noting that the second-prong 17 inquiry depends “very much on the facts of each case”
How later courts described this case
- noting that the second-prong 17 inquiry depends “very much on the facts of each case”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 CHARLOTTE R. SANDERS, Case No. 23-cv-00211-JSW
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
9 v. DENYING IN PART MOTION TO
DISMISS
10 SAN FRANCISCO PUBLIC LIBRARY,
MICHAEL LAMBERT, and LAWRENCE Re: Dkt. No. 25
11 LINDISCH,
Defendants.
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13
Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiff Charlotte Sanders (“Sanders)’s
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complaint filed by the San Francisco Public Library (“Library”) and individuals Michael Lambert
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and Lawrence P. Lindisch (collectively, “Defendants”). The Court has considered the parties’
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papers, relevant legal authority, and the record in this case, and HEREBY GRANTS IN PART and
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DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
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BACKGROUND
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Sanders alleges that she worked as librarian at the Library for 19 years, first as a frontline
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reference librarian and, for the five years prior to her termination, in the Collection Development
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Office. (Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9.) On March 16, 2020, the Library closed its public operation after the
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Presidential proclamation of a national state of emergency due to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Id.
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¶¶ 11, 12.) Sanders was able to shift immediately to work remotely. (Id. ¶ 13.) On June 23, 2021,
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the City and County of San Francisco (“City”) announced its COVID-19 vaccination policy,
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which mandated that all City employees report their vaccination status to the City by July 29,
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2021, and be fully vaccinated no later than 10 weeks after the Federal Food and Drug
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Administration gave final approval to a vaccine. (Id. ¶ 16.) In September 2021, the City imposed
1 a vaccine mandate, requiring all employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine unless they qualified
2 for an exemption. (Id. ¶ 22.)
3 On October 1, 2021, Sanders submitted a request for religious exemption from the City’s
4 mandate. (Id. ¶ 24.) The exemption request detailed Sanders’ “sincerely held religious belief that
5 the use of aborted fetuses, or cells derived therefrom, in the vaccine process is gravely evil and
6 that participating by permitting herself to be injected with those vaccines would compound that
7 moral wrong.” (Id. ¶ 26.) On October 7, 2021, a senior human resources manager for the Library,
8 requested that Sanders submit a “Declaration of Support” from someone who knew of her faith
9 and on October 13, 2021, Sanders submitted the requested declaration. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 28.) Sanders
10 represents that she is a “non-denominational Christian who has been a practicing Christian since
11 childhood and regularly attends church. She underwent an intense spiritual awakening in 2010.
12 After much prayer and contemplation, Ms. Sanders stopped vaccinating that same year.” (Id. ¶
13 29.)
14 After several conversations about Sanders’ medical history, on October 29, 2021, the
15 Library denied the exemption request because: “(1) an accommodation would pose a direct threat
16 to the health and safety of others and/or Ms. Sanders, (2) an accommodation would prevent Ms.
17 Sanders from performing essential function(s), and (3) an accommodation would result in undue
18 hardship for the City.” (Id. ¶ 40.) In accordance with Skelly v. State Personnel Board, 15 Cal.3d
19 194 (1975 (“Skelly”), the City provided notice that it intended to terminate Sanders’ employment
20 for failure to comply with the vaccine mandate and held a hearing which upheld this decision. (Id.
21 ¶¶ 41-44.) Defendant Lawrence Lindisch acted as the Skelly officer and upheld the City’s decision
22 to terminate Sanders. (Id. ¶ 44.) Defendant Michael Lambert allegedly affirmed Lindisch’s
23 findings and signed a letter dismissing Sanders on November 29, 2021, followed by a final notice
24 of dismissal dated April 4, 2022. (Id. ¶¶ 46, 47.)
25 After exhausting her remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
26 receiving a right-to-sue letter, Sanders filed this lawsuit 91 days later against the Library, and
27 individuals Lindisch and Lambert. She asserts two claims for violation of the First Amendment’s
1 individual capacities and one in their official capacities. Sanders also asserts a claim for violation
2 of Title VII against the Library.
