Haney v. Talladega, City of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

EASTERN DIVISION

NICHOLAS HANEY,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 1:23-cv-1026-CLM

CITY OF TALLADEGA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Nicholas Haney (“Haney”) sues the City of Talladega

(“City”) and one of its police officers, Mohamed Sow (“Officer Sow”),

claiming that Officer Sow violated his constitutional right against

unreasonable searches or seizures. (Doc. 9). Haney pleads four counts in

his Complaint: three against Officer Sow (Counts I-III) and one against

the City (Count IV). (Doc. 9).

The City seeks dismissal of the count against it under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). (Doc. 11). As explained within, even if

Haney could prove the facts he alleges, he does not plead a viable claim

against the City. The court thus GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss

Count IV of the Amended Complaint, (doc. 11). But the court will give

Haney one more chance to amend his Complaint to correct the pleading

deficiencies that the court identifies.

BACKGROUND

The court takes these facts from Haney’s Amended complaint and

assumes all facts are true. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); see, e.g., Hishon v. King

& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (at the motion-to-dismiss stage, “the

complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and all

facts alleged by the plaintiff are accepted as true”).

On August 14, 2022, Nicholas Haney was shopping at Marvin’s in

Talladega, Alabama when Officer Sow handcuffed him and transported

him to Talladega County Jail, where Haney remained for approximately

six hours. (Doc. 9 at ¶¶ 7-8, 15). Officer Sow also took Haney’s driver’s

license. (Doc. 9 at ¶ 14). Haney claims Officer Sow did not have probable

cause to arrest him and did not have a warrant for Haney’s arrest. (Doc.

9 at ¶ 13). Haney pleads four counts stemming from this incident:

• Count I: Officer Sow violated Haney’s constitutional right not to be

subjected to an unreasonable seizure by arresting Haney without

arguable probable cause and/or a warrant in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, (doc. 9 at ¶ 20);

• Count II: Officer Sow violated Haney’s constitutional right not to

be subjected to an unreasonable search by searching Haney without

arguable probable cause and/or a warrant in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, (doc. 9 at ¶ 21);

• Count III: Officer Sow violated Haney’s constitutional right not to

be subjected to an unreasonable seizure by seizing Haney’s personal

property without due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (doc.

9 at ¶ 22); and

• Count IV: The City did not have policies and procedures in place

for City of Talladega police officers to follow to verify warrants prior

to making an arrest and, thus, failed to properly train Officer Sow

in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983, (doc. 9 at ¶¶ 23-2[6]).1

Officer Sow answered Haney’s Amended Complaint, (doc. 12), so only

Count IV—the count against the City—is at issue here.

1 Haney’s Amended Complaint, (doc. 9), omits paragraph 26.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim

showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule

8 does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but does demand more

than “an unadorned, ‘the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me’

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and

conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”

are insufficient. Id.

Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint fails to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “To

survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint states a facially plausible claim

for relief when the plaintiff pleads facts that permit a reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id.

DISCUSSION

This is the entirety of Count IV, as pleaded:

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

23. Nicholas Haney has clearly established rights to be

free from unreasonable searches and seizures of his

person and property as secured by the 4th Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

24. On August 14, 2022, the City of Talladega did not have

policies and procedures in place for City of Talladega

police officers to follow to verify warrants prior to

making an arrest.

25. The City of Talladega knew or should have known that

the failure and/or refusal to verify warrants prior to

making an arrest will result in unlawful searches and

seizures.

2[6]. On August 14, 2022, Nicholas Haney was subjected to

an unlawful search and seizure as a proximate result

of the City of Talladega’s will indifference to Nicholas

Haney’s rights protected by the 4th Amendment to the

United States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C.

§1983.

(Doc. 9 at ¶¶ 23-2[6]). It’s possible to read this count to plead either (i) a

general municipal liability claim against the City for failure to have

various policies and procedures or (ii) a failure-to-train claim.

Assuming that Haney wants to raise a general municipal liability

claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he must identify a municipal “policy” or

“custom” that caused his injury. Bd. Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla.

v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); see Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach,

Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A city may only be held liable

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the injury caused was a result of municipal

policy or custom.”). As explained by the United States Supreme Court:

Locating a ‘policy’ ensures that a municipality is held liable

only for those deprivations resulting from the decisions of its

duly constituted legislative body or of those officials whose

acts may fairly be said to be those of the municipality.

Similarly, an act performed pursuant to a ‘custom’ that has

not been formally approved by an appropriate decisionmaker

may fairly subject a municipality to liability on the theory

that the relevant practice is so widespread as to have the

force of law.

Id. at 404 (internal citations omitted). But Haney fails to identify a

municipal policy or custom that caused his injury. So the court must

dismiss a general liability claim based on a policy of custom.

Assuming instead that Haney wants to assert a failure-to-train

claim, he must “‘present some evidence that the municipality knew of a

need to train . . . in a particular area and the municipality made a

deliberate choice not to take any action.’” Petkovich v. City of Montgomery,

No. 2:14-923-WHA-WC (WO), 2015 WL 263391, at *6-7 (M.D. Ala. Jan.

21, 2015) (quoting Gold v. City of Miami, 151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir.

1998)). Haney pleads that the City “knew or should have known that the

failure and/or refusal to verify warrants prior to making an arrest [would]

result in unlawful searches and seizures.” (Doc. 9 at ¶ 25). But Haney

pleads no facts that would prove the City had the knowledge necessary to

make a choice against acting. For example, did the City have a record of

officers making warrantless searches before warrantless arrests and

choose to do nothing about it? Without such requisite facts, the court must

dismiss Count IV as insufficiently pleaded.

—

Rule 15(a)(2) says that the court “should freely give leave [to amend]

when justice so requires.” FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). So the court will give

Haney the opportunity to file a second amended complaint that addresses

the pleading deficiencies that the court has identified, while also

complying with the representation requirements of Rule 11(b).

Haney must file his Second Amended Complaint on or before July

3, 2024. If Haney either chooses not to amend his Complaint by that date,

or he again fails to plead a viable claim against the City, the court will

dismiss his claim(s) against the City with prejudice.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the court GRANTS the City’s Motion to Dismiss

Count IV of Haney’s Amended Complaint, (doc. 11). If Haney decides to

amend his complaint, he must file that complaint on or before July 3,

2024. The court will enter a separate order that carries out this ruling and

dismisses Haney’s claim against the City without prejudice.

DONE and ORDERED on June 17, 2024.

Level Hay

COREY L.MAZE ~

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE