United States v. Humphries

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4822

DEBBIE HUMPHRIES,

Defendant-Appellant.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of West Virginia, at Charleston.

John T. Copenhaver, Jr., District Judge.

(CR-01-66)

Submitted: February 12, 2002

Decided: April 8, 2002

Before WIDENER, WILKINS, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Matthew A. Victor, VICTOR, VICTOR & HELGOE, L.L.P.,

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kasey Warner, United

States Attorney, Steven I. Loew, Assistant United States Attorney,

Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

2 UNITED STATES v. HUMPHRIES

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Debbie Humphries appeals her jury convictions and seventy-two

month sentence for possession of stolen firearms, in violation of 18

U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924(a)(2) (1994) and possession of firearms by a

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)

(1994). Finding no error, we affirm.

Humphries first contends there was insufficient evidence to support

her jury convictions. This Court reviews a jury verdict for sufficiency

of the evidence by determining whether there is substantial evidence,

when viewed in a light most favorable to the government, to support

the verdict. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). The evi-

dence presented at trial demonstrated Humphries possessed two stolen

firearms. Further, two law enforcement officers recovered five fire-

arms from Humphries’ bedroom and closet. We thus find there was

sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.

Humphries next contends the district court abused its discretion by

denying her motion for a new trial based on inconsistent verdicts.

Even assuming the verdicts were inconsistent, such inconsistency pro-

vides no basis for vacating a verdict or ordering a new trial. See

United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1984); United States v.

Helem, 186 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the district court

did not abuse its discretion.

Humphries next contends the district court erred in enhancing her

sentence for obstruction of justice due to its finding she committed

perjury at trial. See United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 3C1.1 (1998). Humphries also contests the district court’s enhance-

ment pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(1)(C) for possessing nine firearms

because the jury acquitted her of possessing two of them.

The district court did not err in finding Humphries’ perjury at trial

warranted application of a two-level enhancement under § 3C1.1. See

United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 92-98 (1993). Further, it is

well settled that acquittal of an offense does not preclude a sentence

UNITED STATES v. HUMPHRIES 3

enhancement based upon the same conduct. Monge v. California, 524

U.S. 721, 728 (1998) (holding that double jeopardy principles are

inapplicable to sentencing proceedings); United States v. Watts, 519

U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (per curiam) (holding that a jury’s verdict of

acquittal does not prevent the sentencing court from considering con-

duct underlying the acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been

proved by a preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Kinter,

235 F.3d 192, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.

1393 (2001). The district court’s findings were not clearly erroneous

and the enhancement was therefore proper.

Accordingly, we affirm Humphries’ convictions and sentence. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argu-

ment would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED