Opinion

Daniel Turner v. City of Los Angeles

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Jul 24, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.9%

finding tasing constituted excessive force when suspect was face down, with two officers on top of him, with his hands underneath him and having already been shocked twice with the 20 || Taser

How later courts described this case

  • finding tasing constituted excessive force when suspect was face down, with two officers on top of him, with his hands underneath him and having already been shocked twice with the 20 || Taser

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The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 DANIEL TURNER, ) Case No. CV 18-03405 DDP (KSx)

)

12 Plaintiff, )

) ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

13 v. ) SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

14 CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., )

) [Dkt. 51]

15 Defendants. )

)

16

17 Presently before the court is a Motion for Summary Judgment

18 filed by Defendants City of Los Angeles and Stephanie Johnigan,

19 Veronica Padilla, Antonio Ramirez, Lidia Leon, Gloria Velez, and

20 Juan Gonzalez. Having considered the submissions of the parties

21 and heard oral argument that court grants the motion with respect

22 to the failure to train claim alleged against the City of Los

23 Angeles, denies the motion in all other respects, and adopts the

24 following Order.

25 I. Background

26 In the afternoon of March 22, 2017, Los Angeles Police

27 Department Officers Kong and Johnigan were dispatched to an office

28 building in downtown Los Angeles. (Dkt# 51-4, Declaration of Lynn

Partial Summary Judgment, (“Carpenter Decl.”) Ex. D at 44:23-45:6.)

21) Building security officers reported that a “homeless-looking” white

man in a black hoodie and khaki pants attempted to rob and

4] threatened to rape a female passerby earlier in the morning. (Id.

at 44:25-45:3; Carpenter Decl., Ex. L at 44:9-14.) One of the

security guards showed the officers a photo of the suspect.

7] (Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 29:14-16; Ex. Lat 44:5-8.) Officers Kong

and Johnigan then proceeded to 3rd and Hill Streets. (Carpenter

9]}Decl., Ex. E at 29:12-19.) As Officers Kong and Johnigan approached

3rd Street, they saw Plaintiff Daniel Turner, who matched the

description of the earlier report and the photo. (Carpenter Decl.,

12) Ex. E at 30:24-31:7; 31:18-21.) When Turner saw the officers, he

began to back away. (Id. at 34:24-35:6.) Officer Kong testified

14} that he told Turner to “come here,” to which Turner responded,

15] “no,” and then attempted to walk away. (Id. at 35:7-15.)

16 Officer Kong grabbed Turner’s hands and attempted to handcuff

him. (Id. at 35:14-20.) Turner attempted to bring his hands toward

the front of his body to prevent Officer Kong from handcuffing him.

19] (Id. at 36:4-14.) When Turner attempted to pull away, Officer Kong

20 pushed Turner onto a vehicle and used the vehicle to “stabilize”

Turner. (Id. at 36:14-17.) The two then ended up on the ground.

22 (Id. at 37:11-15.) Turner alleges that Officer Kong “tackled” him

to the ground. (Id. at 37:16-17.) Officer Kong testified that

2411 because he believed one of Turner’s hands came loose, he used a

25] “twisting motion” to bring Turner to the ground. (Id. at 37:16-17.)

Both Turner and Officer Kong were on their sides in the street.

27} (Id. at 38:6-8.) Officer Kong then put his body weight on top of

28] Turner to prevent him from moving. (Id. at 38:8-10.)

1 Officer Johnigan started to request an additional unit, as she

saw Officer Kong was “winded.” (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at 57:1-4.)

3} Officer Kong overheard Officer Johnigan requesting the additional

unit and yelled out “backup,” known to officers as a higher

5] priority call. (Id. at 57:4-11; Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 40:1-3.)

6] Officer Kong testified that he believed he was losing the struggle

with Turner. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 39:18-24.) As the two

8 || continued struggling, they gradually moved toward the curb. (Id. at

39:1-5.) Turner was on top of a metal grate surrounding tree roots,

with Officer Kong on top of him. (Id.) Before backup arrived,

11] Officer Kong gave Turner verbal commands such as, “Put your hands

behind your back... stop resisting.” (Id. at 40:10-12.) Turner

replied, “No.” (Id.)

