Debra Jean Allen v. Nancy A. Berryhill

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10 EASTERN DIVISION

11 DEBRA J. A.,1 ) Case No. 5:19-cv-00688-JDE

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Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

13 ) ORDER

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14 v. )

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15 ANDREW M. SAUL,2 ) )

Commissioner of Social Security, )

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17 Defendant. )

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19 Plaintiff Debra J. A. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint on April 16, 2019,

20 seeking review of the Commissioner’s denial of her applications for disability

21 insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security income (“SSI”). The

22 parties filed a Joint Submission (“Jt. Stip.”) regarding the issues in dispute on

23 February 12, 2019. The matter now is ready for decision.

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1 Plaintiff's name has been partially redacted in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P.

25 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and

Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

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27 2 Andrew M. Saul, now Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, is

substituted as defendant for Nancy A. Berryhill. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).

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1 I.

2 BACKGROUND

3 Plaintiff protectively filed her applications for DIB and SSI on July 29,

4 2015, alleging disability commencing on May 1, 2013. AR 19, 31, 39, 232-45.

5 On May 2, 2018, after her applications were denied (AR 104-05, 132-33),

6 Plaintiff, represented by counsel, testified via video before an Administrative

7 Law Judge (“ALJ”), and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified telephonically.

8 AR 19, 39-77. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to

9 January 1, 2014. AR 19, 57-58.

10 On May 23, 2018, the ALJ issued a written decision concluding Plaintiff

11 was not disabled. AR 15-31. The ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in

12 substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged onset date and had severe

13 impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; arthropy of the

14 bilateral knees; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”); overactive

15 bladder; and obesity. AR 21-25. The ALJ also found Plaintiff did not have an

16 impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a

17 listed impairment and had the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform

18 sedentary work except she: (1) can lift, carry, push, and pull up to 10 pounds

19 occasionally, and less than 10 pounds frequently; (2) can sit for up to six hours

20 in an eight-hour workday; (3) can stand and/or walk for up to two hours in an

21 eight-hour workday; (4) must be allowed to change positions every 15 minutes;

22 (5) can occasionally climb ramps and stairs; (6) must not climb ladders, ropes,

23 or scaffolds; (7) can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl;

24 (8) should avoid walking on uneven terrain; (9) should avoid concentrated

25 exposure to hazards; (10) should avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold

26 and heat; (11) should avoid concentrated exposure to wetness; (12) should

27 avoid concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, odors, and pulmonary irritants;

28 and (13) must have a workstation in close proximity to a restroom. AR 25-26.

1 The ALJ further found that Plaintiff could perform her past relevant work

2 as an office manager (Dictionary of Occupational Titles 169.167-034) because

3 that work did not require performance of work-related activities precluded by

4 her RFC. AR 30. Thus, the ALJ found Plaintiff was not under a “disability,” as

5 defined in the Social Security Act, from the amended alleged onset date of

6 January 1, 2014, through the date of the decision. AR 30-31. Plaintiff’s request

7 for review of the ALJ’s decision by the Appeals Council was denied, making

8 the ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision. AR 5-10.

9 II.

10 LEGAL STANDARDS

11 A. Standard of Review

12 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this court may review the Commissioner’s

13 decision to deny benefits. The ALJ’s findings and decision should be upheld if

14 they are free from legal error and supported by substantial evidence based on

15 the record as a whole. Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir.

16 2015) (as amended); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007).

17 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable person

18 might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504

19 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a

20 preponderance. Id. To determine whether substantial evidence supports a

21 finding, the reviewing court “must review the administrative record as a whole,

22 weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from

23 the Commissioner’s conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th

24 Cir. 1998). “If the evidence can reasonably support either affirming or

25 reversing,” the reviewing court “may not substitute its judgment” for that of

26 the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21; see also Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,

27 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Even when the evidence is susceptible to more than one

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1 rational interpretation, [the court] must uphold the ALJ’s findings if they are

2 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”).

3 Lastly, even if an ALJ errs, the decision will be affirmed where such

4 error is harmless (Molina, 674 F.3d at 1115), that is, if it is “inconsequential to

5 the ultimate nondisability determination,” or if “the agency’s path may

6 reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than

7 ideal clarity.” Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 492 (citation omitted).

