Angelica R. Untalan v. Warren A. Stanley

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8 United States District Court

9 Central District of California

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11 ANGELICA R. UNTALAN, Case № 2:19-cv-07599-ODW (JEMx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

13 v. DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

AND PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR

14 WARREN A. STANLEY, et al., PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

15 Defendants. [94] [97]

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17 I. INTRODUCTION

18 Before the Court are the parties’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment on

19 Plaintiff Angelica Untalan’s claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California

20 Civil Code section 52.1. (Defs. Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“DMot.”), ECF No. 94; Pl.

21 Mot. Partial Summ. J. (“PMot.”), ECF No. 97.) For the reasons below, the Court

22 GRANTS in part and DENIES in part both Motions.1

23 II. BACKGROUND

24 On May 12, 2019, Angelica Untalan was driving her Pontiac Grand Am (the

25 “Vehicle”) in Los Angeles County when she was stopped by Officer Paola Trinidad of

26 the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”). (Defs. Statement of Genuine Issues ISO

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28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motions, the Court deemed the

matters appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15.

1 Defs. Opp’n (“DSGI”) 1–2, ECF No. 99-2.)2 Trinidad determined Untalan had a

2 suspended license and consequently impounded the Vehicle pursuant to California

3 Vehicle Code section 14602.6 (“Section 14602.6”). (DSGI 3–4.) This resulted in a

4 thirty-day impound that required CHP authorization for release. It could have been

5 impounded under a different code section that did not provide a 30-day impound or

6 require CHP authorization for release. (Pl. Statement of Uncontroverted Facts ISO

7 PMot. (“PSUF”) 5–6, 14, ECF No. 97-1; DSGI 5–6, 14.) Trinidad ordered Untalan

8 out of her vehicle and patted her down, despite having no reason to believe she posed

9 a threat. (DSGI 7–11.)

10 When Untalan contacted the tow company to retrieve the Vehicle she was

11 informed she needed CHP authorization. (DSGI 13–14.) On May 14, 2019, Untalan

12 went to the CHP office with a friend who was licensed and could drive her car, but

13 was informed her Vehicle would not be released due to the thirty-day hold.

14 (PSUF 15–17.)3

15 On May 17, 2019, Untalan’s counsel spoke with CHP Sergeant Justin Vaughan

16 on the telephone. (DSGI 17; Pl. Statement of Genuine Issues ISO Pl. Opp’n

17 (“PSGI”) 16, ECF No. 101.) Untalan’s counsel informed Vaughan that refusal to

18 release the Vehicle was wrongful under Ninth Circuit precedent, Brewster v. Beck,

19 859 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2017). (DSGI 18.) Vaughan acknowledged the Brewster

20 decision but stated it did not apply; he advised that Untalan could request a storage

21 hearing for release of the Vehicle. (DSGI 19–20.)

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2 Both parties submit objections to evidence and/or improper argument in their statements of fact.

23 The Court OVERRULES all boilerplate objections and improper argument. (See Scheduling and

Case Mgmt. Order 7–9, ECF No. 33.) Further, where the objected evidence is unnecessary to the

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resolution of the Motions or supports facts not in dispute, the Court need not resolve those objections

25 here. To the extent the Court relies on objected-to evidence in this Order, those objections are

OVERRULED. See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1122 (E.D. Cal.

26 2006) (proceeding with only necessary rulings on evidentiary objections).

3 Defendants purport to dispute the facts underlying the May 14 event but offer no evidence in

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support, instead relying solely on objections to Untalan’s evidence. (See DSGI 15–16.) As noted

28 above, Defendants’ objections are overruled. Therefore, the Court considers these facts undisputed.

See C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3.

