concluding that the relief sought was 17 not public injunctive relief because “any benefit to the public would be derivate of and ancillary to 18 the benefit to DoorDash’s employees”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the relief sought was 17 not public injunctive relief because “any benefit to the public would be derivate of and ancillary to 18 the benefit to DoorDash’s employees”
- noting 6 federal policy favoring arbitration
- “This Court finds that 8 the 2017 TOS provided a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the arbitration provision.”
- taking judicial notice of the “TOS, the opt-out 25 website, and the website at which advertisers accepted or declined the TOS,” because, inter alia, “they are not the subject of reasonable dispute and their authenticity is not in question” (citing 26 FED. R. EVID. 201)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 CALIFORNIA CRANE SCHOOL, INC., Case No. 21-cv-10001-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
9 v. DENYING MOTION TO STAY
PENDING ARBITRATION
10 GOOGLE LLC, et al.,
Re: Dkt. Nos. 32, 34
11 Defendants.
12
13 This is an antitrust lawsuit that alleges that Google LLC and Apple Inc. have entered into
14 an anticompetitive agreement not to compete in the internet search business. See Dkt. No. 39
15 (“FAC”) ¶ 2. Before the Court is Google LLC’s, Alphabet Inc.’s, XXVI Holdings Inc.’s, Sundar
16 Pichai’s, and Eric Schmidt’s (collectively, “Google” or “Google Defendants”) motion for an order
17 compelling arbitration and dismissing or staying Plaintiff California Crane School, Inc.’s
18 (“Plaintiff”) claims against the Google Defendants. Dkt. No. 32. (“Mot.”). That motion is fully
19 briefed. See Dkt. Nos. 43 (“Opp.”), 48 (“Reply”), 81 (“Sur-Reply”). Also pending is Apple Inc.’s
20 and Tim Cook’s (collectively, “Apple” or “Apple Defendants”) motion to stay this action in its
21 entirety pending resolution of any arbitration between Plaintiff and the Google Defendants. Dkt.
22 No. 34. The Court held a hearing on both motions on August 11, 2022. For the reasons provided
23 below, the Court GRANTS Google’s motion and DENIES Apple’s motion.
24 I. BACKGROUND
25 The operative Complaint alleges that Google and Apple violated Sections 1 and 2 of the
26 Sherman Act by engaging in an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade in and monopolize the
27 internet search market. See FAC. Specifically, it alleges that Google and Apple entered into an
1 alleges that Plaintiff, a crane operator certification company, bought search advertisements on
2 Google and in so doing paid prices that were inflated by the allegedly illegal agreement between
3 Apple and Google. Id. ¶ 45. Plaintiff asserts the same claims against Google and Apple, and they
4 arise out of the same underlying facts. See id. ¶¶ 135-42.
5 The following facts have not been contested. When advertisers sign up to use Google’s
6 advertising platforms in the United States, they are shown Google’s Advertising Program Terms
7 (“TOS”) and are asked to expressly agree to the TOS. See Dkt. No. 32-1, Declaration of Courtney
8 Shadd ISO Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration (“Shadd Decl.”) ¶ 3.1 An advertiser will not
9 be able to use Google’s services until after the TOS have been agreed to. Id. Plaintiff accepted
10 the TOS in 2017 and 2018. Id. ¶¶ 13-16.
11 The TOS states in its very first paragraph that it “require[s] the use of binding individual
12 arbitration to resolve disputes rather than jury trials or class actions.” Id., Exs. A & D.
13 Specifically, the TOS’s arbitration clause states that the parties “agree to arbitrate all disputes and
14 claims . . . that arise out of or relate in any way to” Plaintiff’s participation in Google’s advertising
15 programs and services. Id. § 13(A). The provision further states that the agreement to arbitrate “is
16 intended to be broadly interpreted and includes, for example . . . claims brought under any legal
17 theory.” Id. And the provision also expressly states that it applies to claims brought against
18 “Google,” “Google parent companies, and the respective officers [and] directors” of those entities.
19 Id. Google’s records do not reflect any attempts by Plaintiff to opt out of the arbitration provision
20 pursuant to Section 13(F) of the TOS. Shadd Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15-16; see also id., Exs. A & D, §
21
22
1 The Google Defendants ask the Court take judicial notice of the TOS and related
documents, including the opt-out website, and the website at which advertisers accepted or
23
declined the TOS. Mot. at 2. Plaintiff has not opposed this request. The Court agrees to take
judicial notice of the existence of these documents, as they are not the subject of reasonable
24
dispute and their authenticity is not in question. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Trudeau v. Google LLC,
349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 876 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (taking judicial notice of the “TOS, the opt-out
25
website, and the website at which advertisers accepted or declined the TOS,” because, inter alia,
“they are not the subject of reasonable dispute and their authenticity is not in question” (citing
26
FED. R. EVID. 201)), aff’d, 816 F. App’x 68 (9th Cir. 2020). That said, the Court only takes
judicial notice of the existence of the documents and is not bound by any specific fact findings and
27
legal conclusions set forth in them.
1 13(F) (explaining opt out process).
2 II. LEGAL STANDARD
3 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., sets forth a policy favoring
4 arbitration agreements and establishes that a written arbitration agreement is “valid, irrevocable,
5 and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621 (2018) (noting
6 federal policy favoring arbitration); Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
7 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (same). The FAA allows that a party “aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect,
8 or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United
9 States district court . . . for an order directing that . . . arbitration proceed in the manner provided
10 for in such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. This federal policy is “simply to ensure the enforceability,
11 according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.” Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of
12 Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989). Courts must resolve any
13 “ambiguities as to the scope of the arbitration clause itself . . . in favor of arbitration.” Id.
14 When a party moves to compel arbitration, the court must determine (1) “whether a valid
15 arbitration agreement exists” and (2) “whether the agreement encompasses the dispute at issue.”
16 Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363 F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004). The
17 agreement may also delegate gateway issues to an arbitrator, in which case the court’s role is
18 limited to determining whether there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to
19 arbitrate arbitrability. See Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015). In either
20 instance, “before referring a dispute to an arbitrator, the court determines whether a valid
21 arbitration agreement exists.” Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524,
22 530 (2019) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2).
23 III. DISCUSSION
24 A. Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
25 Google moves to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims against it pursuant to an agreed-
26 upon arbitration clause in Google’s terms of service. On a motion to compel arbitration, this
27 Court’s role is simply to determine (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists and, if it does,
1 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiff’s primary argument in response to Google’s motion to
2 compel arbitration is that the so-called “McGill rule” renders the parties’ arbitration agreement
3 unenforceable. The Court will first explain why the arbitration agreement is valid and covers the
4 dispute at issue, and it will then briefly explain why the McGill rule is irrelevant to this case.
5 First, the arbitration agreement is valid. Section 2 of the FAA contains a savings clause,
6 which provides that arbitration agreements are “enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
7 law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. This savings clause “preserves
8 generally applicable contract defenses.” Kilgore, 718 F.3d at 1058 (citations omitted). Under the
9 FAA savings clause, state law doctrines that “arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
10 revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally” remain applicable to arbitration
11 agreements. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud,
12 duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without
13 contravening § 2. Id. And under California law, a contractual clause is unenforceable if it is both
14 procedurally and substantively unconscionable. See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d
15 1257, 1280 (9th Cir. 2006).2
16 Google contends, and Plaintiff does not dispute, that the arbitration clause in the TOS is
17 neither procedurally nor substantively unconscionable. The Ninth Circuit has held that “the
18 threshold inquiry in California’s unconscionability analysis is whether the arbitration agreement is
19 adhesive.” Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201, 1210 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting
20 Nagrampa, 469 F.3d at 1281 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted)). “[I]f there is an
21 opportunity to opt out,” the arbitration agreement is not adhesive, and thus not procedurally
22 unconscionable. Id.
23 Here, the TOS offers advertisers an opportunity to opt out of arbitration. Specifically,
24
25
2 There is no dispute that California law governs the interpretation of the TOS and its arbitration
clause. See Mot. at 3, n.1 (In the TOS, the parties agreed that “ALL CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF
26
OR RELATING TO THESE TERMS OR THE PROGRAMS WILL BE GOVERNED BY
CALIFORNIA LAW, . . . EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT CALIFORNIA LAW IS
27
CONTRARY TO OR PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW.”) (citing Shadd Decl., Exs. A & D, §
1 Section 13(F) of the TOS provides an advertiser with 30 days to opt out of the arbitration
2 provision, which the advertiser can do by clicking on a hyperlink that leads to a landing webpage
3 containing the “Opt Out Procedure.” See Shadd Decl. ¶¶ 10, 12, 15-16 (discussing the TOS’s opt-
4 out process). Plaintiff has not argued that this procedure fails to afford a meaningful opportunity
5 to opt out of arbitration. So in light of this voluntary opt out procedure, the Court finds that the
6 arbitration provision in the TOS is not procedurally unconscionable and thus not unconscionable.
7 See Trudeau v. Google LLC, 349 F. Supp. 3d 869, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“This Court finds that
8 the 2017 TOS provided a meaningful opportunity to opt out of the arbitration provision.”), aff'd,
9 816 F. App'x 68 (9th Cir. 2020); Adtrader, Inc. v. Google LLC, No. 17-CV-07082-BLF, 2018 WL
10 1876950, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2018) (“[A]n advertiser’s decision to decline the September
11 2017 AdWords Agreement to avoid being subject to the new arbitration provision is a voluntary
12 choice given that he or she can easily opt out from that provision.”). There is thus no need to
13 assess whether the arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable. But in any event,
14 Plaintiff does not contend that it is, and the Court finds no reason to conclude otherwise. At
15 bottom, the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable.
16 Second, the arbitration agreement encompasses Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff alleges that it
17 overpaid Google for showing advertisements on Google’s search results pages due to an
18 anticompetitive agreement not to compete in the internet search business between Apple and
19 Google. See FAC ¶¶ 45, 48, 139. With exceptions that no one contends are applicable here, the
20 TOS applies to “all disputes and claims” under “any legal theory” that “arise out of or relate in any
21 way” to Google’s advertising programs. Shadd Decl., Exs. A & D, § 13(A). Moreover, the
22 arbitration agreement applies to Plaintiff’s claims against each of the respective Google
23 Defendants, since the TOS also applies to “Google,” “Google parent companies, and the
24 respective officers [and] directors” of those entities. See id. Plaintiff has identified no reason why
25 this broad agreement does not encompass the antitrust claims here, and the Court is aware of none.
26 Thus, a valid agreement to arbitrate exists, and it encompasses the dispute at issue in this lawsuit.
27 All of that is uncontested. Plaintiff’s main argument in response to Google’s motion is that
1 relief”—renders the parties’ arbitration agreement unenforceable. The Court disagrees.
2 California courts have interpreted certain California unfair competition and consumer
3 protection statutes to “authorize injunctive relief that is primarily for the benefit of the general
4 public.” Hodges v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 21 F.4th 535, 541 (9th Cir. 2021) (citation
5 omitted); see also Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 (UCL), et seq.; id. § 17500 (FAL), et seq.; Cal.
6 Civ. Code § 1750 (CLRA), et seq. In McGill v. Citibank, N.A., the California Supreme Court
7 reasoned that any contract that purports to waive a party’s right to seek the “the public injunctive
8 relief available under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law” would “seriously
9 compromise the public purposes the statutes were intended to serve.” 2 Cal. 5th 945, 216 Cal.
10 Rptr. 3d 627, 638 393 P.3d 85, 94 (2017). The “McGill rule” is the case’s central holding, which
11 is that an arbitration provision that purports to waive the right to request such public injunctive
12 relief in any forum is invalid and unenforceable under California law. Id.
13 After Google filed its motion to compel arbitration, Plaintiff amended its complaint to add
14 a request for “Forward-Looking Public Injunctive Relief for the General Public as a Whole.”
15 Compare Compl. ¶ 156 (g), (k) (omitting any request for such relief) with FAC ¶ 162 (adding that
16 request). The request essentially asks the Court to enjoin Apple and Google from engaging in the
17 alleged anticompetitive conduct. FAC ¶ 162. Since the Complaint now “clearly seeks public
18 injunctive relief,” Plaintiff contends, “the McGill rule is implicated, and the arbitration agreement
19 should not be enforced.” Reply at 3.
20 But Plaintiff’s novel attempt to invoke the McGill rule fails at the threshold because none
21 of Plaintiff’s claims authorize it to seek public injunctive relief in the first place. “The public
22 injunction is a creature of California law,” and, as interpreted by California courts, it is authorized
23 by certain California unfair competition and consumer protection statutes. Rogers v. Lyft, Inc.,
24 452 F. Supp. 3d 904, 919 (N.D. Cal. 2020). The McGill rule, in turn, is a state law doctrine that
25 protects public injunctions already available under those statutes. See McGill, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
26 638, 393 P.3d at 94 (reasoning that enforcing a contract to waive a party’s right to seek “the public
27 injunctive relief available under the UCL, the CLRA, and the false advertising law” would
1 Nothing in the California Supreme Court’s decision in McGill purports to extend its reach to
2 claims that arise under the law of other jurisdictions.
3 The Amended Complaint, meanwhile, raises no California state law claims. It instead
4 raises two federal antitrust claims pursuant to Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Antitrust Act (15
5 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26). See FAC ¶¶ 1, 44. Plaintiff has not identified a single case where the McGill
6 rule was invoked to protect federal claims, and the Court is aware of none. In short, while the
7 Amended Complaint nominally requests public injunctive relief, it does not premise that request
8 on a California statute that authorizes such relief. The Court accordingly finds no basis in McGill
9 to bar enforcement of the parties’ arbitration agreement. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Football League's
10 Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., No. ML15-2668-PSG-JEMX, 2021 WL 2350814, at *7 (C.D. Cal.
