The opinion
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-4088 ODW (PVC) Date: July 20, 2020
Title Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. C/O Drake
Present: The Honorable Pedro V. Castillo, United States Magistrate Judge
Marlene Ramirez None
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder
Attorneys Present for Petitioner: Attorneys Present for Respondent:
None None
PROCEEDINGS: [IN CHAMBERS] ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT
THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF HABEAS
JURISDICTION
Pending before the Court is a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by
Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr., a California state prisoner state prisoner proceeding pro se.
(“Petition,” Dkt. No. 1). Petitioner is serving two consecutive life terms with the
possibility of parole, plus a consecutive determinate eight month term, pursuant to his
1992 convictions in the Los Angeles County Superior Court on two counts of torture, one
count of mayhem, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, one count of corporal
injury to a cohabitant, and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. (See Robert
Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. On Habeas Corpus, C.D. Cal. Case No. CV 18-9026 ODW (SS), Dkt.
No. 12 at 2).
While the Petition is nearly impossible to understand, Petitioner appears to allege
in relevant part that his conviction in a disciplinary proceeding on September 15, 2018 at
the California Men’s Colony, where he was then housed, violated his due process rights.
Petitioner further contends that the Rules Violation Report that gave rise to the
disciplinary proceeding was falsely issued in retaliation for his having filed grievances
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-4088 ODW (PVC) Date: July 20, 2020
Title Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. C/O Drake
against prison employees, in violation of his First Amendment rights. (Petition at 11-
12).1
According to the Petition, on September 4, 2018, Lieutenant Escobedo ordered
Officer Farley to move Petitioner from his “Americans with Disabilities Act” dorm to a
non-ADA dorm because Petitioner had filed a grievance against Officer Drake. (Id. at
11). Petitioner slipped and fell in the shower in the non-ADA dorm and was moved back
to the ADA dorm on September 5, 2018. (Id. at 12). The prison’s written “Disciplinary
Hearing Results” report, attached as an exhibit to the Petition, (id. at 27-31), states that
Petitioner was accused of attempting to intimidate Officer Farley from performing his
duties on September 4, 2018, by threatening him with legal action if he did not reverse
the bed move. (Id. at 29). Petitioner was found guilty and was “assessed Temporary
Privilege Group ‘C’ placement for a period of thirty (30) days.”2 (Id. at 30). Prisoners
subject to Group “C” restrictions are confined to their assigned dorm room after 1 p.m.
daily, with exceptions for evening meals, work assignments, therapy sessions, medical
appointments, religious programs, and law library access, among other permissible
activities. Group “C” prisoners are also subject to program restrictions, such as being
allowed only 1/4 of their maximum canteen draw, only emergency telephone calls, no
quarterly packages, and no family visits, among other limitations. (Id. at 35).
1 Citations to the Petition follow the CM/ECF-generated page numbers on the Court’s
docket.
2 The incidents at issue in the Petition were previously the subject of a civil rights action
filed by Petitioner in this Court. (See Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. T. Drake, et al., C.D. Cal.
Case No. CV 19-5656 ODW (PVC), Dkt. Nos. 1 (Complaint) & 9 (First Amended
Complaint)). That action was dismissed with prejudice on May 28, 2020 after Plaintiff
declined to cure the pleading defects in the First Amended Complaint. (See id., Dkt. Nos.
15 (Report and Recommendation), 20 (Order Accepting) & 21 (Judgment)). Petitioner’s
appeal of the dismissal of that action is currently pending in the Ninth Circuit. (Dkt. No.
22).
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-4088 ODW (PVC) Date: July 20, 2020
Title Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. C/O Drake
“Federal law opens two main avenues to relief on complaints related to
imprisonment: a petition for habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and a complaint under the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750
(2004) (per curiam). “Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to particulars
affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on
circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.” Id. (internal citation
omitted). The district court’s jurisdiction to provide relief depends on whether a given
claim is presented in a habeas petition or a civil rights complaint. In Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court held: “[w]hen a state prisoner is
challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks
is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that
imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 499 (emphasis
added). A claim falls within the core of habeas corpus where “success in that action
would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.” Wilkinson
v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005) (emphasis added). Conversely, “a § 1983 action is
the exclusive vehicle for claims brought by state prisoners that are not within the core of
habeas corpus.” Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Challenges to disciplinary proceedings may or may not give rise to a habeas claim.
