John C. Young v. Los Angeles Police Department

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 JOHN C. YOUNG, Case No. CV 20-11087-VBF (KK)

11 Plaintiff,

12 v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT

WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

13 LOS ANGELES POLICE

DEPARTMENT, ET AL.,

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Defendant(s).

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I.

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INTRODUCTION

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Plaintiff John C. Young (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

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filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations of his

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Fourth Amendment rights. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the

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Complaint with leave to amend.

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II.

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ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT

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On November 30, 2020, Plaintiff constructively filed1 a Complaint against the

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Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”), the County of Los Angeles, Sergeant

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1 Smith, and various “John Doe” defendants in their individual and official capacities.

2 ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1.

3 On February 2, 2021, prior to the Court screening the Complaint, Plaintiff

4 constructively filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against the LAPD, “John

5 Does 1-10,” and five LAPD employees in their individual capacity: Officer Grant,

6 Officer Lopez, Officer Arnendariz, Officer Dzwoniarek, and Sergeant Smith

7 (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. 8, FAC at 3-4. The FAC alleges Defendants

8 subjected Plaintiff to a “warrantless arrest and subsequent malicious prosecution” in

9 violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 5. Specifically, the FAC sets forth the

10 following relevant allegations:

11 On November 5, 2019, Plaintiff was arrested by the LAPD. Id. at 9. On the

12 day of his arrest, Plaintiff was shopping at a CVS when he believed he observed the

13 cashier “jotting down his credit card number.” Id. at 5. Plaintiff left the CVS and

14 entered a nearby cell phone store in the shopping plaza to call the police. Id. at 5-6.

15 Defendants Dzwoniarek and Arnendariz approached Plaintiff, who “requested to file

16 a report,” but was told by the officers that they had been alerted to Plaintiff’s

17 “disruptive” behavior. Id. at 6. The officers instructed Plaintiff to leave and told

18 Plaintiff they would take down his report after they attended to an “entirely different

19 matter” that had originally brought them to the plaza. Id. Defendants Dzwoniarek

20 and Arnendariz then walked away to join defendants Grant, Lopez, Smith and

21 “several other unnamed officers.” Id.

22 After “three hours of waiting” and approaching the group of officers multiple

23 times,2 Plaintiff approached defendant Smith, who told Plaintiff, “[Plaintiff] had not

24 presented the requisite evidence to motivate a report or any other kind of

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26 signed. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010); see Douglas v.

Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating the “mailbox rule applies to

27 Section 1983 suits filed by pro se prisoners”).

1 investigatory inquiry” and that Plaintiff should take it up at the “sub-station.” Id. at 7.

2 Plaintiff then got in his car and pulled around to the CVS where Defendants were

3 standing. Id. Plaintiff rolled down his driver-side window and “sought to verbally

4 complain” to defendant Smith, who was on the left side of Plaintiff’s vehicle in the

5 parking lot, while the other officers were on the right side of Plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. at

6 8. The “discussion between [Plaintiff] and defendant Smith became heated,” and “at

7 some point,” defendant Smith ordered Plaintiff out of the vehicle and arrested him

8 without a warrant. Id. Plaintiff was taken into custody and posted bond, and “a new

9 court [date] of December 6, 2019 was set.” Id. at 9.

10 On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff was arraigned and charged with violating

11 section 422 of the California Penal Code for making criminal threats in case number

12 LACBA48258401. Id. at 9, 12. Plaintiff’s bail was raised to $1,075,000 “to reflect his

13 two previous strikes” and Plaintiff “was now facing a maximum sentence of life in

14 prison.” Id. Plaintiff was remanded into the custody of Los Angeles County Jail for

15 “about fifty days, during which the defendants – via fraud, corruption, perjury and

16 fabricated evidence – maliciously prosecuted [Plaintiff], exposing him to a maximum

17 sentence of life in prison.” Id. at 5, 9-10.