14 Officer Johnigan then told Officer Kong that she would deploy

her taser, and Officer Kong agreed. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at

59:5-11.) Officer Kong warned Turner that if he refused to comply,

he would be tased and that it would hurt. (Id. at 59:12-13.)

18} Officer Johnigan, within seven feet of Turner, then deployed her

taser in Probe/Dart mode. (Id. at 59:14-19.) The taser darts

20] attached to Turner’s body on the back of his right leg and upper

21]} thigh buttocks area. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at 59:22-60:1.) The

22\| first taser deployment lasted five seconds. (Carpenter Decl. Ex.

23||N.) Officer Johnigan stated that she did not see the taser darts

24])/make contact with Turner’s skin, but that Turner yelled out “as if

he was in pain.” (Id. at 60: 6-7; 109:14-16.)

26 During the struggle, Turner managed to grab and hold onto the

metal tree grate with his left hand. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at

28 |} 65:20-25.) Officer Leon, one of the responding backup officers,

1 activated her body-worn video camera and went to the location.

2 (Carpenter Decl., Ex. F at 60:7-9.) When Officer Leon arrived, she

3 saw Turner and Officer Kong on the metal grate. (Id. at 50:5-10.)

4 Officer Leon approached and attempted to free Turner’s left hand

5 from the metal grate. (Id. at 50:25-51:9.) Officer Kong maintained

6 a “firm grip” on Turner’s right hand, but not Turner’s left hand,

7 which Officer Kong was still attempting to control to handcuff.

8 (Carpenter Decl., Ex. E at 41:23-42:3.) Bodycam video shows, and

9 Officer Leon testified, that Officer Johnigan’s taser wires were

10 still attached to the taser device when Leon arrived at the scene.

11 (Carpenter Decl., Ex. F at 48:1-21; Carpenter Decl., Ex. O – VIDEO

12 at 1:29-1:48.) At this point, at least six officers were present,

13 and at least four, including Leon and Johnigan, were attempting to

14 restrain Turner.

15 Officer Johnigan then told Officers Leon and Kong, “Watch out,

16 I’m gonna drive-stun him.” (Carpenter Decl. Ex. O – VIDEO at 1:39-

17 1:40.) Officer Leon told Johnigan to “stun him.” (Id. at 2:10.)

18 Officer Johnigan then used her taser in drive-stun mode on various

19 areas of Turner’s body. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. D at 61:10-14.)

20 Someone yelled out indistinctly and grunted several times, but the

21 bodycam video does not clearly indicate who made those noises.

22 Turner, with his hood over his ears, repeatedly said “I don’t trust

23 you,” then turned his head around to the officers and said, “Will

24 nobody say something?” (Carpenter Decl., Ex. O – VIDEO at 1:54-

25 1:58.) Turner also pled with the officers, “Promise you won’t take

26 me to jail,” amidst indistinct sounds of scuffling and multiple

27 officers’ voices. (Id. at 2:04-2:36.) Turner’s hand was eventually

28 freed from the metal grate and Turner was handcuffed. (Id. at 2:06-

1 2:42.) His legs were also hobbled. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. H at

2 39:5-10.) Including the first taser deployment in Probe mode,

3 Officer Johnigan activated her taser eleven times over a period of

4 two minutes and eight seconds. (Carpenter Decl., Ex. N.) The

5 aggregate time the taser was activated amounted to fifty-three

6 seconds. (Id.)