1 On May 23, 2019, CHP Lieutenant Jonathan Cochran conducted Untalan’s

2 storage hearing; CHP Lieutenant Joseph Zagorski was also present. (DSGI 21, 26, 28

3 PSGI 18.) Cochran authorized a conditional release of the Vehicle to Untalan’s

4 counsel, who was not to allow Untalan access to the Vehicle for the remainder of the

5 thirty-day period unless she obtained a valid license. (DSGI 26.) Untalan’s counsel

6 informed Zagorski that Ninth Circuit authority required the CHP to release the

7 Vehicle, but he refused to order an unconditional release. (DSGI 31–32.) CHP

8 Captain Tariq Johnson approved the May 23, 2019 Storage Hearing Report form after

9 reviewing the underlying documents, including the citation, the form documenting

10 seizure, a memorandum correcting that form, and Untalan’s driving history.

11 (DSGI 35–36.)

12 By the time of the conditional release on May 23, Untalan could not afford to

13 pay the accrued towing and storage fees. (PSUF 27.) On June 19, 2019, Untalan’s

14 counsel sent a letter to Johnson stating that Untalan had previously offered to pay any

15 fees and have a licensed driver pick up her car, and that, under Brewster, the Vehicle

16 should have been released on May 14, 2019. (DSGI 37.) Johnson forwarded that

17 letter to CHP’s legal department. (DSGI 38.) On July 1, 2019, the Vehicle was sold

18 at a lien sale and Untalan lost all possession of it. (DSGI 43.)

19 Untalan asserts three claims against Defendants Warren A. Stanley, Joseph

20 Farrow, Johnson, Cochran, Zagorski, Vaughan, and Trinidad (“Defendants”) in their

21 individual capacities: (1) unlawful search of person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

22 California Civil Code section 52.1(c), against Trinidad only; (2) unlawful vehicle

23 impound under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against all Defendants; and (3) violation of the

24 Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1, against Stanley, Cochran, Zagorski, and

25 Vaughan. (First Am. Compl. (“FAC”) ¶¶ 33–43, ECF No. 84.)

26 Untalan and Defendants all move for partial summary judgment. Untalan seeks

27 partial summary judgment as to her first and second claims. (See generally PMot.)

28 Defendants seek partial summary judgment as to Untalan’s second and third claims.

1 (See generally DMot.) The motions are fully briefed. (Defs. Opp’n to PMot., ECF

2 No. 99; Pl. Reply, ECF No. 105; Pl. Opp’n to DMot., ECF No. 100; Defs. Reply, ECF

3 No. 103.4)

4 III. LEGAL STANDARD

5 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no

6 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

7 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of establishing the absence of a

8 genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

9 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986), and the court must view the facts and draw reasonable

10 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Scott v. Harris,

11 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that

12 fact might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is

13 “genuine” where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

14 the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

15 Conclusory or speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues

16 of fact and defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp.,

17 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh

18 conflicting evidence or make credibility determinations, there must be more than a

19 mere scintilla of contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu v.

20 Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 2000).

21 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply

22 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a

23 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd.

24 v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); see Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

25 Nor will uncorroborated allegations and “self-serving testimony” create a genuine

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4 As Defendants’ Reply exceeds the permitted page length, the Court does not consider it beyond

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page twelve. See Standing Order of Hon. Otis D. Wright II, VII.A.3, https://www.cacd.uscourts.

28 gov/honorable-otis-d-wright-ii (“Replies shall not exceed 12 pages . . . Filings that do not conform to

the Local Rules and this Order will not be considered.”).

1 issue of material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061

2 (9th Cir. 2002). The court should grant summary judgment against a party who fails

3 to demonstrate facts sufficient to establish an element essential to the case when that

4 party will ultimately bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

5 Pursuant to the Local Rules, parties moving for summary judgment must file a

6 proposed “Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law” that should

7 set out “the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine

8 dispute.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-1. A party opposing the motion must file a “Statement of

9 Genuine Disputes” setting forth all material facts as to which it contends there exists a

10 genuine dispute. C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-2. “[T]he Court may assume that material facts as

11 claimed and adequately supported by the moving party are admitted to exist without

12 controversy except to the extent that such material facts are (a) included in the

13 ‘Statement of Genuine Disputes’ and (b) controverted by declaration or other written

14 evidence filed in opposition to the motion.” C.D. Cal. L.R. 56-3.

15 IV. DISCUSSION

16 The Court first considers Untalan’s motion and then turns to Defendants’.

17 A. Untalan’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

18 Untalan seeks summary judgment regarding her first two claims, unlawful

19 search of person against Trinidad and unlawful vehicle impound against Defendants.

20 Defendants do not oppose Untalan’s motion with respect to the first claim for

21 unlawful search of person. (Defs. Opp’n 2 n.1.) The Court has reviewed the evidence

22 and finds Untalan has adequately supported partial summary judgment as to this

23 claim. Trinidad cannot claim the search was for her personal protection while Untalan

24 was being transported because Trinidad did not transport her, but left her on the street.

25 The Court thus focuses on her second claim, that Defendants’ impound of the Vehicle

26 violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court first addresses the impoundment’s

27 constitutionality and then assesses each Defendant’s liability.

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1 1. Fourth Amendment Violation

2 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

3 U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[thirty]-day impounds under

4 [S]ection 14602.6 are seizures for Fourth Amendment purposes.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of

5 Sonoma, 912 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 142 (2019); see

6 also Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1196 (“A seizure is ‘a meaningful interference with an

7 individual’s possessory interests in [her] property.’” (quoting Soldal v. Cook Cnty.,

8 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992))). “A seizure is justified under the Fourth Amendment only to

9 the extent that the government’s justification holds force. Thereafter, the government

10 must cease the seizure or secure a new justification.” Brewster, 859 F.3d at 1197.

11 While an initial seizure may be justified under Section 14602.6 pursuant to the

12 community caretaking exception, “[t]he exigency that justifie[s] the seizure vanishe[s]

13 once the vehicle arrive[s] in impound and [the owner] show[s] up with proof of

14 ownership and a valid driver’s license.” Id. at 1196; see also Sandoval, 912 F.3d

15 at 516 (“Once [the owner] was able to provide a licensed driver who could take

16 possession of the truck, the [government’s] community caretaking function was

17 discharged.”).

18 There is no dispute that Untalan’s vehicle was seized pursuant to

19 Section 14602.6, implicating the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Untalan presents

20 evidence that she went to the CHP office on May 14, 2019, to pay the accrued storage

21 fees and retrieve the Vehicle. (PSUF 15.) A friend who was licensed and could

22 legally drive her car accompanied her. (PSUF 15.) Despite this, CHP personnel did

23 not release the Vehicle. (See PSUF 16.) These facts plainly show Untalan’s Fourth

24 Amendment rights were violated as a matter of law under Brewster and Sandoval.

25 Defendants purport to dispute these facts but fail to provide counter evidence or

26 raise a genuine issue for trial. Instead, they merely object to the admissibility of

27 Untalan’s evidence on the grounds of relevancy, hearsay, and lack of foundation. (See

28 DGSI 15–16; Defs. Objs. ¶¶ 1, 2, 4, 9, 10, 12, ECF No. 99-1.) First, “relevance

1 objections are redundant” at the summary judgment stage, Burch, 433 F. Supp. 2d

2 at 1119, and Defendants’ hearsay and lack of foundation objections lack merit.

3 Further, “[a]t the summary judgment stage, we do not focus on the admissibility of the

4 evidence’s form. We instead focus on the admissibility of its contents.” Fraser v.

5 Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003). Untalan submits declaration and

6 deposition testimony that she went to the CHP office on May 14, 2019, accompanied

7 by Douglas Foster who showed the CHP officer his license and insurance, but the

8 officer refused to release the Vehicle. These facts are properly admissible before the

9 Court—they reflect Untalan’s personal knowledge and are not the hearsay statements

10 of others. See Gannon Int’l v. Blocker, 684 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding

11 hearsay objection properly overruled where it did “not even attempt to argue that the

12 information contained in [the] statement could not have been presented in an

13 admissible form at trial”). As such, Untalan has shown as a matter of law that she

14 suffered a Fourth Amendment violation when the CHP refused to release the

15 impounded Vehicle to her when the initial exigency had vanished.

16 2. Liability of Defendants5

17 Turning to Defendants’ individual liability, § 1983 states that “[e]very person

18 who, under color of [law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any . . . person . . . to

19 the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable

20 to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[F]or a person acting under color of state

21 law to be liable under section 1983 there must be a showing of personal participation

22 in the alleged rights deprivation.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir.

