holding that 22 the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts 23 of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.”
How later courts described this case
- holding that 22 the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts 23 of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 CHONG SOOK LIM, Case No. 1:21-cv-01734-DAD-BAM
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING APPLICATION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
13 v.
(Docs. 2, 4)
14 LISA A. MILLER, Ph.D., et al.,
SCREENING ORDER GRANTING
15 Defendants. PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO AMEND
16 (Doc. 1)
17
18 Plaintiff Chong Sook Lim (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, initiated this civil rights action
19 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Lisa A. Miller, Ph.D. and Does 1-53 on December 7, 2021.
20 (Doc. 1.)
21 I. Application to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
22 Concurrent with her complaint, Plaintiff filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis
23 without prepaying fees or costs pursuant to Title 28 of the United States Code section 1915(a).
24 (Doc. 2.) The application was not signed. Accordingly, on March 3, 2022, the Court directed
25 Plaintiff to file a completed application to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 3.) Plaintiff
26 submitted a signed application to proceed in forma pauperis on March 30, 2022. (Doc. 4.)
27 Plaintiff has made the showing required by section 1915(a), and accordingly, the request
28 to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
1 II. Screening Requirement and Standard
2 The Court screens complaints brought by persons proceeding in pro se and in forma
3 pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to
4 dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
5 granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
6 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
7 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
8 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
9 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
10 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
11 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
12 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
13 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
14 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
15 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
16 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
17 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
18 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
19 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
20 III. Summary of Plaintiff’s Allegations
21 Plaintiff brings this section 1983 action against Defendant Lisa A. Miller, Ph.D., a
22 licensed clinical psychologist. Plaintiff’s complaint relates to state court child custody
23 proceedings on December 18, 2019, and October 14, 2021, involving Plaintiff and her minor
24 daughter, Yerin Lim. (Doc. 1, Compl. at ¶¶ 1, 7, 8.). According to the complaint, Defendant
25 provided a report and appeared as a witness in contested family court proceedings, presumptively
26 as a child custody evaluator. (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 8, 33, 35, 38.) Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant falsely
27 diagnosed Plaintiff, who is an adult and the mother of a child, as a result of three conjoint
28 therapies as a child psychologist.” (Id. at ¶ 4.) Defendant is sued based on allegations that “she
1 neglected [her] responsibility to report to the CPS, reported false information about the Plaintiff
2 and the child to the Family Court several times, committed perjury in family court hearings, and
3 violated the law of confidentiality to be observed as a child psychologist.” (Id.)
4 On December 18, 2019, the family court rejected Plaintiff’s request for change of custody
5 based on Defendant’s allegedly false report that Plaintiff had Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome
6 (“MBPS”). The court ordered supervised visits and ordered Plaintiff to attend individual
7 counseling because of the allegedly false MBPS diagnosis. Plaintiff contends that without
8 Defendant’s report, “the court had no reason to dismiss the Plaintiff’s custody change and
9 unsupervise [sic] visits on December 18, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 7.)
10 At some unknown point, Plaintiff requested that the family court dismiss Defendant’s
11 reports as invalid and inaccurate, but that request was dismissed. Plaintiff asserts that according
12 to Defendant’s report, “Plaintiff could neither have custody of her child nor have any visitation
13 rights.” (Id. at ¶ 14.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant is not eligible for custody evaluation with
14 her license and her recommendations as a custody evaluator should be dismissed. (Id.) Plaintiff
15 further asserts that Defendant, a child psychologist, is unqualified to do adult psychiatric
16 evaluations and analyses. Defendant’s alleged “misdiagnosis and misreporting cause the
17 Plaintiff, who was a preschool teacher, to lose her job for a living and lose her full custody of her
18 child.” (Id. at ¶ 15.)
19 Defendant also reportedly “emailed Plaintiff’s eldest daughter, spitting out all the
20 information about the Plaintiff and the patient.” (Id. at ¶ 17.) Defendant allegedly stated, “The
21 typical outcome of Munchausen by Proxy is death. I do not want that to happen to your sister. I
22 am not the only doctor professional that has had the same assessment of the situation.” (Id.)
