Opinion

Zachary Castaneda v. Owner VCI Medical Center

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Dec 21, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.0%

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ZACHARY CASTANEDA, ) NO. SACV 21-2060-FMO (AGR)

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Plaintiff, )

13 ) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

v. ) COURT SHOULD NOT

14 ) RECOMMEND (1) DENIAL OF

OWNER UCI MEDICAL CENTER, ) REQUEST TO PROCEED

15 et al., ) WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF

) FILING FEES; AND (2)

16 Defendants. ) DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT AS

) BARRED BY STATUTE OF

17 ) LIMITATIONS

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The court orders Plaintiff to show cause on or before January 21, 2022,

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why this court should not recommend dismissal of his complaint as barred by the

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statute of limitations and denial of his request to proceed without prepayment of

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filing fees.

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1 I.

2 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

3 On December 15, 2021, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, constructively filed a

4 civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

5 Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging Eighth

6 Amendment claims based on an incident alleged to have occurred on February 2,

7 2017. He names four defendants: Owner of the University of California Irvine

8 (“UCI”) Medical Center; Chief D. Valentin of the Santa Ana Police Department;

9 Probation Officer M. Lesko; and the Santa Ana Police Department. (Compl. at 2-

10 3, 6.)1

11 II.

12 ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

13 The complaint stems from incidents on February 2, 2017. Plaintiff alleges

14 that he was parked outside a 7-11 with his son when Probation Officer Lesko did

15 a random probation search. (Compl. at 6.) Plaintiff was beaten, tasered and

16 blacked out. (Id. at 10.) Ambulance paramedics took him to the hospital and

17 injected him with drugs he did not request. (Id.) Plaintiff woke up the next day at

18 UCI Medical Center. He had IVs and machines that he did not request. The

19 medical center did not take an MRI of his brain, back or neck. (Id.)

20 Plaintiff alleges Eighth Amendment claims against all defendants. (Id. at 4.)

21 He seeks an apology, monetary relief and discipline of Chief Valentin and the

22 gang unit of the Santa Ana Police Department. (Id. at 14-15.)

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28 1 Because the complaint is not paginated consecutively, the court cites

page numbers assigned by CM/ECF in the header of the document.

1 III.

2 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

3 It appears that Plaintiff’s suit is barred by the statute of limitations on the

4 face of the complaint. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954,

5 969 (9th Cir. 2010).

6 Federal courts apply the forum state’s analogous statute of limitations to §

7 1983 claims. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007); Fink v. Shedler, 192

8 F.3d 911, 914 (9th Cir. 1999). In California, the applicable limitations period is

9 two years. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. Assuming Plaintiff was incarcerated

10 during the limitations period, he may be entitled to two additional years of

11 statutory tolling under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a). Federal courts also apply

12 the forum state’s law regarding tolling, including equitable tolling, when not

13 inconsistent with federal law. Mills v. City of Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1166 (9th

14 Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 388 (2019).

15 Federal law, however, governs when a claim accrues. Id.; Wallace, 549

16 U.S. at 388. “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff

17 knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the action.” Belanus

18 v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015). “‘The cause of action accrues

19 even though the full extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.’”

20 Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 (citation omitted).

21 Plaintiff’s complaint arises from the incident on February 2, 2017. Any §

22 1983 claim arising from this incident accrued on that date for all defendants

23 except UCI Medical Center because Plaintiff was aware of his injuries at that

24 time. For UCI Medical Center, the statute of limitations began to run on the next

25 day, when Plaintiff woke up and saw IVs and machines that he alleges he did not

26 request. See Belanus, 796 F.3d at 1025. The statute of limitations expired two

27 years later. Even assuming Plaintiff has been incarcerated from February 2,

28 2017 through the filing of the complaint for a term less than life – which he does

1 not allege – and is therefore entitled to two years of statutory tolling under Cal.

2 Civ. Proc. Code § 352.1(a), the statute of limitations expired four years later, or

3 no later than February 3, 2021.

4 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint would be barred by the statute of

5 limitations. The complaint does not indicate any basis for tolling the statute of

6 limitations. “Under California law, a plaintiff must meet three conditions to

7 equitably toll a statute of limitations: ‘(1) defendant must have had timely notice of

8 the claim; (2) defendant must not be prejudiced by being required to defend the

9 otherwise barred claim; and (3) plaintiff’s conduct must have been reasonable

10 and in good faith.’” Fink, 192 F.3d at 916 (citation omitted).

11 Moreover, Plaintiff’s claims are defective for the following reasons.

12 A. Bivens Claims

13 Plaintiff alleges claims under Bivens. As the complaint form explains, a

14 Bivens claim is available only against federal officials. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.

15 The defendants named are not federal officials. Plaintiff cannot state Bivens

16 claims and must proceed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

17 B. UCI Medical Center

18 Plaintiff sues the “owner” of the UCI Medical Center. UCI is part of the

19 University of California. Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages are barred by

20 Eleventh Amendment immunity. The University of California and the Board of

21 Regents of the University of California are deemed instrumentalities of the state

22 of California for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Jackson v. Hayakawa,

23 682 F.2d 1344, 1350 (9th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal

24 jurisdiction over claims against a state unless the state has consented to suit or

25 Congress has abrogated its immunity. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.

26 Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99-100 (1984). California has not consented to be sued

27 under § 1983 in federal court, and the Supreme Court has held that § 1983 was

28 not intended to abrogate a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Dittman

1 v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Atascadero State

2 Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985), and Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

3 159, 169 n.17 (1985)).

4 C. Chief Valentin

5 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Valentin is the Chief of the Santa Ana Police

6 Department but does not allege that he committed any acts or omissions that

7 resulted in an alleged constitutional violation against him.

8 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions

9 of their employees under a theory of respondeat superior. A supervisory

10 defendant may be liable under § 1983 if there exists either (1) personal

11 involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection

12 between the supervisor's wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation. Starr

13 v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011). The causal connection may be

14 established by setting in motion a series of acts by others, or by knowingly

15 refusing to terminate a series of acts by others, that the supervisor knew or

16 reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional

17 injury. Id. at 1207–08. “A supervisor can be liable in his individual capacity for

18 his own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his

19 subordinates; for his acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation; or for conduct

20 that showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1208;

21 see also Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (“A supervisor is only

22 liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor participated

23 in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent

24 them.”) Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official

25 personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of

26 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

27 D. Monell Claims Against Santa Ana Police Department

28 A local government entity is not vicariously liable under § 1983 for its

1 employees or agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 694

2 (1978); Streit v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 565 (9th Cir. 2001). If

3 Plaintiff contends that individual employees are at fault, then he must name those

4 individuals as defendants and allege what each of them did, or failed to do, in

5 violation of his constitutional rights.

6 A local governmental entity may be held liable under § 1983 "when

7 execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or

8 by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

9 the injury." Id. "Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government's

10 lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and

11 widespread as to practically have the force of law." Connick v. Thompson, 563

12 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91, 694. A local governmental

13 entity is liable only if there is "a direct causal link" between its policies or customs

14 and the alleged constitutional violation. Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n,

15 541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,

16 385 (1989)).

17 Plaintiff does not allege a police department policy, custom or longstanding

18 practice, and does not allege how any such policy, custom or practice has a

19 “direct causal link” to any constitutional violation against him.

20 IV.

21 ORDER

22 For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED THAT Plaintiff shall show

23 cause in writing, by no later than January 21, 2022, why the court should not

24 recommend that the complaint be dismissed as barred by the statute of

25 limitations and that Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees be

26 denied.

27 If Plaintiff fails to file a response to this order to show cause on or before

28 January 21, 2022, this court may recommend that the complaint be dismissed as

1 barred by the statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs request to proceed without

2 prepayment of fees be denied.

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5 DATED: December 21, 2021 Ubi. A Keaendeng,

6 United States Magistrate Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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