(PC) Maestas v. Belt

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 RANDY MAESTAS, Case No. 1:23-cv-00418-HBK (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER TO ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO

DISMISS CASE1

14 TIMOTHY BELT,

(Doc. No. 20)

15 Defendant.

14-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD

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Pending before the Court for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A is the first amended pro

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se civil rights complaint filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Randy Maestas—a state prisoner. (Doc.

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No. 20, “FAC”). Upon review, the undersigned finds the FAC fails to state any cognizable

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federal claim and recommends the district court dismiss this case for failure to state a claim.

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BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY OF OPERATIVE COMPLAINT

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Plaintiff initiated this action on March 21, 2023 by filing a prisoner civil rights complaint

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under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 17, 2023, the undersigned directed the Clerk of Court to strike

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the Complaint because it was illegible and ordered Plaintiff to refile his Complaint. (Doc. No.

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10). On June 8, 2023, Plaintiff refiled his Complaint. (Doc. No. 11). On July 14, 2023, the

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1 This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302

28 (E.D. Cal. 2022).

1 undersigned screened the Complaint and found that it failed to state any cognizable constitutional

2 claim. (See Doc. No. 16). The undersigned afforded Plaintiff the option to either (1) file an

3 amended complaint; (2) stand on his Complaint subject to the undersigned recommending the

4 District Court dismiss the complaint; or (3) voluntarily dismiss the case. (Id. at 6-7). On July 26,

5 2023, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 18). Plaintiff failed to sign it and

6 the undersigned directed the Clerk of Court to strike it. (Doc. No. 19). Plaintiff then refiled a

7 signed First Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 20, “FAC”).

8 The FAC does not state where the events giving rise to the FAC occurred, but the Court

9 infers they took place at California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility (“SATF”), since three of

10 the named Defendants in the FAC are employed at SATF. (See id. at 2-3). The FAC names as

11 Defendants (1) Timothy Belt; (2) Samantha Solorio; (3) Brittany Mendoza; and (4) Office of

12 Appeals Department. (Id.). The following facts are presumed true at this stage of the screening

13 process.

14 Although not the model of clarity, the FAC appears to allege that Defendant Belt used

15 excessive force against Plaintiff on an unspecified date. (Id. at 5). It alleges that Defendants

16 Solorio and Mendoza denied Plaintiff medical care and intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s

17 legal mail. (Id. at 5-6). It alleges that the Appeals Department “defend[ed] real bad cops.” (Id.).

18 The FAC also appears to allege that Defendant Solorio sexually harassed Plaintiff after he asked

19 for a roll of toilet paper and claims she engages in romantic encounters at work with a fellow

20 CDCR employee. (Id. at 6). The FAC states that “Solorio and her boyfriend prison sgt put me in

21 the hole.” (Id.).

22 As relief, Plaintiff seeks $10 million from each of the three individual Defendants. (Id. at

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24 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS

25 A. Section 1915A Screening

26 Because Plaintiff commenced this action while he was incarcerated, he is subject to the

27 Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), that requires, inter alia, that the court screen a complaint

28 that seeks relief against a governmental entity, its officers, or its employees under 28 U.S.C. §

1 1915A before directing service upon any defendant. This requires the court to identify any

2 cognizable claims and dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, that

3 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a

4 defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1), (2); see also 28

5 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) (governing actions proceeding in forma pauperis).

6 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

7 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

8 Cir. 1984). Claims are frivolous where they are based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or

9 where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim fails to state

10 a claim upon which relief may be granted if it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

11 in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,

12 73 (1984); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log Owners Ass’n, Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir.

13 1981). Examples of immunity that would preclude relief during screening, include, but are not

14 limited to, quasi-judicial immunity, sovereign immunity, or qualified immunity. Additionally, a

15 prisoner plaintiff may not recover monetary damages absent a showing of physical injury. See 42

16 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). In other words, to recover monetary damages, a plaintiff must allege physical

17 injury that need not be significant but must be more than de minimis, except when involving First

18 Amendment claims. Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 626-28 (9th Cir. 2002) (surveying other

19 circuit courts for the first time to address injury requirement for monetary damages, and agreeing

20 with the Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits on PLRA’s injury requirement).

21 At the screening stage, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true,

22 Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Tr., 425 U.S. 738, 740 (1976), construes the complaint in the light

23 most favorable to the plaintiff and resolves all doubts in the plaintiff’s favor. Jenkins v.

24 McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969); Bernhardt v. L.A. County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir.

