referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
How later courts described this case
- referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 RAGHVENDRA SINGH, No. 2:22-CV-0634-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or
22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief
23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover,
24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain
25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This
26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the
28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it
1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with
2 at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims,
3 vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for
4 the Court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague and
5 conclusory.
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7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
8 Plaintiff is a prisoner currently housed at Kern Valley State Prison, located in
9 Delano, California. See ECF. No. 1. Plaintiff brings suit against the following defendants: (1)
10 County of Sacramento; (2) Brad Rose, Sheriff Lieutenant; (3) Scott R. Jones, Sheriff; (4) Anne
11 Schubert, Sacramento County District Attorney; and (5) Lesley Kolb, Sacramento County
12 Assistant District Attorney. Id.
13 Plaintiff alleges that at the direction and order of the listed defendants, unidentified
14 officers beat him and broke his feet at an unspecified location, either at Kern Valley State Prison
15 or Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center. Id. at 3. Furthermore, Plaintiff states that he was
16 “misused” by either the same or different unidentified officers. Also, the same or different
17 unidentified officers shut down “services,” which according to Plaintiff made the jail a horrible
18 place for inmates. Id.
19 Plaintiff also alleges that the same or different unidentified officers did not follow
20 COVID-19 protocols or health regulations, which resulted in deaths to inmates, thus, damages
21 should be provided to their families. Id. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that the same or different
22 unidentified officers caused him to suffer COVID-19, which led to nerve problems, instability,
23 and heart attacks. Id.
24 Finally, Plaintiff claims that, on January 30, 2020, Plaintiff alleges that the same or
25 different unidentified officers took documents and evidence from his jail cell that could
26 potentially have proven that the charges against him are false, fabricated, illegal, and
27 unconstitutional. Id.
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1 Plaintiff is seeking damages of $90,000,000 along with the return for his property.
2 Id. Plaintiff states that the listed defendants need to be stopped because their inability to follow
3 laws, COVID-19 protocols, and health regulations, has led to the killing and destruction of
4 minority inmates. Id. Plaintiff has requested the proper treatment of inmates henceforward. Id.
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6 II. DISCUSSION
7 As discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
8 which relief can be granted as against any named defendant. First, Plaintiff has not alleged
9 sufficient facts to establish municipal liability as to the County of Sacramento. Second, it appears
10 Defendants Schubert and Kolb are prosecutors subject to immunity. Finally, Plaintiff has not
11 alleged sufficient facts to establish a causal link between any of the individual defendants and a
12 violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.
13 A. Municipal Liability
14 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to
15 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
16 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at
17 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local
18 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials
19 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S.
20 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of
21 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the
22 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or
23 custom of the municipality. See id.
24 Here, Plaintiff has not alleged at all, let alone with any specificity, that Defendant
25 County of Sacramento violated his rights by way of any policy or custom of the county. Plaintiff
26 will be provided an opportunity to amend in the event he can allege such facts.
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1 B. Prosecutorial Immunity
2 Prosecutorial immunity protects eligible government officials when they are acting
3 pursuant to their official role as advocate for the state. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
4 430 (1976). This immunity extends to actions during both the pre-trial and post-trial phases of a
5 case. See Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 1984). State prosecutors are
6 entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for acts taken in their official capacity. See Kalina v.
7 Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123-25 (1997).
8 Here, Defendants Schubert and Kolb are alleged to be prosecutors. Plaintiff has
9 not alleged facts to indicate that either took acts outside their official capacities or the context of a
10 criminal prosecution. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend.
11 C. Causal Link
12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
13 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
14 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
15 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
16 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
17 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
18 See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
19 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
20 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
21 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
22 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
23 As to all named defendants, referred to collectively throughout the complaint,
24 Plaintiff has not alleged what each specific defendant did or did not do that caused deprivation of
25 a constitutional or statutory right. It is not sufficient to refer to defendants collectively. Instead,
26 as outlined above, Plaintiff must allege facts as to each specific named defendant’s conduct.
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1 III. CONCLUSION
2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection
16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d
17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. Plaintiffs original complaint, ECF No. 1, is dismissed with leave to
3 | amend; and
4 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of
5 || service of this order.
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7 || Dated: September 20, 2022 Svc
8 DENNIS M. COTA
9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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