“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot 23 use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. He must seek federal 24 habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”
How later courts described this case
- “[A] prisoner in state custody cannot 23 use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. He must seek federal 24 habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”
- a plaintiff 8 must show an official knew of and disregarded a serious risk to his health
- dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring 19 amendment of complaint
- dismissal for noncompliance with local rule
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JUAN C. GUZMAN, Case No. 1:21-cv-01465-BAM (PC)
12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO
RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO
13 v. ACTION
14 CATES, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO
DISMISS ACTION, WITH PREJUDICE, FOR
15 Defendants. FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE
TO OBEY COURT ORDER, AND FAILURE
16 TO PROSECUTE
17 (ECF No. 5)
18 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE
19
20 I. Background
21 Plaintiff Juan C. Guzman (“Plaintiff”) is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil
22 rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate
23 Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
24 On January 4, 2022, the Court issued a screening order granting Plaintiff leave to file a
25 first amended complaint or a notice of voluntary dismissal within thirty (30) days. (ECF No. 5.)
26 The Court expressly warned Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Court’s order would
27 result in a recommendation for dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court
28 order and for failure to state a claim. (Id. at 9.) The deadline has expired, and Plaintiff has failed
1 to file an amended complaint or otherwise communicate with the Court.
2 II. Failure to State a Claim
3 A. Screening Requirement
4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a
5 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
6 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous
7 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary
8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).
9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
10 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as
14 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
15 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
16 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires
17 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable
18 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret
19 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully
20 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility
21 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
22 B. Plaintiff’s Allegations
23 Plaintiff is currently housed at the California Correctional Institution (“CCI”), at
24 Tehachapi, California, where the events in the complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff
25 names the following defendants: (1) B. Cates, Warden, (2) Baker, CCRA Case Records,
26 (3) Edward, Counselor, and (4) CDCR Board of Parole.
27 Plaintiff alleges as follows.
28 ///
1 I’m here in prison suffered injury in my head and blinded my right eye and been
incarcerated for 23 yrs with life sentenced for the same and similar offenses and
2
range 3-6-8. The criminal procedure never implement by both parties, the court
neither the District Attorney’s office never submitted report for retention in
3
CDCR central file. That violated my constitutional rights. There’s no accuracy
4 from the Parole Board and the case records, see U.S.S.G. sentencing guidelines.
I’m also detected positive with Covid-19 without a proper care.
5
6 (ECF No. 1, p. 3 (unedited text).) Plaintiff further alleges:
7 I’m receiving punishment here in prison for 23 years with a mistrial deadlock,
attached copies. I’m a low risk CSRA-low-1 with 33.3% and the charges range 3-
8
6-8. The warden responsibilities is to send back to the court if there’s no report
9 submitted for retention to the CDCR central file within 30 days, but never happen.
CDCR also agreed Playa v. Brown, June 5, 2015 medical and mental issue will
10 receive 50% never happen. A mistrial deadlock and sent to prison never happen
in the history of America and violated my Constitutional rights.
11
12 (Id. (unedited text).)
13 C. Discussion
14 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and fails to
15 state a cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
16 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
17 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
18 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
19 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
20 of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
21 (citation omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
22 claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
23 at 570). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also
24 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57.
25 Although Plaintiff's complaint is short, it is not a plain statement of his claims. As a basic
26 matter, the complaint does not clearly state what happened, when it happened or who was
27 involved. Plaintiff’s allegations must be based on facts as to what happened and not conclusions.
28 The allegations are hard to follow, and it is unclear what each defendant did which Plaintiff
1 claims violated his rights. In fact, it is difficult to understand what Plaintiff claims is the
2 purported Constitutional violation.
3 2. Linkage Requirement
4 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:
5 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,
6
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the
7 party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
8
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
10 The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between the actions
11 of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v.
12 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, (1976). The Ninth
13 Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right,
14 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s
15 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the
16 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
17 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to link all Defendants to potential constitutional violations.
18 Plaintiff must name individual defendants and allege what each defendant did or did not do that
19 resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff has not alleged what each individual
20 defendant did or did not do that caused the asserted deprivation.
21 3. Supervisory Personnel
22 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Cates, or any other defendant, based
23 solely upon his or her supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on
24 supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of
25 respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011,
26 1020–21 (9th Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v.
27 Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
28 ///
1 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or
2 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
3 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v.
4 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). Supervisory liability may also exist without any
5 personal participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a
6 repudiation of the constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.”
7 Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations
8 marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).
9 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his
10 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed
11 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713
12 (9th Cir. 2010). When a defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between such
13 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v.
14 Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir.
15 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in
16 civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.
17 1982).