7 Once Turner was handcuffed and seated upright on the curb, he

8 cooperated with officers and answered questions. Officer Leon

9 began to wipe her hands because, as she stated, she had blood all

10 over her hands. (Carpenter Decl., Ex O – VIDEO at 4:32.) Turner

11 was later transported to a nearby hospital, where he was treated

12 for scrapes to his hands and face and the taser darts were removed

13 from his body. (Dkt #53-2, Declaration of Andrew T. Magaline in

14 Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary

15 Judgment, (“Magaline Decl.”), Exs. 7, 12.).

16 Subsequently, Turner was charged with and pleaded no contest

17 to a felony for making criminal threats, in violation of Penal Code

18 §422(a) and a misdemeanor for resisting arrest by Officer Kong, in

19 violation of California Penal Code section 148(a). (Dkt #53-2,

20 Declaration of Andrew T. Magaline in Support of Plaintiff’s

21 Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, (“Magaline

22 Decl.”), Ex. 13.; Carpenter Decl., Ex. M at 119-20.)

23 Pursuant to Los Angeles Police Department policy, the

24 department conducted an investigation into officers Kong and

25 Johnigan’s use of force during the incident. (Magaline Decl. Ex.

26 8.) The report approved of Officer Kong’s use of force, but found

27 that Officer Johnigan’s use of the taser was “OUT OF

28 POLICY/TRAINING.” (Id.) The report determined that Johnigan’s use

1 of the taser in probe mode, “to gain the compliance of the suspect

2 for the purpose of ta[]king him into custody . . . appeared not to

3 be an objectively reasonable option.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 8 at

4 37.) The report found each of Johnigan’s eleven taser deployments

5 “OUT OF POLICY,” warranting “Administrative Disapproval” of each

6 use. (Id. at 38.) Officer Johnigan received “additional training”

7 following the investigation. (Id.) Johnigan later testified that

8 the purpose of the training was to “ensure an understanding of the

9 functions of the taser itself,” and the training she received

10 included guidance that her “use of the Taser for this matter was

11 not that it was improper.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 2 at 24:4-13.)

12 Turner brings four claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) an

13 excessive force claim against Officer Johnigan and the other

14 individual defendants; (2) a municipal liability claim against the

15 City of Los Angeles on a ratification theory(3) a municipal

16 liability claim against the City of Los Angeles for failure to

17 train; and (4) a custom, policy, or practice claim against the City

18 of Los Angeles. Turner also alleges a state law battery claim

19 against the six individual officers. Defendants now move for

20 summary judgment on all of Turner’s claims.

21 II. Legal Standard

22 Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,

23 depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,

24 together with the affidavits, if any, show “that there is no

25 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

26 to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party

27 seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

28 court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those portions

1]}of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). All reasonable inferences from

4] the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. See

5] Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242 (1986). If the

moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it is

7! entitled to summary judgment if it can demonstrate that “there is

an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.”

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.

10 Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to

the nonmoving party opposing the motion, who must “set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is warranted if a

14] party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the

existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,

17] 477 U.S. at 322. A genuine issue exists if “the evidence is such

that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

19] party,” and material facts are those “that might affect the outcome

20]}/of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

There is no genuine issue of fact “[w]here the record taken as a

whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the

23 ])/nonmoving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

24]| Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

25 It is not the court’s task “to scour the record in search of a

26|| genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275,

271278 (9th Cir. 1996). Counsel have an obligation to lay out their

28 |) support clearly. Carmen v. San Francisco Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d

1} 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001). The court “need not examine the entire

file for evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact, where the

evidence is not set forth in the opposition papers with adequate

4] references so that it could conveniently be found.” Id.

III. Discussion

6 A. Excessive Force Claim

7 1. Injury to Plaintiff

8 Defendants argue first, and very briefly, that they are

entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force

claim because Plaintiff “sustained no injury, damage, loss or harm

11] from Officer Johnigan’s use of Taser on Plaintiff.” (Motion at

10:1-2.). This argument fails.

13 In Fourth Amendment excessive force cases, the question is

whether, under the totality of the circumstances, police officers’

actions are objectively reasonable. Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F.3d

16] 805, 823 (9th Cir. 2010). This analysis requires a balancing of

the governmental interests at stake against the intrusion upon an

individual’s rights. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97

(1989). Of course, “[n]ot every push or shove” violates the Fourth

Amendment, and plaintiffs cannot recover for “provably accidental

or de minimis” bodily intrusions. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Fontana

22\|v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871, 880 (9th Cir. 2001). A use of force may

be constitutionally unreasonable, however, “even without physical

blows or injuries,” and a plaintiff may be able to recover nominal

damages “even if the plaintiff suffered no actual damage.” Bryan,

630 F.3d at 824; Wilks v. Reyes, 5 F.3d 412, 416 (9th Cir. 1993).

Although some circuits, such as the Fifth Circuit, require a

plaintiff to show “significant injury,” there is no such

requirement in this circuit. Wilks, 4 F.3d at 416; Wilenchik v.