For example, Preiser was brought by state prisoners who challenged the loss of good
time credits as a result of disciplinary determinations. In that case, restoration of the
forfeited credits would have resulted in the prisoners’ “immediate release from physical
custody.” Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487. The Supreme Court held that because restoration of
the credits would necessarily shorten the length of the prisoners’ confinement in prison,
their claims fell within the “core of habeas corpus.” Id.
However, the loss of good time credits does not inevitably bring a case within the
core of habeas corpus. In Nettles, a state prisoner serving an indeterminate life term with
the possibility of parole filed a habeas petition challenging a disciplinary conviction that
resulted in the loss of good time credits. Nettles, 830 F.3d at 925-27. Petitioner argued
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-4088 ODW (PVC) Date: July 20, 2020
Title Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. C/O Drake
that if his rules violation report were expunged, he would be more likely to obtain an
earlier, and favorable, parole hearing. Id. at 934. The Ninth Circuit concluded that
petitioner’s claim did not fall within the core of habeas corpus because “[s]uccess on the
merits of [his] claim would not necessarily lead to immediate or speedier release . . .” Id.
at 934 (emphasis added). The Court explained that in determining a prisoner’s suitability
for parole, the parole board must consider “[a]ll relevant, reliable information” bearing on
whether a prisoner constitutes a threat to public safety. Id. at 935 (quoting Cal. Code
Regs. tit. 15, § 2281(b)). A rules violation is merely one of the factors the board may
consider, and “[b]ecause the parole board has the authority to deny parole ‘on the basis of
any of the grounds presently available to it,’ the presence of a disciplinary infraction does
not compel the denial of parole, nor does an absence of an infraction compel the grant of
parole.” Id. (internal citation to Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 (9th Cir. 2003)
omitted). Accordingly, because the parole board could deny parole even if the rules
violation report were expunged, success on the claim would not necessarily result in
petitioner’s “immediate or earlier release.” Id. at 935. As such, the Ninth Circuit
determined that petitioner’s claim could be brought only under § 1983. Id.
Here, it does not appear that Petitioner’s claims, however construed, fall within the
“core” of habeas corpus. The sole penalty imposed as a result of the disciplinary
proceeding challenged in the Petition was the temporary assessment of Privilege Group
“C” status. While Group “C” status restricted Petitioner’s movement within the prison
and his ability to program, it did not prolong his prison term, and therefore did not affect
the “fact or duration” of his confinement. However, even if Petitioner had lost good time
credits as punishment for his disciplinary conviction, which he did not, it still does not
appear that he would be able to assert a habeas claim challenging that loss because he is
serving two consecutive indeterminate life terms. Like the petitioner in Nettles, any
restoration of forfeited good time credits would not necessarily result in Petitioner’s
immediate or earlier release because he could still be denied parole based on any of the
factors that the parole board is authorized to consider. It does not appear that the Court
could grant any relief on the claims in the Petition that would necessarily “shorten the
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. CV 20-4088 ODW (PVC) Date: July 20, 2020
Title Robert Lee Jenkins, Jr. v. C/O Drake
prisoner’s sentence.” Consequently, “habeas jurisdiction is absent.” Ramirez, 334 F.3d
at 859.3
Because Petitioner’s claims do not challenge the fact or duration of his
confinement, the Petition does not appear to confer habeas jurisdiction upon this Court.
Petitioner is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, within twenty-one (21) days of
the date of this Order, why this action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Instead of filing a response to the instant Order, Petitioner may request a
voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).
A Notice of Dismissal form is attached for Petitioner’s convenience. However,
Petitioner is advised that any dismissed claims may be later subject to the statute of
limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by AEDPA, which provides
that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
Petitioner is expressly warned that the failure to timely file a response to this
Order may result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed with prejudice
for failure to comply with Court orders and failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
41(b).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order upon Petitioner at
his current address of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Initials of Preparer mr
3 Petitioner foreclosed his ability to litigate his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
declining to cure the deficiencies in his defective First Amended Complaint. Therefore,
unless the Ninth Circuit reverses this court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s civil rights claims
with prejudice, Petitioner will be unable to re-assert any claims involving the incidents
alleged in the Petition in a civil rights action.