judge is not “deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done 14 maliciously, or in excess of his authority”
How later courts described this case
- judge is not “deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done 14 maliciously, or in excess of his authority”
- “[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the 6 complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”
- judicial immunity not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 MOHAMMAD HAIDER AGHA HASAN, Case No. 19-cv-04553-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
9 v. MOTION FOR DISCLOSURE OF
FINANCIAL INTERESTS, MOTION
10 JON S. TIGAR, et al., TO RELATE CASES, AND MOTION
FOR PERMISSION FOR
11 Defendants. ELECTRONIC CASE FILING
12 Re: Dkt. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5
13
14 Pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis, motion for
15 disclosure of financial interests, motion to relate cases, and motion for permission for electronic
16 case filing (“e-filing”). Dkt. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5. Plaintiff Mohammad Haider Agha Hasan brings this
17 action against the Honorable Jon S. Tigar and the Honorable Jeffrey S. White of the United States
18 District Court, Northern District of California. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff’s motion to
19 proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and the Court DISMISSES the Complaint with leave to
20 amend. The Court further DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for disclosure of financial interests, motion
21 to relate cases, and motion for permission for e-filing.
22 I. LEGAL STANDARD
23 The Court may authorize the commencement of a civil action in forma pauperis if it is
24 satisfied that the would-be litigants cannot pay the filing fees necessary to pursue the action and
25 that the action is not frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1); Escobedo v. Applebees, 787
26 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the Court review an in
27 forma pauperis complaint before directing the United States Marshal to serve the complaint.
1 upon which relief can be granted. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
2 “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which
3 relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.
5 2012) (citing Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-31 (9th Cir. 2000)). The complaint must
6 include a “short and plain statement,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and “sufficient factual matter,
7 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
8 662, 678 (2009) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must provide the grounds that entitles a plaintiff
9 to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
10 Because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court construes his pleadings liberally and affords him the
11 benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988);
12 cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). The Court is not,
13 however, required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions
14 of fact, or unreasonable inferences. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th
15 Cir. 2001).
16 II. DISCUSSION
17 Even construing the Complaint liberally and affording Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt, the
18 Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not state any cognizable claims. Plaintiff merely
19 alleges, without any factual support, that Judge White and Judge Tigar “injured” Plaintiff, and that
20 Plaintiff “suffered from the injuries inflicted by” Judge White and Judge Tigar. Compl. at 8. He
21 purportedly brings this action under the “United States Constitution,” “United States Code,” and
22 “Common Law.” Id. at 9. These bare, conclusory allegations are clearly insufficient to state a
23 claim for relief, as the Complaint is devoid of even a single allegation as to what Judge White and
24 Judge Tigar purportedly did to “injure” Plaintiff.
25 “Although a pro se litigant . . . may be entitled to great leeway when the court construes his
26 pleadings, those pleadings nonetheless must meet some minimum threshold in providing a
27 defendant with notice of what it is that it allegedly did wrong.” Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 66
1 threshold and accordingly DENIES his request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and
2 DISMISSES his Complaint.
3 While the Court is doubtful that Plaintiff can successfully amend his claims, the Court
4 cannot say at this stage that amending the complaint would be entirely futile. See Lucas v. Dep’t
5 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A] pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the
6 complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”).
7 However, to the extent Plaintiff’s amended complaint rests on allegations of actions taken by
8 Judge White and Judge Tigar in their roles as judicial officers, Plaintiff’s case will be subject to
9 dismissal with prejudice. Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for acts
10 performed in their judicial capacities. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–55 (1967) (judges
11 immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial discretion; immunity
12 extends to suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57
13 (1978) (judge is not “deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done
14 maliciously, or in excess of his authority”) (quotations and citation omitted); Mireles v. Waco, 502
15 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (judicial immunity not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice).
16 Plaintiff’s assertion that he does not have to “explain his legal theory for overcoming a ‘possible’
17 defense of judicial immunity” is clearly contrary to well-established law.
18 Plaintiff also moves for the Court to order “its judicial officer” to provide financial
19 disclosure documents. Dkt. No. 3. The Court lacks authority to grant the requested relief and
20 DENIES the motion. The Court also finds no basis for relating the other pending cases and
21 DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to relate. Dkt. No. 4. The further Court DENIES AS MOOT
22 Plaintiff’s motion for permission for e-filing. Dkt. No. 5.
23 III. CONCLUSION
24 The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and DISMISSES his
25 complaint. See Dkt. No. 2. The Court further DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for disclosure of
26 financial interests, motion to relate cases, and motion for permission for e-filing. See Dkt. Nos. 3,
27 4, 5. Plaintiff shall file any amended complaint by no later than September 30, 2019. Failure to
1 without further leave to amend. In addition, Plaintiff’s amended complaint will be dismissed with
2 || prejudice if it only alleges judicial actions by Judge White and Judge Tigar. Alternatively,
3 || Plaintiff may pay the required filing fee by the September 30, 2019 deadline.
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5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 || Dated: 9/16/2019
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
8 United States District Judge
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