11 Apr. 20, 2021) (finding the McGill rule “irrelevant” where the complaint does not raise CLRA,
12 UCL, or FAL claims); In re Google Digital Advert. Antitrust Litig., No. 20-CV-03556-BLF, 2021
13 WL 2021990, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 2021) (“The Court credits Defendants’ concern that [the
14 plaintiffs] may not seek public injunctive relief under the Sherman Act.”).
15 At oral argument, Plaintiff’s counsel for the first time suggested that he could remedy this
16 issue by (again) amending the Complaint to add a Cartwright Act claim, which he contends would
17 then authorize Plaintiff to seek public injunctive relief. But any such amendment would not
18 change the Court’s conclusion. See Novak v. United States, 795 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2015)
19 (“the general rule that parties are allowed to amend their pleadings does not extend to cases in
20 which any amendment would be an exercise in futility”) (cleaned up). This is primarily because,
21 to the Court’s knowledge, no court has interpreted the Cartwright Act (or any other law other than
22 the UCL, CLRA, and FAL) to authorize the distinct kind of public injunctive relief addressed in
23 McGill.
24 Even if the Cartwright Act could generally be read to authorize public injunctive relief, the
25 specific claims Plaintiff seeks to raise would still not authorize such relief. Both the California
26 Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have made clear that public injunctive relief cannot be
27 sought in pursuit of representative claims or for the benefit of a discrete subset of similarly
1 request for [public injunctive] relief does not constitute the pursuit of representative claims or
2 relief on behalf of others”); Hodges, 21 F.4th at 548 (“[W]e reaffirm that non-waivable ‘public
3 injunctive relief’ within the meaning of the McGill rule refers to prospective injunctive relief that
4 aims to restrain future violations of law for the benefit of the general public as a whole, rather
5 than a discrete subset of similarly situated persons, and that does so without requiring
6 consideration of the individual claims of non-parties.”). Plaintiff’s antitrust claims here, however,
7 seek relief on behalf of itself and other “consumers and businesses who paid Google to place
8 advertising on Google search in the United States since January 1, 2005,” on the ground that those
9 individuals and entities paid inflated prices for advertising services and therefore are entitled to
10 recoup their past losses. FAC ¶ 65. In the Court’s view, these are paradigmatic “representative
11 claims” that would primarily benefit a discrete set of similarly-situated persons—namely,
12 individuals or entities that have paid to advertise on Google’s services. To the extent the public
13 would benefit from these claims, it would be collaterally, not primarily. See Hodges, 21 F.4th at
14 546 (“[T]he existence of an incidental benefit to the general public is not enough to classify that
15 relief as non-waivable public injunctive relief.”) (citations omitted); see also Magana v.
16 DoorDash, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 3d 891, 901 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (concluding that the relief sought was
17 not public injunctive relief because “any benefit to the public would be derivate of and ancillary to
18 the benefit to DoorDash’s employees”). The Court’s conclusion is thus reinforced: Plaintiff
19 cannot evade its plainly valid arbitration agreement by tacking on the label of “public injunctive
20 relief.”
21 In the end, a valid arbitration agreement exists and covers the dispute at issue in this case.
22 The FAA accordingly requires this Court “to compel arbitration in accordance with the terms of
23 the agreement.” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748
24 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Google’s motion is therefore GRANTED. Once an
25 arbitration agreement is found to be valid, enforceable, and applicable, the court shall stay the
26 action pending the outcome of the arbitration or dismiss the action. 9 U.S.C. § 3; Sparkling v.
27 Hoddwan Constr. Co. Inc., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988). Having found that the arbitration
1 Court STAYS Plaintiff’s claims against Google pending the outcome of arbitration.
2 B. Apple’s Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration
3 Having ordered that Plaintiff’s claims against Google be compelled to arbitration, the
4 Court turns to Apple’s request to stay the claims against it pending arbitration. See Dkt. No. 34.
5 This request is denied.
6 Under Section 3 of the FAA, a stay is mandatory as to the parties to the arbitration
7 agreement. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. As to litigants who are not parties to the arbitration agreement,
8 however, the court may stay the litigation as a matter of discretion to await the outcome of the
9 pending arbitration. When exercising its discretionary power to stay, a court must weigh the
10 “competing interests which will be affected by the granting or refusal to grant a stay,” among
11 which are “the possible damage which may result from the granting of a stay, the hardship or
12 inequity which a party may suffer in being required to go forward, and the orderly course of
13 justice measured in terms of the simplifying or complicating of issues, proof, and questions of law
14 which could be expected to result from a stay.” Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1110
15 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting CMAX Inc. v. Hall, 200 F.2d 265, 268 (9th Cir. 1962)). The Ninth Circuit
16 has noted “a preference for proceeding with the non-arbitrable claims when feasible.” See Gray v.
