to establish a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff 5 “must show that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that 6 they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional 7 right”
How later courts described this case
- to establish a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff 5 “must show that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that 6 they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional 7 right”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 KESHAWN FULTON MITCHELL, Case No. 21-cv-05014-DMR
8 Plaintiff,
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS
9 v. SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
10 COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 50
11 Defendants.
12 Plaintiff Keshawn Fulton Mitchell filed a complaint against Defendants County of Contra
13 Costa (“Contra Costa”) and law enforcement officers Thomas Brook and Kyle Emley alleging
14 claims arising out of his February 2020 arrest. Defendants now move pursuant to Federal Rule of
15 Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)1 to dismiss Mitchell’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution.
16 [Docket No. 50.] This matter is suitable for resolution without a hearing. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). For
17 the following reasons, the motion is denied.
18 I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
19 The operative second amended complaint (“SAC”) contains the following allegations:
20 Brook and Emley are officers with the Contra Costa County Sheriff’s Office (“CCCSO”).
21 [Docket No. 49 (Second Am. Compl., “SAC”) ¶ 5.] On February 27, 2020, Mitchell “was a
22 passenger in a vehicle that had been pursued by law enforcement.” Id. at ¶ 12 n.1. When the car
23 stopped, Mitchell exited the vehicle and “very briefly, ran before stopping and surrendering to the
24 Defendant Deputies” in accordance with their orders. Id. (emphasis removed). After Mitchell
25 surrendered, he was “unnecessarily, repeatedly, and inappropriately struck by Brook and/or
26 Emley” with batons. Id. at ¶ 12. The officers also stomped the back of his head while he was
27
1 face-down on the ground with his arms out. He suffered dental injuries and injury to his head. Id.
2 Mitchell alleges that the officers “materially and deliberately misrepresented their contact”
3 with him by claiming that he ignored their commands “to stop running and get on the ground”
4 after they identified themselves, resulting in a foot chase that ended when Mitchell tried and failed
5 to jump over a fence. Id. They also fabricated a report that Mitchell’s injuries were caused by an
6 alleged fall, face first, from the fence. Mitchell alleges that he “did not fall face first onto the
7 sidewalk, did not attempt to climb or jump over a wrought iron fence, [and] did not ignore
8 multiple commands from Defendants resulting in a foot chase spanning 200 yards or lasting
9 approximately 1 minute.” Id. He also alleges that he “did not, at any time, physically resist,
threaten, batter, or assault any Defendant,” fail to obey any order prior to the officers’ use of force,
10
or “delay, obstruct, or interfere” with the officers’ duties. Id. at ¶ 14.
11
Mitchell was arrested and charged with violating California Penal Code section 148(a)(1)2
12
based on “deliberately fabricated facts.” Id. at ¶ 13. He alleges that his prosecution “was subject
13
to a Misdemeanor Pre-Trial Diversion Order . . . without a plea following [his] appearance in
14
Court[,] the failure of which would subject [him] to arrest pursuant to a Court-issued warrant.” Id.
15
Following Mitchell’s successful completion of the misdemeanor pre-trial diversion order, the
16
criminal complaint was dismissed and the prosecution ended without a conviction. Id.
17
Mitchell filed the original complaint on June 29, 2021. Defendants subsequently moved
18
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to dismiss certain claims, which the court
19
granted with leave to amend on February 22, 2022. Mitchell v. Cnty. of Contra Costa (“Mitchell
20
I”), No. 21-CV-05014-DMR, 2022 WL 526161, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2022). Mitchell filed an
21
22
2 The relevant provision of California Penal Code section 148 states:
23
Every person who willfully resists, delays, or obstructs any public
24
officer, peace officer, or an emergency medical technician . . . in the
discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office or
25
employment, when no other punishment is prescribed, shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by
26
imprisonment in a county jail not to exceed one year, or by both that
fine and imprisonment.
27
1 amended complaint and Defendants again moved to dismiss certain claims. The court granted the
2 motion in part on April 26, 2022, dismissing Mitchell’s municipal liability claims based on
3 failure-to-train and ratification theories as well as his supervisory liability claim. Mitchell v. Cnty.
