Opinion

In Re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation

Court
District Court, N.D. California
Filed
Oct 23, 2019
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.6%

The opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 MICHELE JONES, et al., Case No. 18-cv-02518-JSW (KAW)

8 Plaintiffs,

ORDER REGARDING JOINT

9 v. DISCOVERY LETTER

10 MICRON TECHNOLOGY INC., et al., Re: Dkt. No. 103

11 Defendants.

12 Case No. 18-cv-3805-JSW (KAW)

IN RE DYNAMIC RANDOM ACCESS

13 MEMORY (DRAM) DIRECT ORDER REGARDING JOINT

PURCHASER ANTITRUST LITIGATION DISCOVERY LETTER

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Re: Dkt. No. 52

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17 The instant cases concern allegations that Defendants conspired to raise market prices for

18 Dynamic Random Access Memory (“DRAM”) products. DRAM is a semiconductor memory

19 device that is used in digital electronics, including mobile phones, personal computers, tablets, and

20 televisions. Plaintiffs represent two groups: direct purchasers (“DP”), who buy DRAM directly

21 from Defendants, and indirect purchasers (“IP”), who buy the products that DRAM has already

22 been incorporated into. The DP complaints have been consolidated into In re Dynamic Random

23 Access (DRAM) Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Case No. 18-cv-3805 (“DP Case”), while

24 the active IP case is Jones v. Micron Technology, Inc., Case No. 18-cv-2518 (“IP Case”).1

25 Pending before the Court are two identical discovery letters, in which Plaintiffs request

26 that the Court: (1) compel Defendants to produce documents provided to any regulatory or

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1 governmental authority since January 1, 2017, specifically a Chinese investigation; and (2) compel

2 the parties to promptly participate in a Rule 26(f) conference, or to produce the documents prior to

3 the Rule 26(f) conference.2

4 I. DISCUSSION

5 A. Production of Documents

6 Rule 26(d) provides that “[a] party may not seek discovery from any source before the

7 parties have conferred as required by Rule 26(f), except . . . when authorized by these rules, by

8 stipulation, or by court order.” In deciding whether to allow early discovery, courts apply a good

9 cause standard. Twitch Interactive, Inc. v. Johnston, Case No. 16-cv-3404-BLF, 2017 U.S. Dist.

10 LEXIS 44863, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2017); Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208

11 F.R.D. 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). “Good cause may be found where the need for expedited

12 discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the

13 responding party.” Semitool, Inc., 208 F.R.D. at 276.

14 The Court finds that Plaintiffs have not established good cause because they have not

15 explained why they require expedited discovery. While Plaintiffs argue that other courts in this

16 district “routinely order the production of antitrust investigation documents pending the filing of

17 consolidated amended complaints,” the fact that other courts permit such production does not

18 establish why Plaintiffs require expedited discovery here. (See Discovery Letters at 2.) Similarly,

19 arguments that the burden to Defendants is minimal does not establish good cause, as Plaintiffs

20 must still establish that their need for expedited discovery outweighs any such burden. (See id. at

21 4.)

22 Moreover, the Court notes that in dismissing the IP Complaint’s Sherman Act claims, the

23 presiding judge specifically did not consider allegations regarding the Chinese investigation,

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2 Plaintiffs also request that the Court reset the date by which Plaintiffs are to file their amended

complaints to forty-five days after the production of the documents. (Discovery Letters at 2.) In

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the referral order, the presiding judge stated that the deadlines for the IP amended complaint and

DP consolidated complaint will be set after the undersigned “rules on the dispute outlined in the

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October 2, 2019 letter (namely, whether to compel production of certain documents or whether to

1 explaining that “[a]llegations concerning past or ongoing investigations are also not particularly

2 helpful to suggest a contemporary conspiracy: the scope of an investigation is not always evident

3 to the public or to the Court, and investigations that do not result in a finding of fact or admission

4 suggest only that a government body believed a circumstance appeared suspicious.” (IP Case,

5 Dkt. No. 98 at 26-27.) Further, “allegations of investigations outside of the United States are fully

6 unpersuasive: foreign laws may prohibit behavior that is lawful under § 1.” (Id. at 27.) While

7 Plaintiffs argue that other courts have permitted early discovery of documents provided to foreign

8 investigatory bodies, Plaintiffs again do not explain why such discovery is warranted in this case.3

9 Thus, for purposes of expedited discovery, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish

10 any need for the requested documents prior to the Rule 26(f) conference.

11 B. Rule 26(f) Conference

12 Rule 26(f)(1) requires that “the parties must confer as soon as practicable--and in any event

13 at least 21 days before a scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under

14 Rule 16(b).” At the Rule 26(f) conference, the parties must make their Rule 26 disclosures and

15 devise a proposed discovery plan, taking into consideration “the nature and basis of their claims

16 and defenses . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(2).

17 Plaintiffs request that Defendants be ordered to participate in a Rule 26(f) conference,

18 arguing that because “the case has been pending for over a year, it is appropriate and efficient for

19 the parties to hold a Rule 26(f) conference now.” (Discovery Letters at 5.) Defendants respond

20 that the current claims and defenses are not clear, as there is no operative complaint in the IP Case,

21 and DP Plaintiffs have been ordered to file a consolidated complaint.

22 The Court finds that a Rule 26(f) conference is premature, particularly when the presiding

23 judge will be setting briefing deadlines “on the expected motions to dismiss in the IP and DP

24 cases.” (IP Case, Dkt. No. 104 at 3.) Thus, even if the general subject matter of the cases is

25 known, the pleadings and scope of the specific claims are not settled, making it premature to make

disclosures and discuss a discovery plan. See Zavala v. Kruse-Western, Inc., 2019 WL 3219254,

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1 at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2019) (denying motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference because

2 “(until the motion to dismiss is resolved, the actual claims and defenses at issue will be unclear’’);

3 Contentguard Holdings, Inc. v. ZTE Corp., Case No. 12cv1226-CAB (MDD), 2013 WL

4 12072533, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2013) (finding no good cause to require a Rule 26(f)

5 conference because “[u]ntil the motion to dismiss is resolved, the actual claims and defenses will

6 || be unclear. It would be inefficient and cause unnecessary expense for the parties to engage in

7 discovery on claims that may not survive and defenses and counterclaims that may not be

8 || asserted”).

9 Il. CONCLUSION

10 For the reasons stated above, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ request for expedited discovery

11 or a Rule 26(f) conference.

q 12 IT IS SO ORDERED.

13. || Dated: October 23, 2019

14 oak A. Hide (ad

315 United States Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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