3 On May 9, 2023, Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
4 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
5 Defendants contend that (1) Sanders’ claim for violation of Title VII is time-barred because she
6 failed to initiate this lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a right-to sue notice;1 (2) the Library is a
7 constituent department of the City and County of San Francisco and only the City may be sued in
8 a civil action pursuant to San Francisco Charter Article VIII, section 8.102, Article I, section
9 1.101; (3) Sanders’ section 1983 official capacity claim is redundant as to Lindisch and Lambert
10 and should therefore be dismissed;2 (4) Sanders’ claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause
11 against the Library should be dismissed as governmental entities are not subject to suit in their
12 individual capacities;3 and (5) Sanders’ claim for violation of the Free Exercise Clause against
13 Lindisch and Lambert in their individual capacities should be dismissed based on qualified
14 immunity.
15 The only remaining contentions for the Court to decide are: (1) whether the Library or the
16 City is the correct defendant to sue; and (2) whether the claim against the individual Defendants in
17 their individual capacities for violation of Sanders’ Free Exercise rights is subject to dismissal
18 based on qualified immunity.
19 The Court shall address other relevant facts in the remainder of its order.
20 ANALYSIS
21 A. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss.
22 A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the
23 pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A court’s “inquiry is limited to
24 the allegations in the complaint, which are accepted as true and construed in the light most
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1 Defendants abandon this contention on the basis that the extra day was a holiday, and therefore
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the filing of the complaint was within 90 days and therefore timely.
2 Sanders concedes that the official capacity claim against the two individuals is redundant and
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concedes their dismissal.
1 favorable to the plaintiff.” Lazy Y Ranch LTD v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 Even under the liberal pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), “a plaintiff’s
3 obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
4 conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
5 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
6 (1986)).
7 Pursuant to Twombly, a plaintiff must not merely allege conduct that is conceivable but
8 must instead allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
9 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
10 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In reviewing the plausibility
12 of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the
13 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire &
14 Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). However, courts do not “accept as true
15 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable
16 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
17 If dismissal is appropriate, a court “should grant leave to amend even if no request to
18 amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured
19 by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (quotation
20 marks and citation omitted).
21 B. Library is Not the Proper Defendant.
22 Defendants contend that Sanders should have sued the City and not the Library. Although
23 Sanders concedes that the City is the proper defendant as to her constitutional claims pursuant to
24 Section 1983, she argues that the Library is the proper defendant under Title VII. Title VII
25 imposes liability on employers, including governmental entities and agencies, who employ 15 or
26 more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
27 Under the San Francisco Charter, only the City has the power to “appear, sue, and defend
1 S.F. Charter Article I, § 1.101.) Further, nothing in the statute and nothing offered by Sanders
2 provides that an unincorporated municipal department, which by Charter lacks the ability to be
3 sued, may be named as a defendant in a Title VII action. The Court recognizes that the Library is
4 an agent of the City, which by its own Charter may be sued and defend may defend all claims
5 remaining. Sanders’ Title VII claim as well as her claim under Section 1983 may be brought
6 against the City, which has conceded that it is amenable to suit. Accordingly, the Court
7 GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Library as the defendant and instead SUBSTITUTES
8 the City in its place.
9 C. Qualified Immunity.
10 Defendants argue that the individual defendants Lindisch and Lambert are qualifiedly
11 immune from liability for claims under Section 1983 in their individual capacities because they
12 did not violate a clearly established right.
13 Qualified immunity shields government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar
14 as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
15 reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). It
16 “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they
17 exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and
18 liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
19 (2009). To analyze qualified immunity, a court engages in a two-prong inquiry, asking whether a
20 constitutional right has been violated and whether that right was “clearly established.” Pearson v.
21 Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232, 236 (2009). Whether a right is “clearly established” depends on
22 whether the “contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
23 understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
24 “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether
25 it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
26 confronted.” Id. Courts may choose which prong of this analysis to address first. See Pearson,
27 555 U.S. at 236-39. Examining the second prong first may “expedite the resolution of the case”
1 23 (9th Cir. 2017).