23 2002). “Section [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that

24 makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.” Monroe v.

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26 5 To the extent Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity in their opposition to

Untalan’s motion or in their affirmative motion for partial summary judgment, the Court previously

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considered Defendants’ argument on this issue and held they are not so entitled. (See generally

28 Defs. MJOP, ECF No. 45; MJOP Order, ECF No. 75.) The Court sees no substantive differences in

Defendants’ argument here and is not inclined to revisit the issue.

1 Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of

2 Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

3 “Generally, proximate cause is a question of fact.” Leaf v. United States,

4 588 F.2d 733, 736 (9th Cir. 1978), abrogated on other grounds by Sosa v. Alvarez-

5 Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). “Proximate cause is said to depend on whether the

6 conduct has been so significant and important a cause that the defendant should be

7 legally responsible.” Mendez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 897 F.3d 1067, 1076 (9th Cir.

8 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he touchstone of proximate cause in a

9 § 1983 action is foreseeability.” Id.

10 There is no dispute that the officers were acting under color of state law and, as

11 discussed above, no question that the series of events here is the cause in fact of the

12 constitutional violation—the prolonged impound. Thus, the question is whether

13 Defendants were each the proximate cause of that violation such that holding them

14 liable is appropriate. Although Untalan brings her second cause of action against all

15 Defendants, (FAC ¶¶ 38–39), she argues in her motion for the liability of only

16 Trinidad, Vaughan, Cochran, Zagorski, and Johnson, (See PMot. 11–16). The Court

17 addresses each Defendant’s liability in turn.

18 a. Trinidad

19 Untalan contends Trinidad’s decision to impound the Vehicle confers liability.

20 (PMot. 14.) However, Trinidad’s initial seizure was lawful and not the root of the

21 constitutional violation. Rather, the violation arose with the continued seizure of the

22 Vehicle, after Untalan was prevented from retrieving it with a licensed driver on

23 May 14, 2019. See Sandoval, 912 F.3d at 516–17 (holding that once the exigency is

24 extinguished, continued impoundment is unconstitutional). The evidence

25 demonstrates that Trinidad had no involvement in the continued impoundment.

26 Further, Untalan’s argument that Trinidad should have foreseen the subsequent

27 violation when she impounded pursuant to Section 14602.6, which provided a

28 thirty-day impound, rather than a different code section that did not, is not supported.

1 See id. at 519 (“[A] 30-day impound does not necessarily violate the Fourth

2 Amendment. Instead, such a prolonged seizure is only unconstitutional when it

3 continues in the absence of a warrant or any exception to the warrant requirement.”).

4 Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Trinidad as the

5 nonmoving party, a reasonable juror could find Trinidad would not have foreseen the

6 subsequent constitutional violation. Therefore, Untalan is not entitled to summary

7 judgment against Trinidad for the second cause of action, unlawful impound.

8 b. Vaughan

9 Turning to Vaughan, Untalan contends he is liable for the Fourth Amendment

10 violation because he refused to release the Vehicle despite knowing of the Brewster

11 decision. (PMot. 15.) The undisputed facts show that Untalan’s counsel spoke with

12 Vaughan on the phone on May 17, 2019, and asserted that, per Brewster, the refusal to

13 release the Vehicle on May 14, 2019, was wrongful. (DSGI 17–19.) However,

14 Untalan has not shown that Vaughan refused to release the Vehicle during that

15 conversation or even that Vaughan could have done so.6 The undisputed evidence

16 shows only that a release did not occur following the phone call. Drawing all

17 reasonable inferences in a light favorable to Vaughan, a reasonable juror could

18 conclude he was not involved in prolonging the impoundment. As such, Untalan is

19 not entitled to summary judgment against Vaughan on this claim.

20 c. Cochran and Zagorski

21 Untalan groups Lieutenants Cochran and Zagorski together, arguing their

22 involvement in the post storage hearing creates liability. (PMot. 15.) It is undisputed

23 that Cochran conducted the hearing and authorized a conditional release of the Vehicle

24 to Untalan’s attorney. (DSGI 21, 26.) It is also undisputed that Zagorski participated

25 in the hearing and he, too, failed to authorize an unconditional release from impound.

