concluding that § 7 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which 8 includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor
How later courts described this case
- concluding that § 7 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which 8 includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JORGE AGUILAR SANTOYO, No. 2:23-CV-2481-TLN-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 TATUM, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
18 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint. See ECF No. 1.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by litigants who, as here, have
20 been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Under this
21 screening provision, the Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(A), (B).
24 Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), this Court must dismiss an
25 action if the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3),
26 the Court will also consider as a threshold matter whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction.
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1 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
2 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Tatum, a California Highway
3 Patrol (CHP) officer; (2) J. Pebbles, a CJHP officer; (3) Jennifer Dupre, a Sutter County Assistant
4 District Attorney; and (4) Sukhdeed Singh Gosal, a Sutter County Assistant District Attorney.
5 See ECF No. 1, pgs. 1, 2.
6 Plaintiff alleges that “officers” claimed he was making statements which made no
7 sense. Id. at 3. According to Plaintiff, he was sitting in a non-operable vehicle that was out of
8 gas and had been on the side of the road for hours. See id. Plaintiff claims the vehicle had been
9 left by the side of the road by someone else. See id. Plaintiff states that he was arrested for
10 driving under the influence even though there is no DNA evidence, and his blood-alcohol level
11 was “0.00.” Id. The vehicle was also impounded. See id.
12 It appears Plaintiff’s DUI arrest involved use of methamphetamine and possession
13 of paraphernalia. Specially, Plaintiff includes the words “influence,” “meth,” “foil,” and
14 “vehicle,” for which Plaintiff provides his own definition. Id. Plaintiff defines “influence” as
15 meaning “visitation.” Id. He defines “meth” as “foreknowledge.” Id. He defines “vehicle” as
16 “human body.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff defines “foil” as meaning “thwart.” Id.
17 Plaintiff states he “remains in jail” without any DNA evidence to prove he was
18 operating the vehicle. Id. Plaintiff seeks damages for emotional distress, lost earnings, distress to
19 his family, and compensation for towing and impound fees. See id.
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21 II. DISCUSSION
22 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint suffers from two fundamental defects, as
23 explained in more detail below. First, it appears that Plaintiff’s claims against all defendants may
24 be Heck-barred because they relate to a criminal conviction. Second, even if Plaintiff’s claims
25 are not barred as against all defendants, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to link any of the named
26 defendants to a violation of Plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional rights.
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1 A. Heck Bar
2 As a general rule, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory
3 relief alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the an
4 underlying conviction or sentence, such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the
5 conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by habeas petition, or through some
6 similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483-84 (1994) (concluding that §
7 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to malicious prosecution action which
8 includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding was concluded in plaintiff’s favor).
9 In this case, it is not clear whether the Heck bar applies. While Plaintiff refers to
10 an arrest for DUI, and while Plaintiff clearly appears to take issue with that charge, it is not clear
11 whether Plaintiff has been convicted. If Plaintiff has been convicted and that conviction has not
12 been set aside or otherwise been invalidated, then the case is barred. If, however, Plaintiff has not
13 been convicted, his claims may be able to proceed subject to curing the defect discussed below.
14 Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to file a first amended complaint to state additional facts
15 relating to his DUI arrest, specifically whether he has been convicted and the status of any
16 challenges to that conviction.
17 B. Causal Link
18 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
19 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
20 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
21 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
22 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
23 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
24 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
25 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
26 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
27 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
28 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
1 Here, Plaintiff’s factual allegations make no reference to any of the named
2 defendants. While Plaintiff refers to “officers,” he does not specify which of the two named
3 officers, if either, were involved or how. Plaintiff’s complaint makes no reference to conduct by
4 either of the named Assistant District Attorneys. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to
5 amend to allege, in addition to facts relating to his DUI arrest and any resulting conviction,
6 further facts concerning the individual involvement of the four named defendants.
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8 III. CONCLUSION
9 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
10 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
11 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
12 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
13 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
14 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
15 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
16 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
17 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
18 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
19 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
20 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
21 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
22 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
23 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
24 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
25 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
26 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
27 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
28 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
1 | See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
3 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
4 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
5 || service of this order.
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7 || Dated: January 31, 2024 Svc
8 DENNIS M. COTA
9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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