; 15 at 4.) Defendants claim the fees and
4 costs incurred were “reasonable and necessary to prepare and present multiple claims
5 during the 6-day trial and prevail at the administrative hearing level.” (ECF No. 15 at 4.)
6 The judgment in the underlying OAH case provided for Defendants to be reimbursed
7 in the amount of $22,000 for educational services from ATSC, as well as in the amount of
8 $3,018.40 for transportation, and $1,500 for IEEs in the areas of academics and speech and
9 language. (Id.) Defendants state that they have received the reimbursement funds from
10 the District. (Id. at 5.) As the Agreement resolves the District’s appeal of the OAH
11 judgment, Defendants will keep any funds they have already been reimbursed.
12 Defendants’ Counterclaim sought only recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs, and not
13 damages or injunctive relief. Therefore, the $50,000 settlement is to go directly to
14 Defendants’ attorneys to pay the attorneys’ fees incurred in litigating the OAH matter.
15 As such, the Student will not directly receive any of the money. The entire amount
16 of the settlement will be applied towards the attorneys’ fees his family incurred in pursuing
17 his rights. (ECF Nos. 15 at 6; 15-1 at 3.) The District has agreed to issue a check made
18 payable to “The Law Offices of Cara Lucier.” (ECF No. 15-1 at 3.) The Lucier Law Group
19 (formerly The Law Offices of Cara Lucier) has represented Defendants for the entirety of
20 the litigation. (ECF No. 15 at 6.) The funds will be paid to a Client Trust Account
21 maintained by the Lucier Law Group and then distributed to the Lucier Law Group. (Id.)
22 In addition to the $50,000 settlement and $5,500 previously paid by Defendants in fees,
23 Defendants will thereafter pay a “small portion of the remaining balance” owed to their
24 attorneys. (Id.) Counsel has agreed to “courtesy” discount the remaining balance of the
25 legal fees. (Id.) This method of disbursement of the $50,000 appears fair and reasonable
26 and is within the bounds of applicable law and this District’s Local Civil Rules. See CivLR
27 17.1(b)(1) (citing Cal. Prob. Code § 3600, et seq.).
28
1 The Court has considered whether Defendants would have ultimately recovered the
2 full amount of fees and costs incurred in the OAH case, as well as any reasonable attorneys’
3 fees and costs incurred as the prevailing parties in this case. If this case had continued,
4 there is no certainty that Defendants would have been the prevailing parties. If Defendants
5 had not prevailed, they would not have recovered any of their attorneys’ fees; their award
6 in the underlying case was also in jeopardy. Moreover, this Agreement settles a related
7 action in state court the defense of which would have required Defendants to expend
8 additional funds. The outcome of that action was also uncertain. In addition, as
9 Defendants’ attorneys have agreed to discount their attorneys’ fees and costs, Defendants
10 are no longer obligated to pay the full amount that they had sought in this matter.
11 Lastly, the Court is required to consider the outcome of similar cases to determine
12 whether the settlement on behalf of the Student is reasonable. Defendants’ motion does
13 not identify any cases involving similar facts to those here. However, the Court has
14 conducted its own review of the applicable case law and finds cases involving an award of
15 attorney’s fees out of settlement proceeds to be instructive. For example, in A.S. v.
16 Harrison Twp. Bd. of Educ. & E. Greenwich Sch. Dist., No. CV 14-147 (NLH/KMW),
17 2017 WL 1362025 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2017), the district court reviewed an unopposed motion
18 for approval of the parties’ settlement in an IDEA case. In doing so, the court stated that
19 it “must carefully consider” whether the minor’s attorney’s fees are fair and reasonable
20 “[s]ince . . . the settlement at issue is structured in such a way that every dollar [the minor’s
21 attorney] recovers in fees is one less dollar that will be deposited into a trust account for
22 [the minor].” Id. at *2; see also J.N. v. Penn-Delco Sch. Dist., No. CV 14-1618, 2017 WL
23 395481, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2017) (quoting Sosenke v. Norwood, No. 91-2623, 1993
24 WL 512824, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 6, 1993)) (“Especially where the attorneys’ fees affect
25 the amount ultimately awarded to the minor, ‘[i]t is incumbent upon counsel to persuade
26 the court that the attorneys’ fees and costs requested are reasonable and equitable.’”). Here,
27 as discussed above, the attorneys’ fees being awarded are not reducing the amount that the
28
1 || Student would otherwise receive. Accordingly, the Court finds the settlement to be fair
2 ||and reasonable and in the best interest of the Student.
3 CONCLUSION
4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Approval of
5 ||Minor’s Compromise. The parties shall implement the settlement in accordance with the
6 ||terms of the Agreement (ECF No. 15-1), including the filing of a Joint Motion for
7 || Dismissal of this action within five (5) court days after the date of this Order (id. at 4). See
8 || CivLR 7.2.
9 IT IS SO ORDERED.
10 || Dated: August 21, 2019 -
i
on. Jill L. Burkhardt
12 nited States Magistrate Judge
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