4 of Contra Costa (“Mitchell II”), No. 21-CV-05014-DMR, 2022 WL 1225015, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
5 Apr. 26, 2022).
6 The remaining claims are: 1) a section 1983 claim for violations of the Fourth Amendment
7 based on excessive force, unlawful arrest, and fabrication of material facts against Brook and
8 Emley and Doe Defendants 1 to 100; and 2) a section 1983 claim against Contra Costa and Doe
9 Defendants 101 to 200 under Monell based on policies, customs, or practices.
10 Mitchell subsequently moved for leave to amend to file a second amended complaint to
11 add a section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution pursuant to the recent United States Supreme
12 Court decision in Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1341 (2022). The court granted the motion
13 on August 30, 2022 and ordered Mitchell to file his proposed SAC by September 6, 2022.
14 Mitchell v. Cnty. of Contra Costa (“Mitchell III”), No. 21-CV-05014-DMR, 2022 WL 3925287, at
15 *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2022). Mitchell timely filed the SAC. Defendants now move to dismiss
16 the malicious prosecution claim.3
17 II. LEGAL STANDARD
18 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in
19 the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).
20 When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all
21 of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
22 (per curiam) (citation omitted), and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal
23 theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to
24 relief.” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing
25
3 The SAC also includes allegations related to the dismissed Monell claims based on failure-to-
26
train and ratification theories and the dismissed supervisory liability claim. See SAC ¶¶ 24-26, 28-
31. Defendants dispute any effort by Mitchell to “resurrect” these claims, which were dismissed
27
with prejudice. Mot. 7. In his opposition, Mitchell acknowledges that the presence of these
1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.
2 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual
3 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
4 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged
5 must demonstrate “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of
6 a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citing
7 Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir.
8 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. Cty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
9 2002).
10 III. DISCUSSION
11 The SAC alleges that Defendants Brook and Emley “deprived [Mitchell] of the well-
12 settled constitutional right . . . to be free from criminal prosecution based upon the fabrication of
13 material facts, as secured by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution” and
14 “violated [Mitchell’s] constitutional right, under the Fourth Amendment of the United States
15 Constitution, to be free from a criminal prosecution lacking probable cause.” It asserts that the
16 “criminal prosecution to which [he] was subjected also denied [Mitchell] his constitutional right to
17 liberty.” SAC ¶ 20. It further alleges that Brook and Emley “acted maliciously, intentionally,
18 oppressively, willfully, and in conscious, wanton and reckless disregard of [Mitchell’s] rights,
19 safety, and emotional well-being” and that their “motive in causing the prosecution to be filed and
20 maintained was malicious because . . . they sought to hide and cover-up their unlawful conduct [¶
21 12] which caused [Mitchell] his physical injuries and which injuries had to be reported and
22 otherwise explained and justified to Defendants’ employer.” Id. at ¶ 21.
23 “In general, a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under § 1983 if process is
24 available within the state judicial systems to provide a remedy,” but an exception to that rule exists
25 “when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to . . . subject a person to a denial of
26 constitutional rights.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 919 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up)
27 (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 1985)). “To state a malicious prosecution
1 malice; (3) without probable cause; and (4) with ‘the purpose of denying plaintiff equal protection
2 or another constitutional right.’” Heard v. Jackson, No. 21-CV-09472-JSC, 2022 WL 2356821, at
3 *4 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2022) (quoting Lacey, 693 F.3d at 919 (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa
4 Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995) (to establish a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff
5 “must show that the defendants prosecuted her with malice and without probable cause, and that
6 they did so for the purpose of denying her equal protection or another specific constitutional
7 right”)). A plaintiff must also show that “the criminal prosecution ended without a conviction.”
8 Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341. Where, as here, a malicious prosecution claim is based on the
9 Fourth Amendment, see SAC ¶ 20, the plaintiff “must demonstrate a Fourth Amendment seizure .
10 . .” See Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1015 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks and
11 citations omitted).