18 Plaintiff has failed to allege direct participation in the alleged violations by Defendant
19 Cates. Plaintiff has failed to allege the causal link between defendant and the claimed
20 constitutional violation which must be specifically alleged. He does not make a sufficient
21 showing of any personal participation, direction, or knowledge on the defendant’s part regarding
22 any other prison officials’ actions. Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendant personally
23 participated in the alleged deprivations.
24 Plaintiff fails to allege what the specific policy is and the causal link between such
25 defendant and the claimed constitutional violation. Plaintiff also has failed to plead facts showing
26 that any policy was a moving force behind the alleged constitutional violations. See Willard v.
27 Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 14-0760, 2014 WL 6901849, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2014)
28 (“To premise a supervisor’s alleged liability on a policy promulgated by the supervisor, plaintiff
1 must identify a specific policy and establish a ‘direct causal link’ between that policy and the
2 alleged constitutional deprivation.”). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that the
3 policy itself is a repudiation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights.
4 4. No Constitutional Protection for Early Parole
5 To the extent Plaintiff is seeking early parole, Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional
6 violation based on denial of early parole consideration, because Plaintiff has no protected liberty
7 interest in parole. There is no right under the U.S. Constitution to be conditionally released
8 before the expiration of a valid sentence. Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 220 (2011); see also
9 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (there is no federal
10 constitutional right to parole). It follows that there is no constitutional right to parole
11 consideration. Deprivation of any rights to resentencing or early parole therefore cannot be
12 vindicated here. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (only deprivation of rights secured by federal law is
13 actionable under Section 1983); see also Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996)
14 (state law issue cannot be transformed into federal law issue by merely invoking due process).
15 5. Habeas Action
16 The Court notes that is unclear what relief Plaintiff seeks in the instant proceeding and
17 whether Plaintiff intends to state a habeas claim.
18 To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to challenge the validity of his conviction and his
19 incarceration, the exclusive method for asserting that challenge is by filing a petition for writ of
20 habeas corpus. It has long been established that state prisoners cannot challenge the fact or
21 duration of their confinement in a section 1983 action, and that their sole remedy lies in habeas
22 corpus relief. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 78 (2005) (“[A] prisoner in state custody cannot
23 use a § 1983 action to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. He must seek federal
24 habeas corpus relief (or appropriate state relief) instead.”).
25 6. Privacy Act
26 It is not clear if Plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
27 § 552a. To the extent that he is, he fails to state a claim. The Privacy Act only applies to the
28 federal government, not state or local government agencies. United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d
1 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2009). “The Privacy Act prohibits federal agencies from disclosing certain
2 personal records without an individual's consent, and also provides a means for an individual to
3 access his or her records maintained by a federal agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(1).” Jones v.
4 Jimenez, 2017 WL 85783, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2017), report and recommendation adopted
5 sub nom. Jones v. Lundy, 2017 WL 915591 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2017). The Ninth Circuit “has
6 held that the private right of civil action created by the Privacy Act, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)
7 (providing that a private individual ‘may bring a civil action against the agency’), ‘is specifically
8 limited to actions against agencies of the United States Government. The civil remedy provisions
9 of the statute do not apply against private individuals, state agencies, private entities, or state and
10 local officials.’ ” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis omitted)
11 (quoting Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985)). As Plaintiff is only suing
12 state and local officials, Plaintiff has not stated a cognizable claim as Plaintiff has no right of
13 action against the defendants under the Privacy Act of 1974.
14 7. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Need
15 Plaintiff alleges he tested positive for Covid and has not received proper care. Plaintiff
16 names as a defendant in the case caption, “Medical Issue-Covid-19, Injury.”1
17 “To sustain an Eighth Amendment claim, the plaintiff must prove a denial of ‘the minimal
18 civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ occurring through ‘deliberate indifference’ by prison
19 personnel or officers.” Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
20 The government must give medical care to incarcerated persons. Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d
21 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–05 (1976)). Failure to do
22 so can constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. In order to prevail on an inadequate
23 medical care claim, a plaintiff must show “deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs.”
24 Id. (quotations omitted). In the Ninth Circuit, the test for deliberate indifference consists of two
25 parts. Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). “First, the plaintiff must show a
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27 1 The “defendant” appears to be named in error and is in fact, Plaintiff’s claim regarding
contracting Covid. The Clerk of the Court was instructed to terminate defendant “Medical Issue-
28 Covid-19, Injury.” (ECF No. 5.)
1 serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in
2 further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id. (citations and
3 internal quotation marks omitted).
4 “Second, the plaintiff must show the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately
5 indifferent.” Id. “Th[e] second prong . . . is satisfied by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to
6 respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the indifference.”