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6 Untalan points to Vaughan’s deposition to support that Vaughan “would not authorize release” of

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the Vehicle unless Untalan “obtained a valid driver’s license.” (See PSUF 20.) Neither the cited

28 deposition testimony nor its surrounding context supports Untalan’s proposed fact. (See Decl. of

Donald W. Cook (“Cook Decl.”) Ex. F (“Vaughan Dep.”) 93–95, ECF No. 97-2; DSGI 20.)

1 (DSGI 28, 32.) Thus, Cochran and Zagorski knew the exigency had abated and

2 possessed the authority to release the Vehicle. However, Cochran released the Vehicle

3 to Untalan’s attorney, as Untalan’s licensed agent, only on the condition that she

4 “ensure that [Untalan] will not have access to said vehicle during the remainder of the

5 [thirty]-day impoundment period.” (Cook Decl. Ex. N (“Release Agreement”), ECF

6 No. 97-2 (emphasis added).) The imposition of this condition on release, following

7 the end of any exigency justifying seizure, is itself an unlawful continued seizure. See

8 Sandoval, 912 F.3d at 516–17 (finding continued seizure unreasonable once the owner

9 provided a licensed driver who could take possession of the vehicle).

10 Viewing all reasonable inferences in Cochran’s and Zagorski’s favor, they both

11 knew the seizure was no longer justified and had the authority to release the Vehicle,

12 yet conditioned the release on denying Untalan access to the Vehicle for the remainder

13 of the thirty-day impoundment period. On these undisputed facts, any reasonable

14 juror would find Cochran and Zagorski prolonged the seizure without justification.

15 Untalan is therefore entitled to summary judgment against them on her second cause

16 of action.

17 d. Johnson

18 Untalan next argues for summary judgment against Johnson. (PMot. 15–16.)

19 The undisputed facts show that Johnson approved the Storage Hearing Report and

20 reviewed all underlying documents. (DSGI 35–36.) As such, like Cochran and

21 Zagorski, Johnson knew the exigency had abated but nevertheless approved only a

22 conditional release. Thus, Untalan is entitled to summary judgment against Johnson

23 on this claim as well.

24 3. Summary—Untalan’s Motion

25 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Untalan is entitled to summary

26 judgment on her first claim for unlawful search of a person against Trinidad. She is

27 also entitled to summary judgment on her second claim for unlawful impound against

28 Cochran, Zagorski, and Johnson, but not against Trinidad or Vaughan. Untalan has

1 established as a matter of law that she suffered a constitutional violation due to an

2 unlawful impound, but genuine issues of material fact remain regarding Trinidad’s and

3 Vaughan’s liability for that violation. The Court therefore GRANTS in part and

4 DENIES in part Untalan’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

5 B. Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

6 The Court next turns to Defendants’ Motion seeking partial summary judgment

7 on Untalan’s second claim for unlawful impound under § 1983, and third claim for

8 violation of the Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1. (DMot. 6–9, 16–17.)

9 Defendants also argue they are entitled to various state law immunities with respect to

10 Untalan’s Bane Act claim. (Id. at 17–20.) The Court addresses each issue in turn.

11 1. Unlawful Impound

12 Defendants first contend they are entitled to summary judgment on Untalan’s

13 second claim for unlawful impound because no Defendant violated Untalan’s Fourth

14 Amendment rights. (DMot. 6–9.) The Court discussed above that Untalan is entitled

15 to summary judgment as to the unlawful impound against Cochran, Zagorski, and

16 Johnson. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion is denied on this claim as to them and the

17 Court considers Defendants’ arguments as to the remaining Defendants—Trinidad,

18 Vaughan, Former CHP Commissioner Farrow, and CHP Commissioner Stanley.

19 The legal requirements for liability on this claim are stated above and continue

20 to apply here. However, as the Court now considers Defendants’ Motion, the burdens

21 and inferences are reversed. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23 (burden on moving

22 party); Scott, 550 U.S. at 378 (reasonable inferences for nonmoving party). Thus, the

23 Court now examines whether Defendants have shown there is no genuine dispute of

24 material fact and they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, taking all facts and

25 reasonable inferences in Untalan’s favor.

