officials may “still be on notice that their conduct violates established law 26 even in novel factual circumstances”
How later courts described this case
- officials may “still be on notice that their conduct violates established law 26 even in novel factual circumstances”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
----oo0oo----
11
12
DEBORAH STAMPFLI, an individual, No. 2:20-cv-01566 WBS DMC
13
Plaintiff,
14
v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:
15 DEFENDANT STEVE J. STUMP’S
SUSANVILLE SANITARY DISTRICT, a MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
16 political subdivision of the
State of California; STEVE J.
17 STUMP, in his individual and
official capacities; JOHN
18 MURRAY, in his individual and
official capacities; ERNIE
19 PETERS, in his individual and
official capacities; DAVID
20 FRENCH, in his individual and
official capacities; KIM ERB, in
21 his individual and official
capacities; MARTY HEATH, in his
22 individual and official
capacities; DOES I-V, inclusive;
23 BLACK & WHITE CORPORATIONS I-V;
and ABLE & BAKER COMPANIES,
24 inclusive,
25 Defendants.
26
27 ----oo0oo----
28 Plaintiff Deborah Stampfli brought this action
1 containing numerous claims against the Susanville Sanitary
2
District (“District”), Steve J. Stump, John Murray, Ernie Peters,
3
David French, Kim Erb, Marty Heath, Black & White Corporations I-
4
V, Able and Baker Companies, and Does 1-5 inclusive.
5
The court previously issued three orders on separate
6
motions to dismiss, dismissing most of plaintiff’s claims. (See
7
Docket Nos. 34, 48, 66.) All that remains are plaintiff’s fifth
8
claim, alleging deprivation of procedural due process under the
9
Fourteenth Amendment by Steve J. Stump, and seventh claim,
10
alleging failure to produce public records by the District, from
11
the Third Amended Complaint. (See Third Am. Compl. ¶¶ 333-34,
12
365-68; Order on Mot. to Dismiss Third. Am. Compl. (Docket No.
13
66) at 18-19.) Defendant Steve J. Stump now moves for summary
14
judgment on plaintiff’s fifth claim on the sole ground of
15
qualified immunity. (Def. Steve J. Stump’s Mot. for Summ. J.
16
(“Mot.”) (Docket No. 72).) Plaintiff opposes the motion and
17
cross-moves for partial summary judgment establishing that
18
plaintiff was not an at-will employee. (Pl.’s Suppl. Opp’n
19
(Docket No. 102).)1
20
I. Facts
21
The District hired plaintiff as Treasurer in 2005.
22
(Decl. of Susan Stampfli (“Stampfli Decl.”) (Docket No. 81-3) ¶
23
18.) At the time of her hiring, plaintiff became a member of
24
Operating Engineers Local Union No. 3. (Id. ¶ 18.) Agreements
25
between the union and the District established a number of
26
27 1 Contrary to defendant’s argument, plaintiff complied
with the timing requirements for filing a cross-motion under the
28 Local Rules. See L.R. 230(e).
1 protections for union members, including the right to continued
2
employment and termination only for good cause and after the
3
satisfaction of procedural requirements. (Decl. of Art Frolli
4
(Docket No. 102-7) ¶¶ 2-3.) From 2005 to 2013, plaintiff
5
performed her assigned duties and a host of additional duties
6
typically performed by supervisory personnel, and consistently
7
received high performance evaluations. (See Stampfli Decl. ¶ 19;
8
Decl. of Randy O’Hern (“O’Hern Decl.”) (Docket No. 102-4) ¶ 5.)
9
By October 2013, plaintiff was performing many
10
management and administrative functions but, because she was a
11
union member, she could not participate in confidential meetings
12
of the District’s Board of Directors (“the Board”). (Stampfli
13
Decl. ¶ 19.) Her inability to participate in these meetings was
14
inconvenient because the Board frequently had to stop meetings or
15
delay them to obtain information possessed only by plaintiff.