25 2003). A court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual

26 allegations.” United States ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n. 2 (9th Cir.1986). Nor

27 does the court accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted

28 deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). Critical

1 to evaluating a constitutional claim is whether it has an arguable legal and factual basis. See

2 Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

3 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require only that the complaint contain “a short and plain

4 statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

5 Nonetheless, a claim must be facially plausible to survive screening, which requires sufficient

6 factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the

7 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Moss v. U.S. Secret Service,

8 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not

9 sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard.

10 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969. Although detailed factual allegations are not

11 required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

12 statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted), and courts “are not required

13 to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.

14 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, it is inappropriate for the court to

15 assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have

16 violated the ... laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal.,

17 Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723

18 (1983).

19 If an otherwise deficient pleading could be cured by the allegation of other facts, the pro

20 se litigant is entitled to an opportunity to amend their complaint before dismissal of the action.

21 See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127-29 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Lucas v. Department of

22 Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995). However, it is not the role of the Court to advise a pro se

23 litigant on how to cure the defects. Such advice “would undermine district judges’ role as

24 impartial decisionmakers.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004); see also Lopez, 203 F.3d at

25 1131 n.13.

26 B. Rule 8

27 Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that “[e]ach allegation must be

28 simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). When the factual elements of a cause of

1 action are not organized into a short and plain statement for each particular claim, a dismissal for

2 failure to satisfy Rule 8(a) is appropriate. Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640

3 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Nevijel, 651 F.2d at 674. As noted above, in order to survive screening,

4 the operative pleading must contain sufficient factual detail to allow the court to reasonably infer

5 that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although

6 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

7 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.

8 Here, Plaintiff’s FAC fails to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8. It consists

9 almost exclusively of conclusory allegations against the three named Defendants without alleging

10 any facts. While Plaintiff is entitled to a liberal interpretation of his FAC, the Court cannot

11 supply the essential elements of a claim that are not pled. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266,

12 268 (9th Cir. 1982). For example, the FAC simply states “Belt – unnecessary excessive force –

13 video” but does not allege any facts to support the claim that Defendant Belt used excessive force.

14 (Id. at 5). Similarly, the FAC alleges Defendants Solorio and Mendoza engaged in mail

15 tampering but does not allege any facts to support this claim. (See id.). The FAC alleges that the

16 Appeals Department “defend[s] bad cops” but does not allege any facts articulating how the

17 Appeals Department violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. (Id. at 5). There are no facts

18 substantiating Plaintiff’s conclusory claim that Defendants Solorio and Mendoza denied him

19 medical care. (Id. at 6).

20 In addition to lacking essential factual allegations, the FAC fails to comply with Rule 8

21 because it does not allege when any of the Defendants’ alleged acts of wrongdoing took place.

22 See Valenzuela v. Monson, 2020 WL 1812043, at *2 (D. Ariz. Apr. 8, 2020); Fisher v.

23 Washington State Department of Corrections, 2019 WL 1745086, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 18,

24 2019) (the complaint violated Rule 8 because, among other reasons, it did not provide a specific

25 date and therefore it did not “provide the defendants fair notice of what the claim is . . .”); Walker

26 v. Muniz, 2019 WL 2359229, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 4, 2019) (referencing Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

27 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) when explaining the specific date must be alleged to meet the

28 requirement of giving defendants fair notice); McIntosh v. City of L.A., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

1 53641, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2005) (citing McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir.

2 1996)).

3 C. Related Claims and Joinder

4 The Rules permit a complaint to include all related claims against a party and permit

5 joinder of all defendants alleged to be liable for the “same transaction, occurrence, or series of

6 transactions or occurrences” where “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will

7 arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a) and 20(a)(2) (emphasis added). But the Rules do not

8 permit conglomeration of unrelated claims against unrelated defendants in a single lawsuit.

9 Unrelated claims must be filed in separate lawsuits.

10 The controlling principle appears in Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a): ‘A party

asserting a claim to relief as an original claim, counterclaim, cross-

11 claim, or third-party claim, may join, either as independent or as

alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as

12 the party has against an opposing party.’ Thus multiple claims

against a single party are fine, but Claim A against Defendant 1

13 should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.

Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different

14 suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim,

multiple defendant] suit produce[s], but also to ensure that prisoners

15 pay the required filing fees-for the Prison Litigation Reform Act

limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner

16 may file without prepayment of the required fees. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g).

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18 K’napp v. California Dept. of Corrections, 2013 WL 5817765, at *2 (E.D. Cal., Oct. 29,

19 2013), aff’d sub nom. K’napp v. California Dept. of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 599 Fed.

20 Appx. 791 (9th Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607

21 (7th Cir. 2007).

22 Here, Plaintiff alleges claims based on seemingly unrelated incidents involving different

23 individuals—excessive use of force by Defendant Belt, interference with legal mail and denial of

24 medical care by Defendant Mendoza and Solorio, sexual harassment by Defendant Solorio, and

25 denial of an unspecified appeal by the Appeals Department. (See generally Doc. No. 20). There

26 are no facts alleged demonstrating that these incidents arise out of the same transaction,

27 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences. Accordingly, the attempted claims are

28 misjoined and may not proceed in the same action. Moreover, as set forth in this Order, none of

1 the causes of actions states a cognizable federal claim.

2 D. Sexual Harassment

3 The only cause of action for which the FAC pleads facts with some specificity is his

4 construed claim of sexual harassment against Defendant Solorio. Like the other claims, however,

5 the FAC lacks any dates regarding the offending conduct and thus this claim fails to comply with

6 Rule 8. Moreover, as set forth below, the claim does not set forth conduct that rises to the level of

7 a constitutional violation.

8 Sexual harassment by a prison guard can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. In

9 Berry v. Oswalt, a female prisoner alleged that a male guard “had attempted to perform

10 nonroutine patdowns on her, had propositioned her for sex, had intruded upon her while she was

11 not fully dressed, and had subjected her to sexual comments.” 143 F.3d 1127, 1131 (8th Cir.

12 1998). A jury found for the prisoner and the guard challenged the verdict on appeal arguing that

13 the prisoner could not establish the objective element necessary for an Eighth Amendment

14 violation. Id. The Eighth Circuit upheld the verdict, stating that it was “within the jury’s

15 discretion to find that [the guard’s] alleged harassing behavior was ‘harmful enough,’ to be a

16 violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 1133.

17 In Watson v. Jones, two male inmates alleged that a female correctional officer routinely

18 “fondled them during pat-down searches” in a two-month period. 980 F.2d 1165, 1165 (8th Cir.

19 1992). The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the

20 correctional officer and concluded that the allegations could state a constitutional claim. Id.

21 In Calhoun v. DeTella, prison guards “purposefully demeaned and sexually harassed [the

22 plaintiff-prisoner] while strip searching him in front of female officers.” 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th

23 Cir.2003). The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim but the Eighth

24 Circuit reversed concluding that the strip search was conducted “in a manner designed to demean

25 and humiliate” the inmate and, thus, sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim. Id. at 940.

26 These decisions and others comport with the view that, at its core, the Eighth Amendment

27 protects “the basic concept of human dignity” and forbids conduct that is “so totally without

28 penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia,

1 428 U.S. 153, 182–83 (1976).

2 Here, the FAC alleges that Defendant Solorio harassed Plaintiff by refusing his request for

3 a roll of toilet paper; by flirting with him in unspecified ways, and by allegedly carrying on an

4 affair with another correctional officer in the prison. (Doc. No. 20 at 6). Unlike the plaintiffs in

5 the cases cited above, the FAC does not allege Defendant Solorio touched Plaintiff improperly,

6 subjected him to repeated, unwanted sexual advances, or subjected him to other degrading

7 conduct. Accordingly, the FAC fails to state an Eighth Amendment sexual harassment claim

8 against Defendant Solorio.

9 CONCLUSION

10 For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s FAC fails to state

11 any cognizable federal claim against any Defendant. The undersigned finds further leave to

12 amend this claim is not warranted because Plaintiff was previously advised of the pleading

13 requirements of Rule 8 and Plaintiff nevertheless fails to allege any plausible claim. Ferdik v.

14 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting discretion to deny leave to amend is

15 particularly broad where court has afforded plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his

16 complaint); see also Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (A district court can

17 deny leave “where the amendment would be futile . . . or where the amended complaint would be

18 subject to dismissal”). Rather than addressing the deficiencies in his original Complaint, Plaintiff

19 now alleges several additional, unrelated claims supported only by conclusory assertions. The

20 undersigned therefore concludes that further amendment would be futile and therefore

21 recommends Plaintiff’s case be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

22 Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

23 The Clerk of Court is directed to assign a district judge to this case.

24 It is further RECOMMENDED:

25 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 20) be dismissed for failure to state a

26 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b)(1).

27 NOTICE TO PARTIES

28 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge

1 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen (14)

2 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, a party may file written

3 | objections with the court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

4 | Findings and Recommendations.” Parties are advised that failure to file objections within the

5 | specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834,

6 | 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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Dated: _ October 31,2023 Wiha Th fares Hack

9 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

10 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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