23 Plaintiff is concerned that Defendant is still consulting with Plaintiff’s child. Defendant
24 “showed a trial of retaliation against the Plaintiff and a great effort to forcibly separate the child
25 from the child’s mother. Defendant is building a new relationship by coaching and managing the
26 child from Plaintiff and her family. Defendant is alienating the child, the child’s mother, her
27 sister and her whole family.” (Id. at ¶ 23.) Plaintiff and her family reported Defendant to the
28 California Board of Psychologists in January 2020.
1 On December 19, 2019, Defendant reported to the family court that certain of Plaintiff’s
2 actions were part of Munchausen Syndrome. Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s “irresponsible and
3 unconsidered false diagnosis, misunderstanding and distortion . . . destroyed the life of an
4 innocent mother and her family.” (Id. at ¶ 30.)
5 Plaintiff further alleges that after Defendant confirmed with Plaintiff’s individual therapist
6 that Plaintiff was still attending therapy, Defendant continued to claim and report to the court that
7 Plaintiff was not complying with the court order because Plaintiff had discontinued her therapy.
8 Plaintiff avers that “[t]hese false statements and delusions about the Plaintiff, the Defendant
9 concluded, would increasingly negatively affect repeated contact between the Plaintiff and the
10 child.” (Id. at ¶ 32.)
11 Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated the California Board of Psychology policy by
12 sharing child-patient and parent information with a third party without prior consent or
13 permission. Defendant allegedly disclosed all information about Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s child to
14 other patients and their parents, and Plaintiff’s friends and eldest daughter. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff
15 claims that Defendant provided unfiltered information about Plaintiff’s child to a third party. (Id.
16 53.)
17 Plaintiff claims that Defendant must no longer see the child as patient, that Defendant is
18 jealous of the bond between mother and child and is trying to turn attention to herself by breaking
19 several laws. Plaintiff avers that Defendant is not competent to carry on the work of a Child
20 Custody Evaluator and that Defendant has created speculation about the Plaintiff that is
21 unreasonable and far from reality. As an example of the purported speculation, Plaintiff points to
22 Defendant’s statement that she has “grave concerns that nonprofessionals such as church
23 members or family friends would not be able to stop [Plaintiff] from engaging in inappropriate
24 and potentially dangers behaviors, which may include her taking the child and refusing to return
25 her to her custodial parent.” (Id. at ¶ 38.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant does not know how to
26 distinguish between her fantasies/shows and reality. Plaintiff also claims that she has not had any
27 contact with Defendant since 2019 and Defendant does not have a right to evaluate Plaintiff or the
28 case. Plaintiff contends that what Defendant has done to Plaintiff and her child is an act of racism
1 toward an Asian mother and the intent to deprive Plaintiff of her maternal rights is a human rights
2 violation. (Id. at ¶ 43.)
3 On October 14, 2021, the court again dismissed Plaintiff’s request for custody change and
4 unsupervised visits. Defendant was summoned as a witness in the contested hearing. Defendant
5 “testified that Plaintiff was not complying with the court order by lying that Plaintiff was not
6 attending the individual therapy ordered by the court.” (Id. at ¶ 8.) The court did not confirm this
7 information with Plaintiff or the report of Plaintiff’s individual therapist. Plaintiff alleges:
8 Defendant falsely stated that the Plaintiff continued to harass the child’s
biological father and his extended family with inappropriate conduct without
9 substantiation, and that the Plaintiff entered the Defendant’s office at number 15
or 20 times and stated differently “many many many times” without an
10 appointment and falsely stated that the Plaintiff had requested a false report that
the child had been abused by the child’s father.
11
12 (Id. at ¶ 33.) Plaintiff claims that Defendant provided other “completely unsubstantiated false
13 testimony” at the contested hearing. (Id. at ¶ 48.)