12 Defendants previously argued that Mitchell should be denied leave to add the malicious
13 prosecution claim on the ground that it was futile because the proposed SAC “does not allege facts
14 showing that Plaintiff was seized in connection with his allegedly unlawful prosecution.” Mitchell
15 III, 2022 WL 3925287, at *3. The court rejected this argument because it “ignore[d] that the FAC
16 and proposed SAC both allege that ‘Plaintiff was arrested and criminally charged . . . based upon
17 the deliberately fabricated facts’” and noted that “[i]t is well-settled ‘that a Fourth Amendment
18 seizure occurs when a person is held in custody by arresting officers.’” Id. at *4 (emphasis
19 removed; internal citation omitted) (citing Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th
20 Cir. 2003) (citing Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 879 (9th Cir. 2001))).
21 Defendants now move to dismiss the malicious prosecution claim on the ground that
22 Mitchell does not allege that “he was seized as a result of the alleged malicious prosecution.”
23 Mot. 5 (emphasis added) (citing Thompson, 142 S. Ct. at 1341). Defendants acknowledge the
24 allegation that Mitchell was arrested but argue that the SAC “does not allege he was in custody or
25 detained when Deputies Brook and Emley submitted their reports about the incident, when
26 charges were filed against him, or at any point after his prosecution commenced.” Mot. 5. They
27 contend that Mitchell “cannot recover on a theory of malicious prosecution, where his seizure had
1 Defendants primarily rely on Taylor v. City of Oakland, No. C 06-05169 WHA, 2007 WL
2 2669914, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2007), but that case is distinguishable. In Taylor, the plaintiff
3 (Taylor) was involved in a minor car accident. She attempted to exchange information with the
4 other driver involved who refused to cooperate and became hostile. Id. at *1. Taylor made
5 several calls to the Oakland police for assistance. Because she reported that the other driver “had
6 been threatening and failed to exchange information,” the dispatcher advised her to stay in her car,
7 lock the doors, and wait for the police to arrive. In her fifth call to the police, Taylor asked if she
8 could leave the scene “because she did not feel safe and had not gotten [the other driver’s]
9 information.” Id. at *1. The dispatcher told her “to use [her] judgment” if she “[didn’t] feel safe”
10 and that she could “always make a report at a later time.” Id. at *2. Taylor left the scene and
11 called the dispatcher again, explaining what had happened and that she was going to go home “and
12 address the damage to [her] car first” before making a report in person with the Traffic Division.
13 Id.
14 Defendant Larson, a police officer, arrived at the scene of the accident after Taylor had left
15 and “broadcast that Taylor had been engaged in a hit and run.” He then traveled toward her
16 residence. While Larson was en route, a second police officer physically detained Taylor in front
17 of her residence. She was then placed under arrest by the second police officer and Larson, and
18 after receiving medical treatment, she was taken to the City of Oakland jail, booked, and placed in
19 a cell. She was released the next day. Id. at *2-3. “Larson then wrote a supplemental report in
20 which he described listening to the tapes of the phone calls between Taylor and the dispatcher,
21 determined they were inconclusive, and ordered that Taylor be arrested for resisting arrest, but not
22 for leaving the scene of a car accident,” and later made another supplemental report in which he
23 recommended prosecuting Taylor for leaving the scene of an accident. Taylor was criminally
24 prosecuted for leaving the scene of an accident and was eventually acquitted. Id. at *3.
25 Taylor brought a claim for malicious prosecution based on the First, Fourth, and
26 Fourteenth Amendments against Larson and moved for partial summary judgment on those
27 claims. Id. The court denied the motion on the ground that there were several disputes of material
1 on a malicious prosecution claim based on the Fourth Amendment, “a plaintiff must establish that
2 she was subjected to a seizure, including an arrest or an incarceration” and noted that neither side
3 disputed that Taylor had been arrested. Id. at *7 (citing Karam, 352 F.3d at 1193). However,
4 Taylor had been released “before she was charged with leaving the scene of an accident,” and
5 “Larson’s allegedly filing a false report after Taylor was arrested and released [was] the heart of
6 her claim.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the court held, Taylor “has not met her burden of
7 showing that Larson caused her to be prosecuted for the purpose of depriving her of her Fourth
8 Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable seizure.” Id.