Ryan, No. CIV10-541TUCDCBGEE, 2010 WL 5644812, at *3 (D. Ariz. Dec.

6, 2010).

4 Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Agency, 261 F.3d

5] 912 (9th Cir. 2001) is not to the contrary. There, the Ninth

Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment where the plaintiff

71 “failed to meet her burden of proof of providing specific facts to

show that the force being used was unreasonable or that she

sustained actual injuries.” Arpin, 261 F.3d at 922. The record

here suffers from no such evidentiary deficiencies. It is

undisputed that Johnigan tased Plaintiff eleven times, and heard

12] him scream out in pain. Audio from Officer Leon’s body camera also

includes screams of pain or distress. As the Ninth Circuit has

recognized, tasers inflict “high levels of pain,” possible

15] paralysis and loss of muscular control, and wounds from barbed

taser darts that require hospitalization. Bryan, 630 F.3d at 824-

25. Indeed, it is undisputed that here, Plaintiff was hospitalized

18}| for, in part, removal of taser barbs from his flesh. On such a

record, Defendants’ contention that there is no evidence to support

20]/a finding that Johnigan’s use of force was unreasonable has no

merit.

22 2. Qualified Immunity

23 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government

24] officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct

does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks

28 |) omitted). Whether a government official is entitled to qualified

immunity depends on “(1) whether there has been a violation of a

constitutional right; and (2) whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the officer’s alleged misconduct.”

4] Lal _v. California, 746 F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014). ™“{[W]jJhen

there are disputed factual issues that are necessary to a qualified

immunity decision, these issues must first be determined by the

7 jury before the court can rule on qualified immunity.” Morales v.

Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 824 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing commentary to Ninth

9} Circuit Model Civil Jury Instruction 9.34 (2017)); see also

Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 532 (9th

Cir. 2010).

12 a. Constitutional Violation

13 Defendants argue that Officer Johnigan is entitled to

14] qualified immunity claim on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim

because Johnigan’s decision to tase Plaintiff eleven times was

objectively reasonable. (Mot. at 11.) Whether a use of force was

reasonable will depend on the facts of the particular case,

including, but not limited to, whether the suspect posed an

immediate threat to anyone, whether the suspect resisted or

attempted to evade arrest, and the severity of the crime at issue.

211 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Of these factors, whether the suspect

posed an immediate threat to anyone is the most important. Mattos

□□ Agarano, 661 F.3d 433, 441 (9th Cir. 2011). The Graham factors

are not exclusive, however, and courts analyzing objective

reasonableness must consider the totality of the circumstances.

26] Id.

27 Here, Defendants devote approximately one page of their

28 initial briefing to the Graham factors. There is no dispute that

10

1 Plaintiff was resisting arrest and was suspected of serious crimes,

2 including a felony.1 These factors weigh in favor of objective

3 reasonableness.

4 The most important factor, however, whether Plaintiff posed a

5 danger to anyone, is in dispute. Defendants argue that Plaintiff

6 “posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers and to

7 others by his . . . continuing active resistance . . . .” (Mot. at

8 13:25-14:2.) A reasonable trier of fact could, however, conclude

9 otherwise.2 Contrary to Johnigan’s later deposition testimony that

10 Plaintiff was “fighting so violently,” the police department’s own

11 investigation, based in large part upon Johnigan’s own report of

12 the incident, concluded that Plaintiff was not “violently resisting

13 or unsafe to approach.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 8 at 37.) It is

14 undisputed that Johnigan tased Plaintiff eleven times. Only four

15 of those instances are clearly discernible from body camera

16 footage, which also reveals that, when Leon arrived on the scene,

17 Johnigan’s taser was still connected to wires leading from the

18 taser probe darts.3 The video footage also reveals that when Leon

19

1 The Ninth Circuit has observed, however, that even where a

20 person has committed a serious crime in the recent past, such

completed action does not, in and of itself, justify the use of

21 force where the suspect is no longer engaged in unlawful or

dangerous activities. See, e.g. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d

22 689, 702–03 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Harris v. Roderick, 126 F.3d

1189, 1203 (9th Cir. 1997).