2 A federal right is “clearly established” when, at the time of the official’s conduct, the law
3 was “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand” that what he or she was
4 doing was unlawful. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 527, 589 (2018) (citations and
5 quotations omitted). For a right to be clearly established, the law must be “settled”—the
6 constitutionality “beyond debate”—with a sufficiently clear foundation in “then-existing
7 precedent.” Id.; Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991). It is not enough that the right in
8 question is “suggested” by precedent existing at the time of the official’s challenged conduct.
9 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. at 590. Rather, a rule must be dictated by controlling authority or a “robust
10 consensus of cases of persuasive authority.” Id. at 589-90 (citations and quotations omitted). The
11 precedent must be sufficiently clear so that “every reasonable official would interpret it to
12 establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court must
13 therefore ask whether every reasonable official in Defendants’ positions would have known that
14 their specific actions were unconstitutional, given the particular facts that they faced and the
15 “precedent on the books.” Hamby v. Hammond, 821 F.3d 1085, 1091 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation and
16 quotation omitted); see Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 309 (2015) (noting that the second-prong
17 inquiry depends “very much on the facts of each case”).
18 The first step in the determination whether a right is clearly established is to define the
19 right in question. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). A plaintiff bears the initial
20 burden of proving that the rights allegedly violated by defendants were clearly established at the
21 time of the alleged misconduct. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 197 (1984); Houghton v. Smith,
22 965 F.2d 1532, 1534 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he proper fact-specific inquiry . . . is not whether the
23 law is settled, but whether, in light of clearly established law and the information available to him,
24 a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position could have objectively believed his actions to be
25 proper.” Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991).
26 Sanders defines the right at issue as “the particular right of being free from religious
27 discrimination under policies that are not neutral and generally applicable.” (Opp. Br. at 7, citing
1 the right in question as “the right to work unvaccinated at a public institution during a pandemic.”
2 (Motion at 11.) The Court finds neither party’s definition of the right at issue to be accurate.
3 Rather, the right at issue is whether, in enforcing the City’s mandate and religious exemption
4 provisions, the individual defendants infringed Sanders’ Free Exercise rights. The question
5 whether the mandate was neutral on its face or whether the individual defendants performed their
6 duties to enforce the mandate in a discriminatory way are still disputed issues. At this procedural
7 posture, the Court cannot determine that the individuals, while performing their duties for the City
8 during an unprecedented health crisis, would have known that their specific actions were
9 unconstitutional. The Court has not made a determination whether enforcement of the City
10 mandate and its specific decision to deny Sanders’ religious exemption request violated her
11 constitutional rights. There is clear case precedent for the finding that “the urgent public health
12 needs of the community can outweigh the rights of an individual to refuse vaccination” during a
13 health crisis. We The Patriots USA v. Hochul, 17 F.4th 266, 294 n.35 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing
14 Jacobsen v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)). However, it is not clear
15 whether in this particular instance the City’s religious exemption provision and enforcement of
16 that provision by these individuals violated the clearly established right to be free from
17 discrimination based on the free exercise of religion. Accordingly, and at this procedural posture,
18 the Court does not find that Defendants met their burden to show that the individual defendants
19 Lindisch and Lambert are qualifiedly immune from liability for claims under Section 1983 in their
20 individual capacities. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion to dismiss the
21 individual Defendants in their individual capacities on the basis of qualified immunity as
22 premature.
23 CONCLUSION
24 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
25 Defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Court does not find the suit was late-filed. The Court
26 SUBSTITUTES the City in place of the Library as a named defendant. The Section 1983 official
27 capacity claim against Lindisch and Lambert are DISMISSED as redundant. The Section 1983
1 individual capacity. Lastly, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the Section 1983 claim
2 against Lindisch and Lambert in their individual capacities as it finds the defense of qualified
3 |} immunity is premature.
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5 IT IS SO ORDERED. fo)
i ff
6 Dated: September 5, 2023 / Lous
Jerry S. WHITE
8 | / United States District Judge
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