26 a. Trinidad

27 As discussed above, the evidence demonstrates that Trinidad’s initial seizure of

28 the Vehicle was lawful and that Trinidad had no subsequent involvement in the

1 impound. Untalan argues Trinidad’s decision to impound the Vehicle under

2 Section 14602.6 necessarily means she should have foreseen the unjustified prolonged

3 impoundment by other officers down the line. Not so. Such a finding would subject

4 every officer who lawfully impounds a vehicle pursuant to Section 14602.6 to liability

5 for the subsequent actions of others handling the impoundment; this is simply not the

6 law. See Jones, 297 F.3d at 934 (“[T]here must be a showing of personal participation

7 in the alleged rights deprivation.”); see also Sandoval, 912 F.3d at 519 (“[A] 30-day

8 impound does not necessarily violate the Fourth Amendment.”). Untalan has not

9 shown or raised a genuine issue that Trinidad was involved in the subsequent

10 prolonged impoundment. Viewing all reasonable inferences in Untalan’s favor, no

11 reasonable juror could conclude Trinidad prolonged the impoundment. See Leaf,

12 588 F.2d at 736 (discussing that proximate cause may be a question of law if “the

13 proof is insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that the act complained of was the

14 proximate cause of the injury”). Therefore, Trinidad is entitled to summary judgment

15 on Untalan’s second cause of action for unlawful impound.

16 b. Vaughan

17 Also discussed above, the evidence shows that Untalan’s counsel spoke with

18 Vaughan on the phone on May 17, 2019, and informed him that the prolonged

19 impound was unlawful. However, Untalan has offered nothing to suggest that

20 Vaughan could have released the Vehicle or provided any other relief based on his sole

21 interaction—the phone call. Taking all facts and reasonable inferences in Untalan’s

22 favor, based on the evidence and undisputed facts before the Court, no reasonable

23 juror could conclude that Vaughan refused to release the Vehicle or prolonged the

24 impound. See Leaf, 588 F.2d at 736. As such, Vaughan is also entitled to summary

25 judgment on Untalan’s second cause of action.

26 c. Farrow and Stanley

27 Defendants contend Farrow and Stanley (the “Commissioners”) are entitled to

28 summary judgment because they were not personally involved with the constitutional

1 violation, and no supervisory liability attaches to their conduct because they had no

2 involvement in any decisions to not change the impound policy. (DMot. 9.)

3 Supervisory liability can arise from “action or inaction in the training,

4 supervision, or control of . . . subordinates, . . . acquiescence in the constitutional

5 deprivations of which the complaint is made, or conduct that showed a reckless or

6 callous indifference to the rights of others.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06

7 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendants do not dispute that the

8 Commissioners and their staff are responsible for developing, reviewing, and

9 approving CHP policy. (See Decl. of Chris Lane ¶ 2, Ex. 1 (Highway Patrol

10 Manual 1.1) ¶1.5(a), ECF No. 94-4; see also Suppl. Decl. of Donald W. Cook (“Suppl.

11 Cook Decl.”) Ex. EE (“Decl. of Dale E. Bonner”) ¶ 6, ECF No. 100-1.) Although

12 Defendants argue the Commissioners were not involved in formulating the policy or

13 the decision not to revise it, that itself supports Untalan’s argument that the

14 Commissioners may have been deliberately indifferent to constitutional violations of

15 the type occurring here.

16 Untalan submits evidence of CHP management emails advising all CHP field

17 offices of the Brewster decision, seeking advice regarding the legal impact of that

18 decision, and providing legal advice from attorneys in the form of a client advisory.