16
(Id.) Because of these difficulties, the Board proposed the
17
creation of a new management level position, entitled “Office
18
Administrator,” which would allow plaintiff to participate in
19
confidential board meetings but would require her to relinquish
20
her union membership. (Id. ¶ 21.)
21
When plaintiff was offered this new position, she
22
declined it because she did not wish to lose the job security
23
offered by her union affiliation. (Id. ¶ 22.) In response to
24
her concerns, plaintiff was advised by the General Manager and
25
the District’s General Counsel that although she could not remain
26
a union member, plaintiff would not become an at-will employee
27
and would be afforded all the job security rights and benefits
28
1 available to union members. (Id. ¶ 24; Decl. of Jaimee Jones
2
(“Jones Decl.”) (Docket No. 102-2) ¶ 6.) Plaintiff was promised
3
that her employment with the District would only be terminated
4
for cause and in accordance with established Skelly procedures.2
5
(See Stampfli Decl. ¶ 24; Jones Decl. ¶ 6.) Based on these
6
representations, plaintiff relinquished her position as Treasurer
7
and accepted the new position of Office Administrator. (Stampfli
8
Decl. ¶ 25.)
9
During 2017, plaintiff performed many duties typically
10
performed by the General Manager, a position held at that time by
11
Randy O’Hern. (Id. ¶ 30.) In October 2017, General Manager
12
O’Hern recommended to the Board that plaintiff be provided a 20%
13
salary increase to account for the additional duties she
14
performed and that she receive the additional title of Assistant
15
General Manager. (Id. ¶ 34; O’Hern Decl. ¶ 14.) O’Hern
16
presented his proposal for the title change and salary increase
17
to the Board at a board meeting on October 10, 2017. (O’Hern
18
Decl. ¶ 17.) During the meeting, O’Hern described plaintiff as
19
an “at-will” employee and explained that in the new proposed
20
position, she would “serve at the pleasure of the Board and the
21
new hire.” (Id. ¶ 19.) The official meeting minutes, which were
22
signed by plaintiff, memorialize O’Hern’s comment that plaintiff
23
was “at will.” (Minutes of Adjourned Regular Meeting of the Bd.
24
25
2 “Skelly procedures” refers to the case Skelly v. State
Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194 (1975). In Skelly, the California
26
Supreme Court held that an employer cannot take away a permanent
27 public employee’s property rights (i.e., their vested right to
continued employment) without certain procedural safeguards. See
28 id. at 215.
1 of Directors, Oct. 10, 2017 (“Oct. 10, 2017 Minutes”) (Docket No.
2
81-6) at 139-2-483.) Following a discussion of the proposal,
3
the Board approved a motion to “change [plaintiff’s] title to
4
include Assistant General Manager with a 20% salary increase
5
effective October 1, 2017.” (Id. at 140-1-117.)
6
Plaintiff knew that there might come a time when the
7
new General Manager no longer needed her assistance in performing
8
the duties and functions of General Manager, and states that she
9
was led to believe that if this change occurred, she would be
10
relieved of any additional Assistant General Manager duties, but
11
would continue to perform all the functions she previously
12
performed as Office Administrator. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 39.)
13
Plaintiff states that she was never told that her position as
14
Office Administrator had been converted to a position terminable
15
at will or that she could summarily be deprived of her permanent
16
position as Office Administrator. (Id.)
17
In March 2018, the District hired defendant Steve Stump
18
to the position of probationary General Manager. (Decl. of Steve
19
Stump (“Stump Decl.”) (Docket No. 72-2) ¶ 1.) Plaintiff contends
20
that following the completion of defendant Stump’s probationary
21
period, he became increasingly hesitant to work in conjunction
22
with her. (Stampfli Decl. ¶ 46.)
23
In April 2019, defendant Stump wanted plaintiff to
24
shift funds from various accounts to allow for the purchase of a
25
portable generator. (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.) Given plaintiff’s
26
instructions from several board members regarding the financial
27
affairs of the District, she requested that defendant Stump delay
28
1 this purchase until after a new budget for 2020 was created or
2
seek approval from the Board for the purchase. (Id. ¶ 50.) On
3
or about January 8, 2020, defendant Stump directed plaintiff to
4
have financial computer programs placed on his office computer.
