Opinion

Adonai El-Shaddai v. T. Foss

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Feb 14, 2020
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 17.9%

“[t]here is no Sixth Amendment right to a 20 jury trial for post-conviction determinations,” which include parole eligibility 21 determinations

How later courts described this case

  • “[t]here is no Sixth Amendment right to a 20 jury trial for post-conviction determinations,” which include parole eligibility 21 determinations
  • “Of course indeterminate 3 || schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ADONAI EL-SHADDAI, ) Case No. 2:19-cv-03317-RGK-JC

a.k.a. James Ray Wilkerson, )

12 ) (PROPOSED)

Petitioner, )

13 ) ORDER ACCEPTING FINDINGS,

v. ) CONCLUSIONS, AND

14 ) RECOMMENDATIONS OF

T. FOSS, Warden, ) UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE

15 ) JUDGE

Respondent. )

16 ________________________________

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I. SUMMARY

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Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the Court has reviewed the Petition for Writ of

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Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”) and accompanying

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documents, the submissions in connection with the Motion to Dismiss the Petition,

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and all of the records herein, including the October 28, 2019 Report and

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Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge (“Report and

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Recommendation”) and petitioner’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation

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filed on February 10, 2020.

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The Court has made a de novo determination of those portions of the Report

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and Recommendation to which objection is made. The Court concurs with and

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accepts the findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the United States

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1 Magistrate Judge, and overrules petitioner’s objections. Although the Court has

2 considered and overruled all of petitioner’s objections, the Court further addresses

3 certain of petitioner’s objections to the Report and Recommendation below.

4 II. DISCUSSION

5 Petitioner contends that the Board of Parole Hearings violated his Sixth

6 Amendment right to a jury trial when the Board relied on facts not found true by a

7 jury to deny him parole. (Objection at 9 (citing Cunningham v. California, 549

8 U.S. 270 (2007)). Petitioner’s invocation of principles discussed in Cunningham is

9 inapt as such principles have no application to his case. In Cunningham, the

10 Supreme Court held that in California, any additional factfinding to increase a

11 sentence beyond the middle term must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable

12 doubt. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 293-94. The rule set forth in Cunningham is

13 based on the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee and the requirement of proof

14 beyond a reasonable doubt contained in the Due Process Clause. See Cunningham,

15 548 U.S. at 281. At his parole hearing, petitioner enjoyed no constitutional right to

16 jury trial or to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Knights, 534

17 U.S. 112, 120 (2001) (“trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt”

18 inapplicable in post-conviction probation proceedings); United States v. Santana,

19 526 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[t]here is no Sixth Amendment right to a

20 jury trial for post-conviction determinations,” which include parole eligibility

21 determinations); United States v. Huerta-Pimentel, 445 F.3d 1220, 1225 (9th Cir.)

22 (same), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1014 (2006); compare United States v. Haymond,

23 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2379-80 & n.5 (2019) (federal statute governing revocation of

24 supervised release, authorizing new mandatory minimum sentence based on a

25 judge’s factfinding by a preponderance of the evidence, violated the Due Process

26 Clause and the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as applied; a jury must find

27 facts that trigger a new sentence).

28 Additionally, the rationale on which Cunningham is based does not apply, as

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1 || here, to indeterminate sentencing within the permitted sentencing range. See

2 || Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004) (“Of course indeterminate

3 || schemes involve judicial factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may

4 || implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing

5 || discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the defendant has a legal right to

6 || a lesser sentence — and that makes all the difference insofar as judicial

7 || impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is concerned.’’) (emphasis

8 || original).

9] I. ORDERS

10 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition is denied on the merits, this

11 || action is dismissed with prejudice, the Motion to Dismiss is denied as moot, and

12 || Judgment be entered accordingly.

13 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk serve copies of this Order and

14 || the Judgment herein on petitioner and on respondent’s counsel.

15 IT ISSO ORDERED.

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17 || DATED: February 14, 2020

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19 7 Racrtinea/

20 HONORABLE R. GARY KLAUSNER

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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