Ford v. Kern High School District

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 OTHA FORD, Case No. 1:22-cv-00159-JLT-BAK

12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDING DISMISSING ACTION

13 v. FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

14 KERN HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., (ECF No. 8)

15 Defendants. OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN

DAYS

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17 I.

18 INTRODUCTION

19 Plaintiff Otha Ford (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil

20 rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States magistrate

21 judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. On March 29, 2022, the Court

22 screened Plaintiff’s first amended complaint and granted thirty (30) days to file a second

23 amended complaint. (ECF No. 7.) Currently before the Court is Plaintiff’s second amended

24 complaint, filed on April 25, 2022. (ECF No. 8.) For the reasons discussed herein, it is

25 recommended that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim.

26 II.

27 SCREENING REQUIREMENT

Notwithstanding any filing fee, the court shall dismiss a case if at any time the Court

1 determines that the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which

2 relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

3 such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000)

4 (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners);

5 Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis

6 proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. United States, 70

7 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis

8 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998)

9 (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). The Court exercises its discretion to

10 screen the plaintiff’s complaint in this action to determine if it “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii)

11 fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a

12 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

13 In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same

14 pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a

15 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R.

16 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

17 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

18 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

19 544, 555 (2007)).

20 In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and

21 accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

22 94 (2007). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint,

23 a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A]

24 complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability . . . ‘stops

25 short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting

26 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for

27 the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

1 III.

2 COMPLAINT ALLEGATIONS

3 The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of

4 the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

5 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint names the following Defendants: (1) Kern High

6 School (District); (2) Allen Paradise, Human Resources; (3) John Client, Director; (4) Matt

7 Despot, Supervisor; and (5) Alfonso Valdez, Assistant Director. (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”)

8 1-5,1 ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff claims federal question and diversity jurisdiction. (SAC at 5.)

9 Plaintiff states she is suing Defendants for $10,000,000.00. (SAC at 2.) Plaintiff states the

10 Defendants are defaming her name, discriminated against her, violated her rights in the

11 workplace, and are “refusing” to let her work. (Id.) Plaintiff also avers to the tort of

12 discrimination at the work place, harassment, and violation of her federal rights. (SAC at 3.)

13 Under relief, Plaintiff also avers to a request for punitive damages relating to an alleged

14 back and left knee injury that she states was neglected, referencing dates of February 19, 2014

15 and September of 2021, a denial of workers’ compensation, and a threat to kill Plaintiff. (SAC at

16 7.) Finally, another page attached avers to negligence, tort, no medical aid when Plaintiff fainted

17 at work, no paramedics were called, and that “they” let Plaintiff drive home under her condition.

18 (SAC at 8.)

19 IV.

20 DISCUSSION

21 A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

22 Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

23 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must

24 simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which

25 it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citation and internal

26 quotation marks omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals

27 1 All references to pagination of specific documents pertain to those as indicated on the upper right corners via the

CM/ECF electronic court docketing system.

1 of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

2 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). This is because, while factual allegations are accepted

3 as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57; Moss v. U.S.

4 Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient

5 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal,

6 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

7 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

8 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550

9 U.S. at 556).

10 Most of Plaintiff’s allegations are vague and conclusory statements alleging some form of

11 discrimination or back/leg injury related to her work. As currently pled, Plaintiff’s complaint

12 does not contain enough factual details to permit the Court to draw the reasonable inference that

13 any named Defendants are liable for any misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Most

14 significantly, after naming the individual Defendants, Plaintiff does not state any specific actions

15 that any named Defendants took relating to the alleged discrimination or other misconduct.

16 Plaintiff does not mention any of the individual Defendants again after naming them as

17 Defendants.

18 For these reasons, Plaintiff’s complaint does not comply with the requirements of Rule

19 8(a)(2). The Court advised Plaintiff of this deficiency in granting leave to file amended

20 complaints, however, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed to cure such deficiencies. (See ECF Nos. 5

21 at 4; 7 at 4.)

22 B. Federal Discrimination Law

23 Under Title VII, an employer is prohibited from discriminating against any individual

24 because of the individual’s race or color. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d

25 1019, 1028 (9th Cir. 2006). To establish a prima facie case for Title VII discrimination, plaintiff

26 must show the following: (1) they are a member of a protected class; (2) they were qualified for

27 the position; (3) they suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated

1 Services of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 847 (9th Cir. 2004).

2 Plaintiff’s complaint contains insufficient facts and fails to state any cognizable claim.

3 C. Allegations of Defamation, Negligence, and Wrongful Termination

4 Plaintiff avers to a claim for defamation. To bring a claim for defamation in a Section

5 1983 action, Plaintiff must meet the “stigma-plus,” or “defamation-plus” standard.

