Luis Licea v. Brown Sugar LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT yvord

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 20-6916 FMO (RAOx) Date October 5, 2020

Title Luis Licea v. Brown Sugar, LLC

Present: The Honorable Fernando M. Olguin, United States District Judge

Vanessa Figueroa None None

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.

Attorney Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney Present for Defendant(s):

None Present None Present

Proceedings: (In Chambers) Order Remanding Action

On June 29, 2020, Luis Licea (“plaintiff”) filed a complaint (“Complaint”) in the Los Angeles

County Superior Court (“state court”) against Brown Sugar, LLC (“defendant”), asserting state-law

claims regarding defendant's website. (See Dkt. 1, Notice of Removal (“NOR”) at J 1; Dkt. 1-1,

Complaint). Defendant removed the action on diversity jurisdiction grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1332, 1441, and 1446(b). (See Dkt. 1, NOR at J 3). Having reviewed the pleadings, the court

hereby remands this action to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §

1447(c).

LEGAL STANDARD

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized

by Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114

S.Ct. 1673, 1675 (1994). The courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears

affirmatively from the record. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n. 3, 126

S.Ct. 1854, 1861 (2006). Federal courts have a duty to examine jurisdiction sua sponte before

proceeding to the merits of a case, see Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583, 119

S.Ct. 1563, 1569 (1999), “even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H

Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006).

“The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court

must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” Syngenta

Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32, 123 S.Ct. 366, 369 (2002) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Where Congress has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes, unless

otherwise stated, are strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.' See id. Unless otherwise

expressly provided by Congress, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district

' For example, an “antiremoval presumption” does not exist in cases removed pursuant

to the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). See Dart Cherokee Basin

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 20-6916 FMO (RAOx) Date October 5, 2020

Title Luis Licea v. Brown Sugar, LLC

courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the

defendants, to the district court[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); see Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 1252

(9th Cir. 2013) (same). A removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal is

proper. See Abrego Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on removal rests with the

removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong

presumption against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always has the burden of

establishing that removal is proper.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, if there is any

doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must resolve those doubts

in favor of remanding the action to state court. See Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566 (“Federal jurisdiction

must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.”).

“Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that

provision, [the removing defendant] must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies

in the federal courts.” Syngenta Crop Protection, 537 U.S. at 33, 123 S.Ct. at 370. Failure to do

so requires that the case be remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and.

. . the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass'n, Inc.

v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). Indeed, “[i]f at any time before final

judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be

remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n. 2

(9th Cir. 1988) (“It is elementary that the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is not a

waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by one of the parties, by motion or in the

responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the trial or reviewing court.”); Washington v. United Parcel

Serv., Inc., 2009 WL 1519894, *14 (C.D. Cal. 2009) (a district court may remand an action where

the court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction either by motion or sua sponte).

DISCUSSION

The court’s review of the NOR and the attached Complaint makes clear that this court does

not have subject matter jurisdiction over the instant matter. In other words, plaintiff could not have

originally brought this action in federal court, as plaintiff does not competently allege facts

supplying diversity jurisdiction.* Therefore, removal was improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);

Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429 (1987) (“Only state-court

actions that originally could have been filed in federal court may be removed to federal court by

the defendant.”) (footnote omitted).

Defendant bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount

in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. See Valdez v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115,

1117 (9th Cir. 2004); Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.

Defendant seeks only to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction. (See, generally, Dkt. 1,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 20-6916 FMO (RAOx) Date October 5, 2020

Title Luis Licea v. Brown Sugar, LLC

2003) (per curiam) (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more than $75,000 is

in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the

amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt regarding the right to

removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes omitted). Here, there is

no basis for diversity jurisdiction because the amount in controversy does not appear to exceed

the diversity jurisdiction threshold of $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.° The amount of damages

plaintiff seeks cannot be determined from the Complaint, as the Complaint does not set forth a

specific amount. (See, generally, Dkt. 1-1, Complaint).

Defendant concedes that plaintiff does not seek monetary relief exceeding $75,000. (See

Dkt. 1, NOR at 9). However, defendant contends that given plaintiff's request for injunctive relief,

the jurisdictional threshold is met. (See id. at J] 11-14). However, defendant fails to show that the

value of injunctive relief brings the action within the jurisdictional threshold. (See, generally, id.

at Jf] 13-14). Defendant merely cited the number of total nationwide subscribers and its monthly

revenue (which is not significant) but does not explain the connection, (see, generally, id.), or why

overhauling its website would exceed $75,000. (Id. at | 14). Thus, defendant has not shown by

a preponderance of the evidence that the pecuniary result of any potential injunctive relief would

be sufficient to meet the jurisdictional threshold.

In sum, given that any doubt regarding the existence of subject matter jurisdiction must be

resolved in favor of remanding the action to state court, see Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566, the court is

not persuaded, under the circumstances here, that defendant has met its burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.

See Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090 (“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that more

than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold. Where doubt

regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court.”) (footnotes

omitted); Valdez, 372 F.3d at 1118 (same). Therefore, there is no basis for diversity jurisdiction.

This order is not intended for publication. Nor is it intended to be included in or

submitted to any online service such as Westlaw or Lexis.

CONCLUSION

> □□ relevant part, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) provides that a district court has diversity jurisdiction

“where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, . . . and is between...

citizens of different States” or “citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state[.]” 28

U.S.C. §§ 1332(a)(1)-(2).

* Although plaintiff has filed an amended complaint (see Dkt. 15), the amount in

controversy is determined by the complaint operative at the time of removal. Chavez v. JPMorgan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 20-6916 FMO (RAOx) Date October 5, 2020

Title Luis Licea v. Brown Sugar, LLC

Based on the foregoing, IT |S ORDERED that:

1. The above-captioned action shall be remanded to the Superior Court of the State of

California for the County of Los Angeles, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1447(c).

2. The Clerk shall send a certified copy of this Order to the state court.

3. Any pending motion is denied as moot.

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