5
(Id. ¶ 54.) Plaintiff told defendant Stump that she wished to
6
meet with certain board members to determine whether it was
7
necessary for the programs to be placed on his computer. (Id. ¶¶
8
55-56.)
9
On January 9, 2020, defendant Stump placed plaintiff on
10
unpaid administrative leave. (Stump Decl. ¶ 5.) On January 13,
11
2020, defendant Stump sent plaintiff a text message offering to
12
allow plaintiff to return to work if she promised not to be
13
insubordinate to him. (Id. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff did not respond to
14
the text message. (Id.) On January 14, 2020, defendant Stump
15
informed plaintiff that her administrative leave would be paid,
16
but not the reason she was placed on leave. (Stampfli Decl. ¶
17
59.) On March 6, 2020, defendant Stump sent plaintiff a letter
18
releasing her from her “at-will” employment as Office
19
Administrator/Assistant General Manager. (Stump Decl ¶ 12.)
20
Plaintiff was never afforded an appeal process or other
21
procedural safeguards. (See Stampfli Decl. ¶¶ 60-62; Stump Decl.
22
¶¶ 12-13.)
23
II. Legal Standard
24
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that
25
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
26
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
27
P. 56(a). A party may move for summary judgment either for one
28
1 or more claims or defenses, or for portions thereof. Id. Where
2
a court grants summary judgment only as to a portion of a claim
3
or defense, it “may enter an order stating any material fact . .
4
. that is not genuinely in dispute and treating the fact as
5
established in the case.” Id. at 56(g).
6
III. Discussion
7
Defendant moves for summary judgment solely on the
8
basis that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff
9
argues that defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity and
10
cross-moves for partial summary judgment establishing that she
11
was not an at-will employee. The court will first address
12
plaintiff’s cross-motion.
13
A. Plaintiff’s Employment Status
14
Under multiple employment policies promulgated by the
15
District, plaintiff was dismissible only for cause and in
16
accordance with Skelly procedures. (See Resol. 4.06 (Docket No.
17
81-11) at Ex. A, § 1; Ordinance No. 17 (Docket No. 81-9) § 8;
18
Admin. Policies Manual (Docket No. 81-13) at 26.3) Additionally,
19
according to O’Hern and then-General Counsel Jaimee Jones, the
20
District promised plaintiff that she would continue to receive
21
the rights afforded to union members (including for-cause and
22
procedural due process protections) despite plaintiff forfeiting
23
her union membership when she received the Office Administrator
24
25
3 The Administrative Policies Manual establishes Skelly
rights for “permanent” employees, i.e., employees who had
26
completed their probationary period. See Admin. Policies Manual
27 at 6, 26. Plaintiff, as an employee of the District for over
fourteen years, was clearly a permanent employee, which defendant
28 does not seem to dispute.
1 position. (See O’Hern Decl. ¶ 9; Jones Decl. ¶ 6; Minutes of
2
Adjourned Regular Meeting of the Bd. of Dirs., Oct. 8, 2013
3
(Docket No. 102-18) at 114-1-368 to 114-1-383.) By virtue of
4
these rights, plaintiff was not an at-will employee. See Guz v.
5
Bechtel Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 335 (2000) (citing Cal. Lab.
6
Code § 2922).4
7
Defendant argues that the Board’s actions at the
8
October 10, 2017 meeting implicitly repealed all of these
9
existing protections. However, the relevant District policies
10
were not even mentioned at the October 10, 2017 meeting, and
11
there was no discussion of plaintiff’s employment status and
12
protections beyond O’Hern’s comments. (See generally Pl.’s Ex.
13
4, Partial Tr. of Oct. 10, 2017 Board Meeting (Docket No. 81-4);
14
Oct. 10, 2017 Minutes.) Importantly, the motion approved by the
15
Board made no mention of plaintiff’s employment type, only the
16
title change and compensation increase. (See Oct. 10, 2017
17
Minutes at 140-1-117.)