8 B. Standard for Determining Disability Benefits

9 When the claimant’s case has proceeded to consideration by an ALJ, the

10 ALJ conducts a five-step sequential evaluation to determine at each step if the

11 claimant is or is not disabled. See Ford v. Saul, __ F.3d __, No. 18-35794, 2020

12 WL 829864, at *2-3 (9th Cir. Feb. 20, 2020); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110.

13 First, the ALJ considers whether the claimant currently works at a job

14 that meets the criteria for “substantial gainful activity.” Molina, 674 F.3d at

15 1110. If not, the ALJ proceeds to a second step to determine whether the

16 claimant has a “severe” medically determinable physical or mental impairment

17 or combination of impairments that has lasted for more than twelve months.

18 Id. If so, the ALJ proceeds to a third step to determine whether the claimant’s

19 impairments render the claimant disabled because they “meet or equal” any of

20 the “listed impairments” set forth in the Social Security regulations at 20

21 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. See Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

22 Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir. 2015). If the claimant’s impairments do

23 not meet or equal a “listed impairment,” before proceeding to the fourth step

24 the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC, that is, what the claimant can do on a

25 sustained basis despite the limitations from her impairments. See 20 C.F.R.

26 §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4); Social Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p.

27 After determining the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ proceeds to the fourth

28 step and determines whether the claimant has the RFC to perform her past

1 relevant work, either as she “actually” performed it when she worked in the

2 past, or as that same job is “generally” performed in the national economy. See

3 Stacy v. Colvin, 825 F.3d 563, 569 (9th Cir. 2016). If the claimant cannot

4 perform her past relevant work, the ALJ proceeds to a fifth and final step to

5 determine whether there is any other work, in light of the claimant’s RFC, age,

6 education, and work experience, that the claimant can perform and that exists

7 in “significant numbers” in either the national or regional economies. See

8 Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 1999). If the claimant can

9 do other work, she is not disabled; but if the claimant cannot do other work

10 and meets the duration requirement, the claimant is disabled. See id. at 1099.

11 The claimant generally bears the burden at each of steps one through

12 four to show she is disabled, or she meets the requirements to proceed to the

13 next step; and the claimant bears the ultimate burden to show she is disabled.

14 See, e.g., Ford, 2020 WL 829864 at *2; Molina, 674 F.3d at 1110; However, at

15 Step Five, the ALJ has a “limited” burden of production to identify

16 representative jobs that the claimant can perform and that exist in “significant”

17 numbers in the economy. See Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th Cir.

18 2012); Tackett, 180 F.3d at 1100.

19 III.

20 DISCUSSION

21 The parties present three disputed issues, reordered as:

22 Issue No. 1: Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective

23 testimony and statements;

24 Issue No. 2: Whether the ALJ properly considered the presence of a

25 medically determinable mental impairment; and

26 Issue No. 3: Whether the ALJ properly considered the need for a close-

27 proximity restroom.

28 Jt. Stip. at 4.

1 A. Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony

2 In Issue No. 1, Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to state proper reasons

3 for rejecting her symptom and limitation testimony. Jt. Stip. at 20-23, 26-27.

4 1. Applicable Law

5 Where a disability claimant produces objective medical evidence of an

6 underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain

7 or other symptoms alleged, absent evidence of malingering, the ALJ must

8 provide “‘specific, clear and convincing reasons for’ rejecting the claimant’s

9 testimony regarding the severity” of the symptoms. Treichler v. Comm’r Soc.

10 Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Moisa v.

11 Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004). The ALJ’s findings “must be

12 sufficiently specific to allow a reviewing court to conclude that the [ALJ]

13 rejected [the] claimant’s testimony on permissible grounds and did not

14 arbitrarily discredit the claimant’s testimony.” Id. at 885 (citation omitted). But

15 if the ALJ’s assessment of the claimant’s testimony is reasonable and is

16 supported by substantial evidence, it is not the Court’s role to “second-guess”

17 it. See Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001). Finally, the

18 ALJ’s credibility finding may be upheld even if not all the ALJ’s reasons for

19 rejecting the claimant’s testimony are upheld. See Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec.

20 Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004).

21 2. Analysis

22 To support her applications for benefits, Plaintiff submitted at least three

23 disability reports and a function report explaining her symptoms, conditions,

24 limitations, and medications. AR 268-75, 290-98, 302-15.

25 At the May 2018 hearing, Plaintiff, almost 62 years old at the time,

26 testified as follows. She worked from 2005 until 2013 as an office manager for

27 a psychiatric nurse practitioner, handling reception, appointments, records,

28 and schedules, and helped with administration of sample medications. AR 44-

1 46, 62-65. Her employer hired an assistant to help her the last three years she

2 worked due to her difficulties walking, bending, standing, and lifting. AR 46-

3 47, 63-64. Prior to her office manager position, she was a bakery clerk in a

4 grocery store from 2001 to 2005. AR 47-48.