14 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated various California statutes, including the
15 California Family Code, the California Penal Code and the California Civil Code. Plaintiff also
16 claims that Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621 and 1623. As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary
17 damages and injunctive relief.
18 IV. Discussion
19 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, fails to state
20 a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary relief against a
21 defendant who is immune from such relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding in pro se, and in an
22 abundance of caution, the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint to the
23 extent she can do so in good faith. To assist Plaintiff, the Court provides the relevant pleading
24 and legal standards.
25 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
26 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and
27 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
28 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
1 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
2 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
3 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
4 at 570, 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are
5 not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557.
6 Plaintiff’s complaint is not a short and plain statement of her claims. Plaintiff’s narrative
7 is rambling, confusing, and lacks chronological order. It also contains extraneous statements and
8 information, making it difficult to separate the relevant factual allegations from the irrelevant
9 ones. It is not the type of complaint contemplated by Rule 8. See Murguia v. Langdon, No.
10 1:19-cv-00942-DAD-BAM, 2020 WL 3542310, at *12 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2020) (dismissing
11 complaint with leave to amend where complaint failed to comply with Rule 8 and was “mostly
12 narrative ramblings and storytelling”). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, it should be a
13 short and plain statement of her claims and must be limited only to those factual allegations
14 related to her claims which identify what happened, when it happened and who was involved.
15 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
16 B. Child Custody Claims
17 Plaintiff presents her claims as a civil rights action against Defendant Miller. However,
18 to the extent Plaintiff’s purpose in bringing this action is to seek modification of child custody
19 orders or modification of the terms and conditions of visitation, she may not do so. The Court
20 lacks jurisdiction over claims concerning child custody issues because they are exclusively
21 matters of state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-704 (1992) (holding that
22 the domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts
23 of power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees.”); see also Peterson v. Babbitt,
24 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir.1983) (stating that “federal courts have uniformly held that they
25 should not adjudicate cases involving domestic relations, including ‘the custody of minors and a
26 fortiori, right of visitation.’ For that matter, the whole subject of domestic relations and
27 particularly child custody problems is generally considered a state law matter”). “Even when a
28 federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which would deeply involve
1 them in adjudicating domestic matters.” Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th
2 Cir.1986).
3 Further, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging the orders of the state court regarding
4 custody or visitation premised on Defendant Miller’s reports or testimony, she may not do so.
5 This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the final determinations of state court
6 dependency proceedings. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890
7 (9th Cir.1986) (“The United States District Court ... has no authority to review the final
8 determinations of a state court in judicial proceedings.”). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a
9 federal district court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the
10 judgment of a state court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84
11 (2005); see also Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983);
12 Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claims relating to
13 child custody and supervised visitation, which presumably arise from state court orders, would
14 be barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Walton v. Hopper, No. 2:22-cv-00453 JAM AC
15 PS, 2022 WL 837268, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022), (“Child custody and parental rights are
16 quintessentially state law matters that are generally outside the purview of the federal court.”),
17 report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-cv-0453 JAM AC PS, 2022 WL 1506096 (E.D.
18 Cal. May 12, 2022).
19 C. Quasi-Judicial Immunity
20 “It has long been established that judges are absolutely immune from liability for acts
21 ‘done in the exercise of their judicial functions.” Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir.
22 2008) (quotation omitted). The absolute immunity granted to judges has been extended to other
23 public officials “who perform activities that are ‘functionally comparable’ to those of judges.”
24 Id. (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)). District courts in the Ninth Circuit,
25 including this district, have found that quasi-judicial immunity applies to defendants performing
26 functions similar to those that Defendant Miller was alleged to be performing as a child custody
27 evaluator. See, e.g., Thomas v. Ventura Cty. Superior Ct., No. CV 17-8659-MWF (ASx), 2018
28 WL 6016916, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2018) (finding “child custody recommending counselor”
1 entitled to quasi-judicial immunity); Karkanen v. Fam. Ct. Servs. of Contra Costa Cty., No. 17-
2 CV-00999-HSG, 2017 WL 2730227, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (finding child custody
3 evaluator entitled to absolute immunity); Stone v. Freitas, No. CV 14-1267-LJO, 2014 WL
4 6774192, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2014) (“child-custody evaluators” serve in quasi-judicial
5 roles, providing recommendations to the courts regarding child-custody). This immunity applies
6 even if Defendant Miller’s action were made in error, in excess of her authority, or she acted in
7 bad faith, so long as they were within the scope of her jurisdiction. See Stone, 2017 WL
8 2730227, at *5 (concluding that even if child-custody evaluator acted in error or in bad faith, her
9 actions were shielded from liability by quasi-judicial immunity so long as those actions were
10 within the scope of her jurisdiction).
11 D. Claims Under Title 18 of the United States Code
12 Plaintiff alleges violations of Title 18, sections 1621 and 1623. (Compl. at ¶ 62.) “[T]he
13 fact that a federal statute has been violated and some person harmed does not automatically give
14 rise to a private cause of action in favor of that person.” Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
15 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 688 (1979)).
16 Rather, the Court is to consider if Congress intended to create the private right of action in the
17 statute, looking first to the language of the statute. Id. “Civil causes of action ... do not generally
18 lie under the criminal statutes contained in Title 18 of the United States Code.” Del Elmer;
19 Zachay v. Metzger, 967 F. Supp. 398, 403 (S.D. Cal. 1997).
20 Here, the sections cited by Plaintiff under Title 18 provide for fines and incarceration for
21 criminal offenses. There is no language in these sections that would imply a cause of action
22 exists to allow Plaintiff to seek a remedy for these criminal statutes in this action.
23 E. California Penal Code Violations
24 Plaintiff cites a variety of California Penal Code sections. Generally, the California Penal
25 Code does not permit a private right of action. See Thomas v. Restaurant, Case No. 1:15-cv-
26 01113-DAD-SKO, 2015 WL 9583029, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 31, 2015). Plaintiff has not
27 demonstrated that any of the cited Penal Code sections authorize a private cause of action.
28 ///
1 F. State Law Claims
2 To the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert state claims, the Court declines to screen
3 them in the absence of a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. Under 28 U.S.C. §
4 1367(a), in any civil action in which the district court has original jurisdiction, the “district courts
5 shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
6 action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under
7 Article III of the United States Constitution,” except as provided in subsections (b) and (c). The
8 Supreme Court has stated that “if the federal claims are dismissed before trial, ... the state claims
9 should be dismissed as well.” United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
10 Although the Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims, Plaintiff must
11 first have a cognizable claim for relief under federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
12 V. Conclusion and Order
13 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, fails to state
14 a cognizable claim upon which relief may be granted, and seeks monetary damages from a
15 defendant that is immune from such relief. As Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will grant
16 Plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint to cure these deficiencies to the extent she is
17 able to do so in good faith. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
18 Plaintiff’s amended complaint should be brief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), but it must state what
19 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights, Iqbal,
20 556 U.S. at 678-79. Although accepted as true, the “[f]actual allegations must be [sufficient] to
21 raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . .” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations
22 omitted). Additionally, Plaintiff may not change the nature of this suit by adding new, unrelated
23 claims in his first amended complaint. George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no
24 “buckshot” complaints).
25 Finally, Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint.
26 Lacey v. Maricopa Cty., 693 F.3d 896, 927 (9th Cir. 2012). Therefore, Plaintiff’s amended
27 complaint must be “complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading.”
28 Local Rule 220.
1 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:
2 1. The Clerk’s Office shall send Plaintiff a complaint form;
3 2. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall file a
4 first amended complaint curing the deficiencies identified by the Court in this order or file a
5 notice of voluntary dismissal; and
6 3. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint in compliance with this order, the
7 Court will recommend dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order
8 and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
9
IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
11 Dated: June 16, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28