7 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096; see Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (a plaintiff
8 must show an official knew of and disregarded a serious risk to his health). “Indifference ‘may
9 appear when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it
10 may be shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care,’ ” but “an
11 ‘inadvertent [or negligent] failure to provide adequate medical care’ alone does not state a claim.”
12 Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). “A difference of opinion does
13 not amount to a deliberate indifference to [a prisoner’s] serious medical needs.” Sanchez v. Vild,
14 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989).
15 Plaintiff has failed to link any defendant to his Eighth Amendment claim or state any
16 factual basis for any defendant’s liability under the Eighth Amendment. Even if the Court
17 accepts that Covid is a serious illness, Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that each defendant
18 was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need.
19 8. Parole Board
20 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim against the parole board. “[P]arole board
21 officials are entitled to absolute immunity from liability for damages for their actions taken when
22 processing parole applications.” Bermudez v. Duenas, 936 F.2d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir. 1991);
23 Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (9th Cir. 1981).
24 9. Brown v. Plata
25 Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is asking for immediate release based on the decision in
26 Brown v. Plata, the Court notes that “a remedial court order, standing alone, cannot serve as the
27 basis for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because such orders do not create rights, privileges or
28 immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Thus, Plata by itself does
1 not provide any substantive right on which plaintiff can rely. . . .” Thomas v. Alameda County,
2 2015 WL 1201290, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2015) (citation and internal quotation marks
3 omitted). See also Peyton v. Brown, 584 F. App’x 603, 604 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he decision in
4 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1946–47, 179 L.Ed.2d 969 (2011), requiring the
5 State of California to reduce prison overcrowding to improve mental health and medical services
6 to inmates, does not give [Plaintiff] cognizable claims for immediate or temporary supervised
7 release merely because he also alleges deprivations arising from prison overcrowding.”).
8 III. Failure to Prosecute and Failure to Obey a Court Order
9 A. Legal Standard
10 Local Rule 110 provides that “[f]ailure . . . of a party to comply with these Rules or with
11 any order of the Court may be grounds for imposition by the Court of any and all sanctions . . .
12 within the inherent power of the Court.” District courts have the inherent power to control their
13 dockets and “[i]n the exercise of that power they may impose sanctions including, where
14 appropriate, . . . dismissal.” Thompson v. Hous. Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A
15 court may dismiss an action, with prejudice, based on a party’s failure to prosecute an action,
16 failure to obey a court order, or failure to comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ghazali v. Moran, 46
17 F.3d 52, 53–54 (9th Cir. 1995) (dismissal for noncompliance with local rule); Ferdik v. Bonzelet,
18 963 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with an order requiring
19 amendment of complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 130–33 (9th Cir. 1987)
20 (dismissal for failure to comply with court order).
21 In determining whether to dismiss an action, the Court must consider several factors:
22 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its
23 docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of
24 cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson v. Duncan, 779
25 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986); Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988).
26 B. Discussion
27 Here, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint is overdue, and he has failed to comply with the
28 Court’s orders. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket if Plaintiff ceases litigating his
1 case. Thus, the Court finds that both the first and second factors weigh in favor of dismissal.
2 The third factor, risk of prejudice to defendant, also weighs in favor of dismissal, since a
3 presumption of injury arises from the occurrence of unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action.
4 Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976). The fourth factor usually weighs against
5 dismissal because public policy favors disposition on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d
6 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose
7 responsibility it is to move a case toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes
8 progress in that direction,” which is the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products
9 Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
10 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in
11 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262;
12 Malone, 833 at 132–33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. The Court’s January 4, 2022 screening
13 order expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to file an amended complaint would result in a
14 recommendation of dismissal of this action, with prejudice, for failure to obey a court order and
15 for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 5, p. 9.) Thus, Plaintiff had adequate warning that dismissal
16 could result from his noncompliance.
17 Additionally, at this stage in the proceedings there is little available to the Court that
18 would constitute a satisfactory lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further
19 unnecessary expenditure of its scarce resources. Although Plaintiff paid the filing fee and is not
20 proceeding in forma pauperis in this action, in light of his incarceration it is not clear whether
21 monetary sanctions will be of any use, and the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is likely to
22 have no effect given that Plaintiff has ceased litigating his case.
23 IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
24 Accordingly, the Court HEREBY ORDERS the Clerk of the Court to randomly assign a
25 district judge to this action.
26 Further, the Court finds that dismissal is the appropriate sanction and HEREBY
27 RECOMMENDS that this action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim
28 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to obey a Court order, and for Plaintiff’s failure to
1 prosecute this action.
2 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge
3 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen
4 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written
5 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s
6 Findings and Recommendation.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the
7 specified time may result in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual
8 findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v.
9 Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
10
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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12 Dated: February 22, 2022 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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