5 She stated she can no longer work due to symptoms with her bladder,

6 back, feet, knees, breathing condition, and mental health. AR 51, 56.

7 Regarding her bladder, during the day she needs to use the bathroom twice

8 every hour; at night she relieves herself every two hours, for a total of at least

9 four times. AR 51, 56, 58-60. It takes her about 10 minutes to use the restroom.

10 AR 59. She experiences leakage, so she uses pads and stays close to a

11 restroom. AR 56-57. Sometimes she does not make it on time, and she has

12 previously had accidents at work. AR 57-58, 60. Physician’s Assistant John

13 Batin,3 whom she sees monthly, prescribed Vesicare for her bladder, but

14 discontinued it. AR 53, 60-61. She also has constipation and diarrhea. AR 59.

15 Plaintiff describes that her spine is curving, which limits her ability to

16 stand for only about 10 minutes. AR 52. She can sit for a couple of hours, but

17 then must elevate her feet about three times per day, 20 minutes per time or

18 until she feels comfortable. AR 52, 62. Her feet can also go numb. AR 52. Mr.

19 Batin recommended back surgery. AR 62. Two doctors said her knees need to

20 be replaced. AR 53. She has had injections in her knees. AR 53. She also

21 suffers from COPD. AR 52. She can walk only 75 feet without experiencing

22 shortness of breath. AR 51-52. She uses an inhaler. AR 52.

23 Mentally, she says she is “not there anymore,” suffering from depression

24 and anxiety. AR 52, 54. She cries, yells, and sits in her bedroom all the time.

25 AR 55. She also feels overwhelmed and panics and cannot be in crowds. Id.

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27 3 Mr. Batin is a certified physician’s assistant (“PA-C”) in primary care physician

(“PCP”) Dr. Pablo Sobero’s office. See AR 415.

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1 Plaintiff takes antidepressants and medication for her anxiety, including

2 Abilify and Lorazepam, but they are not working. AR 55, 67. She also takes

3 pain medication, including Tylenol with Codeine, twice a day. AR 66. It gives

4 her a dry mouth and makes her dizzy. AR 66.

5 She can lift 15 pounds, but she would not be able to carry an object of

6 that weight across a room. AR 54. She can sit for just a few hours. AR 54. She

7 has a driver’s license but does not drive because she becomes panicky and

8 nervous. AR 45, 66. She lives in a house with her boyfriend. AR 65. He does

9 the housework. AR 65. She doesn’t cook, although “[o]nce in a great while”

10 she will prepare something that doesn’t require her to stand over the stove. AR

11 65. She does not do laundry or yardwork, or shop. AR 65. She uses a seat

12 when she bathes. AR 65.

13 The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s disability reports and function report to

14 be “of the same general nature as [Plaintiff’s] subjective complaints from [her]

15 hearing testimony.” AR 27. The ALJ found her medically determinable

16 impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but

17 her statements “concerning the intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects of

18 [the] symptoms” were “not entirely consistent” with the medical evidence and

19 other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in the decision. AR 26.

20 Those reasons were that Plaintiff’s subjective statements were not entirely

21 consistent with: (1) her conservative treatment; and (2) the objective medical

22 evidence. AR 27-28; see also Jt. Stip. 23-26.

23 The ALJ found Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected to

24 cause the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the

25 intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely

26 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the

27 reasons explained.” AR 27. Immediately thereafter, the ALJ states, regarding

28 Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and arthropy of the

1 bilateral knees, the ALJ states her “medical history is not fully consistent with

2 the alleged severity of her symptoms,” citing examples. Id. Inconsistency

3 between Plaintiff’s statements and the objective evidence, alone, is not a

4 sufficient basis to support a credibility determination. See Rollins, 261 F.3d at

5 856-57; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir. 2005) (lack of objective

6 medical evidence to support subjective symptom allegations cannot form the

7 sole basis for discounting pain testimony); Dschaak v. Astrue, 2011 WL

8 4498835, at *1 (D. Or. Sept. 27, 2011) (“[O]nce the[] other bases for the ALJ’s

9 decision were discarded as erroneous, the ALJ’s credibility determination

10 could not rely solely on conflicts with the medical evidence.”).

