The opinion
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9 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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Case No. ED CV 19-2459 VAP (MRW)
13 ANTHONY SCOTT GRANTHAM,
ORDER DISMISSING ACTION
14 Petitioner,
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
15 v.
16 PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA,
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Respondent.
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20 The Court dismisses this habeas corpus action without prejudice for
21 lack of federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
22 * * *
23 1. Petitioner is currently an inmate in local custody. According to
24 the California Attorney General, Petitioner was convicted at trial in San
25 Bernardino Superior Court in February 2020 on charges of resisting arrest
26 and evading a peace officer. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to
27 six years in prison. (Docket # 10-1 at 2.) Petitioner is currently appealing
28 his conviction and sentence in the state appellate court. (Id.)
1 2. Petitioner filed this habeas corpus action in federal court before
2 his trial. (Docket # 1.) The gist of his habeas claims was to challenge to
3 the propriety of pretrial competency proceedings (Id. at 4-9.) Relatedly,
4 Petitioner claimed that his speedy trial right was violated by his pretrial
5 detention. (Id.)
6 3. The Attorney General moved to dismiss the federal habeas
7 action on several grounds. (Docket # 10.) Most significantly, the Attorney
8 General contends that Younger abstention and lack-of-exhaustion
9 principles due to the ongoing post-conviction appellate proceedings in state
10 court warrant dismissal of the action.
11 4. Petitioner’s brief response acknowledges his recent conviction
12 and appeal. (Docket # 14 at 2-4.) However, he contends that he “was not
13 aware that the writ of habeas [ ] would hinder Petitioner’s appeals.” He
14 also states that he understood that he “could have more than one petition
15 [ ] in the courts.” (Id.) Petitioner provided no argument in response to the
16 Attorney General’s jurisdictional positions.1
17 * * *
18 5. If it “appears from the application that the applicant or person
19 detained is not entitled” to habeas relief, a court may summarily dismiss a
20 habeas action. 28 U.S.C. § 2243; see also Local Civil Rule 72-3.2
21 (magistrate judge may submit proposed order for summary dismissal to
22 district judge “if it plainly appears from the face of the petition [ ] that the
23 petitioner is not entitled to relief”).
24 6. Younger Abstention. Federal courts generally abstain from
25 interfering with pending state criminal proceedings until the conviction
26 1 The Court takes notice that it recently dismissed a parallel action
involving Petitioner. Grantham v. People, No. CV 19-10106 VAP (MRW) (C.D.
27 Cal.). Petitioner challenged an expired sentence that allegedly affected his
ongoing incarceration. The Court summarily dismissed the case on jurisdictional
28 grounds.
1 becomes final after the conclusion of appellate proceedings. Younger v.
2 Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of
3 Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973) (same). Younger abstention “is
4 appropriate if (1) there are ongoing state judicial proceedings, (2) the
5 proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) there is adequate
6 opportunity in the state proceedings to raise federal questions.” Dubinka
7 v. Judges of Superior Court, 23 F.3d 218, 223 (9th Cir. 1994); Sheehee v.
8 Baca, 588 F. App’x 716 (9th Cir. 2014) (same).
9 7. There are few exceptions to the Younger rule. They are limited
10 to “cases of proven harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state
11 officials in bad faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction” [Brown v.
12 Ahern, 676 F.3d 899, 903 (9th Cir. 2012)] or when a prisoner raises a
13 “colorable claim of double jeopardy.” Stanley v. Baca, 555 F. App’x 707, 708
14 (9th Cir. 2014).
15 8. Exhaustion. Under federal habeas law, a prisoner must
16 exhaust all claims as a prerequisite to federal court consideration of a
17 habeas corpus petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d
18 940, 946 (9th Cir. 2015). Exhaustion occurs when a prisoner fairly
19 presents those claims to the state’s highest court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
20 509 (1982); Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 370 (1995).
21 * * *
22 9. In the present matter, the Attorney General convincingly
23 demonstrated that this Court does not have (or should decline to exercise)
24 jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas claims. Petitioner’s conviction and
25 sentence are currently the subject of ongoing proceedings in the state
26 appellate court. There is clearly an adequate opportunity on direct appeal
27 for Petitioner to raise issues about his pretrial detention and the process by
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1 | which his mental competency was assessed. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45;
2 | Dubinka, 23 F.3d at 223. Moreover, Petitioner makes no colorable claim of
3 | bad faith prosecution or double jeopardy violations. Brown, 676 F.3d
4 | at 908; Stanley, 555 F. App’x at 708. Younger abstention is appropriate.
5 10. Further, Petitioner presents obviously unexhausted claims in
6 | his current petition. Petitioner’s post-conviction direct appeal is currently
7 | pending in the state’s intermediate appellate court. He hasn’t presented
8 | these claims to the state supreme court yet. As a result, his federal habeas
9 | action consists solely of unexhausted claims. Dismissal is warranted on
10 | this basis. Kyzar, 780 F.3d 946; Rose, 455 U.S. at 509.
11 11. Therefore, the present action is hereby DISMISSED without
12 | prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.”
13 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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| Dated: April 28, 2020 Vigan x A, fe
16 HON. VIRGINIA A. PHILLAPS
17 CHIEF U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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19 Presented by:
20 LU [ |
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22 | HON. MICHAEL R. WILNER
93 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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26 ———__
27 | declines to take up the Attorney Generals alternative contentions regarding
mootness and whether Petitioner named an appropriate respondent. (Docket
28 | #10-1 at 3, 5.)