18
A cursory remark by O’Hern--who was a manager and not a
19
member of the Board--that plaintiff was “at-will” did not serve
20
to repeal the procedural protections established by the
21
District’s ordinances, policies, and explicit promises to
22
plaintiff. See McGraw v. City of Huntington Beach, 882 F.2d 384,
23
388 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding, in light of the “City Council’s
24
stated purpose of protecting City employees from dismissal
25
26
4 Defendant testified that he understood plaintiff to not
27 be an at-will employee prior to the October 10, 2017 board
meeting. (See Dep. of Steve Stump (“Stump Dep.”) (Docket No.
28 102-12) at 254.)
1 without ‘just cause,’” that City Council did not terminate
2
employee’s “permanent” status “sub silentio upon promotion, once
3
again subjecting the promoted employee to the risks of . . . ‘at-
4
will’ employment status”); City & County of San Francisco v. All
5
Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C, 51 Cal. App. 5th
6
703, 715 (1st Dist. 2020) (quoting Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v.
7
State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 249, 279 (1991))
8
(because “‘the law shuns repeals by implication,’” there was no
9
implied repeal by subsequent legislative action that did “‘not
10
even mention’” the earlier legislative action).
11
Defendant relies on Iscoff v. Police Commission of City
12
& County of San Francisco, which held that “where a subsequent
13
ordinance is so conflicting with and repugnant to an earlier one
14
that the two cannot stand together, the later enactment is
15
controlling and the earlier one is repealed by implication.” 222
16
Cal. App. 2d 395, 409 (1st Dist. 1963). This case is not on
17
point for two reasons. First, O’Hern’s comments cannot be
18
equated with a binding action of the Board. Second, even if
19
O’Hern’s comments had legal effect, taken in context they are not
20
wholly inconsistent with plaintiff’s pre-existing employment
21
protections. O’Hern intended the “at-will” and “at the pleasure
22
of” descriptions to apply to the title change and salary
23
increase, which would only be in effect so long as the Board felt
24
it necessary, at which time plaintiff would revert to her
25
previous position. (See O’Hern Decl. ¶¶ 17-20; see also Oct. 10,
26
2017 Minutes at 140-1-055 (indicating that plaintiff could revert
27
to former position once the new General Manager was capable of
28
1 performing all duties).)5
2
The court therefore concludes that there is no genuine
3
dispute of material fact as to plaintiff’s employment status and
4
grants plaintiff’s cross-motion for partial summary judgment,
5
establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee and had
6
for-cause and procedural protections according to the District’s
7
policies and the terms of her employment.
8
B. Qualified Immunity
9
The court next turns to the question of whether
10
defendant Stump is entitled to qualified immunity. “Qualified
11
immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct violated a
12
clearly established constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan,
13
555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
14
In determining whether a state official is entitled to
15
qualified immunity on summary judgment, the court first
16
determines “whether the evidence viewed in the light most
17
favorable to the plaintiff is sufficient to show a violation of a
18
constitutional right.” Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d
19
657, 671 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted).
20
The court then determines “whether the right was
21
clearly established such that a reasonable official would [have]
22
known that he was engaging in unlawful conduct.” Levine v. City
23
of Alameda, 525 F.3d 903, 906 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Pearson,
24
25
5 Defendant also cites Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d
804, 811 (1954), for the proposition that “the power to enact
26
ordinances implies power, unless otherwise provided in the grant,
27 to repeal them.” The relevance of this case is unclear, as the
Board’s general ability to repeal prior ordinances is not in
28 question here.
1 555 U.S. at 244. If the right was clearly established, the court
2
evaluates whether a reasonable person in the position of the
3
defendant would know that the conduct at issue violated that
4
right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on
5
other grounds by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Levine, 525 F.3d at 906.
6
Plaintiff alleges that defendant violated her right to
7
procedural due process. “The requirements of procedural due
8
process apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by
9
the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.”