19 (See Suppl. Cook Decl. ¶¶ 5–6, Exs. HH, II.) Defendants argue Stanley would not

20 have seen some of these and that the determination to not revise the policy was not

21 elevated to the commissioner level, (DMot. 9–10), but viewing inferences in Untalan’s

22 favor, a reasonable juror could conclude from this evidence that Farrow and Stanley

23 were aware of the Brewster decision and its legal import to CHP impound policy and

24 failed to act. Therefore, Farrow and Stanley are not entitled to summary judgment on

25 Untalan’s second cause of action for unlawful impound.

26 2. The Bane Act

27 Defendants next contend they are entitled to summary judgment as to Untalan’s

28 third claim, violation of the Bane Act, because Defendants did not violate Untalan’s

1 constitutional rights and Untalan cannot prove Defendants’ specific intent to do so.

2 (DMot. 16–17.) Untalan brings this claim against Vaughan, Cochran, Zagorski, and

3 Stanley. (FAC ¶¶ 40–43.) The Court has already determined Vaughan is entitled to

4 summary judgment on the issue of whether he violated Untalan’s rights and the

5 remaining Defendants are not. Therefore, the Court focuses on whether Untalan can

6 prove Cochran’s, Zagorski’s, and Stanley’s specific intent.

7 The Bane Act addresses hate crimes, “civilly protect[ing] individuals from

8 conduct aimed at interfering with rights . . . where the interference is carried out ‘by

9 threats, intimidation or coercion.’” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040

10 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230,

11 1233 (2007)). “The specific intent inquiry for a Bane Act claim is focused on two

12 questions.” Sandoval, 912 F.3d at 520 (quoting Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San

13 Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 803 (2017)). “First, ‘[i]s the right at issue clearly

14 delineated and plainly applicable under the circumstances of the case,’ and second,

15 ‘[d]id the defendant commit the act in question with the particular purpose of

16 depriving the citizen victim of his enjoyment of the interests protected by that right?’”

17 Id. “So long as those two requirements are met, specific intent can be shown ‘even if

18 the defendant did not in fact recognize the unlawfulness of his act’ but instead acted in

19 ‘reckless disregard’ of the constitutional right.” Id.

20 Untalan’s right to reclaim the Vehicle has been clearly established since the

21 decisions of Brewster and Sandoval. See id. (“[I]t was legally unclear whether the

22 30-day impounds were ‘seizures’ at all within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment

23 until we issued our decision in Brewster.”). Thus, the question is whether the

24 undisputed facts establish that Cochran, Zagorski, and Stanley acted with the

25 particular purpose of depriving Untalan of the enjoyment of her right or reckless

26 disregard of that right.

27 Defendants fail to point to evidence showing Cochran, Zagorski, or Stanley are

28 entitled to summary judgment on the question of specific intent. To the contrary,

1 several pieces of evidence support their intent to deprive Untalan of possession for

2 thirty days, or reckless disregard for the constitutional harm such an unjustified

3 seizure would cause: chiefly, the conditional release, which restricted Untalan’s access

4 to the Vehicle even if she had a licensed driver with her, and CHP policy regarding

5 enforcement of the thirty-day impound despite Ninth Circuit precedent holding

6 unjustified impounds unconstitutional. Viewing all reasonable inferences in Untalan’s

7 favor, a reasonable juror could find this circumstantial evidence supports Cochran’s

8 and Zagorski’s specific intent to deprive Untalan of her property as well as Stanley’s

9 reckless disregard for that deprivation. Consequently, Cochran, Zagorski, and Stanley

10 are not entitled to summary judgment on Untalan’s Bane Act claim.

11 As Vaughan is entitled to summary judgment on the issue of whether he

12 violated Untalan’s constitutional rights, he is also entitled to summary judgment on

13 her third claim for violation of the Bane Act.

14 3. State Law Immunities

15 Finally, Defendants argue that even if Untalan can establish a Bane Act

16 violation, (a) they are entitled to immunity based on California Government Code

17 sections 820.6 and 821.6, and (b) Stanley is entitled to immunity based on

18 sections 820.2 and 820.8. (DMot. 17–20.) “When applicable, these grants of

19 immunity preclude the imposition of damages on public employees . . . .” Gibson v.

