Brown v. Henderson

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

LYNN BROWN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

WILLIAM J. HENDERSON, Postmaster  No. 00-2044

General, United States Postal

Service, A Federal Agency,

Defendant-Appellee.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.

H. Brent McKnight, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-99-498-3MCK)

Submitted: March 9, 2001

Decided: March 23, 2001

Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

Roger W. Rizk, ROGER W. RIZK, P.A., Charlotte, North Carolina,

for Appellant. Mark T. Calloway, United States Attorney, James M.

Sullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina;

Eric J. Scharf, Managing Counsel, Stephan J. Boardman, UNITED

STATES POSTAL SERVICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

2 BROWN v. HENDERSON

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Lynn Brown appeals the magistrate judge’s dismissal of her com-

plaint against the United States Postmaster General. Brown alleged

the Postal Service discriminated against her because of her physical

disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 2000)

("ADA"). Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

From 1988 to 1996, Brown was employed as a postal carrier for the

Postal Service. In 1998, Brown filed an internal Equal Employment

Opportunity ("EEO") complaint alleging physical disability discrimi-

nation. The Postal Service’s EEO Office dismissed Brown’s com-

plaint as untimely. Next, Brown appealed the EEO’s dismissal to the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The EEOC

dismissed Brown’s appeal as untimely. Finally, Brown challenged the

EEOC’s dismissal in the district court. The Appellee moved to dis-

miss, asserting Brown failed to state a claim upon which relief could

be granted. The magistrate judge granted the Appellee’s motion to

dismiss because Brown’s complaint failed to state a claim against the

Postal Service.

The magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by dismissing

Brown’s ADA claim because the Postal Service is not subject to suit

under the ADA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111(5)(B); see also Spence v. Straw,

54 F.3d 196, 197 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that suit under the Rehabili-

tation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-797 (West 1999 & Supp.

2000), "is the exclusive means by which a plaintiff may raise claims

against federal agencies relating to handicap discrimination").

Additionally, the magistrate judge did not abuse his discretion by

denying Brown’s request to amend her complaint to allege claims

under the Rehabilitation Act, the statutory basis for raising a disability

BROWN v. HENDERSON 3

discrimination claim against a government agency. Brown failed to

timely pursue her administrative remedies and therefore cannot seek

relief in district court under the Rehabilitation Act. See 29 U.S.C.A.

§ 794a(a)(1) (stating that the "remedies, procedures, and rights" in

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 "shall be available" to any

federal employee complaining of discrimination against the handi-

capped); Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,

9 F.3d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that "a federal employee must

exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing an action in dis-

trict court" under the Civil Rights Act).

Accordingly, Brown’s complaint was properly dismissed. We dis-

pense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid in the decisional process.

AFFIRMED