10
Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). The existence
11
of a property interest is determined by sources independent of
12
the Constitution, for instance state law or the terms of an
13
individual’s employment. See id. at 578; Dorr v. Butte County,
14
795 F.2d 875, 876 (9th Cir. 1986). Under California law, a
15
permanent public employee “dismissible only for cause” possesses
16
a “‘property interest in his continued employment which is
17
protected by due process.’” Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876 (quoting
18
Skelly, 15 Cal. 3d at 207–08). As explained above, plaintiff was
19
a permanent public employee dismissible only for cause.
20
Accordingly, plaintiff held a constitutionally protected property
21
interest in her continued public employment and was entitled to
22
procedural due process. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Dorr, 795
23
F.2d at 876.
24
Plaintiff was summarily terminated without any
25
opportunity to be heard, which defendant does not dispute. (See
26
Stampfli Decl. ¶¶ 61-62; Mot. at 7-12; Stump Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.)
27
The court thus concludes that there is sufficient evidence to
28
1 establish that plaintiff’s procedural due process rights were
2
violated. See Austin v. Univ. of Oregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1139
3
(9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
4
(1976)) (“‘some form of hearing is required before an individual
5
is finally deprived of a property interest’”).
6
The court next considers whether the procedural due
7
process right at issue was clearly established. A right is
8
clearly established for purposes of determining qualified
9
immunity if the “contours of the right were sufficiently clear
10
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
11
violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. In determining
12
whether the right at issue was clearly established, the court may
13
not “define clearly established law at a high level of
14
generality.” See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011).
15
Rather, “the clearly established law must be particularized to
16
the facts of the case.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
17
(internal quotation marks omitted).
18
As this court previously found (see Docket No. 48 at
19
11), the right to procedural protections for permanent public
20
employees who are dismissible only for cause according to the
21
terms of their employment is well-established under federal law.
22
See Roth, 408 U.S. at 569; Dorr, 795 F.2d at 876; Skelly, 15 Cal.
23
3d at 207–08. This formulation of the right at issue is
24
appropriately tailored to the facts here. Cf. Flores v. Von
25
Kleist, 739 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1255 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Burrell, J.)
26
(defining the relevant right for purposes of “clearly
27
established” analysis as whether “due process protections are
28
1 implicated where the plaintiff has a legitimate expectation of
2
continued employment stemming from a mutually explicit
3
understanding”) (internal quotation marks omitted).6
4
The outcome here thus turns on whether a reasonable
5
official in defendant’s position could have “reasonably believed”
6
that his conduct did not violate a clearly established
7
constitutional right. See Levine, 525 F.3d at 906; see also
8
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 199. If so, defendant will be entitled to
9
qualified immunity. See id.
10
Defendant’s counsel argues that defendant “considered
11
what legal effect prior resolutions, practices, or policy manuals
12
of the District might have” on plaintiff’s employment status.
13
(Mot. at 12.) However, defendant himself testified otherwise,
14
explaining that once he learned that plaintiff was referred to as
15
an “at-will employee” during the October 10, 2017 meeting,
16
defendant concluded that he could terminate plaintiff without
17
cause or procedural protections. (See Stump Dep. at 94, 102,
18
131, 266.) In coming to this conclusion, defendant did not
19
consider the effect of any sources other than the October 10,
20
21
6 Defendant proposes that the court define the issue as
22 whether “a public employee who was told that they are ‘at will’
and serve at the ‘pleasure of’ the appointing authority during
23 the creation of their management-level position possess [sic] a
constitutionally protected interest in their continued
24 employment.” (See Def.’s Reply (Docket No. 107) at 20.) This
formulation is too factually granular. See Bonivert v. City of
25
Clarkston, 883 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (officials may
“still be on notice that their conduct violates established law
26
even in novel factual circumstances”). Further, this formulation
27 is inappropriately skewed in favor of defendant, as it
misconstrues the facts and fails to account for the litany of
28 evidence establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee.
1 2017 meeting. (See id.)