11 The only other rationale offered by the ALJ for rejecting Plaintiff’s

12 symptom testimony that is apparent in the decision, and the only other

13 rationale defended by the Commission here, is the ALJ statement that

14 Plaintiff’s “treatment has been on the conservative side, consisting primarily of

15 medication management and a series of trigger point injections in late 2015.”

16 AR 27. The ALJ then discussed the series of trigger point injections, a referral

17 to a pain specialist, and Mr. Batin’s prescription of Neurontin (Gabapentin)4

18 and Tylenol with Codeine. AR 27-28. The Court finds ALJ’s rationale based

19 on conservative treatment is not supported here.

20 First, several courts have cast doubt that injections are conservative

21 treatment or have found they are not conservative. See, e.g., Garrison v.

22 Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 n.20 (9th Cir. 2014) (expressing doubt that “shots

23 to the neck and lower back qualify as ‘conservative’ medical treatment”);

24 Contreras v. Berryhill, 2020 WL 619792, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2020)

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26 4 See Warren v. Battle, 2020 WL 61037, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 6, 2020) (Neurontin and

Gabapentin are synonymous); Johnson v. Chau, 2019 WL 7037654, at *7 (E.D. Cal.

27 Dec. 20, 2019).

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1 (stating “[n]umerous courts have rejected the argument that trigger point

2 injections are ‘conservative’”; collecting cases). This is especially true when

3 injections are combined with other treatment, such as Plaintiff’s strong pain

4 medication5 and referral to a pain specialist. See, e.g., Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue,

5 382 F. App’x 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (suggesting powerful pain medications

6 and injections were not conservative treatment); Christine G. v. Saul, 402 F.

7 Supp. 3d 913, 926 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“Many courts have previously found that

8 strong narcotic pain medications and spinal epidural injections are not

9 considered to be ‘conservative’ treatment.’”; collecting cases); Eldridge v.

10 Berryhill, 2018 WL 2357147, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2018) (medication

11 treatment, including Gabapentin and Tylenol with Codeine, combined with

12 pain-specialist referral and injections is “far from conservative”).

13 Second, while the treatment identified by the ALJ in the credibility

14 determination is sufficient to refute the conservative-treatment finding, it does

15 not represent the full extent and history of Plaintiff’s treatment. In addition to

16 Neurontin and Tylenol with Codeine, Plaintiff has been prescribed

17 Hydrocodone and Aspirin for pain (AR 306, 312, 325), Levothyroxine for her

18 thyroid (AR 306, 325), Meloxicam for her upset stomach (AR 306, 312),

19 Metoprolol for high blood pressure (AR 306, 312, 325), oxygen, Pro-Air

20 inhaler, and Symbicort for COPD (AR 306, 312, 325, 429), Vesicare for her

21 bladder (AR 60-61), and Abilify, Lorazepam, Wellbutrin, Ativan, Brintellix for

22 her mental health issues (AR 287, 297, 312, 325, 416-18, 422-23, 426, 429, 432,

23 435-36, 441, 444). While some of these, by themselves, could be considered

24 conservative, collectively they demonstrate a fairly intensive treatment regimen

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5 See Eldridge v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 2357147, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 23, 2018)

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(describing Gabapentin and Tylenol with Codeine as prescription medications to treat

27 “severe pain”); Yang v. Barnhart, 2006 WL 3694857, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2006)

(describing Tylenol with Codeine as a “potent drug” to alleviate pain).

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1 through the years. Moreover, many medications were discontinued because

2 they were not providing relief, corroborating Plaintiff’s statements about her

3 symptom severity. This heavy and multi-faceted medicinal treatment,

4 combined with Plaintiff’s injections, is not “on the conservative side.” AR 29;

5 see, e.g., Lapeirre-Gutt, 382 F. App’x at 664; Christine G., 402 F. Supp. 3d at

6 926; Eldridge, 2018 WL 2357147 at *9; Wilson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2016

7 WL 4402108, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016) (opioid, anti-convulsant, and

8 psychotropic medication, along with CPAP machine, and two trigger point

9 injections by a pain-management doctor is not “minimal treatment”).

10 Third, in addition to the pain-management referral, in August 2017 PA-

11 C Batin referred Plaintiff to an orthopedic surgeon for her right knee and

12 shoulder. AR 436. Around that time, Dr. Sobero also referred Plaintiff for

13 further diagnostic imaging because her “symptoms ha[d] not responded

14 satisfactorily to conservative medical management.” AR 433. These referrals

15 and the finding less drastic measures were not alleviating Plaintiff’s symptoms

16 casts further doubt on a finding that Plaintiff’s symptoms have been treated by

17 measures “on the conservative side.” See Carolyn P. v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.

