“plaintiffs in federal court are not required to plead with 11 precision legal theories”
How later courts described this case
- “plaintiffs in federal court are not required to plead with 11 precision legal theories”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 | Gayle W. Brown, No. 2:19-cev-01921-KJM-AC
12 Plaintiff, ORDER
13 v.
Simpson Strong-Tie Company, Inc.,
1S Defendant.
16
17 The court conducted a final pretrial conference in this employment discrimination case on
18 | February 11, 2022. See Final Pretrial Order, ECF No. 51. At the final pretrial conference, the
19 | parties requested that the court hear motions in /imine on an advanced briefing and hearing
20 | schedule, and the court did so on April 15, 2022. See ECF No. 63. The court denied without
21 | prejudice defendant’s fourth, fifth, and sixth motions in /imine; granted defendant’s ninth motion
22 | in limine; and ordered the parties to meet and confer to narrow their dispute regarding defendant’s
23 | eighth motion in limine. Id. The court resolves defendant’s four remaining motions in limine
24 | here.
25 | I. DEFENDANT?’S FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD MOTIONS
26 Defendant’s second motion in limine seeks to exclude any claim, evidence, testimony, or
27 | argument regarding claims not properly pled in the operative complaint. ECF No. 32. Defendant
28 | argues this includes plaintiffs hostile work environment claim. /d. While the court denied
1 plaintiff’s eleventh-hour motion to file a fourth amended complaint, see Mot. for Leave to Amend
2 Third Amended Complaint, ECF No. 53, it did so primarily on the grounds that plaintiff did not
3 cite the applicable rule, Rule 16, see Order at 2–3, ECF No. 55. Amendment is also unnecessary
4 because the court previously construed plaintiff’s third amended complaint to include a claim for
5 hostile work environment. See Am. Order Den. Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 28 at 6–8.
6 Indeed, plaintiff’s third amended complaint discusses “hostile work environment” in four places,
7 thus satisfying the requirement to “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
8 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting
9 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see also Benuzzi v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago,
10 647 F.3d 652, 664 (7th Cir. 2011) (“plaintiffs in federal court are not required to plead with
11 precision legal theories”). Accordingly, the court denies defendant’s second motion in limine.
12 Defendant’s first and third motions in limine involve evidence plaintiff wants to introduce
13 at trial that may support a hostile work environment claim. See ECF Nos. 31, 33. Because the
14 court has found plaintiff pled a hostile work environment claim, it denies without prejudice
15 defendant’s first and third motions in limine.
16 II. DEFENDANT’S SEVENTH MOTION
17 Defendant’s seventh motion seeks to exclude any evidence regarding Johnny Miles’
18 termination or other “me too” evidence. ECF No. 37. Defendant argues that courts “routinely
19 prohibit witnesses unrelated to the plaintiff’s case from offering such ‘me too’ evidence,” citing
20 Goff v. Continental Oil Co., 678 F.2d 593 (5th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds, Carter v.
21 South Cent. Bell, 912 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1990) and Haskell v. Kaman Corp., 743 F. 2d 113 (2d
22 Cir. 1984). ECF No. 37 at 2–3. Therefore, defendant concludes, “testimony by, or about, other
23 company employees who were allegedly subjected to discrimination by [defendant] should be
24 excluded as irrelevant under Rule 402.” Id. at 3.
25 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that in discrimination and retaliation cases plaintiffs
26 may rely upon comparisons with “similarly situated employees” if the comparison supports an
27 inference that retaliation was the motive. Hawn v. Executive Jet Mgmt., Inc., 615 F.3d 1151,
28 1156 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Heyne v. Carruso, 69 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir.1995) (reversing
1 | trial court’s decision to preclude “me too” evidence from other employees harassed by defendant,
2 | because evidence was probative of defendant’s motive for firing plaintiff). Even whether
3 | evidence of “discrimination by other supervisors is relevant . . . is fact based and depends on
4 | many factors, including how closely related the evidence is to the plaintiff's circumstances and
5 | theory of the case.” Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 388 (2008). The
6 | Eleventh Circuit has held that “me too” evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) “to prove the
7 | intent of [an employer] to discriminate and retaliate,” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., 513 F.3d
8 | 1261, 1286 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Demers v. Adams Homes of Northwest Florida, Inc.,
9 | 321 F. App’x 847, 853-854 (11th Cir. 2009), and under Rule 402, “as relevant to [employee’s]
10 | claim of hostile work environment” and whether an employer’s “antidiscrimination and
11 | antiretaliation policies ... were effective,” id. at 1236-37.
12 Here, the court has insufficient information before it to determine whether the “me too”
13 | testimony or evidence Johnny Miles or other employees would offer is relevant and should thus
14 | beadmitted. Accordingly, the court denies the motion without prejudice to specific objections
15 | at trial, which may be lodged after a detailed proffer outside the presence of the jury.
16 | Ill. CONCLUSION
17 The court denies defendant’s second motion. The court denies defendant’s first, third, and
18 | seventh motions without prejudice to specific objections at trial. This order resolves ECF
19 | Nos. 31, 32, 33, and 37.
20 IT IS SO ORDERED.
21 | DATED: May 16, 2022. [ (]
22 l ti / { q_/
33 CHIEF NT] ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE