Opinion

Barbara Kinneberg v. Ford Motor Company

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Jun 18, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.9%

“we are confident that district courts are well equipped to determine whether defendants have carried their burden of proving future attorneys’ fees, and to determine when a fee estimate is too speculative because of the likelihood of a prompt settlement”

How later courts described this case

  • “we are confident that district courts are well equipped to determine whether defendants have carried their burden of proving future attorneys’ fees, and to determine when a fee estimate is too speculative because of the likelihood of a prompt settlement”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No.: CV 20-00865 AB (FFMx) Date: June 18, 2020

ML 18-02814 AB (FFMx)

Title. Barbara Kinneberg v. Ford Motor Company et al.,

member case in In Re: Ford Motor Co. DPS6 Powershift Transmission

Products Liability Lit.

Present: The Honorable ANDRE BIROTTE JR., United States District Judge

Carla Badirian N/A

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Appearing None Appearing

Proceedings: [In Chambers] ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REMAND

IN KINNEBERG, CV 20-00865

Before the Court is Plaintiff Barbara Kinneberg’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion for

Remand (“Motion,” Dkt. No. 9). Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Defendant”)

filed an Opposition and Plaintiff filed a Reply. The Motion is GRANTED.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and thus have subject matter

jurisdiction only over matters authorized by the Constitution and Congress. See

Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). “Because of

the Congressional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on

removal,” statutes conferring jurisdiction are “strictly construed and federal

jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the nght of removal in the

CV-90 (12/02) CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk CB

first instance.” Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations

and quotations omitted).

There is a strong presumption that the Court is without jurisdiction until

affirmatively proven otherwise. See Fifty Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,

446 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1970). When an action is removed from state court,

the removing party bears the burden of demonstrating that removal is proper.

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).

Federal diversity jurisdiction exists when the parties are completely diverse

and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an action from state court to federal

court if the diversity and amount in controversy requirements are satisfied and if

none of the defendants are citizens of the forum state.

The amount in controversy, for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, is the total

“amount at stake in the underlying litigation.” Theis Research, Inc. v. Brown &

Bain, 400 F.3d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005). “[I]n assessing the amount in controversy,

a court must ‘assume that the allegations of the complaint are true and assume that

a jury will return a verdict for the plaintiff on all claims made in the complaint.’”

Campbell v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 471 Fed. App’x 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Kenneth Rothschild Trust v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 199 F. Supp. 2d 993,

1001 (C.D. Cal. 2002)).

“The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the

defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980

F.2d at 566. And while “‘a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a

plausible allegation that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional

threshold,’ . . . ‘[e]vidence establishing the amount is required’” when “defendant’s

assertion of the amount in controversy is contested by plaintiffs.” Ibarra v.

Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Dart Cherokee

Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014)). The defendant

must establish the amount in controversy by the preponderance of the evidence.

See Dart, 135 S. Ct. at 553-54.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Amount In Controversy Is Not Satisfied.

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed in state court, alleges warranty and lemon law

claims under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civil Code § 1791 et

seq., and related claims under Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17531 and § 17535, against

Defendant arising out of alleged defects in a 2014 Ford Focus that Plaintiff

purchased in 2015. See Compl. (Dkt. No. 1-2) ¶ 6. Defendant removed the action

based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff now moves to remand on the ground that

Defendant has not established either the amount in controversy or complete

diversity of citizenship.

The Court concludes that Defendant has not established that the amount in

controversy is satisfied. Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s actual and consequential

damages, plus a two-times civil penalty, and attorneys’ fees available under Song-

Beverly, together satisfy the amount in controversy. Defendant assumes that

estimate that Plaintiff paid about $14,325 for the vehicle. See Notice of Removal ¶

21. This amount, plus the maximum two-times civil penalty, equals $42,975.1 This

is $32,026 short of satisfying the amount in controversy. Defendant argues that the

attorneys’ fees Plaintiff seeks would make up this difference, and cites a number of

lemon law cases in which attorneys’ fees ranging from $60,000 to $355,680 were

sought or awarded. But Defendant has not shown that these amounts from other

cases are probative of the attorneys’ fees put in issue in this case. See Fritsch v.

Swift Transportation Co. of Arizona, LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 795 (9th Cir. 2018) (“we

are confident that district courts are well equipped to determine whether defendants

have carried their burden of proving future attorneys’ fees, and to determine when

a fee estimate is too speculative because of the likelihood of a prompt settlement”).

Defendant’s attorneys’ fees estimate is too speculative to make up the difference

necessary to satisfy the amount in controversy, so the Court finds that the amount

in controversy is not satisfied.

The Court denies Plaintiff’s request for an award of $3,160 in attorneys’ fees

incurred to bring this motion. “Absent unusual circumstances, courts may award

attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an

objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively

reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp.,

1 This total does not take into consideration any offsets that would reduce the

damages.

546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005). Although it is a close call, the Court finds that

Defendant’s basis for removal was sufficiently reasonable to deny the fee request.

However, the Court expects Defendant’s future decisions regarding removal

and motions for remand to be informed by this and similar orders that the Court

has issued recently. Should other plaintiffs in this MDL be forced to move for

remand in similarly improvidently-removed cases, the Court may find Defendant’s

removals unreasonable and award attorneys’ fees.

III. CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand is GRANTED, but her request for fees is

denied.

The Court REMANDS this action back to the state court from which it was

removed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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