18 On January 15, 2020, Plaintiff’s preliminary examination proceeded before

19 Magistrate Judge Murgia in case number LACBA48258401. Id. at 10. Plaintiff states

20 Defendants had prepared police reports that falsely claimed Plaintiff stated to

21 defendants Grant and Arnendariz, “I’m gonna ram your fucken SUV. You gonna get

22 hurt.” Id. at 10. At the preliminary hearing, defendants Smith and Grant “committed

23 perjury” and “furthered their malicious plot” by falsely testifying that Plaintiff had

24 “told the two women officers [defendants Grant and Arnendariz] that he was gonna

25 ram . . . their fucken SUV,” but Plaintiff never made such statements to defendants

26 Grant and Arnendariz. Id. at 10-12. Plaintiff submitted a report prepared by “the

27 detective assigned to the case,” which “truthfully stated that [Plaintiff] had been

1 that therefore, “there was no criminal threat.” Id. at 10-11. At the end of the hearing,

2 the Magistrate Judge “set aside the Complaint, ruling that the arrest has been without

3 probable cause,” id. at 11, and the “prosecution terminated in [Plaintiff]’s favor,” id. at

4 5.

5 Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ actions constitute malicious prosecution because a

6 criminal case was commenced by Defendants; the case was terminated in Plaintiff’s

7 favor; the case was brought “without probable cause – established by the ruling at the

8 preliminary examination”; and the case was “initiated with malice – established by the

9 perjury, fraud, blatant lies and other unethical acts.” Id. at 13.

10 Plaintiff alleges the LAPD “authorized and ratified” the wrongful acts of the

11 individual defendants, as “the result of policies, practices and customs to subject

12 persons to outrageous and unreasonable seizures void of probable cause [and]

13 malicious initiations of fraudulent criminal complaint[s] aimed at ruining lives.” Id.

14 Plaintiff also alleges the LAPD is liable for “failure to train their employees where the

15 failure amounts to LAPD officers constantly engaging in fraudulent and warrantless

16 arrest, the subsequent unjustified confinements and malicious prosecutions.” Id.

17 Plaintiff further alleges Defendants’ actions caused “stress, anxiety,” “[loss of]

18 hundreds of thousands of dollars by posting bail, paying for his car to be released

19 from impound, loss of money on a house he was selling, lost money on his braces…

20 [and] loss of potential income.” Id. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive

21 damages. Id. at 15.

22 III.

23 STANDARD OF REVIEW

24 Where a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, a court must screen the

25 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it

26 concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may

27 be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such

1 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194

2 (9th Cir. 1998).

3 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (“Rule 8”), a complaint must contain a

4 “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

5 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for

6 screening purposes, a court applies the same pleading standard as it would when

7 evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

8 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).

9 A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim “where there is no

10 cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a

11 cognizable legal theory.” Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007). In

12 considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the

13 material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir.

14 2011). The court, however, need not accept as true “allegations that are merely

15 conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re

16 Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). Although a complaint

17 need not include detailed factual allegations, it “must contain sufficient factual matter,

18 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cook v.

19 Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

20 678 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when it “allows the court to draw the

21 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The

22 complaint “must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice

23 and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d

24 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011).

25 “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,’ and a ‘pro se complaint,

26 however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal

27 pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008).

1 allegations,” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989), and a court need not

2 accept as true “unreasonable inferences or assume the truth of legal conclusions cast

3 in the form of factual allegations,” Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir.

4 2003).

5 If a court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim,

6 the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith,

7 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it

8 appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if the

9 plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106

10 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaint cannot

11 be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70

12 F.3d at 1107-11; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009).

13 IV.

14 DISCUSSION

15 A. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO STATE A CLAIM AGAINST THE LAPD

16 1. Applicable Law

17 A municipality “may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by

18 its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government’s policy or

19 custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be

20 said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is

21 responsible under § 1983.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S.

22 658, 694 (1978). An “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be

23 treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985);

24 see also Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985); Larez v. City of Los Angeles,

25 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official

26 personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166

27 (emphasis in original).

1 To state a cognizable Section 1983 claim against a municipality or local

2 government officer in his or her official capacity, a plaintiff must show the alleged

3 constitutional violation was committed “pursuant to a formal governmental policy or

4 a ‘longstanding practice or custom which constitutes the standard operating procedure

5 of the local governmental entity.’” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.