20 Cnty. of Riverside, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2002). “In general, under

21 California law public employees are not liable for actions taken to enforce laws unless

22 they act with malice or without due care or good faith.” Id. (citing Cal. Gov’t Code

23 §§ 820.4, 820.6, & 821.6). Defendants bear the burden to establish immunity. Id.

24 a. Government Code sections 820.6 and 821.6—Cochran & Zagorski

25 Section 820.6 provides immunity for public employees acting “in good faith,

26 without malice, and under the apparent authority of an enactment that is

27 unconstitutional.” Untalan argues the evidence shows Defendants based their release

28 refusals on CHP’s impound policy, rather than on Section 14602.6, removing their

1 acts from the protective umbrella of section 820.6’s immunity. (Pl. Opp’n 26–28.)

2 She points to how the impound policy differs from the statute, in that it requires

3 drivers obtaining early release to be denied all access to their vehicle—a requirement

4 missing from Section 14602.6—and that the conditional release agreement mirrors the

5 policy’s language, rather than Section 14602.6’s. (Id.; Release Agreement; see Decl.

6 of Kaytie Sproul Ex. 6 (Highway Patrol Manual 81.2) ¶ 2.2.d.(10), ECF No. 94-2.)

7 The Court agrees that this evidence raises doubts about whether Defendants were

8 acting under authority of Section 14602.6 or were instead acting under authority of

9 CHP policy, which is not an “enactment.” See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810.6, 811.6

10 (defining enactment and regulation, respectively). As such, a reasonable juror could

11 find Defendants are not entitled to immunity under this section.

12 Next, Government Code section 821.6 is “confin[ed] . . . to malicious

13 prosecution actions.” Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir.

14 2016) (quoting Sullivan v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 721 (1974));

15 Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 488 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]s

16 [section 821.6] applies to police conduct, [it] is limited to actions taken in the course

17 or as a consequence of an investigation.”). This matter does not concern an

18 investigation or a malicious prosecution, so the immunity of Government Code

19 section 821.6 does not apply. See Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 488.

20 b. Government Code sections 820.2 and 820.8—Stanley

21 Section 820.2 states that “a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting

22 from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the

23 discretion vested in him.” Under this section, “[q]uasi-legislative policy decisions are

24 protected from judicial scrutiny pursuant to a separation of powers rationale,” but

25 defendants must show “an actual policy decision made by an employee who

26 consciously balanced risks and advantages.” Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare,

27 666 F.3d 631, 639 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applied here, it

28 is clear the undisputed facts do not establish that Stanley balanced the risks and

1 || advantages of policy decisions. Stanley disclaims any participation in the decision to

not revise CHP policy in light of Brewster. Even viewing the facts in favor of

3 || Untalan, such that Stanley did participate in that determination, no evidence suggests

4|| he exercised discretion or balanced any risks or advantages. As such, Stanley is not

5 || entitled to summary judgment on the basis of this immunity provision.

6 Lastly, under Government Code section 820.8, “a public employee is not liable

7 || for an injury caused by the act or omission of another person.” This section codifies

8 | the accepted principle that public employees are liable only for their own torts. See

9 || Martinez v. Cahill, 215 Cal. App. 2d 823, 824 (1963). As discussed above, Untalan

10 || seeks to hold Stanley lable for his own deficient supervisory acts. Therefore, this

11 || immunity does not apply either.

12 Vv. CONCLUSION

13 For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary

14 | Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (ECF No. 94.) Specifically,

15 || Defendants’ motion is granted as to Trinidad and Vaughan on Untalan’s second cause

16 || of action, granted as to Vaughan on Untalan’s third cause of action, and denied as to

all other issues and claims. Untalan’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is

18 | GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (ECF No. 97.) Specifically, Untalan’s

19 | motion is granted as to her first cause of action against Trinidad, granted as to her

20 || second cause of action in that she has established as a matter of law that she suffered a

21 || constitutional violation due to unlawful prolonged impound, granted as to her second

22 || cause of action on the liability of Cochran, Zagorski, and Johnson, and denied as to

23 || the second cause of action on the liability of Trinidad and Vaughan.

24 IT IS SO ORDERED.

25 August 2, 2021 ss

26 fy

Géldiot

28 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE