The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ADAM RANDOLPH POWELL, No. 2:22-cv-01275-CKD P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 E. ROSE, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
18 1983. This proceeding was referred to this court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
19 636(b)(1).
20 Plaintiff requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. As plaintiff has submitted a
21 declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his request will be granted.
22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C. §§
23 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the court will direct the appropriate agency to collect the
24 initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the Clerk of the Court.
25 Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent of the preceding
26 month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will be forwarded by
27 the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in plaintiff’s account
28 exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).
1 I. Screening Requirement
2 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
3 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The
4 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally
5 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek
6 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).
7 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.
8 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th
9 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an
10 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,
11 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully
12 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th
13 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.
14 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than
15 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
16 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,
17 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
18 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim
19 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
20 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
21 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
22 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,
23 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and
24 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
25 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
26 II. Allegations in the Complaint
27 At all times relevant to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was an inmate at High
28 Desert State Prison. He names six correctional officers as well as sixteen John and Jane Does as
1 defendants in this action.
2 According to the allegations in the complaint, plaintiff was beaten and choked by John
3 and Jane Doe defendants on July 6, 2019 after defendant Rose falsely reported that plaintiff
4 struck him. ECF No. 1 at 9. Plaintiff separately alleges that additional John and Jane Doe
5 defendants failed to protect him from this use of excessive force. As a result of the beating by
6 defendants, plaintiff suffered mental and emotional trauma as well as pain and suffering. Id.
7 Plaintiff was also issued a Rules Violation Report, or a CDCR Form 115, as a result of the false
8 report that he struck defendant Rose. By way of relief, plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment; the
9 reversal of the false disciplinary violation and its removal from his central prison file; the
10 restoration of his credits and privileges that were lost; as well as compensatory and punitive
11 damages. ECF No. 1 at 13.
12 III. Legal Standards
13 The following legal standards are being provided to plaintiff based on his pro se status as
14 well as the nature of the allegations in the complaint.
15 A. Linkage Requirement
16 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the
17 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See
18 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
19 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a
20 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates
21 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that
22 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th
23 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must
24 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of
25 plaintiff's federal rights.
26 B. False Report
27 A prisoner has no constitutionally-guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly
28 accused of conduct that may lead to disciplinary sanctions. See Sprouse v. Babcock, 870 F.2d
1 450, 452 (8th Cir. 1989). As long as a prisoner is afforded procedural due process in the
2 disciplinary hearing, allegations of a fabricated charge generally fail to state a claim under section
3 1983. See Hanrahan v. Lane, 747 F.2d 1137, 1140– 41 (7th Cir. 1984). An exception exists
4 when the fabrication of charges infringed on the inmate's substantive constitutional rights, such as
5 when false charges are made in retaliation for an inmate's exercise of a constitutionally protected
6 right. See Sprouse, 870 F.2d at 452 (holding that filing of a false disciplinary charge in retaliation
7 for a grievance filed by an inmate is actionable under section 1983).
8 C. Excessive Force
9 The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from inflicting cruel and unusual
10 punishment on inmates which has been defined as “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
11 pain.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). “[W]henever prison officials stand accused
12 of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the
13 core judicial inquiry is… whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
14 discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 7
15 (1992). The court’s inquiry into an excessive force claim focuses on the extent of the prisoner’s
16 injury, the need for application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of
17 force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to
18 temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (1992) (quotation marks and
19 citations omitted). While the absence of a serious injury is relevant to the Eighth Amendment
20 inquiry, it does not end it. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. The malicious and sadistic use of force to
21 cause harm always violates contemporary standards of decency in violation of the Eighth
22 Amendment. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 327.
23 D. Supervisory Liability
24 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their
25 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)
26 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability,
27 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own
28 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between
1 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a
2 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or
3 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act
4 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d
5 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).
6 IV. Analysis
7 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon
8 which relief can be granted under federal law. Plaintiff does not allege a cognizable claim
9 against defendant Rose who allegedly issued the disciplinary violation against plaintiff because
10 there is no allegation that it was written in retaliation for plaintiff’s prior grievances or other
11 protected conduct. Plaintiff does not link any of the other named defendants in this action to the
12 use of force or the failure to protect claims. Absent this linkage, plaintiff has failed to state a
13 claim against defendants Plascencia, Macovichuk, Suchoski, Palacios, and Navratil. See Johnson
14 v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). To the extent that plaintiff lists the warden and
15 associate warden of HDSP as John Doe defendants in this case, the complaint fails to state a
16 claim against these defendants based solely on their supervisory role. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607
17 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979). The remaining defendants connected to the use of force are all
18 unknown correctional officers identified as John or Jane Does. The complaint does not provide
19 sufficient identifying information for these defendants to be served. For all these reasons,
20 plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended
21 complaint.
22 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions
23 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.
24 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in
25 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.
26 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the
27 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory
28 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of
1 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
2 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to
3 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended
4 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a
5 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375
6 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no
7 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original
8 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.
9 V. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party
10 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not
11 intended as legal advice.
12 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that they do not
13 state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being
14 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order.
15 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30
16 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular
17 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.
18 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
19 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.
20 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees
21 shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the Director of the California
22 Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently herewith.
23 3. Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed.
24 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended
25 complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil
26 Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket
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1 | number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an
2 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action
3 || be dismissed.
4 || Dated: January 9, 2023 Card Kt | (£4 (g—
5 CAROLYN K DELANEY?
6 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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