18 Admin., 2019 WL 6896905, at *4 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 2019) (ALJ did not provide

19 clear and convincing reason to discount testimony where record reflected

20 reports that claimant responded to conservative treatment unsuccessfully);

21 Eldridge, 2018 WL 2357147 at *9 (referrals to rheumatology specialist and

22 pain specialist, along with other factors, belied conservative treatment);

23 Wilson, 2016 WL 4402108 at *5 (referrals to pain and sleep specialist, along

24 with other factors, belied “minimal treatment”); Rodriguez v. Colvin, 2013

25 WL 3052971, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 17, 2013) (ALJ’s finding that claimant

26 obtained relief through conservative treatment “clearly not supported by

27 substantial evidence” where medical report found claimant failed to respond to

28 conservative measures).

1 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the ALJ’s conclusion

2 regarding conservative treatment as a basis to discount Plaintiff’s symptom

3 testimony is not a clear and convincing reason supported by substantial

4 evidence. See Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1102; Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722-23

5 (impermissible for ALJ to develop evidentiary basis by “not fully accounting

6 for the context of materials or all parts of the testimony and reports.”).

7 Thus, assuming without deciding that the ALJ properly discounted the

8 symptom testimony based on inconsistency with the medical evidence, as such

9 ground cannot be the sole basis to do so, the ALJ erred. Here, the Court

10 cannot conclude the ALJ’s error was harmless. See, e.g., Brown-Hunter, 806

11 F.3d at 492-93 (ALJ’s failure adequately to specify reasons for discrediting

12 claimant testimony “will usually not be harmless”). In light of the significant

13 functional limitations reflected in Plaintiff’s subjective statements, the Court

14 cannot “confidently conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the

15 claimant’s testimony, could have reached a different disability determination.”

16 Stout v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055-56 (9th Cir. 2006).

17 B. Remand is appropriate.

18 The decision whether to remand for further proceedings is within this

19 Court’s discretion. Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2000)

20 (as amended). Where further proceedings would serve no useful purpose or

21 where the record has been fully developed, a court may direct an immediate

22 award of benefits. See Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593 (9th Cir. 2004);

23 Harman, 211 F.3d at 1179 (noting that “the decision of whether to remand for

24 further proceedings turns upon the likely utility of such proceedings”). A

25 remand for further proceedings is appropriate where outstanding issues must

26 be resolved before a determination of disability can be made and it is not clear

27 from the record that the claimant is disabled. See Bunnell v. Barnhart, 336

28 F.3d 1112, 1115-16 (9th Cir. 2003).

1 Here, the Court concludes remand for further proceedings is warranted.

2 || The resolution of Plaintiff's credibility affects other issues raised in the Joint

3 Stipulation. See e.g., Vaughn v. Berryhill, 242 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1010 (E.D.

4 || Cal. 2017) (dispensing of exhaustive analysis of plaintiff's remaining issues

5 || because “|t]he ALJ’s .. . evaluations of [p]laintiff's credibility .. . are

6 ||inescapably linked to conclusions regarding the medical evidence”); Alderman

7 ||v. Colvin, 2015 WL 12661933, at *8 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 14, 2015) (remanding in

8 || light of interrelated nature of ALJ’s decision to discount claimant’s credibility

9 ||and give appropriate consideration to physician’s opinions, step-two findings,

10 step-five analysis). Because it is unclear, considering these issues, whether

11 || Plaintiff is in fact disabled, remand here is on an “open record.” See Brown-

12 || Hunter, 806 F.3d at 495; Bunnell, 336 F.3d at 1115-16. The parties may freely

13 ||take up all issues raised in the Joint Stipulation, and any other issues relevant

14 resolving Plaintiff's claim of disability, before the ALJ.

15 Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ shall reassess Plaintiff's subjective

16 ||complaints, and then reassess Plaintiff's RFC in light of the subjective

17 ||symptom testimony and proceed through the remaining steps of the disability

18 || analysis to determine what work, if any, Plaintiff is capable of performing that

19 || exists in significant numbers.

20 IV.

21 ORDER

22 Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), IT THEREFORE IS

23 || ORDERED that Judgment be entered reversing the decision of the

24 ||Commissioner of Social Security and remanding this matter for further

25 ||administrative proceedings consistent with this Order.

26 hye J) Zo

Dated: March 11, 2020

27 HN D. EARLY

28 United States Magistrate Judge

13