Opinion

(PC) Johnson v. Newsom

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
Jan 17, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.2%

finding prison officials 20 may not “be deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease” under the Eighth Amendment

How later courts described this case

  • finding prison officials 20 may not “be deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease” under the Eighth Amendment

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ELLIS JOHNSON, No. 2:21-cv-0828 KJM KJN P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16

17 Plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action seeking relief

18 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge as provided

19 by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

20 On May 6, 2022, the magistrate judge filed findings and recommendations, which were

21 served on all parties and which contained notice to all parties that any objections to the findings

22 and recommendations were to be filed within fourteen days. Plaintiff filed objections to the

23 findings and recommendations; defendants filed a reply.

24 In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Local Rule 304, this

25 court has conducted a de novo review of this case. Having reviewed the file, the court finds

26 plaintiff should be granted an opportunity to file a second amended complaint.

27 /////

28 /////

1 As set out in the findings and recommendations,

2 Plaintiff alleges the following: His Eighth Amendment right to be

free from cruel and unusual punishment was violated by defendants’

3 failure to protect plaintiff from COVID-19. Plaintiff is medically

high risk, based on lichen simplex chronicus, hypertension,

4 gastroesophageal reflux, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,

and he is over the age of 50. He alleges he is not being adequately

5 protected from COVID-19 due to inadequate sanitation, inadequate

isolation from symptomatic people, inadequate quarantine of

6 exposed people, inadequate exclusion of symptomatic or exposed

staff, and inadequate testing and reporting. Plaintiff was ordered to

7 move to building 9 (in cell living) due to his high risk status, yet

contracted COVID-19 a few days later; another high risk inmate died

8 as a result of moving into that same building. In response to

plaintiff’s administrative appeal seeking early release from

9 incarceration, defendant Dr. Largoza responded “no intervention,”

adding that inmates with a COVID-19 risk score of 4 or higher would

10 undergo additional custodial screening to determine whether eligible

for expedited release. Despite having a rating of 7, plaintiff has not

11 yet been notified of possible release. He claims that defendant Gates

also responded “no intervention.” [Footnote omitted.] (ECF No. 18

12 at 4.)

13 ECF No. 38 at 2.

14 The two defendants against whom this action is currently proceeding, Dr. Largoza and

15 Chief of Health Care Services Gates seek dismissal on a number of grounds. See id. at 5-7. The

16 magistrate judge recommends the motion to dismiss be granted on the merits and without leave to

17 amend the complaint. Id. at 13-15. In particular, the magistrate judge construes the basis for

18 plaintiff’s claim against these two defendants as arising from their roles in reviewing plaintiff’s

19 administrative grievance, which he interprets as “not seeking medical treatment . . . [but r]ather

20 . . . seeking early release from prison based on the risk that he would suffer serious illness if

21 infected with COVID-19.” Id. at 14. In part relevant to the question of whether plaintiff should

22 be allowed to file a second amended complaint, the findings and recommendations set out the

23 following contentions in plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss:

24 In his opposition, plaintiff now contends that he was housed with

inmates who had confirmed cases of COVID-19, rather than being

25 housed with inmates only suspected of having been exposed to

COVID-19, in violation of the guidelines established by the Center

26 for Disease Control and Prevention. He claims unidentified CDCR

medical officials demonstrated deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s

27 health and safety by subjecting him to such conditions and failing to

take reasonable steps to abate them. But plaintiff fails to attribute

28 such housing decisions to either defendant charged with reviewing

1 his grievance. Indeed, in his grievance, plaintiff did not allege issues

with his specific housing; rather, he generally complained about

2 inadequate sanitation, watered-down disinfectant, no hand washing

facilities, inadequate isolation and quarantine of symptomatic and

3 exposed people, inadequate exclusion of symptomatic or exposed

staff, and inadequate testing and reporting. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) Most of

4 such issues, while related to public health matters, concern custody

staff and unidentified prison staff responsible for making housing

5 decisions, and would not fall under the purview of medical

professionals tasked with reviewing health care appeals.

6

7 Id. at 15.

8 In his objections, plaintiff contends he should be given an opportunity to amend his

9 complaint to state claims against defendants responsible for subjecting plaintiff to unsafe

10 conditions of confinement in light of his medical conditions, age, and the increased risks posed by

11 COVID-19. The court agrees.

12 The court should only deny leave to amend when it “is satisfied that the deficiencies in the

13 complaint could not possibly be cured by amendment.” Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th

14 Cir. 2003); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000). The court is persuaded by the

15 analysis in Maney v. Brown, 2020 WL 7364977 (D.Or. Dec. 15, 2020), set out in findings and

16 recommendations in Jones v. Sherman, 2022 WL 783452 (E.D.Cal. Mar. 11, 2022), adopted in

17 full by the district court on September 14, 2022, as follows:

18 Existing precedent clearly establishes the right of an individual in

custody to protection from heightened exposure to a serious

19 communicable disease. See, e.g., Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25,

33, 113 S.Ct. 2475, 125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993) (finding prison officials

20 may not “be deliberately indifferent to the exposure of inmates to a

serious, communicable disease” under the Eighth Amendment); see

21 also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 682-83, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57