23

2 The court notes that some of the evidence cited by

24 Defendants simply does not support their assertions. The fact that

Johnigan and Kong testified, for example, that they parked their

25 car and walked up to Plaintiff slowly appears to have little

bearing on whether Plaintiff presented a threat to anyone. (Mot.

26 at 13:25.)

27 3 Defendants acknowledge that, as the Ninth Circuit has held,

use of a taser in probe or dart mode is “an intermediate,

28 (continued...)

1 arrived on the scene, three other officers were already partially

2 restraining Plaintiff, who was lying face down on the ground. By

3 the time Johnigan announced that she was going to “drive-stun”

4 Plaintiff, and tased him for the first time on video, at least six

5 officers, including Leon, were at the scene. The video also

6 clearly shows that by the time Johnigan tased Plaintiff for the

7 eleventh and final time, he was no longer grabbing the metal tree

8 grate. At no point are any bystanders visible anywhere in the

9 vicinity. On this record, a trier of fact could conclude, contrary

10 to Defendants’ assertion, that Plaintiff was not a threat to

11 officers or to anyone else.

12 b. Clearly Established Law

13 Even if Officer Johnigan’s use of a taser was objectively

14 unreasonable, she is entitled to qualified immunity if it was not

15 clearly established at the time of the incident that tasing a

16 suspect who posed no danger to anyone would qualify as a Fourth

17 Amendment violation.4 Lal v. California, 746 at 1116. Supreme

18

3(...continued)

19 significant level of force.” Bryan, 630 F.3d at 826. Although

Defendants contend that it is undisputed that the latter ten of

20 Johnigan’s uses of the taser were in drive-stun mode, the support

for that assertion is unclear. As discussed above, the probe wires

21 were still attached to the taser when Leon arrived on the scene,

and only four instances of tasing are clearly observable after

22 Johnigan states, “I’m going to drive-stun him.” The record does

not indicate whether it is possible to operate a taser in drive-

23 stun mode when the probe wires are still connected to the device.

But see Mattos, 661 F.3d at 443. (“When a taser is used in drive[-

24 ]stun mode, the operator removes the dart cartridge and pushes two

electrode contacts located on the front of the taser directly

25 against the victim. In this mode, the taser delivers an electric

shock to the victim, but it does not cause an override of the

26 victim's central nervous system as it does in dart-mode.”)

27 4 As discussed above, “when there are disputed factual issues

that are necessary to a qualified immunity decision, these issues

28 (continued...)

1 Court “caselaw does not requires a [prior] case directly on point

2 for a right to be clearly established, [but] existing precedent

3 must have placed the . . . question beyond debate.” Kisela v.

4 Hughes. 138 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2018). The “contours” of the right

5 must be “sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the

6 defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was violating it.”

7 Id. at 53. (internal quotation and citation omitted). “[G]eneral

8 statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair

9 and clear warning to officers,” but “do not by themselves create

10 clearly established law outside an “‘obvious case.’” Id. (internal

11 quotation marks and citation omitted).

12 As an initial matter, before looking to analogous cases, the

13 court notes that the police department’s own investigation

14 concluded that, notwithstanding Johnigan’s intent to “gain

15 compliance of the suspect for the purpose of ta[]king him into

16 custody,” her use of a taser in probe mode “appeared not to be an

17 objectively reasonable option.” (Magaline Decl., Ex. 8 at 37.)

18 Although not determinative of the state of the law at the time of

19 the incident, the report’s conclusions appear to reflect the police

20 department’s understanding of the applicable legal background.

21 The Ninth Circuit issued opinions regarding the use of tasers

22 in the Fourth Amendment context well before March 2017, when the

23 incident at issue here occurred. Plaintiff points to the court’s

24 2011 decision in Mattos. There, the Ninth Circuit reviewed an

25

26 4(...continued)

must first be determined by the jury before the court can rule on

27

qualified immunity.” Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d at 824. For

purposes of this discussion, therefore, the court draws all

28

evidentiary inferences in favor of Plaintiff.

incident in which an officer tased a pregnant woman three times in

drive-stun mode when she refused to exit her vehicle after being

3} pulled over for speeding. Mattos, 661 F.3d at 437. The woman was

not suspected of having committed a serious crime, nor did she pose

any threat to the officers. Id. at 445. Informed by those

factors, the court concluded that officers’ decision to tase the

7! women three times in less than one minute was objectively

unreasonable and violated the Fourth Amendment. Id.

