referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ELIJAH LEE JACKSON, No. 2:21-cv-1814-KJM-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY MAIN JAIL,
15 Defendant.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, ECF No.
19 18.
20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
22 §1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that
28 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply,
2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice
4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,
5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity
6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail
7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening
8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
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10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
11 Here, Plaintiff submitted his second amended complaint on a state court form for
12 complaints regarding personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death. See ECF No. 18. In
13 Plaintiff’s submission, Plaintiff names the Sacramento County Jail and Sheriff Scott Jones as the
14 apparent Defendants. See id. Plaintiff’s complaint does not, however, provide any facts regarding
15 the claims. See id.
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17 II. DISCUSSION
18 On November 15, 2022, the Court issued an order screening Plaintiff’s original
19 complaint. See ECF No. 14. The Court determined that Plaintiff’s complaint failed to contain
20 sufficient allegations to sustain an action against a municipal entity. Plaintiff was provided an
21 opportunity to file a first amended complaint alleging specific terms how each named Defendant
22 is involved, setting forth an affirmative link or connection between each Defendant’s actions and
23 the claimed deprivation.
24 Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint on November 28, 2022. The Court issued
25 an order screening Plaintiff’s first amended complaint. See ECF No. 16. The Court concluded that
26 Plaintiff’s first amended complaint suffered several defects. See id. at 3. First, Plaintiff did not
27 allege a municipal policy or custom that the Court could conclude a municipal entity liable. See
28 id. Second, Plaintiff failed to allege a causal link between the unnamed Chaplain and a
1 constitutional violation. See id. Lastly, Plaintiff’s claim regarding a denial of free exercise of
2 religion failed because the institution had a legitimate penological interest in not allowing inmates
3 to possess materials which advocate violence. See id.
4 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint again suffers several defects, discussed in
5 more detail below. First, Plaintiff has failed to provide a short and plain statement of the claim
6 showing Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Second, Plaintiff has not alleged a municipal policy or
7 custom such that the Court can conclude the Jail, a municipal entity, can be held liable. Third,
8 while Plaintiff asserts claims against the Sheriff Scott Jones, Plaintiff has not alleged a causal link
9 between a named individual and a constitutional violation.
10 A. Municipal Liability of the Jail
11 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to
12 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
13 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at
14 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local
15 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials
16 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
17 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of
18 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the
19 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or
20 custom of the municipality. See id.
21 In this instance, Plaintiff names a county institution, the Sacramento County Jail,
22 as a defendant. Plaintiff has not, however, alleged any official policy or custom as the basis for
23 any alleged violation of his civil rights.
24 B. Causal Link to Sheriff Scott Jones
25 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
26 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
27 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
28 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
1 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
2 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
3 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
4 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
5 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
6 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
7 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
8 Here, Plaintiff names Sheriff Scott Jones as a defendant, however the amended
9 complaint fails to provide any facts showing Defendant Jones acts caused the alleged deprivation.
10 As such, Plaintiff has not established a causal link between an individual and a constitutional
11 violation.
12 C. Failure to State a Claim
13 A complaint must contain more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
14 cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the
15 speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007). The complaint
16 must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570.
17 “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a
18 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
19 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The mere possibility of misconduct will not suffice
20 to meet this standard. See id. at 679.
21 “The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the
22 inartful pleading of pro se litigants. It is settled that the allegations of [a pro se litigant’s
23 complaint] however inartfully pleaded are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
24 drafted by lawyers.” See Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and
25 internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in original). The rule, however, “applies only to a
26 plaintiff’s factual allegations.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). ‘“[A]
27 liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim
28 that were not initially pled.”’ See Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th
1 || Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
2 Here, Plaintiff filed a complaint on a state court standard form identifying
3 || Sacramento County Jail and Sheriff Scott Jones as defendants. Plaintiff seeks $66.6 million in
4 || damages based on his claim of spiritual damages. Plaintiffs claim does not contain enough facts
5 || to state a claim for relief.
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7 Il. CONCLUSION
8 In light of the Court’s previous orders, the Court recommended that Plaintiff be
9 || granted one final leave to remedy the defects in the pleading before the court. Absent correction
10 || of the deficiencies identified herein, no further leave to amend should be permitted, and the entire
11 || action should then be subject to dismissal. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th
12 || Cir. 2000) (en banc).
13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States
14 || District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14
15 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
16 || objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of
17 || objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See
18 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
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20 || Dated: May 13, 2024 Co
21 DENNIS M. COTA
02 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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