Opinion

Rhoades v. Greenbriar Corp

  • 24 F. App'x 175
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Dec 26, 2001
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Niemeyer, Williams, Gregory
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.2%

The opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SHARON J. RHOADES, 

Plaintiff,

and

GREENBRIAR CORPORATION; AMERICAN

CARE COMMUNITIES, INCORPORATED,  No. 01-1616

Defendants-Appellants,

v.

FLOYD B. RHOADES,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.

W. Earl Britt, Senior District Judge.

(CA-99-669-5-BR)

Argued: November 1, 2001

Decided: December 26, 2001

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Camden Robert Webb, MAUPIN, TAYLOR & WILLIS,

P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. James T. Johnson,

LEWIS & ROBERTS, P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-

2 GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES

lee. ON BRIEF: M. Keith Kapp, MAUPIN, TAYLOR & WILLIS,

P.A., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellants. James A. Roberts, III,

LEWIS & ROBERTS, P.L.L.C., Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appel-

lee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

In this diversity case, Greenbriar Corp. (Greenbriar) brings claims

of fraud, constructive fraud, unfair trade practices, and indemnifica-

tion against Floyd Rhoades, its former CEO and the former majority

shareholder of American Care Communities, Inc., a North Carolina

corporation (American Care-NC), which was acquired by Greenbriar

in 1996. Greenbriar alleges that Floyd Rhoades breached his fiduciary

duties to American Care-NC and Greenbriar in connection with an

employment agreement which he negotiated with his wife, Sharon

Rhoades, who at the time was a minority shareholder of American

Care-NC. The district court found that Greenbriar was clearly and

fully informed as to the terms of Sharon Rhoades’s employment

agreement and ratified it. Accordingly, the district court granted sum-

mary judgment in favor of Floyd Rhoades. Finding no reversible

error, we affirm.

I.

A.

In 1992, Floyd and Sharon Rhoades married. In 1993, Floyd

Rhoades founded American Care-NC. Floyd Rhoades owned more

than 70% of the company’s stock and served as both president and a

director of the company. Sharon Rhoades owned 10% of the stock of

American Care-NC and was the company’s Vice President for Opera-

GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES 3

tions, as well as a member of the company’s board of directors. Gary

Smith was a shareholder and the only other director of American

Care-NC.

In 1995, the Rhoadeses began experiencing marital difficulties, and

as a result, they separated in February 1996. Between February and

December 1996, they considered divorce, discussed the division of

marital property, and discussed alimony. On December 11, 1996,

Floyd Rhoades, but not Sharon, signed one of several drafts of a Sep-

aration Agreement and Property Settlement, but no final agreement

was reached until November 5, 1997. In the preliminary agreement of

December 11, Floyd Rhoades promised to provide Sharon Rhoades

with an employment contract with American Care-NC.1 Two days

later, Floyd Rhoades, on behalf of American Care-NC, signed an

Employment Agreement with Sharon Rhoades which altered her

duties and which increased her salary from $80,000 to $125,000 for

a period of three years. Under the contract, Sharon Rhoades was to

report only to the President of the company who, until October 1998,

was Floyd Rhoades. Smith was not informed of the employment

agreement, nor was it approved by American Care-NC’s Board of

Directors.

During December of 1996, American Care-NC and Greenbriar

completed the final stages of negotiating a merger of the two compa-

nies. The merger resulted in Greenbriar assuming the obligations of

American Care-NC.2 During the merger negotiations, Greenbriar was

not aware that the Rhoadeses had discussed Sharon Rhoades’s

employment agreement in the context of their divorce settlement. As

the discussion in Part II below demonstrates, however, Greenbriar

was fully informed of all material terms of the Sharon Rhoades

employment agreement prior to the consummation of the merger.

1

The final agreement between the Rhoadeses included a personal guar-

antee of Sharon’s employment agreement by Floyd Rhoades.

2

The merger was accomplished by merging American Care-NC into

wholly-owned Greenbriar subsidiary American Care Communities, Inc.,

a Nevada corporation.

4 GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES

B.