9 Defendant argues that the circumstances here are more

analogous to those in Marquez v. City of Phoenix, 693 F.3d 1167

11} (9th Cir. 2012). There, police forced their way through a

12] barricaded bedroom door and encountered walls and furniture smeared

with blood, a visibly injured naked woman screaming in the corner

14}/ of the room, and a heavy-set man holding a motionless three-year-

girl in a choke-hold. Marquez, 693 F.3d at 1171. Officers

tased the man twice in probe mode, with no effect. Id. The man

then attacked one of the officers, kicking him in the thighs and

groin, before the officer then deployed the taser in drive-stun

19])/mode. Id. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the officers’ use of

20 the taser was not objectively unreasonable. Id. at 1175.

21 Although neither of these cases is directly analogous to the

circumstances here, the facts of this case bear almost no relation

to the horrific circumstances in Marquez. The facts of the instant

24|| case bear a closer relationship to Mattos, insofar as Plaintiff was

25|/also resisting arrest while posing no danger to anyone. Although

Plaintiff’s active resistance to being handcuffed is

distinguishable from the pregnant woman’s passive refusal in

Mattos, there is a triable issue as to whether Plaintiff presented

14

any danger to officers or bystanders. In both cases, officers

2\| tased plaintiffs repeatedly over a short period of time.

3 The facts here are also similar in many ways to those in

Meyers v. Baltimore Cty., Md., 713 F.3d 723, 728 (4th Cir. 2013).

There, officers reasonably tased a person who was menacing them

with a baseball bat. Meyers, 7013 F.3d at 728. After officers

71 took the suspect to ground, however, and even though three officers

were sitting on the suspect’s back, the tasing officer proceeded to

tase the suspect a further seven times. Id. In denying qualified

immunity to the tasing officer, the court observed not only that

the seven additional tasings were excessive, but that, even in

2007, it was clear that “[t]he use of any unnecessary, gratuitous,

13] and disproportionate force, whether arising from a gun, a baton, a

taser, or other weapon, precludes an officer from receiving

15] qualified immunity if the subject is unarmed and secured.” Id. at

735; see also Cyrus v. Town of Mukwonago, 624 F.3d 856 (7th Cir.

17] 2010) (finding tasing constituted excessive force when suspect was

face down, with two officers on top of him, with his hands

underneath him and having already been shocked twice with the

20 || Taser); Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 907 (llth Cir.2009)

21] (“Quite simply, though the initial use of force (a single Taser

shock) may have been justified, the repeated tasering . . . was

23|| grossly disproportionate to any threat posed and unreasonable under

the circumstances.”).

25 In sum, by 2017, it was sufficiently clear that the tasing,

let alone repeated tasing, of a suspect who was face down on the

ground with three officers on top of him was an excessive use of

force. Officer Johnigan is not entitled to qualified immunity.

15

1

2 D. Heck bar

3 Defendants also argue that Plaintiff’s claims are barred under

4) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The “Heck bar” requires

5] dismissal of any claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that, if successful,

would imply or demonstrate the invalidity of a conviction based

upon the same facts as the § 1983 claim. Beets v. Cty. of Los

Angeles, 669 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2012). Of course, a § 1983

9] claim is not Heck-barred simply because it is somehow related to a

10} conviction. Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff cannot succeed on his

excessive force claims without invalidating his conviction for

resisting arrest by Officer Kong. That argument is not well taken.

14} Plaintiff does not take the position that he did not resist Officer

Kong’s attempts to arrest him. At most, Plaintiff attempts to

16] distinguish “active resistance” from “violent resistance.” Other

courts have made similar distinctions. See, e.g., Cyrus, 624 F.3d

at 863. The nature of a suspect’s resistance is only one factor,

however, in an analysis of whether a use of force is objectively

reasonable. “Force is reasonable only when exercised in proportion

to the threat posed.” Id. Put simply, police officers are not

22\| free to use unlimited force simply because a suspect resists

arrest. Plaintiff can succeed on his $ 1983 claims without

24|| demonstrating or imolying that he did not resist arrest.