17 SEIU, No. 20-CV-01980-JSW, 2020 WL 12228937, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2020) (citing United
18 Commc'ns Hub, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns, Inc., 46 Fed. Appx. 412, 415 (9th Cir. 2002)). A court
19 should accordingly stay “only when doing so would serve some legitimate interest of the parties or
20 the court.” Id.
21 Apple contends that a stay of the remaining claims against it is warranted here because (i)
22 the potential damage to Plaintiff from such a stay is minimal if not nonexistent; (ii) there is a real
23 risk of inconsistent rulings if both arbitration and litigation were to proceed in parallel; and (iii) a
24 stay would promote the orderly course of justice. Dkt. No. 34 at 2.
25 Neither party has identified concrete prejudice (beyond simple delay) that would result
26 from either staying or declining to stay this case, so the Court’s decision is premised on concerns
27 of efficiency and judicial economy. On those fronts, the Court agrees with Apple that there is a
1 and Google, and the claims arise out of the same underlying facts, both an arbitrator and this Court
2 will have to decide similar questions of law and fact to determine whether Google and Apple
3 conspired in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
4 But in a case like this, that redundancy seems inevitable. A stay is generally “appropriate
5 where the arbitrable claims predominate, or where the outcome of the nonarbitrable claims will
6 depend upon the arbitrator’s decision.” United Commc'ns Hub, 46 Fed. Appx. at 415 (quoting
7 Simitar Entm't, Inc. v. Silva Entm't, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 2d 986, 997 (D. Minn. 1999)). Here,
8 however, Apple does not contend that the arbitrator’s findings of fact or law in Plaintiff’s
9 arbitration against Google would be binding on this Court or otherwise have any impact on the
10 non-arbitrable claims left here.3 Since Plaintiff and Apple will presumably need to eventually
11 litigate the remaining non-arbitrable claims irrespective of whatever happens in the arbitration,
12 proceeding with this lawsuit would not waste judicial resources. To the contrary, staying the non-
13 arbitrable claims would only serve to needlessly delay their resolution. In these circumstances,
14 where one alleged co-conspirator has an enforceable arbitration agreement and the other does not,
15 the possibility that parallel proceedings could produce inconsistent results is simply inevitable.
16 Without more, that risk does not require granting a stay. As such, Apple has not identified how
17 time and effort could be saved by staying the non-arbitrable claims.
18 Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Apple fails to show that a
19 stay would simplify the legal and factual issues in this lawsuit or otherwise promote the orderly
20 course of justice. Apple’s Motion is DENIED.
21 //
22 //
23
24
3 See Glob. Live Events v. Ja-Tail Enterprises, LLC, No. CV 13-8293 SVW, 2014 WL 1830998, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. May 8, 2014) (“Inconsistent verdicts are possible whether the trial precedes the
25
arbitration or vice-versa, and can be avoided only if the second forum gives preclusive effect to
the judgment of the first forum.”); Chen v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 19-6941-MWF (SK), 2020
26
WL 4561658, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020) (“As the arbitration is not binding on the Court, the
arbitrator's decision will not necessarily impact the outcome of the non-arbitrable claims.”);
27
Congdon v. Uber Techs., 226 F. Supp. 3d 983, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (defendant “has not presented
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS Google’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and STAYS Plaintiff's
2
claims against Google pending the outcome of arbitration. Plaintiff and Google are further
3
DIRECTED to file a status report with the Court every 120 days from the date of this order and
4
notify the Court within 48 hours of the completion of arbitration. The Court shall retain
5
jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award and enter judgment, if any, for purposes of
6
enforcement.
7
The Court DENIES Apple’s Motion to Stay Pending Arbitration. As to Defendants’
8
pending motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff and Apple may file a supplemental
9
brief that addresses whether the Amended Complaint states plausible claims against Apple,
10
specifically. Any supplemental brief may not exceed ten pages and is due on August 25, 2022.
11
Neither party may file a reply brief.
12
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 8/12/2022
v 14
4S HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
United States District Judge
16
17
Z 18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28