6 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). Proof of random acts or isolated events is

7 insufficient to establish a custom or practice. Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 714 (9th

8 Cir. 1996). Rather, a plaintiff must prove widespread, systematic constitutional

9 violations which have become the force of law. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan

10 Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). In addition, a plaintiff must show the

11 policy, practice, or custom was “(1) the cause in fact and (2) the proximate cause of

12 the constitutional deprivation.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996).

13 Additionally, a municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation if it

14 inadequately trains its employees. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1988).

15 Under a deficient training theory, a municipality may be held liable where the

16 continued “adherence by policymakers ‘to an approach that they know or should

17 know has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees may establish the conscious

18 disregard for the consequences of their action – the ‘deliberate indifference’ –

19 necessary to trigger municipal liability.” Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178,

20 1186 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S. at 407).

21 Moreover, “the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained

22 employees may tend to show that the lack of proper training, rather than a one-time

23 negligent administration of the program or factors peculiar to the officer involved in a

24 particular incidence, is the ‘moving force’ behind the plaintiff’s injury.” Board of Cty.

25 Comm’rs of Bryan Cty., 520 U.S. at 407-08. Alternatively, a plaintiff may prove a

26 failure-to-train claim without showing a pattern of constitutional violations where “a

27 violation of federal rights may be a highly predictable consequence of a failure to

1 equip law enforcement officers with specific tools to handle recurring situations.” Id.

2 at 409.

3 Lastly, “[a] municipality may be held liable for a constitutional violation if a

4 final policymaker ratifies a subordinate’s actions.” Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 986

5 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Christie v. Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 1999)). “To

6 show ratification, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the ‘authorized policymakers

7 approved a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.’” Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239

8 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).

9 2. Analysis

10 Here, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate he was wrongly arrested or prosecuted

11 pursuant to a formal governmental policy or a “longstanding practice or custom” of

12 the LAPD.

13 Plaintiff alleges the LAPD “authorized and ratified” the acts of the individual

14 defendants, “whose wrongful conduct was the result of policies, practices and

15 customs” of making arrests without probable cause and maliciously initiating criminal

16 complaints “aimed at ruining lives.” Dkt. 8 at 13. Plaintiff also alleges the LAPD is

17 liable for “failure to train their employees.” Id. These conclusory allegations are

18 insufficient to state a Section 1983 claim against the LAPD.

19 First, Plaintiff does not demonstrate widespread, systematic violations which

20 have become the force of law. See Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., 520 U.S.

21 at 404. The FAC does not plausibly allege the LAPD has a policy, custom, or practice

22 to falsely arrest suspects without probable cause, falsely submit police reports, or

23 falsely provide testimony in preliminary hearings; rather, Plaintiff merely alleges an

24 isolated arrest and investigation that resulted in his prosecution.

25 Additionally, the FAC does not include specific factual allegations

26 demonstrating the LAPD is liable for failure to train its employees. Plaintiff does not

27 allege facts “the need for more or different training [was] obvious” and that

1 See City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 396. Finally, despite Plaintiff’s conclusion the LAPD

2 “authorized and ratified” the acts of the individual defendants named in the FAC, the

3 FAC does not allege facts demonstrating “authorized policymakers” approved the

4 defendants’ decisions to arrest and prosecute Plaintiff. See Christie, 176 F.3d at 1239.

5 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against the LAPD is subject

6 to dismissal.

7 B. PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS AGAINST THE DOE DEFENDANTS ARE

8 SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL

9 1. Applicable Law

10 To state a Section 1983 claim against a defendant for violation of civil rights

11 under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant deprived him or her of a

12 right guaranteed under the Constitution or a federal statute. See West v. Atkins, 487

13 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th

14 Cir. 1998). A plaintiff must present facts showing how a particular defendant was

15 directly and personally involved in inflicting the alleged injury. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

16 676. Moreover, although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it

17 “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that

18 is plausible on its face.” Cook, 637 F.3d at 1004 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

19 2. Analysis

20 Here, the FAC fails to allege specific facts regarding “John Does 1-10.”

21 Rather, Plaintiff asserts the “named” Defendants filed and submitted police reports

22 regarding his arrest incident. Plaintiff does not allege facts indicating any other

23 defendants were involved. Plaintiff must allege specific facts showing how each Doe

24 defendant was directly and personally involved in inflicting the alleged constitutional

25 injury. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-

26 official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the

27 Constitution.”).

1 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Doe defendants are subject to

2 dismissal.