25|| To the extent Defendants argue that Plaintiff is barred from

bringing any excessive force claim because he pled no contest to

resisting arrest, the argument is baseless.

28 BE. Defendant City of Los Angeles

16

1 Defendants argue Defendant City of Los Angeles is entitled to

summary judgment on all claims against it.”® A plaintiff alleging

31 civil rights violations under § 1983 may not state a claim against

4i!/a government entity for the actions of the entity’s employees; only

the actions of the entity itself give rise to liability. Monell v.

Dep’ of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).

71 A municipality or local agency is only liable for constitutional

violations perpetrated by its employees if the government entity

officially adopted and promulgated a “policy, custom, or practice

10] that was the ‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.”

11}| Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)

12] (internal quotation and citation omitted). Defendants main

13] contention is that there can be no Monell violation where there is

no underlying constitutional violation. Defendants are correct, in

principle. See, e.g., Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass'n,

541 F.3d 950, 957 (9th Cir. 2008). As discussed above, however,

triable issues remain as to whether Officer Johnigan’s eleven taser

deployments constituted an objectively unreasonable use of force in

violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights.

20 Defendants also argue, briefly, that Plaintiff has presented

21]}/ no evidence to support a ratification theory of Monell liability,

and that Plaintiff cannot succeed on a failure to train theory

based on only a single instance of inappropriate force. (Mot. at

19:28-20:3, 20:7-9.) A plaintiff may establish Monell liability by

proving “that an official with final policy-making authority

26

27 ° Defendants’ initial briefing in support of this argument,

28 which applies to three of Plaintiff’s claims, spans approximately

one page.

17

1 ratified a subordinate’s unconstitutional decision or action and

2 the basis for it.” Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1346–47

3 (9th Cir. 1992). “[R]atification of conduct . . . can be shown by a

4 municipality’s post-event conduct, including its conduct in an

5 investigation of the incident.” Dorger v. City of Napa, No.

6 12-CV-440 YGR, 2012 WL 3791447, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2012).

7 Here, it is undisputed that the Los Angeles Police Department found

8 each of Johnigan’s taser deployments “out of policy,” and

9 administratively disapproved of her actions. Although such a

10 conclusion might often prove dispositive of a ratification claim,

11 there is also evidence in the record that, despite the department’s

12 conclusions, Johnigan received only “informal” re-training in the

13 “functions” of a taser, without any training as to whether, why, or

14 how her use of the taser was “improper.” A finder of fact could,

15 therefore, conclude that Johnigan’s supervisors ratified Johnigan’s

16 conduct.

17 Plaintiff provides no substantive opposition to Defendants’

18 single-incident argument. Generally, a plaintiff can only succeed

19 on a failure to train theory of Monell liability by showing a

20 pattern of violations. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 70

21 (2011). Contrary to Defendant’s argument, however, a failure to

22 train can be shown by a single incident that demonstrates a

23 “patently obvious” failure to train. Id. at 64; see also Dillman

24 v. Tuolumne Cty., No. 1:13-CV-00404 LJO, 2013 WL 1907379, at *14

25 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013). Nevertheless, Plaintiff has presented no

26 argument or evidence that this is such a case. Accordingly, the

27 City of Los Angeles is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

28 Third Claim for failure to train.

1 F. State Law Battery

2 Lastly, Defendants argue that they are all entitled to summary

3 judgment on Plaintiff’s state law battery claim because excessive

4 force tort claims are coextensive with Fourth Amendment claims.

5 Although Defendants’ battery arguments are premised upon the

6 conclusion that any use of force against Plaintiff was objectively

7 reasonable, triable issues remain with respect to Plaintiff’s

8 Fourth Amendment claims, as explained above. Accordingly,

9 Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s

10 state law battery claim.

11 IV. Conclusion

12 For the reasons stated above Defendants’ Motion for Summary

13 Judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part. The motion is

14 granted with respect to Plaintiff’s failure to train claim against

15 Defendant City of Los Angeles. The motion is denied with respect

16 to all other claims.

17

18

19

20

IT IS SO ORDERED.

21

22 Dated: July 24, 2020

DEAN D. PREGERSON

23 United States District Judge

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28

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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