L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (affirming a finding of an Eighth Amendment

22 violation where a facility housed individuals in crowded cells with

others suffering from infectious diseases, such as Hepatitis and

23 venereal disease, and the individuals’ “mattresses were removed and

jumbled together each morning, then returned to the cells at random

24 in the evening”); Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th

Cir. 2007) (recognizing a cause of action under the Eighth

25 Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for an alleged policy of not

screening inmates for infectious diseases—HIV, Hepatitis C, and

26 Heliobacter pylori—and for housing contagious and healthy

individuals together during a known “epidemic of hepatits C””);

27 Trevizo v. Webster, No. CV 17-5868-MWF (KS), 2018 U.S.Dist.

LEXIS 227476, 2018 WL 5917858, at 4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2018) (“It

28 is well accepted that such ‘substantial risks of harm’ include

1 ‘exposure of inmates to a serious, communicable disease[,]’ ”

including MRSA) (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 33, 113 S.Ct. 2475);

2 see also Loftin v. Dalessandri, 3 F.App’x 658, 663 (10th Cir.

2001) (recognizing an Eighth Amendment claim for knowingly

3 housing the defendant in a cell with individuals who had tested

positive for tuberculosis); cf. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843,

4 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (“The question under the

Eighth Amendment is whether prison officials, acting with

5 deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently

substantial ‘risk of serious damage to his future health[.]’ ” (citing

6 Helling, 509 U.S. at 35, 113 S.Ct. 2475))). “For purposes of qualified

immunity, that legal duty need not be litigated and then established

7 disease by disease or injury by injury.” Estate of Clark v. Walker,

865 F.3d 544, 553 (7th Cir. 2017).

8

Thus, the law is clearly established that individuals in government

9 custody have a constitutional right to be protected against a

heightened exposure to serious, easily communicable diseases, and

10 the Court finds that this clearly established right extends to protection

from COVID-19. It is undisputed that COVID-19 is easily

11 communicable. (See Defs.’ Mot. Partial Summ. J. at 3; SAC ¶ 45.)

In addition, based on the known mortality rate, hospitalizations, and

12 medical consequences, there can be no dispute that COVID-

19 exposes AICs to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious harm.

13 (See Defs.’ Reply at 7; Stern Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) The law does not support

a finding of qualified immunity for government officials who fail to

14 protect individuals in their custody from a new serious

communicable disease, as opposed to a serious communicable

15 disease of which they were previously aware. To hold otherwise as a

matter of law would provide qualified immunity to Defendants even

16 if they had done nothing in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

17 ... Defendants also argue that Hines v. Yousseff forecloses a finding

of a clearly established right. 914 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir.), cert. denied

18 sub nom. Smith v. Schwarzenegger, ___ U.S. ___, 140 S.Ct. 159, 205

L.Ed.2d 46 (2019). The Court disagrees.

19

...

20

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Hines v. Youseff does not require a

21 different result. In Hines, the Ninth Circuit found that individuals in

custody had no clearly established right to be free from heightened

22 exposure to Valley Fever spores, 914 F.3d at 1228. Notably, the

court found that “[s]ince the prisoners are confined together, it is

23 especially important that Valley Fever is not contagious.” Id. at 1226.

The court noted that “no societal consensus has emerged that the risk

24 [of contracting Valley Fever] is intolerably grave,” such that a

reasonable officer would not necessarily know that housing

25 individuals together in a region known for Valley Fever violated the

Constitution. Id. at 1232. In contrast here, COVID-19 is highly

26 contagious, is not bound to a geographic area, and a societal

consensus has emerged regarding its danger. There is no dispute that

27 this virus presents a sufficiently substantial risk of harm to AICs, and

it should have come as no surprise to Defendants that they have a

28 duty to protect AICs from exposure to COVID-19.

1 Maney, 2020 WL 7364977, at 4-6 (alterations in original) (footnote

omitted).

2

Jones v. Sherman, 2022 WL 4238875 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 14, 2022). The court also agrees with the

3

Jones court on when a prison inmate states an Eighth Amendment claim in this context:

4

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that a prisoner states a

5 cognizable Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim if

the prisoner can sufficiently allege that a defendant knew of the risks

6 of COVID-19 and had authority to mitigate the risks, yet did nothing

to mitigate those risks. The Court also finds that the law is clearly

7 established that individuals in government custody have a

constitutional right to be protected against a heightened exposure to

8 serious, easily communicable diseases, and that this this clearly

established right extends to protection from COVID-19.

9

Jones, slip op. at *10. Application of the foregoing compels the conclusion that plaintiff must be

10

given an additional opportunity to amend his complaint. Plaintiff makes sufficient assertions in

1]

the record to conclude that he may be able to allege cognizable claims against one or more

12

defendants under the foregoing standards.

13

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

14

1. The findings and recommendations filed May 6, 2022, are adopted only to the extent

15

consistent with this order;

16

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 32) is partially granted;

17

3. Plaintiffs first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to file a second amended

18

complaint within thirty days from the date of this order; and

19

4. This matter is referred back to the assigned magistrate judge for further proceedings

20

consistent with this order.

21

DATED: January 17, 2023.

22 /)

/

TVW X

24 CHIEF NT] ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

25

26

27

28

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.