2
Defendant’s assertion that he reasonably believed his
3
conduct was lawful is thus entirely based on O’Hern’s comments at
4
the board meeting. Defendant’s alleged conclusion about
5
plaintiff’s employment status was not reasonable given the
6
circumstances here. For instance, defendant was aware that
7
plaintiff’s title and salary change were only a temporary “stop
8
gap measure.” (See Stump Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant was also aware
9
that the District’s at-will employees, including plaintiff, could
10
retain some of the rights laid out in the union contract. (See
11
Stump Dep. at 285.) A reasonable official in defendant’s
12
position would not have drawn conclusions about plaintiff’s
13
employment status based solely on offhand comments made by a
14
manager--not a member of the Board--during a presentation.
15
Rather, a reasonable official would have investigated plaintiff’s
16
employment status and based his decision upon the available
17
information. Had defendant properly investigated the issue, he
18
would have considered the applicable ordinances and information
19
concerning the promises made to plaintiff, which establish that
20
plaintiff was not an at-will employee.
21
Defendant’s failure to properly investigate is
22
especially glaring given that both the District and defendant had
23
retained legal counsel in response to the litigation risk
24
occasioned by defendant’s actions in placing plaintiff on leave.
25
(See Minutes of Adjourned Special Board Meeting, Jan. 17, 2020
26
(Docket No. 102-25 at 2-3) ¶ 9; Minutes of Adjourned Special
27
Board Meeting, Feb. 5, 2020 (Docket No. 102-25 at 4-5) ¶ 5.)
28
1 Defendant participated in multiple board meetings where both the
2
District’s counsel and his counsel discussed that litigation
3
risk. (See id.; Stump Dep. at 258-59.) Despite all this,
4
defendant failed to inquire about the legality of his intended
5
conduct with either the District’s lawyer or his own lawyer,
6
instead basing his conclusions entirely on a few words in the
7
October 10, 2017 board meeting minutes. (See Stump Dep. at 102-
8
03, 107-09.)
9
In Levine, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
10
defendant supervisor had qualified immunity based on a reasonable
11
but mistaken belief that he was acting lawfully in terminating
12
the plaintiff, a public employee, without a pretermination
13
hearing. 525 F.3d at 906-07. This belief was reasonable because
14
the supervisor instructed his agent to ensure that the
15
plaintiff’s due process rights were respected, and because the
16
plaintiff’s union contract stated that he was not entitled to a
17
pretermination hearing. Id. at 907.
18
Unlike the supervisor in Levine, it does not appear
19
that defendant was endeavoring to respect plaintiff’s rights; on
20
the contrary, it seems that rather than attempting to truly
21
discern plaintiff’s employment status and protections, defendant
22
was searching for any basis to support his desire to oust
23
plaintiff. In defendant’s words, once he saw the term “at-will”
24
in the meeting minutes, that was “all [he] needed”--he “[could
25
not] get any better luck than that.” (Stump Dep. at 94, 121.)
26
Further, unlike the union contract in Levine, a
27
manager’s comments during a meeting cannot be reasonably
28
ee nnn ee en en nn nn nn nn nnn EI EO
considered to have binding legal effect. And in contrast to the
instant case, there was no indication in Levine that
investigation of the plaintiff’s employment rights would have
yielded evidence clearly showing that the plaintiff had the right
° to a pretermination hearing. See 525 F.3d at 907.
° Because there is sufficient evidence to establish a
constitutional violation and a reasonable official in defendant’s
position would have known he was violating a clearly established
° right, defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity. See
10 Sandoval, 985 F.3d at 671; Levine, 525 F.3d at 906.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Steve J. Stump’s
motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 72) be, and hereby is,
13
DENIED.
14
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s cross-motion for
partial summary judgment (Docket No. 102) be, and hereby is,
GRANTED, establishing that plaintiff was not an at-will employee
and had for-cause and procedural protections according to the
District’s policies and the terms of her employment.
Dated: February 23, 2023 dete ak 4) 4
20 WILLIAMB.SHUBB © |
21 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
22
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24
25
26
27
28
16