9 Taylor is distinguishable on its facts because it was undisputed that no seizure occurred in
10 connection with the charge of leaving the scene of an accident, which was the charge that formed
11 the basis for her malicious prosecution claim. In that way, it is similar to the facts in Yousefian,
12 where the plaintiff was arrested for assault with a deadly weapon, booked, and released from
13 custody. He was later charged with drug possession but released on his own recognizance at his
14 arraignment and never detained in connection with the drug charges, which were later dismissed
15 for lack of probable cause. 779 F.3d at 1012-13. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
16 on his malicious prosecution claims, holding that “there was indisputably probable cause to arrest
17 and prosecute [the plaintiff] for assault and elder abuse.” Id. at 1014. As to the drug charges, the
18 Ninth Circuit noted that “no arrest occurred” and that “[t]he only seizure [the plaintiff] could
19 arguably have suffered as a result of his prosecution on the simple drug possession charges was
20 being subjected to own-recognizance (OR) release conditions” prior to the preliminary hearing.
21 Id. at 1015. The court held that even assuming that the OR release conditions constituted a
22 seizure, “he would have been subjected to that seizure regardless of the filing of the drug
23 possession charges,” because they were imposed on both sets of charges. Id. Accordingly, the
24 court held that the plaintiff “suffered no civil rights injury as a result of the OR release conditions
25 in connection with the drug possession charges.” Id. at 1015.
26 In contrast to Taylor and Yousefian, Mitchell alleges that he was arrested and charged with
27 violating California Penal Code section 148(a)(1) based on Defendants’ “deliberately fabricated
1 conviction. SAC ¶ 13. Defendants offer no other authority that these allegations are insufficient
2 for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim.4 The court concludes that the allegations in the
3 SAC adequately state a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment.
4 Defendants also argue that Brook and Emley are entitled to qualified immunity on the
5 ground that it is not “clearly established” that a plaintiff “may bring a claim for malicious
6 prosecution based on his seizure prior to the commencement of his criminal proceedings.” Mot. 6.
7 As the court previously explained in its order granting Mitchell leave to file the SAC, Defendants’
8 qualified immunity argument is without merit:
9 The issue for qualified immunity is whether “the unlawfulness of
[officers’] conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” D.C. v.
10 Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quotation marks and citation
omitted) (emphasis added). As another court in this district recently
11 held, “it is obvious to any reasonable officer that they cannot cite a
suspect based on knowingly false information, from which a
12 prosecutor would file charges.” Franklin v. Mally, No. 17-cv-00789-
HSG, 2019 WL 2548687, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 20, 2019) (denying
13 summary judgment on malicious prosecution claim based on
qualified immunity) (citing Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d
14 463, 480-83 (9th Cir. 2007)); cf Santana v. Cnty. of Yuba, No. 2-15-
CV-00794 KJM EFB, 2016 WL 8673061, at *13 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 19,
15 2016), aff’d, 856 F. App’x 65 (9th Cir. 2021) (concluding that “no
reasonable officer could conclude that the Constitution permits her to
16 manipulate evidence to support an unsupportable felony charge” and
denying motion to dismiss equal protection claim based on qualified
17 immunity).
18 Mitchell III, 2022 WL 3925287, at *4-5. Existing law clearly puts officers on notice that it is
19 unconstitutional to deliberately fabricate facts in order to arrest and charge an individual.
20 //
21 //
22 //
23
24
4 Defendants also cite Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389-90 (2007), but that case addressed when
25
a claim of false arrest or false imprisonment accrues for purposes of the statute of limitations. The
Court held that “a false imprisonment ends once the victim becomes held pursuant to [legal]
26
process,” and that “damages for that claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process
or arraignment, but not more. From that point on, any damages recoverable must be based on a
27
malicious prosecution claim and on the wrongful use of judicial process rather than detention
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Mitchell’s malicious prosecution
2
3 claim is denied. qED DISTRIG>
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