referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
- holding that there is no 18 respondeat superior liability under § 1983
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 RAGHVENDRA SINGH, also known as No. 2:23-CV-0056-DMC-P
Raj Singh,
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Plaintiff,
13 ORDER
v.
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SACRAMENTO COUNTY, et al.,
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Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
19 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.
20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See
27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that
28 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply,
2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to
3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice
4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121,
5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity
6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail
7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening
8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
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10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
11 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Sacramento County; and (2) Scott
12 Jones, the Sacramento County Sheriff. See ECF No. 1. In his one-page complaint, Plaintiff
13 alleges as follows:
14 On October 14, 2022, Raj Singh, AKA Raghvendra Singh
(“Singh”) was released from Sacramento County Jail. But, Singh was not
15 provided any medicines, medically needed help, Gate fees, housing, and
other financial benefits resulting in Misuse and loss of health dramatically.
16 Singh serve all his time. But, Singh was forced to serve probation for 3
years. The laws require probation at the most 2 years of probation (see
17 AB 1950) only if the accused is sentenced to probation. Defendants had
and have duty to provide stated services but refused to provide such
18 services. Defendants refused to send Singh to his home in Nevada.
Under the leadership of defendants, the County jails adopted stated
19 grossly illegal and unconstitutional practices, customs, and policies which
are contrary to the public policies also. So, please allow this action to
20 restore the public trust and public faith also. Singh does not know the
names of other defendants.
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ECF No. 1 (errors in original).
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23 Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney’s fees and
24 costs, and other relief as deemed appropriate by the Court. See id.
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1 II. DISCUSSION
2 As currently pleaded, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
3 can be granted because he does not allege facts to link any of the named defendants, including
4 Sacramento County, to a claimed constitutional violation.
5 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
6 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
7 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
8 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
9 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
10 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
11 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
12 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
13 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
14 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
15 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
16 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
17 employees. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that there is no
18 respondeat superior liability under § 1983). A supervisor is only liable for the constitutional
19 violations of subordinates if the supervisor participated in or directed the violations. See id. The
20 Supreme Court has rejected the notion that a supervisory defendant can be liable based on
21 knowledge and acquiescence in a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct because government
22 officials, regardless of their title, can only be held liable under § 1983 for his or her own conduct
23 and not the conduct of others. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). Supervisory
24 personnel who implement a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of
25 constitutional rights and the moving force behind a constitutional violation may, however, be
26 liable even where such personnel do not overtly participate in the offensive act. See Redman v.
27 Cnty of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
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1 When a defendant holds a supervisory position, such as the Sacramento County
2 Sheriff Scott Jones named in this action, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed
3 constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th
4 Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory
5 allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not
6 sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “[A] plaintiff must
7 plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has
8 violated the constitution.” Iqbal, 662 U.S. at 676.
9 Municipalities and other local government units, such as Defendant Sacramento
10 County, are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
11 Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and municipal government officials are also
12 “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885
13 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, however, may not be held responsible
14 for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of
15 County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the
16 actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert
17 municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation
18 complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the municipality. See id.
19 Plaintiff will be provided leave to amend consistent with the standards outlined
20 above.
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22 III. CONCLUSION
23 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
24 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
25 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
26 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
27 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
28 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
1 | complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
2 || Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
3 | Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
4 || complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
5 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
6 || conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. See
7 || Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
8 || each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
9 || between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
10 | 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
11 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
12 || time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
13 || 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
14 | with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
15 || See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
16 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
17 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
18 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
19 || service of this order.
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21 || Dated: August 15, 2023 Co
22 DENNIS M. COTA
3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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