3 V.

4 LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

5 For the foregoing reasons, the FAC is subject to dismissal. As the Court is

6 unable to determine whether amendment would be futile, leave to amend is granted.

7 See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Plaintiff is

8 advised that the Court’s determination herein that the allegations in the FAC are

9 insufficient to state a particular claim should not be seen as dispositive of that claim.

10 Accordingly, while the Court believes Plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient factual

11 matter in the pleading, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is viable on its

12 face, Plaintiff is not required to omit any claim in order to pursue this action.

13 However, if Plaintiff asserts a claim in a Second Amended Complaint that has been

14 found to be deficient without addressing the claim’s deficiencies, then the Court,

15 pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, ultimately will submit to the assigned

16 district judge a recommendation that such claim be dismissed with prejudice for

17 failure to state a claim, subject to Plaintiff’s right at that time to file Objections with

18 the district judge as provided in the Local Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate

19 Judges.

20 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT within twenty-one (21) days of the

21 service date of this Order, Plaintiff choose one of the following two options:

22 1. Plaintiff may file a Second Amended Complaint to attempt to cure the

23 deficiencies discussed above. The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a blank

24 Central District civil rights complaint form to use for filing the Second Amended

25 Complaint, which the Court encourages Plaintiff to use.

26 If Plaintiff chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff must clearly

27 designate on the face of the document that it is the “Second Amended Complaint,” it

1 rewritten in its entirety, preferably on the court-approved form. Plaintiff shall not

2 include new defendants or allegations that are not reasonably related to the claims

3 asserted in the FAC. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint must be complete

4 without reference to the Complaint, FAC, or any other pleading, attachment, or

5 document.

6 An amended complaint supersedes the preceding complaint. Ferdik v.

7 Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). After amendment, the Court will treat

8 all preceding complaints as nonexistent. Id. Because the Court grants Plaintiff

9 leave to amend as to all claims raised here, any claim raised in a preceding

10 complaint is waived if it is not raised again in the Second Amended Complaint.

11 Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012).

12 The Court advises Plaintiff that it generally will not be well-disposed toward

13 another dismissal with leave to amend if Plaintiff files a Second Amended Complaint

14 that continues to include claims on which relief cannot be granted. “[A] district

15 court’s discretion over amendments is especially broad ‘where the court has already

16 given a plaintiff one or more opportunities to amend his complaint.’” Ismail v. Cnty.

17 of Orange, 917 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also Ferdik, 963 F.2d at

18 1261. Thus, if Plaintiff files a Second Amended Complaint with claims on

19 which relief cannot be granted, the Second Amended Complaint will be

20 dismissed without leave to amend and with prejudice.

21 2. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a notice with the Court that Plaintiff

22 intends to stand on the allegations in the FAC. If Plaintiff chooses to stand on the

23 FAC despite the deficiencies in the claims identified above, then the Court will submit

24 a recommendation to the assigned district judge that the deficient claims discussed

25 in this Order be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim, subject to

26 Plaintiff’s right at that time to file Objections with the district judge as provided in the

27 Local Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate Judges. If the assigned district judge

1 dismisses the deficient claims discussed in this Order, the Court will issue a separate

2 order regarding service of any claims remaining in the FAC at that time.

3 3. Finally, Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice,

4 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). The Clerk of Court is directed to

5 mail Plaintiff a blank Notice of Dismissal Form, which the Court encourages Plaintiff

6 to use if Plaintiff chooses to voluntarily dismiss the action.

7 Plaintiff is explicitly cautioned that failure to timely respond to this

8 Order will result in this action being dismissed with prejudice for failure to

9 state a claim, or for failure to prosecute and/or obey Court orders pursuant to

10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

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12 Dated: April 21, 2021

13 HONORABLE KENLY KIYA KATO

United States Magistrate Judge

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