6 “To establish a claim for defamation under Section 1983, a plaintiff must first establish

7 defamation under state law.” Flores v. City of Bakersfield, No. 1:17-CV-1393-JLT, 2019 WL

8 7038385, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2019) (citing Crowe v. County of San Diego, 242 F.Supp.2d

9 740, 746 (S.D. Cal. 2003)). Under California law, the elements of a defamation claim are: “(a) a

10 publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory, and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural

11 tendency to injure or that causes special damage.” Kaufman v. United Health Group Inc., 546

12 Fed. Appx. 691, 692 (9th Cir.2013) (quoting Taus v. Loftus, 40 Cal.4th 683, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 775,

13 151 P.3d 1185, 1209 (Cal.2007)). To be actionable, an allegedly defamatory statement must,

14 among other things, “contain a provably false factual connotation.” Gilbrook v. City of

15 Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 861 (9th Cir.) (citation omitted). “Under California law, although a

16 plaintiff need not plead the allegedly defamatory statement verbatim, the allegedly defamatory

17 statement must be specifically identified, and the plaintiff must plead the substance of the

18 statement. Jacobson v. Schwarzenegger, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1216 (C.D. Cal. 2004).

19 In a § 1983 action, injury to reputation alone is not enough to state a claim. “The

20 procedural due process rights of the Fourteenth Amendment apply only when there is a

21 deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.” WMX Techs., Inc. v.

22 Miller (“WMX II”), 197 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 1999). The Supreme Court has made it clear

23 that reputation alone is not an interest protected by the Constitution. WMX II, 197 F.3d at 373;

24 see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 706 (1976) (“the Court has never held that the mere defamation

25 of an individual, whether by branding him disloyal or otherwise, was sufficient to invoke the

26 guarantees of procedural due process absent an accompanying loss of government

27 employment”). “[R]eputational harm alone does not suffice for a constitutional claim.” Miller

1 injury to that interest . . . inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of

2 any ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ recognized by state or federal law.” Paul, 424 U.S at 712. Plaintiff

3 must demonstrate the loss of a recognizable property or liberty interest in conjunction with the

4 allegation that they suffered injury to reputation. Miller, 355 F.3d at 1179; Cooper v. Dupnik,

5 924 F.2d 1520, 1532 (9th Cir. 1991), rev’d on other grounds, 963 F.2d 1220, 1235 n.6 (9th Cir.

6 1992)). A plaintiff can meet this test by showing that “injury to reputation was inflicted in

7 connection with a federally protected right” or that “injury to reputation caused the denial of a

8 federally protected right.” Herb Hallman Chevrolet, Inc. v. Nash–Holmes, 169 F.3d 636, 645

9 (9th Cir. 1999); Cooper, 924 F.2d at 1532-33. This is referred to both as a “defamation-plus” or

10 “stigma-plus” claim. See, e.g., Flores, 2019 WL 7038385, at *17.

11 Plaintiff has not put forth factual allegations that his reputation was injured in connection

12 with a federally protected right or that the damage caused him to be denied a federally protected

13 right. Even if Plaintiff could not meet the defamation-plus standard but was able to demonstrate

14 defamation under California law, the Court would also decline to exercise supplemental

15 jurisdiction over such state claim because Plaintiff failed to state a separate cognizable federal

16 claim, as explained above. See Ward v. Webber, No. 118CV00916SABPC, 2018 WL 3615853,

17 at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 26, 2018) (“Because Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable federal claim, the

18 Court will not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law [slander] claim, even if he

19 cures the deficiencies and states a claim.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Herman Family

20 Revocable Trust v. Teddy Bear, 254 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2001)).

21 Similarly, to the extent Plaintiff is making a claim for wrongful termination, or alleging

22 negligence relating to fainting at work or some other injury at work, the Court would decline to

23 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.

24 V.

25 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

26 The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claim for a violation of their

27 federal rights in this action.

1 | amended complaint filed April 25, 2022 (ECF No. 8), be DISMISSED for failure to state a

2 | cognizable claim.

3 This findings and recommendations is submitted to the district judge assigned to this

4 | action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen

5 | (14) days of service of this recommendation, Plaintiff may file written objections to this findings

6 | and recommendations with the court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

7 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The district judge will review the

8 | magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

9 | Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the

10 | waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing

11 | Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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B IT IS SO ORDERED. DAM Le

14 | Dated: _May 5, 2022 _ ee

Is UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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