Sharon Rhoades filed her complaint in state court against Green-

briar Corporation and American Care Communities, Inc. and Floyd

Rhoades on August 1, 1999. This case was removed to the district

court based on diversity of citizenship.3 On March 28, 2001, follow-

ing discovery, the district court, in the portion of its order relevant to

this appeal, granted summary judgment for Sharon Rhoades on her

claims against Floyd Rhoades and Greenbriar and dismissed all of

Greenbriar’s crossclaims against Floyd Rhoades. The judgment made

Floyd Rhoades and Greenbriar jointly and severally liable to Sharon

Rhoades for $111,642.44. Greenbriar timely appealed from both the

grant of summary judgment in Sharon Rhoades’s favor and the dis-

missal of its counterclaims against Sharon Rhoades and crossclaims

against Floyd Rhoades. Greenbriar and Sharon Rhoades have settled

their dispute, and Sharon Rhoades has been dismissed as a party to

this appeal.

Greenbriar argues on appeal that Floyd Rhoades’s motive for exe-

cuting the employment agreement with Sharon Rhoades was a desire

to reduce or eliminate alimony payments; that this motive was a mate-

rial fact which was not disclosed to American Care-NC’s board of

directors or to Greenbriar; that the terms of the agreement were not

effectively disclosed to Greenbriar; and that as a result, Floyd

Rhoades did not disclose material facts which he had a fiduciary duty

to disclose regarding the transaction. Consequently, Greenbriar argues

that it has established the predicate for its fraud, constructive fraud,

unfair trade practices, and indemnification claims, and it argues fur-

ther that it cannot be deemed to have ratified the employment agree-

ment.

II.

This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing

all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-

3

Floyd Rhoades is a citizen of California; Sharon Rhoades is a citizen

of North Carolina; Greenbriar Corp. and its American Care Communi-

ties, Inc. subsidiary are Nevada corporations whose principal places of

business are in Texas. The amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES 5

prevailing party. See Providence Square Assoc., L.L.C. v. G.D.F.,

Inc., 211 F.3d 846, 850 (4th Cir. 2000). All evidence of the non-

movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn

in his or her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986).

We have reviewed the record, briefs, and pertinent case law on this

matter, and we have had the benefit of oral argument. Our careful

review persuades us that the district court correctly granted summary

judgment in favor of Floyd Rhoades. See Rhoades v. Greenbriar

Corp., No. 5:99-CV-669-BR(2) (W.D.N.C. March 28, 2001) (J.A. at

535). Greenbriar’s president, James Gilley, testified that during

November of 1996, he agreed with Floyd Rhoades that Sharon would

be given an employment contract and that Floyd Rhoades, who later

became CEO of Greenbriar on December 16, 1996, told him that this

would involve increasing her salary. Gilley also stated that he was

aware prior to the closing of the merger that Floyd and Sharon

Rhoades were separated due to marital difficulties. Ronald Brown,

Greenbriar’s merger attorney, reviewed the Sharon Rhoades employ-

ment agreement prior to the consummation of the merger and for-

warded what he referred to as "Greenbriar’s comments" regarding the

agreement to American Care-NC’s attorney. (J.A. at 154.). American

Care-NC’s attorney returned a copy to Brown showing Brown’s

changes incorporated in blackline. A draft of the agreement was faxed

to Greenbriar’s Chief Financial Officer, Gene Bertcher, as well as to

Brown on December 12, 1996, marked "for your review." (J.A. at

147.). The "merger binder" prepared for the merger between Ameri-

can Care-NC and Greenbriar included a copy of the Sharon Rhoades

employment agreement; the facsimile transmission line on this copy

of the employment agreement suggests it was added to the binder on

December 27. Greenbriar admits having received a copy of the binder

before December 31, 1996. The merger binder was delivered to Floyd

Rhoades as CEO of Greenbriar, as well as to Brown and Bertcher. It

is therefore clear that Greenbriar had adequate notice, verbally and in

writing, of all material facts regarding the employment agreement in

question and thus must be deemed to have ratified American Care-

NC’s obligation to Sharon Rhoades.4 Under North Carolina law,

4

We note that from the time of the merger until February 6, 1999,

Sharon Rhoades continued to work for Greenbriar under the terms of the

6 GREENBRIAR CORP. v. RHOADES

Greenbriar’s constructive fraud, fraud, unfair trade practices, and

indemnification claims fail, as Greenbriar bases each of these claims

on Floyd Rhoades’s alleged nondisclosure of material facts. Accord-

ingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Floyd

Rhoades on the reasoning of the district court.

AFFIRMED

employment agreement. In terminating Rhoades during February of

1999, Greenbriar stated that her termination was "pursuant to" the

employment agreement at issue in this case. (J.A. at 378.) Further,

Greenbriar performed under the contract in question for a period of

approximately two years and continued to perform for several months

following Floyd Rhoades’s departure from Greenbriar.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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